



Maintenance Report

QNX[®] Neutrino[®] RTOS Secure Kernel 6.5.0

Issued by:

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Certification Body

Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme

© Government of Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada, 2011

Document number: 383-7-54-MR
Version: 1.0
Date: 17 January 2011
Pagination: 1 to 2

1 Introduction

QNX Software Systems has submitted (via EWA-Canada) the Impact Analysis Report (IAR) for QNX® Neutrino® RTOS Secure Kernel 6.5.0, satisfying the requirements outlined in the Version 1.7 of the Common Criteria document: Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to QNX® Neutrino® RTOS Secure Kernel 6.5.0 (the maintained Target of Evaluation), the evidence updated as a result of the changes and the security impact of the changes.

2 Description of changes to the TOE

The changes in the QNX® Neutrino® RTOS Secure Kernel 6.5.0 comprise bug fixes. For each change, it was verified that there were no required changes to the security functional requirements in the ST, and thorough functional and regression testing was conducted by the developer to ensure that the assurance in the Target of Evaluation (TOE) was maintained.

3 Description of Changes to the IT Environment

Changes to the underlying IT environment, in this case the addition of new hardware platforms, are permissible under assurance continuity provided that they do not change the certified TOE. QNX Software Systems subjected the TOE to complete regression testing on all new hardware platforms. New hardware platforms include:

- PPCBE Multicore
- ARM-Cortex-A

4 Affected developer evidence

Modifications to the product necessitated changes to a subset of the developer evidence that was previously submitted for the TOE. The set of affected developer evidence was identified in the IAR. Additional guidance documents for the newly supported hardware platforms are provided by the developer from their website.

5 Conclusions

All changes to the TOE were bug fixes. Through functional and regression testing of QNX® Neutrino® RTOS Secure Kernel 6.5.0 assurance gained in the original TOE certification was maintained. As all of the changes to the TOE have been classified as minor, it is the conclusion of the CB that the maintained TOE is appropriate for assurance continuity and re-evaluation is not required.

6 References

Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements, v1.7, February 2010.

CCS Guide #6, Technical Oversight for Assurance Continuity of a Certified TOE, v1.5,
October 2010.

[Certification report for QNX Neutrino Secure Kernel v6.4.0, 25 March, 2009](#)