

TnD v5.1 on

ID-One Cosmo J V2

(EAC Configuration)

Public Security Target Reference:

FQR 550 0183 Ed 4



DOCUMENT EVOLUTION

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1 Security Target Introduction

1.1 ST Identification

Title	TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J V2 (EAC Configuration) Public Security Target
ST Identification	FQR 550 0183 Ed 4
CC Version	3.1 Revision 5
Assurance Level	EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
ITSEF	Brightsight
Certification Body	NSCIB
Compliant to Protection Profiles	EAC- Machine readable travel documents with "ICAO Application", Extended Access control – BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th march 2009. [EAC-PP].

1.2 TOE Reference

TOE Commercial Name	TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J V2 (EAC Configuration)
Applet Code Version (SAAAAR Code)	See TOE Configurations table below
Applet Internal Versions	See Applet Internal Versions table below
Platform Name[†]	JCOP 4 v4.7 R1.02.4
Platform Certificate	NSCIB-CC-180212-CR5
IC Reference	NXP Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4)
IC Certificate	BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V3-2022
Crypto Lib reference	Crypto Library V 0.7.7 on N7121. Certified under the IC certificate.

[†] JCOP 4 guidance manual [PTF-UM] describes the platform identifier that corresponds to this configuration.

The following table defines the TOE configurations, depending on the source code compilation and build options:

Configurations	Description of the configurations	Content of the config (package/cap files)	
Config 1	TnD Applet without support for PACE-CAM and DBI	SAAAAR + Version + Config of TnD Java Applet on JCOP {config 1}	203462FF 05010000 0101
		SAAAAR + version + config of Adapter Package config 1	417652FF 01010000 0101
		SAAAAR + version + config of Common Package {JCOP build}	418402FF 01000000 0101
Config 2	TnD Applet with support for PACE-CAM and DBI	SAAAAR + version + config of TnD Java Applet on JCOP {config 2}	203462FF 05010000 0201
		SAAAAR + version + config of Adapter Package config 2	417652FF 01010000 0201
		SAAAAR + version + config of Common Package {JCOP build}	418402FF 01000000 0101

Table 1 TOE Configurations

Note:

In the table above a "SAAAAR code" is denoted by first 4 bytes, a "version" by the next 2 bytes and a "config" ID by the last 2 bytes.

The "SAAAAR" is the product configuration item number within IDEMIA and is uniquely defined as:

S	IDEMIA Site code	1 byte
AAAA	Article number	4 bytes
R	Software Release number	1 byte

Applet Internal Versions of above Configurations are as follows:

Configurations	Returned value of DF67
Config 1	00 00 02 08 01 01 02 0C 00 00 01 08
Config 2	00 00 02 08 01 01 02 0C 00 00 01 08

Table 2 Applet Internal Versions

2 Technical Terms, Abbreviations and Associated References

2.1 Technical Terms

Term	Definition
<i>Accurate Terminal Certificate</i>	A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the issuing Document Verifier is trusted by the travel document's chip to produce Terminal Certificates with the correct certificate effective date, see [TR-03110-1].
<i>Advanced Inspection Procedure (with PACE)</i>	A specific order of authentication steps between a travel document and a terminal as required by [TR-03110-1], namely (i) PACE, (ii) Chip Authentication v.1, (iii) Passive Authentication with SO _D and (iv) Terminal Authentication v.1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIP-PACE.
<i>Agreement</i>	This term is used in the current ST in order to reflect an appropriate relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
<i>Active Authentication</i>	Security mechanism defined in [ICAO-9303]. Option by which means the MTRD's chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the MTRD's chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of organization.
<i>Application note</i>	Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of the TOE (cf. CC part 1, section B.2.7).
<i>Audit records</i>	Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the Initialisation Data and Pre-personalization Data.
<i>Authenticity</i>	Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD's chip were created by the issuing State or Organization
<i>Basic Access Control</i>	Security mechanism defined in [ICAO-9303] by which means the MTRD's chip proves and the inspection system protect their communication by means of secure messaging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
<i>Basic Inspection System (BIS)</i>	A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and operated by a governmental organisation (i.e. an Official Domestic or Foreign Document Verifier) and verifying the travel document presenter as the travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder). The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PACE Terminal additionally supporting/applying the Passive Authentication protocol and is authorised by the travel document Issuer through the Document Verifier of receiving state to read a subset of data stored on the travel document.
<i>Biographical data</i>	The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as

Term	Definition
<i>(bio data).</i>	text in the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a passport book or on a travel card or visa.
<i>Biometric reference data</i>	Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD's chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
<i>Card Access Number (CAN)</i>	Password derived from a short number printed on the front side of the data-page.
<i>Certificate chain</i>	A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates. The Inspection System Certificate is the lowest level, Document Verifier Certificate in between, and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates are on the highest level. A certificate of a lower level is signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher level.
<i>Counterfeit</i>	An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by whatever means.
<i>Country Signing CA Certificate (C_{CSCA})</i>	Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key ($K_{Pu\ CSCA}$) issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
<i>Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA)</i>	<p>An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the travel documents and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI.</p> <p>The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [ICAO-9303], 5.5.1.</p> <p>The Country Signing Certification Authority issuing certificates for Document Signers (cf. [6]) and the domestic CVCA may be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority. However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for different roles, see [TR-03110-1].</p>
<i>Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA)</i>	<p>An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to protection of user data stored in the travel document (at a trial of a terminal to get an access to these data). The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the terminals using it and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. Updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in form of CVCA Link-Certificates, see [TR-03110-1].</p> <p>Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a CVCS as a subject; hence, it merely represents an organizational entity within this ST.</p> <p>The Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) issuing certificates for Document Signers (cf. [ICAO-9303]) and the domestic CVCA may</p>

Term	Definition
	be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority. However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for different roles, see [TR-03110-1].
<i>Current date</i>	The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate card verifiable certificates.
<i>CV Certificate</i>	Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
<i>CVCA link Certificate</i>	Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
<i>Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm</i>	The [ICAO-9303] describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
<i>Document Details Data</i>	Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document representing the document details like document type, issuing state, document number, date of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The document details data are less-sensitive data.
<i>Document Basic Access Keys</i>	Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted between the MRTD's chip and the inspection system [ICAO-9303]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
<i>Document Security Object (SO_D)</i>	A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the MRTD's chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [ICAO-9303]
<i>Document Signer (DS)</i>	<p>An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication.</p> <p>A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [TR-03110-1] and [ICAO-9303].</p> <p>This role is usually delegated to a Personalization Agent.</p>

Term	Definition
<i>Document Verifier (DV)</i>	<p>An organisation enforcing the policies of the CVCA and of a Service Provider (here: of a governmental organisation / inspection authority) and managing terminals belonging together (e.g. terminals operated by a State's border police), by – inter alia – issuing Terminal Certificates. A Document Verifier is therefore a Certification Authority, authorised by at least the national CVCA to issue certificates for national terminals, see [TR-03110-1].</p> <p>Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a DV as a subject; hence, it merely represents an organisational entity within this ST.</p> <p>There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A domestic DV is acting under the policy of the domestic CVCA being run by the travel document Issuer; a foreign DV is acting under a policy of the respective foreign CVCA (in this case there shall be an appropriate agreement between the travel document Issuer und a foreign CVCA ensuring enforcing the travel document Issuer's privacy policy) ^{2 3}</p>
<i>Eavesdropper</i>	<p>A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication between the MRTD's chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD's chip.</p>
<i>Enrolment</i>	<p>The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person's identity. [ICAO-9303]</p>
<i>ePassport application</i>	<p><u>[PACE-PP] definition</u> A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data (incl. biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); this application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst other as a machine readable travel document (MRTD). See [TR-03110-1].</p> <p><u>[PP-EAC] definition</u> Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the IC as the travel document's chip. It includes the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO-9303], the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF.SOD) and the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the authentication data itself.</p>

² The form of such an agreement may be of formal and informal nature; the term 'agreement' is used in the current ST in order to reflect an appropriate relationship between the parties involved.

³ Existing of such an agreement may be technically reflected by means of issuing a CCVCA-F for the Public Key of the foreign CVCA signed by the domestic CVCA.

Term	Definition
<i>Extended Access Control</i>	Security mechanism identified in [ICAO-9303] by which means the MTRD's chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.
<i>Extended Inspection System (EIS)</i>	A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
<i>Forgery</i>	Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the biographical data or the portrait.
<i>Global Interoperability</i>	The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [ICAO-9303]
<i>IC Dedicated Software</i>	Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of the IC hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing delivery procedures between different players. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain life phases.
<i>IC Dedicated Support Software</i>	That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
<i>IC Dedicated Test Software</i>	That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
<i>IC Embedded Software</i>	Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC developer. The IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life phase and embedded into the IC in the manufacturing life phase of the TOE.
<i>IC Identification Data</i>	The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the travel document manufacturer.
<i>Impostor</i>	A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that person's document.

Term	Definition
<i>Improperly documented person</i>	A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel document or visa; (c) someone else's travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if required. [ICAO-9303]
<i>Initialisation</i>	Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE (TOE life-cycle, Phase 2 Manufacturing, Step 3).
<i>Initialisation Data</i>	Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD's material (IC identification data).
<i>Inspection</i>	The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [ICAO-9303]
<i>Inspection system (IS)</i>	A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
<i>Integrated circuit (IC)</i>	Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions. The MRTD's chip is an integrated circuit.
<i>Integrity</i>	Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD's chip have not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization
<i>Issuing Organization</i>	Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [ICAO-9303]]
<i>Issuing State</i>	The Country issuing the MRTD. [ICAO-9303]
<i>Logical Data Structure (LDS)</i>	The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity expansion technology [ICAO-9303]. The capacity expansion technology used is the MRTD's chip.
<i>Logical Data Structure 2 (LDS2)</i>	The file structures required to support the ICAO LDS2 [9303-10_LDS2] consisting of LDS file structure with three additional and optional applications: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Travel records (stamps); • Visa records; and • Additional biometrics.

Term	Definition
<i>Logical travel document</i>	Data of the travel document holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [ICAO-9303] as specified by ICAO on the contact based/contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact based/contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the travel document holder the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1), the digitized portraits (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). EF.COM and EF.SOD
<i>Machine readable travel document (MRTD)</i>	Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read. [ICAO-9303]
<i>Machine readable zone (MRZ)</i>	Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [ICAO-9303] The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived from the machine readable zone and may be used for PACE.
<i>Machine-verifiable biometrics feature</i>	A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read and verified by machine. [ICAO-9303]
<i>Manufacturer</i>	Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
<i>Metadata of a CV Certificate</i>	Data within the certificate body (excepting Public Key) as described in [TR-03110-1]. The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the following elements: - Certificate Profile Identifier, - Certificate Authority Reference, - Certificate Holder Reference, - Certificate Holder Authorisation Template, - Certificate Effective Date, - Certificate Expiration Date.
<i>Optional biometric reference data</i>	Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD's chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the European commission decided to use only finger print and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.

Term	Definition
<i>Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)</i>	A communication establishment protocol defined in [ICAO-9303] part 11. The PACE Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol providing implicit password-based authentication of the communication partners (e.g. smart card and the terminal connected): i.e. PACE provides a verification, whether the communication partners share the same value of a password n). Based on this authentication, PACE also provides a secure communication, whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data transferred within this communication channel are maintained.
<i>PACE passwords</i>	Passwords used as input for PACE. This may either be the CAN or the SHA-1-value of the concatenation of Serial Number, Date of Birth and Date of Expiry as read from the MRZ, see [ICAO-9303] part 11 or a user PIN or PUK as specified in [TR-03110-3]
<i>Polymorphic Authentication Terminal / Service</i>	<p>The terminal or authentication web service that is authorized to retrieve the Polymorphic ID attributes form a Polymorphic eMRTD using standard ICAO and EAC1 ePassport protocols (PACE, CAV1, TAV1) and the Polymorphic Authentication (PMA) protocol to retrieve the PP, PI and CPI data.</p> <p>A Polymorphic Authentication Terminal/Service:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> implements the terminal part of the PACEv2 with PIN, PA, CAV1 and TAV1 protocols configured in accordance with ICAO DOC9303 and TR-03110 v2.10 and the Polymorphic Authentication protocol (PMA). performs the Advanced Inspection Procedure as a precondition to gain access to the randomized polymorphic user data (PI, PP and optional CPI) by executing the PMA protocol. The Polymorphic Authentication Terminal/Service must pass PACE with the correct user PIN and successful CAV1/TAV1 in order to be able to execute the PMA protocol successfully. <p>performs the Polymorphic Authentication protocol (PMA) to retrieve the randomized polymorphic user data (PI, PP and optional CPI) and the non-card unique identifiable meta data.</p>
<i>Polymorphic Authentication System</i>	<p>The complete set of sub systems in the polymorphic authentication infrastructure, required to perform user authentication with privacy protection based on (randomized) Polymorphic ID attributes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Polymorphic Authentication Service (Central) Key Management Authority (optional) Polymorphic eMRTD Status Service <p>Polymorphic Service Provider</p>
<i>Polymorphic document holder</i>	The owner of a Polymorphic eMRTD, that contains his Polymorphic ID attributes.

Term	Definition
<i>Passive authentication</i>	(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values contained in the Document Security Object.
<i>Personalization</i>	The process by which the Personalization Data are stored in and unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document. This may also include the optional biometric data collected during the "Enrolment" (cf. paragraph 1.7.4.3, TOE life-cycle, Phase 3, Step 6).
<i>Personalization Agent</i>	<p>An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalize the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the following activities:</p> <p>ICAO eMRTD</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the travel document, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder, (iii) writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical personalization) and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalization) for the travel document holder as defined in [TR-03110-1], (iv) writing the document details data, (v) writing the initial TSF data, (vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO-9303] (in the role of DS). <p>Polymorphic eMRTD</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) establishing the identity of the polymorphic document holder for requesting the Polymorphic ID attributes, (ii) Requesting the required Polymorphic eMRTD ID attributes from the central Key Management authority, (iii) writing Polymorphic ID attributes, Polymorphic LDS data as defined in [PCA-eMRTD], (iv) writing the TSF data as defined in [PCA-eMRTD], (v) signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO-9303] (in the role of DS). <p>Please note that the role 'Personalization Agent' may be distributed among several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document Issuer.</p> <p>Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this role.</p>
<i>Personalization Data</i>	<p>A set of data incl. individual-related data (biographic and biometric data) of the travel document holder, dedicated document details data and dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Document Security Object).</p> <p>Personalization data are gathered and then written into the non-volatile</p>

Term	Definition
	memory of the TOE by the Personalization Agent in the life-cycle phase card issuing.
<i>Personalization Agent Authentication Information</i>	TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization Agent.
<i>Personalization Agent Key</i>	Symmetric cryptographic key or key set (MAC, ENC) used by the Personalization Agent to prove his identity and get access to the logical travel document and by the MRTD's chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent according to the SFR FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE (FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM for PACE CAM).
<i>Physical part of the travel document</i>	Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to present data including (but not limited to) biographical data, data of the machine-readable zone, photographic image and other data.
<i>Pre-personalization</i>	Process of writing Pre-Personalization Data (see below) to the TOE including the creation of the travel document Application (TOE life-cycle, Phase 2, Step 5)
<i>Pre-personalization Data</i>	Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD's and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Personalization Agent Key Pair and Chip Life-Cycle Production data (CPLC data).
<i>Pre-personalized travel document's chip</i>	Travel document's chip equipped with a unique identifier.
<i>Receiving State</i>	The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [ICAO-9303]
<i>Reference data</i>	Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt.
<i>RF-terminal</i>	A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip according to ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO14443].
<i>Secondary image</i>	A repeat image of the holder's portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document by whatever means [ICAO-9303].
<i>Secure messaging in encrypted /combined mode</i>	Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [ISO7816]
<i>Service Provider</i>	An official organisation (inspection authority) providing inspection

Term	Definition
	service which can be used by the travel document holder. Service Provider uses terminals (BIS-PACE) managed by a DV.
<i>Skimming</i>	Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
<i>Standard Inspection Procedure</i>	<p>A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document and a terminal as required by [ICAO-9303] and [TR-03110-1], namely PACE or BAC and Passive Authentication with SO_D.</p> <p>SIP can generally be used by BIS-PACE and BIS-BAC.</p>
<i>Inspection Procedure for multi-application eMRTDs</i>	This section describes an inspection procedure designed for eMRTDs containing one or more applications besides the eMRTD application ("LDS2-documents"): [LDS2_TR] Annex A2.
<i>Terminal</i>	<p>A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through the contact based or contactless interface. A technical system verifying correspondence between the password stored in the travel document and the related value presented to the terminal by the travel document presenter.</p> <p>In this ST the role 'Terminal' corresponds to any terminal being authenticated by the TOE.</p> <p>Terminal may implement the terminal's part of the PACE protocol and thus authenticate itself to the travel document using a shared password (CAN or MRZ).</p>
<i>Terminal Authorization</i>	Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations of the Inspection System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifier Certification Authority which shall be valid for the Current Date.
<i>Terminal Authorisation Level</i>	Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorisations defined by the Terminal Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current Date.
<i>TOE tracing data</i>	Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document holder) recognising the travel document.
<i>Travel document</i>	Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read; see [ICAO-9303] (there "Machine readable travel document").
<i>Travel document (electronic)</i>	The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the plastic or paper, optical readable cover and providing the following application: <i>ePassport</i> .

Term	Definition
<i>Travel Document Holder</i>	The rightful holder of the travel document for whom the issuing State or Organisation personalized the travel document.
<i>Travel document's Chip</i>	A contact based / contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 [15] and programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO, [ICAO-9303], sec III.
<i>Traveler</i>	Person presenting the travel document to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the travel document holder.
<i>TSF data</i>	Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC part 1 [CC-1]).
<i>Unpersonalized travel document</i>	The travel document that contains the travel document chip holding only Initialisation Data and Pre-personalization Data as delivered to the Personalization Agent from the Manufacturer.
<i>User data</i>	<p>All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel document as defined in [5] and being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE.</p> <p>CC give the following generic definitions for user data: Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF (CC part 1 [CC-1]). Information stored in TOE resources that can be operated upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon which the TSF places no special meaning (CC part 2 [CC-2]).</p>
<i>Verification</i>	The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee's template. [ICAO-9303]
<i>Verification data</i>	Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference data known for the claimed identity.

2.2 Abbreviations

Acronym	Definition
BIS	Basic Inspection System
BIS-PACE	Basic Inspection System with PACE
CA	Chip Authentication
CAN	Card Access Number
CC	Common Criteria
DBI	Digital Blurring of Images
DER	Distinguished Encoding Rules
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DF	Dedicated File
DH	Diffie Hellman
EAC	Extended Access Control
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EF	Elementary File
FID	File identifier
GP	Global Platform
IC	Integrated Chip
ICC	Integrated Chip card
ICCSN	Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number.
IFD	Interface Device
MAC	Message Authentication code
MF	Master File
MRZ	Machine readable zone
PACE	Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PCD	Proximity Coupling Device

Acronym	Definition
PICC	Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PP	Protection Profile
PS	Personalization System
PT	Personalization Terminal
RF	Radio Frequency
ROM	Read Only Memory
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adleman
RSA CRT	Rivest Shamir Adleman – Chinese Remainder Theorem
SAI	SAI (Scanning Area Identifier)
SAR	Security assurance requirement
SCP	Secure Channel Procotol
SFR	Security functional requirement
SHA	Secure Hashing Algorithm
SIP	Standard Inspection Procedure
ST	Security Target
TA	Terminal Authentication
TOE	Target Of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSP	TOE Security Policy (defined by the current document)

2.3 References

Reference	Description
[AGD_OPE]	FQR 220 1496 Ed 7 - TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J - Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE)
[AGD_PRE]	FQR 220 1495 Ed 13 - TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J - Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE)
[ANSI_X9.31]	"Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA)" ANSI X9.31-1998, American Bankers Association.
[BAC-PP]	Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009.
[CC-1]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-001.
[CC-2]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional requirements. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-002.
[CC-3]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance requirements. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-003.
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-004.
[EAC-PP]	EAC- Machine readable travel documents with "ICAO Application", Extended Access control – BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th march 2009.
[ICAO-9303]	International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents – 7th edition, 2015.
[IEEE_1363]	IEEE Std 1363a-2004 Standard Specification of Public-Key Cryptography.
[ISO11770-2]	ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology – Security techniques – Key management – part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996.
[ISO14443]	ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards -- Proximity cards, 2016.
[ISO15946-2]	ISO/IEC15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002.
[ISO15946-3]	ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002.

Reference	Description
[ISO18013-3]	ISO/IEC 18013-3: Information technology — Personal identification — ISO-compliant driving licence. Part 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, 2009-03-01 Including ISO/CEI 18013-3/AC1:2011, TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 1, Published 2011-12-01.
[ISO7816]	ISO/IEC 7816: Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards.
[ISO9796-2]	ISO/IEC 9796-2: 2002, Information Technology - Security Techniques - Digital Signature Schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms.
[JCAPI]	Published by Oracle. Java Card 3 Platform, Application Programming Interface, Classic Edition, Version 3.0.5. May 2015.
[NIST-180-4]	NIST. FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard, February 2011.
[NIST-186-3]	NIST. Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS 186-3, 2009.
[PACE-PP]	Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01, Version 1.01, 22 July 2014, BSI.
[PP-IC]	Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, Registered and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014.
[PP-PL]	Java Card System - Open Configuration Protection Profile, Version 3.0.5, BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017.
[PTF-ST] ⁵	JCOP 4 P71, Security Target for JCOP 4 P71.
[PLTF-UM] ⁵	JCOP 4 P71, User manual for JCOP 4 P71, NXP Semiconductors
[PTF-CERT]	NSCIB-CC-180212-CR5
[RFC-5639]	Lochter, Manfred; Merkle, Johannes. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, RFC 5639, 2010.
[RSA-PKCS#3]	PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993.
[TR-03110-1]	Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents –Part 1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Version 2.10, 20.03.2012 by BSI.
[TR-03110-2]	Technical Guideline TR-03110-2, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents –Part 2 – Extended Access Control Version 2 (EACv2), Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), and Restricted Identification (RI), Version 2.10, 20.03.2012 by BSI.

⁵ The version of this document can be found in platform certificate [PTF-CERT].

Reference	Description
[TR-03110-3]	TR-03110-3 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 3: Common Specifications, version 2.10, 2012-03-07 by BSI.
[TR-03111]	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Technical Guideline TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, TR-03111, Version 1.11, 17.04.2009.

3 TOE Overview and description

3.1 TOE Overview

The TOE is a composite product that consist of an IDEMIA applet named TnD v5.1 and its supporting "Common" library package and Adapter package on top of the NXP JCOP 4 P71 Platform in **EAC configuration**.

It supports the ICAO and TR-3110-1 and -3 defined protocols for EAC1 (Chip Authentication v1 and Terminal Authentication v1) and Active Authentication (AA). In addition, the TOE supports Digital Blurring of Images (DBI).

For compliancy with the protection profiles claimed in this security target, the EAC protocol **MUST** be configured on the TOE for each configured ID document application mentioned below.

Within the scope of this ST, the TOE can be configured as a stand-alone application or as a combination of the following official ID document applications:

- ICAO/EAC eMRTD and
- EU/ISO Driving Licence compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446.

The TOE may be used as an ISO Driving Licence (IDL) compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446, as both eMRTD and IDL applications share the same protocols and data structure organization.

The TnD v5.1 application embeds other secure functionalities, like PACE (Generic Mapping (GM), Integrated Mapping (IM) and Chip Authentication Mapping (CAM)), Basic Access Control (BAC), LDS2 protocol extensions for EAC1 and PACE and Polymorphic Authentication protocol (PMA) for privacy-protected authentication with polymorphic ID attributes, which are not in the scope of this evaluation but are covered in the scope of other evaluated configurations of this product shown in Table 3 below.

This ST considers the TnD v5.1 application in **EAC configuration**, marked **bold** in the table below.

Configuration	PP Conformity	Extensions to the PP
1. EAC	PP 0056v1 (EAC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Active Authentication (AA) - Restart secure messaging AES128, AES192 and AES256 secure messaging (in addition to 3DES) after CAv1 - Digital Blurring of Images (DBI)
2. PACE/EAC1/Polymorphic eMRTD/LDS2	PP 0068 (PACE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ICAO LDS2 protocol extensions for TAV1, PACE and CAv1 - Polymorphic eMRTD extensions for PMA and PACE
	PP 0056v2 (ICAO application, EAC with PACE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Active Authentication (AA) - PACE-CAM - BAC de-activation - Digital Blurring of Images (DBI)
3. BAC	PP 0055 (BAC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Active Authentication (AA) - Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1) - Restart secure messaging AES128, AES192 and AES256 secure messaging (in addition to 3DES) after CAv1

Table 3 Different evaluated configurations of the TnD application

Note

For interoperability reasons, an eMRTD will most likely support BAC, PACE and EAC. The three TOE configurations mentioned above cover the security level of the TOE depending on the inspection procedure executed by the Inspection System/Advanced Inspection System:

- If the Inspection System reads MRTD data after having performed BAC + EAC, the security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described in this ST, which claims compliance to [EAC-PP].
- If the Inspection System reads MRTD data after having performed PACE + EAC, the security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described in the ST, claiming compliance to [EAC-PP-V2] and [PACE-PP].
- If the Inspection System reads MRTD data by performing only BAC, the security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described in the ST claiming compliance to the [BAC-PP].

3.2 TOE Description

The TOE in the **EAC configuration** encompasses the following features:

- In Personalization phase:
 - authentication protocol for personalization agent authentication;
 - 3DES, AES128, AES192 and AES256 Global Platform secure messaging;
 - access control;
 - Creation and configuration of application instances and their logical data structure;
 - Secure data loading;
 - Secure import and/or on-chip generation of Chip Authentication key pair for CAv1;
 - Secure import and/or on-chip generation of the AA key pair;
 - life-cycle phase switching to operational phase;
- In operational phase:
 - EAC1: Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1) and Terminal Authentication v1 (TAv1);
 - Active Authentication (AA);
 - After CAv1: restart ICAO secure messaging in 3DES, AES128, AES192 or AES256 cipher mode;
 - After EAC1: access control to DG3 and DG4 based on the effective authorization established during TAv1;
 - Digital Blurring of Images (DBI).

3.2.1 Physical scope

From physical/hardware point of view, the TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for communication. The physical medium on which the microchip is mounted is not part of the target of evaluation because it does not alter nor modify any security functions of the TOE.

The TOE may be used in several form factors like wafer, chip modules on a reel, chip modules embedded in ID3 passport booklets or ID3 holder pages, chip modules embedded in ID1 cards, chip modules embedded in antenna inlays, etc.

The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure 1 below. The cryptographic boundary of the module is the surface and edges of the die and associated bond pads, shown as circles.






Figure 1 Physical Form

The contactless ports (LA and LB) of the module require a connection to an antenna. The other ports are required for connection to the contact plate of the contact chip module. The chip module’s electrical interfaces are according to [ISO7816] and [ISO14443] interface specifications for respectively contact and contactless connections to card reader devices.

Port	Description	Logical Interface Type
VCC, GND	ISO 7816: Supply voltage	Power (not available in contactless-only configurations)
RST	ISO 7816:Reset	Control in (not available in contactless-only configurations)
CLK	ISO 7816: Clock	Control in (not available in contactless-only configurations)
I/O	ISO 7816: Input/Output	Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (not available in contactless-only configurations)
LA, LB	ISO 14443: Antenna	Power, Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (Not available in Contact-only configurations)

Table 4 TOE physical ports and interfaces

3.2.2 Logical Scope

The Target of Evaluation (TOE), addressed by the current security target, is an electronic travel document representing a contactless/contact based smart card or passport programmed according to Logical data structure (LDS). Electronic Passport is specified in [ICAO-9303], additionally providing the Extended Access Control according to [TR-03110-1] and [TR-03110-3] and Active Authentication according to [ICAO-9303]. The TOE may also be used as an ISO driving license, compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446.

The TOE supports:

- BAC protocol (not within the scope of this ST),
- EAC1 protocols
 - Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1) with AES128, ASE192, AES256 extensions and
 - Terminal Authentication v1 (TAV1),
- Active Authentication (AA) and

- Digital Blurring of Images (DBI).

In accordance with [EAC-PP] the communication between terminal and chip SHALL be established and protected by the Extended Access Control v1 (EAC1) protocol.

The "TnD v5.1 on Cosmo J" TOE consists of:

- The MRTD's chip circuitry and the IC dedicated software;
- The IC embedded software being the "JCOP 4 P71 platform" consisting of
 - Java Card virtual machine, ensuring language-level security;
 - Java Card runtime environment, providing additional security features for Java card technology enabled devices;
 - Java card API, providing access to card's resources for the Applet;
 - Global Platform Card Manager, responsible for management of Applets on the card.
 - Crypto Library.
- TnD v5.1 Applet along with its Common (library) Package and Adapter Package, loaded in non-volatile (FLASH) memory*;
- The associated guidance documentation in [AGD_PRE] and [AGD_OPE];
- The Personalization Agent Key set (see [AGD_PRE]).

* In the remaining part of this Security Target, we refer "TnD v5.1 Applet along with its Common (library) Package and Adapter Package" as "TnD v5.1 Application".

A schematic overview of the TOE's logical architecture is shown in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2 TOE's logical architecture

The following guidance documents will be provided for the TOE:



Description	Audience	Form Factor of Delivery
[AGD_PRE]	Personalising Agent	Electronic Version
[AGD_OPE]	End user of the TOE	
[PLTF-UM]	Application Developer	

Table 5 TOE Guidance

An ST Lite version of this Security Target will also be provided along with above mentioned documents.

All the above mentioned guidance documents will be delivered via mail in a .pgp encrypted format.

Platform related guidance documents are mentioned in [PTF-ST].

Section 4, "Life Cycle" in this ST provides for more details about the TOE delivery for the different options.

3.3 Required Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware

The TOE does not require any explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware to perform its claimed security features. The TOE comprises the chip, the complete operating system and the TnD v5.1 application. Note that for an ICAO compliant ID document, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete travel document. Nevertheless, these parts are not critical for the security of the TOE.

In order to powerup the TOE and to communicate with it, a card reader is required.

3.4 TOE usage and security features for operational use

3.4.1 TOE Usage

Depending on its configuration during pre-personalization and personalization, the TOE can be used as:

- ICAO/EAC eMRTD or
- EU/ISO Driving Licence.

The ICAO/EAC eMRTD and Driver Licence are installed as a separate application instances of the TnD v5.1 applet, each having its own dedicated application identifier and personalization. The following TOE configurations are covered within the scope of this Security Target:

Configuration at Personalization	ICAO/EAC eMRTD	Driver licence
1	present	-
2	-	present

Table 6 TOE Configurations during Personalization

The authentication protocols EAC, Chip authentication (CAv1), Active Authentication and Terminal Authentication (TAV1) specified in [ICAO-9303] and [TR-03110] have also been referred to in ISO18013 for EU driving licences. The BAP-1 protocol defined in ISO18013 is equal to Basic Access Protocol (BAC) defined in [ICAO-9303]. As to the logical data structure, the ISO18013 uses the same concept of Passive Authentication defined in [ICAO-9303], but specifies different ISO7816-4 elementary file identifiers for storing the ICAO defined content of DG3, DG4 and DG15.



When an Issuing state is using the product as an ISO compliant Driving licence, the following name mapping of roles, definitions, data groups and protocol is applicable within the scope of this security target:

MRTD	ISO Driving License
MRTD	IDL
ICAO	ISO/IEC
ICAO 9303	ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446
BAC	BAP-1
DG3	DG7
DG4	DG8
DG15	DG13
MRZ	MRZ or SAI (Scanning area identifier)
Traveler	Holder

Table 7 eMRTD and IDL Terminology

Note

In the remaining parts of this document, the word "MRTD" SHOULD be understood either as an MRTD in the sense of ICAO or a driving license compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446 depending on the targeted usage envisioned by the issuer.

A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveler presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of this Security Target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD's chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and (ii) optional biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD's. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.

The MRTD is viewed as unit of

- a) the **physical MRTD** as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
 - i) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
 - ii) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
 - iii) the printed portrait.
- b) the **logical MRTD** as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [ICAO-9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
 - i) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
 - ii) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
 - iii) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both
 - iv) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
 - v) the Document security object.

The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the MRTD's chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.

The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD's chip) and organizational security measures

(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO-9303]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD's chip to the passport book.

The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD's chip.

The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of additional sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [ICAO-9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.

This security target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control Mechanism. Also it addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described in [TR-03110] as an alternative to the Active Authentication stated in [ICAO-9303].

During the pre-personalization and personalization, the Personalization Agent, once authenticated, gets the rights (access control) for (1) reading and writing data,(2) instantiating the application, and (4) writing of personalization data. The Personalization Agent can so create the file structure (MF / ADF) required for this configuration.

The DBI feature is used as an additional layer of security during personalization. When the DBI Activation process is performed, the biometric image of the card holder shall be corrupted/blurred. After personalization, a specific terminal that has a de-blurring access rights will be used to deactivate or revert the image to its original state. If this step is not performed, this means that the proper personalization up to issuance procedures were not followed. The photo will remain blurred which will be noticeable when reading the contents of the document. This will alert the agencies that the document has been compromised.

3.4.2 Security Features

3.4.2.1 Active Authentication (AA)

Active Authentication is an authentication mechanism ensuring the chip is genuine. It uses a challenge-response protocol between the IS and the chip. Active Authentication is realized with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command. The following algorithms and key sizes are supported:

- RSA ISO/IEC 9796-2 with a key length of 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096 bits and hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 (i.e. SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512).
- ECDSA over prime field curves with hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA2 and the key sizes 192 to 521.

3.4.2.2 Basic Access Control (BAC)

The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by [BAC-PP]. Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD's data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on [ISO11770-2] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data.

The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection system reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD), authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.



The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that the holder gives access to the IS to the logical MRTD (data stored in the chip); It is achieved by a mutual authentication. Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the communication between the chip and the IS.

This table lists the supported configurations for BAC protocol:

Configuration	Key Algo	Key Length	Hash Algo	MAC Algo
BAC	3DES 2Key	16-bytes	SHA-1	Retail MAC

Table 8 BAC Configuration

3.4.2.3 Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1)

The Chip Authentication v1 protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.

The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on a static key pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication v1 is an alternative to the optional ICAO Active Authentication, i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip is genuine but has two advantages over the original protocol:

- Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol are nontransferable.
- Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session keys.

CAv1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys.

3.4.2.4 Terminal Authentication

The Terminal Authentication Protocol is a two-move challenge-response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the terminal.

This protocol enables the MRTD chip to verify that the terminal is entitled to access sensitive data. As the terminal may access sensitive data afterwards, all further communication MUST be protected appropriately. Terminal Authentication therefore also authenticates an ephemeral public key chosen by the terminal that was used to set up Secure Messaging with Chip Authentication v1. The MRTD chip MUST bind the terminal's access rights to Secure Messaging established by the authenticated ephemeral public key of the terminal.

3.4.2.5 Extended Access Control v1 (EAC1)

EAC1 is an authentication protocol based on a PKI infrastructure. It further ensures that the IS is authorized to read and/or update data stored in the applet. This authentication mechanism generates a strong secure messaging session through the step of Chip Authentication v1.

This mechanism is realized by the following steps:

1. Chip Authentication (CAv1)

Chip Authentication v1 is achieved by using a MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET – Key Agreement Template (MSE SET KAT) command

or

by using a MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET – Authentication Template (MSE SET AT) command followed by GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command.



The Chip Authentication mechanism enables the authentication of the chip by using an authenticated DH scheme. It may be realized in two ways:

- Classical DH (DH El Gamal) with key length of 2048 bits
- DH over Elliptic curves over prime fields (ECDH) with the key length supported by the underlying Java Card platform (minimum 192).

2. Certificate Chain verification

The certificate chain is processed through a series of MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – SET – Digital Signature Template (MSE SET DST) and PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION – Verify Certificate (PSO VERIFY) commands.

The chain is done to extract a key from the IS certificate, the key which will be used in the Terminal Authentication.

3. Terminal Authentication (TAv1)

Terminal Authentication v1 is achieved by using an EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.

The Terminal Authentication mechanism is an authentication of the IS based on a classical challenge/response scheme. The signature scheme may be:

- ECDSA SHA-1, ECDSA SHA-224, ECDSA SHA-256, ECDSA SHA-384, or ECDSA SHA-512 on elliptic curves over prime field with key length supported by the underlying Java Card platform
- RSA SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-512 (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PKCS#1 v2.1 - PSS) with a key length of 1280, 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096 bits.

4 Life Cycle

The TOE life cycle in the following figure distinguishes stages for development, production, preparation and operational use in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [PP-IC].




Figure 3 Life cycle Overview

4.1 Development Environment

In this environment, the following two phases take place:

- Phase 1: IC Embedded Software Development (Java Card Open Platform components and TnD v5.1 Application)
- Phase 2: IC Development

The IC Embedded Software Developer is in charge of the specification, development and validation of the software (Java Card Open Platform and TnD v5.1 Application).

The IC Developer designs the IC, develops the IC dedicated software and provides information, software or tools to the IC embedded software developer.

Roles, actors, sites and coverage for this environment of the product life-cycle are listed in the table below:

Role	Actor	Site	Covered by
TnD v5.1 Applet Developer	IDEMIA	MANILA, JAKARTA, COURBEVOIE and PESSAC R&D sites	ALC
Embedded Software Developer (Java Card Open Platform)	NXP	Platform Developer Refer to [PTF-ST]	ALC
Redaction and Review of Documents	IDEMIA	NOIDA and HAARLEM R&D site	ALC
IC Developer	NXP	IC Manufacturer Refer to [PTF-ST]	ALC

4.2 Production Environment

In this environment, the following two phases take place:

- Phase 3: IC Manufacturing
- Phase 4: Smart Card Loading

The TnD v5.1 Applet run time code, Common Package and Adapter Package is integrated in FLASH of the chip.

Depending on the intention:

(Option 1) the TnD v5.1 application with Common package and Adapter package is securely delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to the IC manufacturer (NXP Audited Site). The applet code will be integrated into FLASH by the IC manufacturer on top of the platform already loaded by IC manufacturer (NXP), or

(Option 2) the TnD v5.1 application with Common package and Adapter package and the guidance documentation are securely delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to the travel document manufacturer (IDEMIA Audited Production Sites or IDEMIA Non-Audited Sites) for production. The applet code will be integrated into FLASH by the IDEMIA Audited Production Sites or Non-Audited Sites on top of the platform already loaded by IC manufacturer (NXP), or

(Option 3) the TnD v5.1 application with Common package and Adapter package and the guidance documentation are securely delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to external authorized agent (other external sites) for production. The applet code will be integrated into FLASH by the external authorized agent in external sites on top of the platform already loaded by IC manufacturer (NXP) using guidance documents of the applet.

Several life cycles are available, depending when the Flash Code is loaded. The following tables present roles, actors, sites and coverage for this for this environment of the product life-cycle and describe for each of them the TOE delivery point.

Role	Package to be loaded	Actor	Site	Covered by
IC manufacturer	CAP file of the applet and additional packages	Manufacturer	IC manufacturer production plants [PTF-ST]	ALC
Smart card loader	-	-	-	-
TOE Delivery Point				

Table 9 CAP file of the applet and additional packages is loaded at IC manufacturer (Option 1)

Role	Package to be loaded	Actor	Site	Covered by
IC manufacturer	-	-	-	-
TOE Delivery Point				
Smart card loader	CAP file of the applet and additional packages	IDEMIA	IDEMIA Audited Production Sites (Shenzhen, Haarlem, Noida, Ostrava) and IDEMIA Non Audited Sites	ALC or AGD

Table 10 CAP file of the applet and additional packages is loaded through the loader of the IC (Option 2)

Role	Package to be loaded	Actor	Site	Covered by
IC manufacturer	-	-	-	-
TOE Delivery Point				
Smart card loader	CAP file of the applet and additional packages	External Authorized Agent	External Sites	AGD

Table 11 CAP file of the applet and additional packages is loaded through the loader of the IC (Option 3)

4.3 Preparation Environment

In this environment, the following two phases take place:

- Phase 5: Pre-personalisation of the applet
- Phase 6: Personalisation

The preparation environment may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but may be performed anywhere. All along these two phases, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the pre-personalisation agent or personalisation agent prior to any operation.

The TnD v5.1 applet is pre-personalised and personalised according to [AGD_PRE].

At the end of phase 6, the TOE is constructed. These two phases are covered by [AGD_PRE] tasks of the TOE and [PLTF-UM] tasks of [PTF-ST].

4.4 Operational Environment

The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the "Operational Use" phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified for eMRTD application.

In the scope of LDS2 extension, records can be appended for the Travel records, Visas application and written once for Additional Biometrics applications.

Note that applications can be loaded onto the JCOP 4 P71 Platform during this phase.

During this phase, the TOE may be used as described in [AGD_OPE] of the TOE.

This phase is covered by [AGD_OPE] tasks of the TOE and [PLTF-UM] tasks of [PLTF-ST].



5 Conformance Claims

5.1 CC Conformance claim

This security target claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5 ([CC-2] and [CC-3]).

The conformance to the Common Criteria is claimed as follows:

CC	Conformance rationale
Part 2	Conformance with the extended ⁶ part: FAU_SAS.1 "Audit Storage" FCS_RND.1 "Quality metric for random numbers" FMT_LIM.1 "Limited capabilities" FMT_LIM.2 "Limited availability" FPT_EMS.1 "TOE Emanation" FIA_API.1 "Authentication Proof of Identity"
Part 3	Conformance to Part 3. The product claims conformance to EAL 5, augmented with: ALC_DVS.2 "Sufficiency of security measures" AVA_VAN.5 "Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis"

Table 12 Conformance Rationale

5.2 Protection Profile claims

The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 2: Machine Readable Travel Documents with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control [EAC-PP].

5.3 Package Claim

This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 defined in CC part 3 [CC-3].

5.4 PP Conformance Rationale

This ST claims strict conformance to [EAC-PP]. A detailed justification is given in the following.

5.4.1 *Main aspects*

- The TOE description is based on the TOE definition and TOE usage of [EAC-PP].
- All definitions of the security problem definition in [EAC-PP] have been taken exactly from the protection profile in the same wording.

⁶ The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP

- All security objectives have been taken exactly from [EAC-PP] in the same wording.
- The part of extended components definition has been taken originally from [EAC-PP].
- All SFRs for the TOE have been taken originally from the [EAC-PP] added by according iterations, selections and assignments.
- The security assurance requirements (SARs) have been taken originally from the [EAC-PP]. The requirements are shifted to those of EAL 5+.

5.4.2 **Overview of differences between the PP and the ST**

- a) The Active Authentication has been added to the TOE. For that:
- One assumption has been added to cover Active Authentication during personalisation: **A.Pers_Agent_AA**
 - One security objective for the TOE has been added: **OT_AA_Proof**.
 - Two security objectives for the environment have been added: **OE_AA_MRTD** and **OE.Active_Auth_Sign**. These additions to the original objectives of the PP do not contradict with any other objective nor mitigate a threat (or part of a threat) meant to be addressed by security objectives for the TOE in the PP.
 - Following security functional requirements have been added:
 - **FCS_COP.1/AA**
 - **FIA_API.1/AA**
 - **FMT_MTD.1/AAPK**
 - **FCS_CKM.1/AA**
- b) **OT.DBI** has been added to restrict the access to the plain image data of particular EF(s). Enabling the feature will cause the image data to be corrupted during the reading of the file contents until the blurring is removed by an authorized terminal. The following additional SFRs have been defined for the same:
- **FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI**
 - **FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI**
 - **FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal**

The additions do not contradict any of the threats, assumptions, organizational policies, objectives or SFRs stated in the [PP_EAC] that covers the advanced security methods EAC in operational use phase.

6 Security Problem Definition

6.1 Assets

Logical MRTD sensitive User Data

Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)

Application Note:

Due to interoperability reasons the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [ICAO-9303] requires that Basic Inspection Systems must have access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16. Note the BAC mechanisms may not resist attacks with high attack potential (cf. [PP_BAC]).

Authenticity of the MRTD's chip

The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.

6.2 Users / Subjects

Manufacturer

The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD's chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.

Personalization Agent

The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (v) signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO-9303].

Country Verifying Certification Authority

The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.



Document Verifier

The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations in the form of the Document Verifier Certificates.

Terminal

A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.

Inspection system (IS)

A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD's chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.

MRTD Holder

The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.

Traveler

Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.

Attacker

A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, (ii) to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4) or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.

Application Note:

Note that an attacker trying to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD's chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the physical MRTD) is not considered by this ST since this can only be averted by the BAC mechanism using the "weak" Document Basic Access Keys that is covered by [PP_BAC]. The same holds for the confidentiality of the user data EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 as well as EF.SOD and EF.COM.



An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.

6.3 Threats

T.Read_Sensitive_Data

Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the MRTD's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [PP_BAC]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the MRTD's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the MRTD's chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical MRTD as well.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD

Asset: confidentiality of sensitive logical MRTD (i.e. biometric reference) data,

T.Forgery

Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder's identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD's chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs

Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data,

T.Counterfeit

Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for authentication of a traveler by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely

or partially the data from a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs

Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data,

T.Abuse-Func

Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in "Operational Use" phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF

T.Information_Leakage

Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).

Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD

Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.

T.Phys-Tamper

Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD's chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD's chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD's chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data. The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD's chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD's chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may

result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF

T.Malfunction

Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD's chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD's chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.

Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD

Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF

6.4 Organisational Security Policies

P.BAC-PP

The issuing States or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection Systems have read access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the [ICAO-9303] as well as to the data groups Common and Security Data. The MRTD is successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the 'Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control' [PP_BAC] in order to ensure the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data.

Application Note:

The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [ICAO-9303] is addressed by the [PP-BAC] (cf. P.BAC-PP). The confidentiality of the personal data other than EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC mechanisms may not resist attacks with high attack potential (cf. [PP-BAC]). The TOE shall protect the sensitive biometric reference data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 against attacks with high attack potential. Due to the different resistance the protection of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 on one side and the other EF.SOD, EF.COM, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 are addressed separated protection profiles, which is assumed to result in technically separated evaluations (at least for classes ASE and VAN) and certificates (cf. also to application note 1).

P.Sensitive_Data

The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organization authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRTD's chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the

sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication.

P.Manufact

The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.

P.Personalization

The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.

6.5 Assumptions

6.5.1 Assumptions from PP EAC

A.MRTD_Manufact

It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).

A.MRTD_Delivery

Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives:

- o Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
- o Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and storage.
- o Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill.

A.Pers_Agent

The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD's chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD's chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.

A.Insp_Sys

The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)



verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO-9303]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD. The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD's chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.

A.Signature_PKI

The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.

A.Auth_PKI

The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD's chip.

6.5.2 Additional Assumption

A.Pers_Agent_AA

Personalization of the MRTD's chip (Active Authentication) The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of the Active Authentication Public Key (EF.DG15) if stored on the MRTD's chip.



7 Security Objectives

7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

7.1.1 Security Objectives listed in PP EAC

OT.AC_Pers

The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object according to LDS [ICAO-9303] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.

Application Note:

The OT.AC_Pers implies that

- (1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization,
- (2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and (ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for adding data in the "Operational Use" phase is optional.

OT.Data_Int

The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.

OT.Sens_Data_Conf

The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.

OT.Identification

The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre- Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).



OT.Chip_Auth_Proof

The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD's chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip Authentication as defined in [TR-03110]. The authenticity proof provided by MRTD's chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.

Application Note:

The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the MRTD's chip to have (i) a unique identity as given by the MRTD's Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication attempt of MRTD's chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the MRTD's chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS [ICAO-9303] and (ii) the hash value of the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer.

OT.Prot_Abuse-Func

After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.

OT.Prot_Inf_Leak

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip

- o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
- o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- o by a physical manipulation of the TOE

Application Note:

This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.

OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper

The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with high attack potential by means of

- o measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or

- o measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
- o manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
- o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)

with a prior

- o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.

OT.Prot_Malfunction

The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.

Application Note:

A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE's internals.

7.1.2 Additional Security Objectives for the TOE

OT.AA_Proof

The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRTD's chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO-9303]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD's chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.

OT.DBI

The TOE shall support Digital Blurring of Images. The feature may be used to restrict the access to the plain image data of particular EF(s). Enabling the feature will cause the image data to be corrupted during the reading of the file contents until the blurring is removed by an authorized terminal.

7.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

7.2.1 Issuing State or Organization

OE.MRTD_Manufact

Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6. During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.

OE.MRTD_ Delivery

Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following objectives:

- o non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
- o identification of the element under delivery,
- o meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment),
- o physical protection to prevent external damage,
- o secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE's),
- o traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 - origin and shipment details,
 - reception, reception acknowledgement,
 - location material/information.

Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process. Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.

OE.Personalization

The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.

OE.Pass_Auth_Sign

The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [ICAO-9303].

OE.Auth_Key_MRTD

The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) generate the MRTD's Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and

(iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.

OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data

The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD's holders to authorized receiving States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.

OE.BAC_PP

It has to be ensured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the 'Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control' [PP_BAC]. This is necessary to cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack potential the addressed evaluation and certification is a technically separated process.

7.2.2 Receiving State or Organization

OE.Exam_MRTD

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO-9303]. Additionally General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD's chip.

OE.Passive_Auth_Verif

The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.

OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD

The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.

Application Note:



The figure 2.1 in [TR-03110] supposes that the GIS and the EIS follow the order (i) running the Basic Access Control Protocol, (ii) reading and verifying only those parts of the logical MRTD that are necessary to know for the Chip Authentication Mechanism (i.e. Document Security Object and Chip Authentication Public Key), (iii) running the Chip Authentication Protocol, and (iv) reading and verifying the less-sensitive data of the logical MRTD after Chip Authentication. The supposed sequence has the advantage that the less-sensitive data are protected by secure messaging with cryptographic keys based on the Chip Authentication Protocol which quality is under control of the TOE. The inspection system will prevent additionally eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol. Note that reading the less-sensitive data directly after Basic Access Control Mechanism is allowed and is not assumed as threat in this ST. But the TOE ensures that reading of sensitive data is possible after successful Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication Protocol only.

OE.Ext_Insp_Systems

The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRTD's chip for access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate.

7.2.3 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

OE.AA_MRTD

Active Authentication - Inspection Systems

An Active Authentication (Basic, General or Extended) Inspection system performs all the functions of the Basic, General and Extended Inspection System, and verifies the IC authenticity with an RSA or ECDSA signature generated by the MRTD (if available).

OE.Activ_Auth_Sign

The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infra-structure in order to (i) generate the MRTD's Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 (if generated) and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.

7.3 Security Objectives Rationale

7.3.1 Threats

T.Read_Sensitive_Data The threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data "Read the sensitive biometric reference data" is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf "Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data" requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized

inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data's confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organization as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data "Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data". The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems".

This objective allows an issuing State or Organization to set a secure messaging level it considers as sufficient to ensure a long term confidentiality of the sensitive biometric data of its citizen when being read.

T.Forgery The threat T.Forgery "Forgery of data on MRTD's chip" addresses the fraudulent alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD" requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent. The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering". The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the MRTD passport book" shall ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign "Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature" and verified by the inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif "Verification by Passive Authentication".

T.Counterfeit The threat T.Counterfeit "MRTD's chip" addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof "Proof of MRTD's chip authentication" using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_MRTD "MRTD Authentication Key".

This attack is also thwarted by Active Authentication proving the authenticity of the chip as required by OT.AA_Proof using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization.

According to OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the MRTD passport book" the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip.

OE.Activ_Auth_Sign and OE.AA_MRTD covers this threat enabling the possibility of performing an Active Authentication which reinforce the security associated to the communication.

The threat is also countered by OT.DBI that helps ensure that a counterfeit TOE is identified because of the digitally blurred images.

T.Abuse-Func The threat T.Abuse-Func "Abuse of Functionality" addresses attacks of misusing MRTD's functionality to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objective for the TOE OT.Prot_Abuse-Func "Protection against abuse of functionality" ensures that the usage of functions which may not be used in the "Operational Use" phase is effectively

prevented. Therefore attacks intending to abuse functionality in order to disclose or manipulate critical (User) Data or to affect the TOE in such a way that security features or TOE's functions may be bypassed, deactivated, changed or explored shall be effectively countered.

T.Information_Leakage The threat T.Information_Leakage "Information Leakage from MRTD's chip", is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information Leakage".

T.Phys-Tamper The threat T.Phys-Tamper "Physical Tampering" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering".

T.Malfunction The threat T.Malfunction "Malfunction due to Environmental Stress" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against Malfunctions".

7.3.2 Organisational Security Policies

P.BAC-PP The OSP P.BAC-PP is directly addressed by the OE.BAC_PP.

P.Sensitive_Data The OSP P.Sensitive_Data "Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data" is fulfilled by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf "Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data" requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data's confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organization as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data "Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data". The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems".

P.Manufact The OSP P.Manufact "Manufacturing of the MRTD's chip" requires a unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification.

P.Personalization The OSP P.Personalization "Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only" addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization "Personalization of logical MRTD", and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD". Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the

Personalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification "Identification and Authentication of the TOE". The security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD" limits the management of TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.

7.3.3 Assumptions

7.3.3.1 Assumptions from PP EAC

A.MRTD_Manufact The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact "MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact "Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing" that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.

A.MRTD_Delivery The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery "MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Delivery "Protection of the MRTD delivery" that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.

A.Pers_Agent The assumption A.Pers_Agent "Personalization of the MRTD's chip" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization "Personalization of logical MRTD" including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.

A.Insp_Sys The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the MRTD passport book" which requires the inspection system to examine physically the MRTD, the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and the General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD's chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD "Protection of data from the logical MRTD" require the Inspection System to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.

A.Signature_PKI The assumption A.Signature_PKI "PKI for Passive Authentication" is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign "Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature" covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the MRTD passport book".

A.Auth_PKI The assumption A.Auth_PKI "PKI for Inspection Systems" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data "Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference data" requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving States or Organizations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems" to authorize

Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure.

7.3.3.2 Additional Assumption

A.Pers_Agent_AA The assumption A.Pers_Agent_AA is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.

7.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives

Threats	Security Objectives	Rationale
T.Read Sensitive Data	OT.Sens Data Conf , OE.Authoriz Sens Data , OE.Ext Insp Systems	Section 7.3.1
T.Forgery	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Prot Phys-Tamper , OE.Pass Auth Sign , OE.Exam MRTD , OE.Passive Auth Verif	Section 7.3.1
T.Counterfeit	OT.Chip Auth Proof , OE.Auth Key MRTD , OE.Exam MRTD , OT.AA Proof , OE.Activ Auth Sign , OT.DBI , OE.AA MRTD	Section 7.3.1
T.Abuse-Func	OT.Prot Abuse-Func	Section 7.3.1
T.Information Leakage	OT.Prot Inf Leak	Section 7.3.1
T.Phys-Tamper	OT.Prot Phys-Tamper	Section 7.3.1
T.Malfunction	OT.Prot Malfunction	Section 7.3.1

Table 13 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage

Security Objectives	Threats	Rationale
OT.AC Pers	T.Forgery	
OT.Data Int	T.Forgery	
OT.Sens Data Conf	T.Read Sensitive Data	
OT.Identification		
OT.Chip Auth Proof	T.Counterfeit	
OT.Prot Abuse-Func	T.Abuse-Func	
OT.Prot Inf Leak	T.Information Leakage	
OT.Prot Phys-Tamper	T.Forgery , T.Phys-Tamper	
OT.Prot Malfunction	T.Malfunction	
OT.AA Proof	T.Counterfeit	
OT.DBI	T.Counterfeit	

OE.MRTD_Manufact		
OE.MRTD_Delivery		
OE.Personalization		
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign	T.Forgery	
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD	T.Counterfeit	
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data	T.Read_Sensitive_Data	
OE.BAC_PP		
OE.Exam_MRTD	T.Forgery , T.Counterfeit	
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif	T.Forgery	
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD		
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems	T.Read_Sensitive_Data	
OE.AA_MRTD	T.Counterfeit	
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign	T.Counterfeit	

Table 14 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage

Organisational Security Policies	Security Objectives	Rationale
P.BAC-PP	OE.BAC_PP	Section 7.3.2
P.Sensitive_Data	OT.Sens_Data_Conf , OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data , OE.Ext_Insp_Systems	Section 7.3.2
P.Manufact	OT.Identification	Section 7.3.2
P.Personalization	OT.AC_Pers , OT.Identification , OE.Personalization	Section 7.3.2

Table 15 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage

Security Objectives	Organisational Security Policies	Rationale
OT.AC_Pers	P.Personalization	
OT.Data_Int		
OT.Sens_Data_Conf	P.Sensitive_Data	
OT.Identification	P.Manufact , P.Personalization	
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof		
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func		
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak		
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper		
OT.Prot_Malfunction		

OT.AA Proof		
OT.DBI		
OE.MRTD Manufact		
OE.MRTD Delivery		
OE.Personalization	P.Personalization	
OE.Pass Auth Sign		
OE.Auth Key MRTD		
OE.Authoriz Sens Data	P.Sensitive Data	
OE.BAC_PP	P.BAC-PP	
OE.Exam MRTD		
OE.Passive Auth Verif		
OE.Prot Logical MRTD		
OE.Ext Insp Systems	P.Sensitive Data	
OE.AA MRTD		
OE.Activ Auth Sign		

Table 16 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage

Assumptions	Security Objectives for the Operational Environment	Rationale
A.MRTD Manufact	OE.MRTD Manufact	Section 7.3.3
A.MRTD Delivery	OE.MRTD Delivery	Section 7.3.3
A.Pers Agent	OE.Personalization	Section 7.3.3
A.Insp Sys	OE.Exam MRTD , OE.Prot Logical MRTD	Section 7.3.3
A.Signature PKI	OE.Pass Auth Sign , OE.Exam MRTD	Section 7.3.3
A.Auth PKI	OE.Authoriz Sens Data , OE.Ext Insp Systems	Section 7.3.3
A.Pers Agent AA	OE.Personalization	Section 7.3.3

Table 17 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage

Security Objectives for the Operational Environment	Assumptions	Rationale
OE.MRTD Manufact	A.MRTD Manufact	
OE.MRTD Delivery	A.MRTD Delivery	
OE.Personalization	A.Pers Agent , A.Pers Agent AA	

OE.Pass Auth Sign	A.Signature PKI	
OE.Auth Key MRTD		
OE.Authoriz Sens Data	A.Auth PKI	
OE.BAC PP		
OE.Exam MRTD	A.Insp Sys , A.Signature PKI	
OE.Passive Auth Verif		
OE.Prot Logical MRTD	A.Insp Sys	
OE.Ext Insp Systems	A.Auth PKI	
OE.AA MRTD		
OE.Activ Auth Sign		

Table 18 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage

8 Extended Requirements

8.1 Extended Families

8.1.1 *Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation*

8.1.1.1 Description

The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE's electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, radio emanation etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations. The family FPT_EMS belongs to the Class FPT because it is the class for TSF protection. Other families within the Class FPT do not cover the TOE emanation.

8.1.1.2 Extended Components

Extended Component FPT_EMS.1

Description

This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.

FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:

- FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or user data.
- FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data.

Definition

FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].

FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].

Dependencies: No dependencies.

8.1.2 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities

8.1.2.1 Description

The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the test features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.



8.1.2.2 Extended Components

Extended Component FMT_LIM.1

Description

Definition

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with 'Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)' the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]

Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)

Extended Component FMT_LIM.2

Description

Definition

FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with 'Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)' the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]

Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)

8.1.3 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage

8.1.3.1 Description

To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.

8.1.3.2 Extended Components

Extended Component FAU_SAS.1

Description

Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.

Definition

FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage

FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

8.1.4 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity

8.1.4.1 Description

To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.

Application note 10: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication verification of users' identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [CC_3], chapter 'Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)') from a TOE point of view.

8.1.4.2 Extended Components

Extended Component FIA_API.1

Description

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.



Definition

FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity

FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: *authentication mechanism*] to prove the identity of the [assignment: *authorized user or role*].

Dependencies: No dependencies.

8.1.5 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers

8.1.5.1 Description

This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.

8.1.5.2 Extended Components

Extended Component FCS_RND.1

Description

Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.

Definition

FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers

FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: *a defined quality metric*].

Dependencies: No dependencies.



9 Security Requirements

9.1 Security Functional Requirements

9.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit

The TOE shall meet the requirement "Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)" as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage

FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide **the Manufacturer** with the capability to store **the IC Identification Data** in the audit records.

9.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support

FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**Cryptographic Key Sizes**] that meet the following: [**Standards**]

Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Sizes	Standards
Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1[TR-03110-1] based on the ECDH protocol compliant to [TR-03111] in combination with 112 bits 3DES or 128, 192 or 256 bits AES	192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits	[TR-03111]
Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1[TR-03110-1] based on the DH protocol compliant to [TR-03110-1] in combination with 112 bits 3DES or 128, 192 or 256 bits AES	2048 bits	[TR-03110-1] and [RSA-PKCS#3]

Application Note:

ISO-15946 defined in the protection profile has been replaced since Part 3 that dealt with Key Management using Elliptic Curve has been withdrawn and instead revised by [ISO_11770]



FCS_CKM.1/AA Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.1.1/AA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**Cryptographic Key Sizes**] that meet the following: [**Standards**]

Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Sizes	Standards
ECKeyp	192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521	[IEEE_1363]
RSA	1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096	[ANSI_X9.31]

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method **physically overwriting the keys** that meets the following: **none**.

FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform **hashing** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512** and cryptographic key sizes **none** that meet the following: [**FIPS_180_4**].

FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/SYM The TSF shall perform **see table below** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **see table below** and cryptographic key sizes **see table below** that meet the following: **see table below**

Cryptographic Operations	Cryptographic Algorithms	Key sizes	Standards
secure messaging encryption and decryption	AES in CBC mode	128, 192 and 256 bits	[TR-03110-1]
secure messaging encryption	3DES in CBC mode	112 bits	[TR-03110-

and decryption			1]
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FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform **see table below** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **see table below** and cryptographic key sizes **see table below** that meet the following: **see table below**

Cryptographic Operations	Cryptographic Algorithms	Key sizes	Standards
secure messaging - message authentication code	AES CMAC	128, 192 and 256 bits	[TR-03110]
secure messaging - message authentication code	Retail MAC	112 bits	[TR-03110]

FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER The TSF shall perform **see table below** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **see table below** and cryptographic key sizes **see table below** that meet the following: **see table below**

Cryptographic Operations	Cryptographic Algorithms	Key Sizes	Standards
digital signature verification	ECDSA	192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits	ISO15946-2 specified in [ISO15946-2]
digital signature verification	RSA	1280, 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096	PKCS#1 v1.5 and PKCS#1-PSS

FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation

FCS_COP.1.1/AA The TSF shall perform [**Cryptographic Operation**] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**Cryptographic Algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**Cryptographic Key Sizes**] that meet the following: [**Standard**]

Cryptographic	Cryptographic	Cryptographic Key	Standard
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Operation	Algorithm	Sizes(bits)	
Digital Signature Creation	ECDSA	192 to 521 over prime field curves	[ISO_9796-2], [RSA-PKCS#3], [FIPS_180_2] and [X.92]
Digital Signature Creation	RSA	1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096	[ISO_9796-2]

FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers

FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet the deterministic random number generation specified by FCS_RNG.1 Quality metric for random numbers of [PTF-ST].

9.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication

FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow

- o to establish the communication channel,
- o to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
- o to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow

- o to establish the communication channel,
- o to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
- o to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
- o to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to

- o **Terminal Authentication Protocol,**
- o **Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES.**

Application Note:

The authentication mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES is the authentication process performed in phases 5 and 6

FIA_UAU.5/EAC Multiple authentication mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1/EAC The TSF shall provide

- o **Terminal Authentication Protocol,**
- o **Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,**
- o **Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES**

to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2/EAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following rules:

- o **The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key.**
- o **After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.**
- o **The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.**

FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating

FIA_UAU.6.1/EAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions **each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the GIS.**



FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity

FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a **Chip Authentication Protocol** according to [TR-03110] to prove the identity of the **TOE**.

FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity

FIA_API.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a **Active Authentication** to prove the identity of the **TOE**.

9.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection

FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **Access Control SFP** on **terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD**.

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **Access Control SFP** to objects based on the following:

- o **Subjects:**
 - **Personalization Agent,**
 - **Extended Inspection System**
 - **Terminal,**
- o **Objects:**
 - **data EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,**
 - **data EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD**
 - **data in EF.COM,**
 - **data in EF.SOD,**
- o **Security attributes:**
 - **authentication status of terminals,**
 - **Terminal Authorization.**

FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- o **the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,**

- the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD.
- the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG 4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.

FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.

FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **rule**:

- A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
- A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
- A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
- A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
- Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
- Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG3 to EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.

FDP_UCT.1/EAC Basic data exchange confidentiality
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FDP_UCT.1.1/EAC [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the **Access Control SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure **after Chip Authentication**.

FDP_UIT.1/EAC Data exchange integrity

FDP_UIT.1.1/EAC [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the **Access Control SFP** to **transmit and receive** user data in a manner protected from **modification, deletion, insertion and replay** errors **after Chip Authentication**.

FDP_UIT.1.2/EAC [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether **modification, deletion, insertion and replay** has occurred **after Chip Authentication**.

9.1.5 Class FMT Security Management

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- **Initialization**
- **Pre-personalization**
- **Personalization**
- **Activate and deactivate DBI.**

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles

- **Manufacturer,**
- **Personalization Agent,**
- **Country Verifying Certification Authority,**
- **Document Verifier,**
- **domestic Extended Inspection System**
- **foreign Extended Inspection System.**

FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to **write** the **Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data** to **the Manufacturer**.

Application Note:

Please refer to F.ACW for details of the data written by the manufacturer.



FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to **disable read access for users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.**

FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to **write** the

- o **initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,**
- o **initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,**
- o **initial Current Date**

to **the Personalization Agent.**

FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to **update** the

- o **Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,**
- o **Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate**

to **Country Verifying Certification Authority.**

FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to **modify** the **current date** to

- o **Country Verifying Certification Authority,**
- o **Document Verifier,**
- o **domestic Extended Inspection System.**

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to **write** the **Document Basic Access Keys to the Personalization Agent.**

FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to **load or create** the **Chip Authentication Private Key to the Personalization agent.**

FMT_MTD.1/AAPK Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/AAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to **load or create** the **Active Authentication Private Key** to **the Personalization agent**.

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to **read** the

- o **Document Basic Access Keys,**
- o **Chip Authentication Private Key,**
- o **Personalization Agent Keys**

to **none**.

FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/Activate_DBI The TSF shall restrict the ability to **digitally blur** the **images in EF DG 1 to EF DG 8** to **Personalization agent**.

Application Note:

Even though practically EF DG2, EF DG3 and EF DG 4 will be the files which will be directly acted upon by the personalization agent but since the implementation is not restricted to only these files, so EF DG1 to EF DG 8 is also mentioned in above instantiation.

FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/Deactivate_DBI The TSF shall restrict the ability to **remove the blurring on the digital images** to **the terminal whose name is set by the Personalization agent**.

FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/DBI_Terminal The TSF shall restrict the ability to **set the name (or beginning of the name) of the terminal allowed to remove the digital blurring in phase 7, and identifiers of these files** to **Personalization agent**.



FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data

FMT_MTD.3.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate chain are accepted for **TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control**.

Refinement:

The certificate chain is valid if and only if

- o the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
- o the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
- o the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE.

The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System.

The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System.

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with 'Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)' the following policy is enforced **Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,**

- o **User Data to be manipulated,**
- o **sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,**
- o **TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated**
- o **software to be reconstructed and**
- o **substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks**

FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with 'Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)' the following policy is enforced **Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,**

- o **User Data to be manipulated,**
- o **sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,**
- o **TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated**
- o **software to be reconstructed and**
- o **substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks**

9.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions

FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit **power variations, timing variations and electromagnetic radiation during command execution** in excess of **non useful information** enabling access to **Personalization Agent Key(s) and Chip Authentication Private Key** and

- o **Pre-personalization Agent Keys,**
- o **Secure Messaging Session Keys,**
- o **Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK).**

FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure **users** are unable to use the following interface **smart card circuit contacts** to gain access to **Personalization Agent Key(s) and Chip Authentication Private Key** and

- o **Pre-personalization Agent Keys,**
- o **Secure Messaging Session Keys**
- o **Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK).**

FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:

- o **Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur,**
- o **failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.**



FPT_TST.1 TSF testing

FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests **at the conditions**

- o **At reset**, to demonstrate the correct operation of **the TSF**.

FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **TSF data**.

FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of **stored TSF executable code**.

FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack

FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist **physical manipulation and physical probing** to the **TSF** by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

9.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The Evaluation Assurance Level is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.

9.2.1 ADV Development

9.2.1.1 ADV_ARC Security Architecture



ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description

ADV_ARC.1.1D The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security features of the TSF cannot be bypassed.

ADV_ARC.1.2D The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to protect itself from tampering by untrusted active entities.

ADV_ARC.1.3D The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF.

ADV_ARC.1.1C The security architecture description shall be at a level of detail commensurate with the description of the SFR-enforcing abstractions described in the TOE design document.

ADV_ARC.1.2C The security architecture description shall describe the security domains maintained by the TSF consistently with the SFRs.

ADV_ARC.1.3C The security architecture description shall describe how the TSF initialisation process is secure.

ADV_ARC.1.4C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF protects itself from tampering.

ADV_ARC.1.5C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF prevents bypass of the SFR-enforcing functionality.

ADV_ARC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.1.2 ADV_FSP Functional specification



ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information

ADV_FSP.5.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.

ADV_FSP.5.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.

ADV_FSP.5.1C The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.

ADV_FSP.5.2C The functional specification shall describe the TSFI using a semi-formal style.

ADV_FSP.5.3C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for all TSFI.

ADV_FSP.5.4C The functional specification shall identify and describe all parameters associated with each TSFI.

ADV_FSP.5.5C The functional specification shall describe all actions associated with each TSFI.

ADV_FSP.5.6C The functional specification shall describe all direct error messages that may result from an invocation of each TSFI.

ADV_FSP.5.7C The functional specification shall describe all error messages that do not result from an invocation of a TSFI.

ADV_FSP.5.8C The functional specification shall provide a rationale for each error message contained in the TSF implementation yet does not result from an invocation of a TSFI.

ADV_FSP.5.9C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.

ADV_FSP.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ADV_FSP.5.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.

9.2.1.3 ADV_IMP Implementation representation

ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF

ADV_IMP.1.1D The developer shall make available the implementation representation for the entire TSF.

ADV_IMP.1.2D The developer shall provide a mapping between the TOE design description and the sample of the implementation representation.

ADV_IMP.1.1C The implementation representation shall define the TSF to a level of detail such that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions.

ADV_IMP.1.2C The implementation representation shall be in the form used by the development personnel.

ADV_IMP.1.3C The mapping between the TOE design description and the sample of the implementation representation shall demonstrate their correspondence.

ADV_IMP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that, for the selected sample of the implementation representation, the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.1.4 ADV_INT TSF internals

ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals

ADV_INT.2.1D The developer shall design and implement the entire TSF such that it has well-structured internals.

ADV_INT.2.2D The developer shall provide an internals description and justification.

ADV_INT.2.1C The justification shall describe the characteristics used to judge the meaning of "well-structured".

ADV_INT.2.2C The TSF internals description shall demonstrate that the entire TSF is well-structured.

ADV_INT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ADV_INT.2.2E The evaluator shall perform an internals analysis on the TSF.

9.2.1.5 ADV_TDS TOE design



ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design

ADV_TDS.4.1D The developer shall provide the design of the TOE.

ADV_TDS.4.2D The developer shall provide a mapping from the TSFI of the functional specification to the lowest level of decomposition available in the TOE design.

ADV_TDS.4.1C The design shall describe the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems.

ADV_TDS.4.2C The design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules, designating each module as SFR-enforcing, SFR-supporting, or SFR-non-interfering.

ADV_TDS.4.3C The design shall identify all subsystems of the TSF.

ADV_TDS.4.4C The design shall provide a semiformal description of each subsystem of the TSF, supported by informal, explanatory text where appropriate.

ADV_TDS.4.5C The design shall provide a description of the interactions among all subsystems of the TSF.

ADV_TDS.4.6C The design shall provide a mapping from the subsystems of the TSF to the modules of the TSF.

ADV_TDS.4.7C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module in terms of its purpose and relationship with other modules.

ADV_TDS.4.8C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module in terms of its SFR-related interfaces, return values from those interfaces, interaction with other modules and called SFR-related interfaces to other SFR-enforcing or SFR-supporting modules.

ADV_TDS.4.9C The design shall describe each SFR-non-interfering module in terms of its purpose and interaction with other modules.

ADV_TDS.4.10C The mapping shall demonstrate that all TSFIs trace to the behaviour described in the TOE design that they invoke.

ADV_TDS.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ADV_TDS.4.2E The evaluator shall determine that the design is an accurate and complete instantiation of all security functional requirements.

9.2.2 AGD Guidance documents



9.2.2.1 AGD_OPE Operational user guidance

AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance

AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.

AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.

AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.

AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.

AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.

AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation.

AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.

AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.2.2 AGD_PRE Preparative procedures

AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures

AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.

AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.

AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation.

9.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support

9.2.3.1 ALC_CMC CM capabilities

ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation

ALC_CMC.4.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.

ALC_CMC.4.2D The developer shall provide the CM documentation.

ALC_CMC.4.3D The developer shall use a CM system.

ALC_CMC.4.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.

ALC_CMC.4.2C The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items.

ALC_CMC.4.3C The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.

ALC_CMC.4.4C The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only authorised changes are made to the configuration items.

ALC_CMC.4.5C The CM system shall support the production of the TOE by automated means.

ALC_CMC.4.6C The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.

ALC_CMC.4.7C The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development of the TOE.

ALC_CMC.4.8C The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the TOE.

ALC_CMC.4.9C The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system.

ALC_CMC.4.10C The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in accordance with the CM plan.

ALC_CMC.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.3.2 ALC_CMS CM scope

ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage

ALC_CMS.5.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.

ALC_CMS.5.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; the evaluation evidence required by the SARs; the parts that comprise the TOE; the implementation representation; security flaw reports and resolution status; and development tools and related information.

ALC_CMS.5.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

ALC_CMS.5.3C For each TSF relevant configuration item, the configuration list shall indicate the developer of the item.

ALC_CMS.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.3.3 ALC_DEL Delivery

ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures

ALC_DEL.1.1D The developer shall document and provide procedures for delivery of the TOE or parts of it to the consumer.

ALC_DEL.1.2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures.

ALC_DEL.1.1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer.

ALC_DEL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.3.4 ALC_DVS Development security

ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures

ALC_DVS.2.1D The developer shall produce and provide development security documentation.

ALC_DVS.2.1C The development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the



confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development environment.

ALC_DVS.2.2C The development security documentation shall justify that the security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.

ALC_DVS.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ALC_DVS.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied.

9.2.3.5 ALC_LCD Life-cycle definition

ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model

ALC_LCD.1.1D The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the development and maintenance of the TOE.

ALC_LCD.1.2D The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.

ALC_LCD.1.1C The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and maintain the TOE.

ALC_LCD.1.2C The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the TOE.

ALC_LCD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.3.6 ALC_TAT Tools and techniques

ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards

ALC_TAT.2.1D The developer shall provide the documentation identifying each development tool being used for the TOE.

ALC_TAT.2.2D The developer shall document and provide the selected implementation-dependent options of each development tool.

ALC_TAT.2.3D The developer shall describe and provide the implementation standards that are being applied by the developer.

ALC_TAT.2.1C Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.

ALC_TAT.2.2C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define the meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the implementation.

ALC_TAT.2.3C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.

ALC_TAT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ALC_TAT.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the implementation standards have been applied.

9.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation

9.2.4.1 ASE_CCL Conformance claims

ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims

ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.

ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.

ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.

ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.

ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.

ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended components definition.

ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement packages to which the ST claims conformance.

ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a package as either package-conformant or package-augmented.

ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.

ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem definition in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.

ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.

ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.

ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.4.2 ASE_ECD Extended components definition



ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition

ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.

ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.

ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security requirements.

ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component for each extended security requirement.

ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended component is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.

ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components, families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.

ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective elements such that conformance or nonconformance to these elements can be demonstrated.

ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly expressed using existing components.

9.2.4.3 ASE_INT ST introduction



ASE_INT.1 ST introduction

ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.

ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE overview and a TOE description.

ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.

ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE.

ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of the TOE.

ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.

ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE.

ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.

ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.

ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and the TOE description are consistent with each other.

9.2.4.4 ASE_OBJ Security objectives



ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives

ASE_OBJ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.

ASE_OBJ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security objectives rationale.

ASE_OBJ.2.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment.

ASE_OBJ.2.2C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the TOE back to threats countered by that security objective and OSPs enforced by that security objective.

ASE_OBJ.2.3C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the operational environment back to threats countered by that security objective, OSPs enforced by that security objective, and assumptions upheld by that security objective.

ASE_OBJ.2.4C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security objectives counter all threats.

ASE_OBJ.2.5C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security objectives enforce all OSPs.

ASE_OBJ.2.6C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security objectives for the operational environment uphold all assumptions.

ASE_OBJ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.4.5 ASE_REQ Security requirements



ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements

ASE_REQ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.

ASE_REQ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.

ASE_REQ.2.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the SARs.

ASE_REQ.2.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.

ASE_REQ.2.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the security requirements.

ASE_REQ.2.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.

ASE_REQ.2.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.

ASE_REQ.2.6C The security requirements rationale shall trace each SFR back to the security objectives for the TOE.

ASE_REQ.2.7C The security requirements rationale shall demonstrate that the SFRs meet all security objectives for the TOE.

ASE_REQ.2.8C The security requirements rationale shall explain why the SARs were chosen.

ASE_REQ.2.9C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.

ASE_REQ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.4.6 ASE_SPD Security problem definition



ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition

ASE_APD.1.1D The developer shall provide a security problem definition.

ASE_SPD.1.1C The security problem definition shall describe the threats.

ASE_SPD.1.2C All threats shall be described in terms of a threat agent, an asset, and an adverse action.

ASE_SPD.1.3C The security problem definition shall describe the OSPs.

ASE_SPD.1.4C The security problem definition shall describe the assumptions about the operational environment of the TOE.

ASE_SPD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.4.7 ASE_TSS TOE summary specification

ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification

ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.

ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR.

ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent with the TOE overview and the TOE description.

9.2.5 ATE Tests

9.2.5.1 ATE_COV Coverage

ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage

ATE_COV.2.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.

ATE_COV.2.1C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence between the tests in the test documentation and the TSFIs in the functional specification.

ATE_COV.2.2C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that all TSFIs in the functional specification have been tested.

ATE_COV.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.5.2 ATE_DPT Depth

ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design

ATE_DPT.3.1D The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.

ATE_DPT.3.1C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate the correspondence between the tests in the test documentation and the TSF subsystems and modules in the TOE design.

ATE_DPT.3.2C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF subsystems in the TOE design have been tested.

ATE_DPT.3.3C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF modules in the TOE design have been tested.

ATE_DPT.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.5.3 ATE_FUN Functional tests



ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing

ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.

ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.

ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and actual test results.

ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering dependencies on the results of other tests.

ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful execution of the tests.

ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.

ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

9.2.5.4 ATE_IND Independent testing



ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample

ATE_IND.2.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

ATE_IND.2.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

ATE_IND.2.2C The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that were used in the developer's functional testing of the TSF.

ATE_IND.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ATE_IND.2.2E The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to verify the developer test results.

ATE_IND.2.3E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.

9.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment

9.2.6.1 AVA_VAN Vulnerability analysis

AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

AVA_VAN.5.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

AVA_VAN.5.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

AVA_VAN.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AVA_VAN.5.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.

AVA_VAN.5.3E The evaluator shall perform an independent, methodical vulnerability analysis of the TOE using the guidance documentation, functional specification, TOE design, security architecture description and implementation representation to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.

AVA_VAN.5.4E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing based on the identified potential vulnerabilities to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing High attack potential.

9.3 Security Requirements Rationale

9.3.1 Objectives

9.3.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

Security Objectives listed in PP EAC

OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD" addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization). The Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data for Basic Access Control.

The following paragraph is extracted from [PP_EAC] and has been refined according to the technical characteristics of this TOE. The refinement is right after.

The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/EAC. If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authentication) with the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication), and

FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol) and FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication). If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.

Note: As TA mechanism is not supported for the authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent, the following two paragraphs have been added to demonstrate that symmetric authentication used in Personalization phase fulfills the OT.AC_Pers. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent is performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/EAC. The Personalization Agent can be authenticated by using the symmetric authentication mechanism with the personalization key.

The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR FPT_EMS.1 the confidentiality of these keys.

OT.Data_Int The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The Personalization Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 before accessing these data. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.

The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data after Chip Authentication. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/EAC and FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UIT.1/EACA requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.

The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.

The following part is added to integrate the Manufacturing and Personalization phases in the OT_Data_Int.

OT.Sens_Data_Conf The security objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a validly verifiable certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.

The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 requires the identification and authentication of the inspection systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/EAC requires the successful Chip Authentication

(CA) before any authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the protected communication following the CA the reuse of authentication data is prevented by FIA_UAU.4. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UCT.1/EAC requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.

To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA's public key and certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.

The following part is added to integrate the Manufacturing and Personalization phases in the OT_Sens_Data_Conf.

OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification "Identification and Authentication of the TOE" address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD's chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.

The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 "Operational Use" violates the security objective OT.Identification "Identification and Authentication of the TOE".

OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof "Proof of MRTD's chip authenticity" is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1 proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol [TR-03110] requires additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).

OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func "Protection against Abuse of Functionality" is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.

OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information Leakage" requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD's chip against disclosure

- o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,



- o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1, and/or
- o by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.

OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.

OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.

Additional Security Objectives for the TOE

OT.AA_Proof The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol as defined in FIA_API.1/AA. The FCS_CKM.1/AA provides key generation for Active Authentication. The Active Authentication relies on FCS_COP.1/AA and FCS_RND.1. It is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/AAPK.

OT.DBI is met by FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI that allows the personalization agent to digitally blurr the images in defined EFs. FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal helps to ensure that only an authorized terminal who's name is set by the personalization agent can remove the blurring as defined in FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI.

FMT_SMF.1 provides the necessary management functions based on the roles identified in FMT_SMR.1.

9.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs

Security Objectives	Security Functional Requirements	Rationale
OT.AC Pers	FCS_CKM.1/CA , FCS_CKM.4 , FCS_COP.1/SHA , FCS_COP.1/SYM , FCS_COP.1/MAC , FCS_COP.1/SIG VER , FIA_UID.1 , FIA_UAU.1 , FIA_UAU.4 , FIA_UAU.5/EAC , FIA_UAU.6/EAC , FDP_ACC.1 , FDP_ACF.1 , FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1 , FMT_MTD.1/KEY WRITE , FMT_MTD.1/KEY READ , FPT_EMS.1 , FCS_RND.1	Section 9.3.1
OT.Data Int	FCS_CKM.1/CA , FCS_CKM.4 , FCS_COP.1/SHA , FCS_COP.1/SYM , FCS_COP.1/MAC , FIA_UID.1 , FIA_UAU.1 , FIA_UAU.4 , FIA_UAU.5/EAC , FIA_UAU.6/EAC , FDP_ACC.1 , FDP_ACF.1 , FDP_UIT.1/EAC , FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1 , FMT_MTD.1/CAPK , FMT_MTD.1/KEY READ	Section 9.3.1
OT.Sens Data Conf	FCS_CKM.1/CA , FCS_CKM.4 , FCS_COP.1/SHA , FCS_COP.1/SYM , FCS_COP.1/MAC ,	Section 9.3.1

	FCS COP.1/SIG VER , FIA UID.1 , FIA UAU.1 , FIA UAU.4 , FIA UAU.5/EAC , FIA UAU.6/EAC , FDP ACC.1 , FDP ACF.1 , FDP UCT.1/EAC , FMT MTD.1/CVCA INI , FMT MTD.1/CVCA UPD , FMT MTD.1/DATE , FMT MTD.1/CAPK , FMT MTD.1/KEY READ , FMT MTD.3 , FCS RND.1	
OT.Identification	FAU SAS.1 , FMT MTD.1/INI ENA , FMT MTD.1/INI DIS	Section 9.3.1
OT.Chip Auth Proof	FCS CKM.1/CA , FCS COP.1/SHA , FCS COP.1/SYM , FCS COP.1/MAC , FIA API.1 , FMT MTD.1/CAPK , FMT MTD.1/KEY READ	Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot Abuse-Func	FMT LIM.1 , FMT LIM.2	Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot Inf Leak	FPT EMS.1 , FPT FLS.1 , FPT TST.1 , FPT PHP.3	Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot Phys-Tamper	FPT PHP.3	Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot Malfunction	FPT TST.1 , FPT FLS.1	Section 9.3.1
OT.AA Proof	FCS COP.1/AA , FCS RND.1 , FCS CKM.1/AA , FMT MTD.1/AAPK , FIA API.1/AA	Section 9.3.1
OT.DBI	FMT MTD.1/Activate DBI , FMT MTD.1/Deactivate DBI , FMT MTD.1/DBI Terminal , FMT SMF.1 , FMT SMR.1	Section 9.3.1

Table 19 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage

Security Functional Requirements	Security Objectives	Rationale
FAU SAS.1	OT.Identification	
FCS CKM.1/CA	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf , OT.Chip Auth Proof	
FCS CKM.1/AA	OT.AA Proof	
FCS CKM.4	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf	
FCS COP.1/SHA	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf , OT.Chip Auth Proof	
FCS COP.1/SYM	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf , OT.Chip Auth Proof	
FCS COP.1/MAC	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf , OT.Chip Auth Proof	
FCS COP.1/SIG VER	OT.AC Pers , OT.Sens Data Conf	
FCS COP.1/AA	OT.AA Proof	
FCS RND.1	OT.AC Pers , OT.Sens Data Conf , OT.AA Proof	

FIA_UID.1	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf	
FIA_UAU.1	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf	
FIA_UAU.4	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf	
FIA_UAU.5/EAC	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf	
FIA_UAU.6/EAC	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf	
FIA_API.1	OT.Chip Auth Proof	
FIA_API.1/AA	OT.AA Proof	
FDP_ACC.1	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf	
FDP_ACF.1	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf	
FDP_UCT.1/EAC	OT.Sens Data Conf	
FDP_UIT.1/EAC	OT.Data Int	
FMT_SMF.1	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.DBI	
FMT_SMR.1	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.DBI	
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA	OT.Identification	
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	OT.Identification	
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI	OT.Sens Data Conf	
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD	OT.Sens Data Conf	
FMT_MTD.1/DATE	OT.Sens Data Conf	
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	OT.AC Pers	
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK	OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf , OT.Chip Auth Proof	
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK	OT.AA Proof	
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	OT.AC Pers , OT.Data Int , OT.Sens Data Conf , OT.Chip Auth Proof	
FMT_MTD.1/Activate DBI	OT.DBI	
FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate DBI	OT.DBI	
FMT_MTD.1/DBI Terminal	OT.DBI	
FMT_MTD.3	OT.Sens Data Conf	
FMT_LIM.1	OT.Prot Abuse-Func	
FMT_LIM.2	OT.Prot Abuse-Func	
FPT_EMS.1	OT.AC Pers , OT.Prot Inf Leak	
FPT_FLS.1	OT.Prot Inf Leak , OT.Prot Malfunction	
FPT_TST.1	OT.Prot Inf Leak , OT.Prot Malfunction	
FPT_PHP.3	OT.Prot Inf Leak , OT.Prot Phys-Tamper	

Table 20 SFRs and Security Objectives

9.3.3 Dependencies

9.3.3.1 SFRs Dependencies

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1	No Dependencies	
FCS_CKM.1/CA	(FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.4 , FCS_COP.1/SYM , FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_CKM.1/AA	(FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.4 , FCS_COP.1/AA
FCS_CKM.4	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)	FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/SHA	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SYM	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.1/CA , FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/MAC	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.1/CA , FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.1/CA , FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AA	(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)	FCS_CKM.1/AA , FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1	No Dependencies	
FIA_UID.1	No Dependencies	
FIA_UAU.1	(FIA_UID.1)	FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4	No Dependencies	
FIA_UAU.5/EAC	No Dependencies	
FIA_UAU.6/EAC	No Dependencies	
FIA_API.1	No Dependencies	
FIA_API.1/AA	No Dependencies	
FDP_ACC.1	(FDP_ACF.1)	FDP_ACF.1

FDP_ACF.1	(FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)	FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UCT.1/EAC	(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)	FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1/EAC	(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and (FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)	FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1	No Dependencies	
FMT_SMR.1	(FIA_UID.1)	FIA_UID.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/DATE	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/Activate DBI	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate DBI	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/DBI Terminal	(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)	FMT_SMF.1 , FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.3	(FMT_MTD.1)	FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI , FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_LIM.1	(FMT_LIM.2)	FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2	(FMT_LIM.1)	FMT_LIM.1
FPT_EMS.1	No Dependencies	

FPT_FLS.1	No Dependencies	
FPT_TST.1	No Dependencies	
FPT_PHP.3	No Dependencies	

Table 21 SFRs Dependencies

Rationale for the exclusion of Dependencies

The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/SHA is discarded. The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.

The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1 is discarded. The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.

The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1/EAC is discarded. The SFR FDP_UCT.1/EAC requires the use secure messaging between the MRTD and the GIS. There is no need for the SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.

The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1/EAC is discarded. The SFR FDP_UIT.1/EAC requires the use secure messaging between the MRTD and the GIS. There is no need for the SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.

9.3.3.2 SARs Dependencies

Requirements	CC Dependencies	Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1	(ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)	ADV_FSP.5 , ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5	(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)	ADV_IMP.1 , ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1	(ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1)	ADV_TDS.4 , ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2	(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1)	ADV_IMP.1 , ADV_TDS.4 , ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4	(ADV_FSP.5)	ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1	(ADV_FSP.1)	ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1	No Dependencies	

ALC_CMC.4	(ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and (ALC_LCD.1)	ALC_CMS.5 , ALC_DVS.2 , ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5	No Dependencies	
ALC_DEL.1	No Dependencies	
ALC_DVS.2	No Dependencies	
ALC_LCD.1	No Dependencies	
ALC_TAT.2	(ADV_IMP.1)	ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1	(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1)	ASE_ECD.1 , ASE_INT.1 , ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1	No Dependencies	
ASE_INT.1	No Dependencies	
ASE_OBJ.2	(ASE_SPD.1)	ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2	(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2)	ASE_ECD.1 , ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1	No Dependencies	
ASE_TSS.1	(ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and (ASE_REQ.1)	ADV_FSP.5 , ASE_INT.1 , ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2	(ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1)	ADV_FSP.5 , ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3	(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and (ATE_FUN.1)	ADV_ARC.1 , ADV_TDS.4 , ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1	(ATE_COV.1)	ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2	(ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and (ATE_FUN.1)	ADV_FSP.5 , AGD_OPE.1 , AGD_PRE.1 , ATE_COV.2 , ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5	(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and (AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_DPT.1)	ADV_ARC.1 , ADV_FSP.5 , ADV_IMP.1 , ADV_TDS.4 , AGD_OPE.1 , AGD_PRE.1 , ATE_DPT.3

Table 22 SARs Dependencies

9.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements

The EAL5 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.



9.3.5 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures

The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD's development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD's material.

The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL5 has no dependencies to other security requirements.

9.3.6 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfill the security objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.

The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:

- ADV_ARC.1 "Security architecture description"
- ADV_FSP.4 "Security-enforcing functional specification"
- ADV_TDS.3 "Basic modular design"
- ADV_IMP.1 "Implementation representation of the TSF"
- AGD_OPE.1 "Operational user guidance"
- AGD_PRE.1 "Preparative procedures"
- ATE_DPT.1 "Testing: basic design"

All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package

10 TOE Summary Specification

10.1 TOE Summary Specification

F.ACR - Access Control in Reading

This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:

- o Pre-personalization Agent keys,
- o Personalization Agent keys,
- o CA private key,
- o Document basic access keys,
- o Active Authentication Keys

Regarding the file structure:

In the Operational Use phase:

- o The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, (EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) only after EAC authentication and through a valid secure channel as defined by access conditions in [ICAO-9303].

In the Production and preparation stage:

The Manufacturer can read the Initialization Data in Stage 2 "Production". The pre-personalization agent and the Personalization Agent can read only the random identifier in Stage 3 "Preparation" stored in the TOE. Other data-elements can only be read after they are authenticated by the TOE (using their authentication keys).

It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime

F.ACW - Access Control in Writing

This function controls access to write functions (in NVM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.

Regarding the file structure:

In the Operational Use phase:

It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update any files (system or data files), except for CVCA which can be updated if the "Secure Messaging" access condition is verified by the subjects defined in FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.

In the Production and preparation stage:

The Manufacturer can write all the Initialization data and data for the Pre-personalization. The Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel all the data and Document Basic Access Keys, Chip Authentication Private Key, Active Authentication Keys and Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).



The Pre-Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel data to be used by the personalization agent (after it is authenticated by the TOE using its authentication keys). The Pre-personalization agent is only active after delivery. The key that is written in the TOE for authentication purposes during manufacturing is meant for the pre-personalization agent. The Pre-personalization agent (which is seen as a sub-role of the Personalization agent) will refresh this key.

F.AA - Active Authentication

This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in [ICAO-9303] (if it is activated by the personalizer).

F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information

This security function ensures clearing of sensitive information

- o Authentication state is securely cleared in case an error is detected or a new authentication is attempted
- o Authentication data related to GP authentication and EAC is securely cleared to prevent reuse
- o Session keys are securely erased in case an error is detected or the secure communication session is closed

F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support

This Security Function provides the following cryptographic features:

- o Key Generation based on ECDH with key sizes 192 to 521 bits.
- o Key Generation based on DH with key size 2048 bits.
- o RSA Key generation with key sizes 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096
- o ECKeyP generation with key sizes 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521
- o Hashing using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 meeting [FIPS_180_4]
- o Secure messaging (encryption and decryption) using:
 - Triple-DES in CBC mode (key size 112 bits)
 - AES in CBC mode (key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits)
- o Secure messaging (message authentication code) using:
 - Retail MAC with key size 112 bits
 - AES CMAC with key sizes 128, 192 and 256 bits
- o Digital signature verification using:
 - ECDSA with key sizes 192 to 521 bits.
 - RSA with key sizes 1280, 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096 bits.
- o Digital signature generation using:
 - ECDSA with key sizes 192 to 521 bits.
 - RSA with key sizes 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096 bits.
- o Deterministic random number generation specified by FCS_RNG.1 Quality metric for random numbers of [PTF-ST].

F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC

This TSF provides the Extended Access Control, authentication and session keys generation to be used by F.SM, as described in [TR-03110]. It also provides the following management functions:

- o Maintain the roles: Document Verifier, CVCA, Domestic EIS, Foreign EIS
- o Limit the ability to update the CVCA Public key and CVCA Certificate to the Country Verifying Certification Authority
- o Limit the ability to update the date to CVCA, Document Verifier and Domestic Extended Inspection System
- o Ensures only secure values are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 and the Access Control
- o The terminal whose name is set by the personalization agent is allowed to remove the digital blurring on images.

F.PERS - MRTD Personalization

This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization Agent, provides and requires authentication for data exchange. This function allows to:

- o Manage symmetric authentication using Personalization Agent keys,
- o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM,
- o Load user data,
- o Digitally blur the images in EF DG1 to EF DG8,
- o Set the name (or beginning of the name) of the terminal allowed to remove the digital blurring in phase 7
- o Load or create Chip Authentication Key,
- o Load or create Active Authentication Key,
- o Disable read access to Initialization Data,
- o Write initial CVCA Public Key, initial CVCA Certificate and initial current date
- o Write the document basic access keys,
- o Write the Document Security Object (SO d),

F.PHY - Physical Protection

This Security Function protects the TOE against physical attacks, so that the integrity and confidentiality of the TOE is ensured, including keys, user data, configuration data and TOE life cycle. It detects physical tampering, responds automatically, and also controls the emanations sent out by the TOE.

This Security Function also limits any physical emanations from the TOE so as to prevent any information leakage via these emanations that might reveal or provide access to sensitive data.

Furthermore, it prevents deploying test features after TOE delivery.

F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization

This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Manufacturer, provides and requires an authentication mechanism for data exchange.

- o Compute session keys to be used by F.SM,

- o Initialization of the TOE,
- o Load Personalization Agent keys in encrypted form,
- o Store the Initialization and Pre-Personalization data in audit records.

F.SM - Secure Messaging

This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the communication between the TOE and the interface device. In the operational phase, after a successful Authentication Procedure (i.e. CA), a secure channel is established. This security functionality also provides a Secure Messaging (SCP02 and SCP03) for the transmission of user data in Pre-personalization and Personalization phases. The protocols can be configured to protect the exchanges integrity and/or confidentiality. If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer or if the session is closed, the session keys are destroyed. This ensures protection against replay attacks as session keys are never reused.

F.SS - Safe State Management

This security functionality ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when:

- o a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in NVM).
- o an error due to self test as defined in FPT_TST.1.
- o any physical tampering is detected.

This security functionality ensures that if such a case occurs, the TOE either is switched in the state "kill card" or becomes mute.

F.STST - Self Test

This security function implements self test features through platform functionalities at reset as defined in FPT_TST.1 to ensure the integrity of the TSF and TSF data.

10.2 SFRs and TSS

10.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale

Class FAU Security Audit

FAU_SAS.1 is met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization

Class FCS Cryptographic Support

FCS_CKM.1/CA is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that generates keys after a successful authentication using F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support

FCS_CKM.1/AA is met by F.AA - Active Authentication and F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support

FCS_CKM.4 is met by F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information and F.SM - Secure Messaging that destroys the session keys upon closure of a secure messaging session.

FCS_COP.1/SHA is met by F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support.

FCS_COP.1/SYM is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the requirement.

FCS_COP.1/MAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that uses F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support maintain a secure messaging session as defined in the requirement.

FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that uses F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support for Terminal Authentication.

FCS_COP.1/AA is covered by F.AA - Active Authentication in association with F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support

FCS_RND.1 the deterministic random number generation specified by FCS_RNG.1 Quality metric for random numbers of [PTF-ST].

Class FIA Identification and Authentication

FIA_UID.1 is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that manages read access to data based on the current authentication state.

It is also met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that allows Chip Authentication.

FIA_UAU.1 is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that manages read access to data based on the current authentication state.

It is also met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that allows Chip Authentication.

FIA_UAU.4 is met by F.CLR_INFO Clear Residual Information that ensures all authentication data is securely erased to prevent reuse.

FIA_UAU.5/EAC is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that provides Terminal Authentication.

SFR is also met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that provides symmetric authentication.

The SFR is also met by F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization that provides manufacturer authentication

Finally, it is also met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that provides a secure messaging session.

FIA_UAU.6/EAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent through the secure communication channel after Chip Authentication.

FIA_API.1 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that provides Chip Authentication as defined by [TR-03110]

FIA_API.1/AA is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC that provides Chip Authentication as defined by [TR-03110]

Class FDP User Data Protection

FDP_ACC.1 is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current authentication state using authentication mechanisms provided by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC and F.PERS - MRTD Personalization

FDP_ACF.1 is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing and F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that control read and write access to the data based on the current authentication state using authentication mechanisms provided by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC and F.PERS - MRTD Personalization

FDP_UCT.1/EAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all data is sent through the secure communication channel after a successful Chip Authentication.

FDP_UIT.1/EAC is met by F.SM - Secure Messaging that ensures all messages are sent through the secure communication channel after Chip Authentication.

Class FMT Security Management

FMT_SMF.1 is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization that utilize F.ACW - Access Control in Writing to control write access via secure messaging provided by F.SM - Secure Messaging

FMT_SMR.1 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization and F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization. These roles are maintained by

means of the authentication states during the authentication mechanisms provided by the 3 Security Functions

FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization

FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization that allows the personalization agent to disable read access in F.ACR - Access Control in Reading

FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization

FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls access to updation of CVCA data by authentication through F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC

FMT_MTD.1/DATE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls access to updation of CVCA data by authentication through F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that controls write access based on F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization

FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization

FMT_MTD.1/AAPK is met by F.ACW - Access Control in Writing that ensures access conditions are met by way of authentication through F.PERS - MRTD Personalization

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ is met by F.ACR - Access Control in Reading that ensures the secret keys are never readable.

FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization

FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate_DBI is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC

FMT_MTD.1/DBI_Terminal is met by F.PERS - MRTD Personalization

FMT_MTD.3 is met by F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC

FMT_LIM.1 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection and F.SS - Safe State Management that ensure that no data can be manipulated or revealed and the TSF assumes a safe state in case any illegal attempts to do so are detected.

FMT_LIM.2 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection and F.SS - Safe State Management that ensure that no data can be manipulated or revealed and the TSF assumes a safe state in case any illegal attempts to do so are detected.

Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions

FPT_EMS.1 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection that prevents emanations beyond permissible limits to prevent any accidental revelation of data.

FPT_FLS.1 is met by F.SS - Safe State Management.

FPT_TST.1 is met by F.STST - Self Test that performs self tests to ensure integrity of the TSF

FPT_PHP.3 is met by F.PHY - Physical Protection that protects the TOE against any physical probing or tampering by using F.SS - Safe State Management in case any physical manipulation is detected.

10.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS

Security Functional Requirements	TOE Summary Specification
FAU_SAS.1	F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FCS_CKM.1/CA	F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1/AA	F.AA - Active Authentication, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.4	F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information
FCS_COP.1/SHA	F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/SYM	F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/MAC	F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER	F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/AA	F.AA - Active Authentication, F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FCS_RND.1	F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
FIA_UID.1	F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FIA_UAU.1	F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.EAC - Extended

	Access Control, EAC
FIA_UAU.4	F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information
FIA_UAU.5/EAC	F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.SM - Secure Messaging, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FIA_UAU.6/EAC	F.SM - Secure Messaging
FIA_API.1	F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FIA_API.1/AA	F.AA - Active Authentication
FDP_ACC.1	F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACF.1	F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FDP_UCT.1/EAC	F.SM - Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/EAC	F.SM - Secure Messaging
FMT_SMF.1	F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization, F.SM - Secure Messaging
FMT_SMR.1	F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA	F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS	F.ACR - Access Control in Reading, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI	F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD	F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_MTD.1/DATE	F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE	F.PERS - MRTD Personalization, F.ACW - Access Control in Writing
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK	F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK	F.ACW - Access Control in Writing, F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ	F.ACR - Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/Activate_DBI	F.PERS - MRTD Personalization

FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate DBI	F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_MTD.1/DBI Terminal	F.PERS - MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.3	F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC
FMT_LIM.1	F.SS - Safe State Management, F.PHY - Physical Protection
FMT_LIM.2	F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State Management
FPT_EMS.1	F.PHY - Physical Protection
FPT_FLS.1	F.SS - Safe State Management
FPT_TST.1	F.STST - Self Test
FPT_PHP.3	F.PHY - Physical Protection, F.SS - Safe State Management

Table 23 SFRs and TSS - Coverage

TOE Summary Specification	Security Functional Requirements
F.ACR - Access Control in Reading	FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
F.ACW - Access Control in Writing	FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
F.AA - Active Authentication	FCS_CKM.1/AA, FCS_COP.1/AA, FIA_API.1/AA
F.CLR_INFO - Clear Residual Information	FCS_CKM.4, FIA_UAU.4
F.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support	FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.1/AA, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FCS_COP.1/AA, FCS_RND.1
F.EAC - Extended Access Control, EAC	FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FIA_API.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.1/Deactivate DBI, FMT_MTD.3
F.PERS - MRTD Personalization	FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/AAPK, FMT_MTD.1/Activate DBI, FMT_MTD.1/DBI Terminal
F.PHY - Physical Protection	FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_PHP.3
F.PREP - MRTD Pre-personalization	FAU_SAS.1, FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
F.SM - Secure Messaging	FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FIA_UAU.5/EAC, FIA_UAU.6/EAC, FDP_UCT.1/EAC, FDP_UIT.1/EAC, FMT_SMF.1

F.SS - Safe State Management	FMT LIM.1 , FMT LIM.2 , FPT FLS.1 , FPT PHP.3
F.STST - Self Test	FPT TST.1

Table 24 TSS and SFRs - Coverage