

EAL 3+ Evaluation of Riverbed Cascade Profiler v9.6

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FOREWORD

The Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS) provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the CCS Certification Body, which is managed by the Communications Security Establishment Canada.

A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the CCS Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of *ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories*. Accreditation is performed under the Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN), administered by the Standards Council of Canada.

The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is EWA-Canada.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the CCS Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the security requirements.

This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 26 February 2013, and the security target identified in Section 0 of this report.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted on the CCS Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria Portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Project).

This certification report makes reference to the following registered trademark:

• Cascade is a registered trademark of Riverbed Technology.

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Executive Summary

Riverbed Cascade Profiler v9.6 (hereafter referred to as Cascade Profiler v9.6), from Riverbed Technology, is the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 3 augmented evaluation.

Cascade Profiler v9.6 is a software-only TOE which collects network flow and packet data and uses it to discover applications and track their performance. Administrators are alerted if there are any deviations from normal behavior. To troubleshoot a problem, authorized users can drill down through multi-resolution views, from macro flows at the top level for executive-level reporting, through application-level flows to micro flows (packet-based views) and full packet captures. An authorized user can also view a full graphical representation of network assets and their dependencies. These views help managers address critical IT challenges, such as network monitoring and troubleshooting, application performance, security threats and Wide Area Network (WAN) optimization and analysis.

EWA-Canada is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 07 February 2013 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme (CCS).

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for Cascade Profiler v9.6, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) to which it is asserted that the product satisfies its security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)¹ for this product provide sufficient evidence that it meets the EAL 3 augmented assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. The evaluation was conducted using the *Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3*, for conformance to the *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3*. The following augmentation is claimed: ALC_FLR.2 – Flaw Remediation.

Communications Security Establishment Canada, as the CCS Certification Body, declares that the Cascade Profiler v9.6 evaluation meets all the conditions of the *Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates* and that the product will be listed on the CCS

¹ The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.

Certified Products List (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Project).

1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) augmented evaluation is Riverbed Cascade Profiler v9.6 (hereafter referred to as Cascade Profiler v9.6), from Riverbed Technology.

2 **TOE Description**

Cascade Profiler v9.6 is a software-only TOE which collects network flow and packet data and uses it to discover applications and track their performance. Administrators are alerted if there are any deviations from normal behavior. To troubleshoot a problem, authorized users can drill down through multi-resolution views, from macro flows at the top level for executive-level reporting, through application-level flows to micro flows (packet-based views) and full packet captures. An authorized user can also view a full graphical representation of network assets and their dependencies. These views help managers address critical IT challenges, such as network monitoring and troubleshooting, application performance, security threats and WAN optimization and analysis.

Cascade Profiler v9.6 is separated into three components briefly described as follows:

- Cascade Profiler v9.6 software application performs the actual analysis of network traffic and data;
- Cascade Sensor used to gather data from the network and users. The Sensors retrieve and analyze actual network traffic on the wire; and
- Cascade Gateway collects network flows from infrastructure devices, combines them, and performs some limited pre-processing, encrypts the data, and then reports it to the Profilers.

Each product component can be deployed separately as a Profiler, Sensor, or Gateway or can be deployed as an all-in-one device that runs all of the TOE components on one machine.

The TOE supports secure communication between distributed TOE components and between the TOE and its remote administrators using FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography.

3 Evaluated Security Functionality

The complete list of evaluated security functionality for Cascade Profiler v9.6 is identified in Section 6 of the ST.

The following cryptographic module was evaluated to the FIPS 140-2 standard:

Cryptographic Module	Certificate #
OpenSSL FIPS Object Module v2.0rc1	1747

The following Government of Canada approved cryptographic algorithms were evaluated for correct implementation in Cascade Profiler v9.6:

Cryptographic Algorithm	Standard	Certificate #
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)	FIPS 197	1884
Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA)	ANSI X9.31	960
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)	FIPS 180-3	1655
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication	FIPS 198	1126
Code (HMAC)		
Random Number Generation (RNG)	ANSI X9.31	985
	Appendix A.2.4	
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)	FIPS 186-3	589

4 Security Target

The ST associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following nomenclature:

Title: Riverbed Technology Cascade Profiler v9.6 Security Target Version: 0.26

Date: 07 February 2013

5 Common Criteria Conformance

The evaluation was conducted using the *Common Methodology for Information Technology* Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, for conformance to the *Common Criteria for* Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3.

Cascade Profiler v9.6 is:

- a. *Common Criteria Part 2 extended*; with functional requirements based upon functional components in Part 2, except for the following explicitly stated requirements defined in the ST:
 - FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization,
 - FIA_UAU_EXT.5 Password-based Authentication Mechanism,
 - FPT_PTD_EXT.1 Management of TSF Data,

- FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update,
- FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated session locking,
- NPM_ANL_EXT.1 Analysis, and
- NPM_SDC_EXT.1 System data collection.
- b. *Common Criteria Part 3 conformant*, with security assurance requirements based only upon assurance components in Part 3; and
- c. *Common Criteria EAL 3 augmented*, containing all security assurance requirements in the EAL 3 package, as well as the following: ALC_FLR.2 Flaw Remediation.

6 Security Policy

Cascade Profiler v9.6 implements a role based access control policy to control access to TOE Security Function (TSF) data and administrative functions; details of this security policy can be found in Section 6 of the ST.

In addition, Cascade Profiler v9.6 implements policies pertaining to security audit, cryptographic support, identification and authentication, security management, protection of the TSF, TOE access, trusted path/channel, and network performance management. Further details on these security policies may be found in Section 6 of the ST.

7 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

Consumers of Cascade Profiler v9.6 should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

7.1 Secure Usage Assumptions

The following Secure Usage Assumption is listed in the ST:

• TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner.

7.2 Environmental Assumptions

The following Environmental Assumptions are listed in the ST:

- There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE.
- Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.

• The TOE will be provided a mechanism (through use of an NTP server) in order for the TOE to maintain the correct time.

7.3 Clarification of Scope

Cascade Profiler v9.6 offers protection against inadvertent or casual attempts to breach system security by unsophisticated attackers possessing basic attack potential. Cascade Profiler v9.6 is not intended for situations which involve determined attempts by hostile or well-funded attackers using sophisticated attack techniques.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration for Cascade Profiler v9.6 comprises the Cascade Profiler v9.6 software application build number 20120725_0914, OpenSSL FIPS Object Module v2.0rc1, and Apache Web Server software v2.2 pre-installed on the Cascade Profiler hardware appliance.

The publication entitled Riverbed Technology Cascade Profiler 9.6 Guidance Documentation Supplement Version 0.2 describes the procedures necessary to install and operate Cascade Profiler v9.6 in its evaluated configuration.

9 Documentation

The Riverbed Technology documents provided to the consumer are as follows:

- a. Cascade® Profiler, Express, Sensor and Gateway Appliances Quick Start Guide, March 2012;
- b. Cascade® Profiler, Express, Sensor and Gateway Appliance Installation Guide, 9.6, July 2012;
- c. Riverbed Cascaded Profiler 9.0 Release Notes, 9.0, February 2011;
- d. Cascade® Profiler and Cascade® Express Appliance User's Guide, 9.6, July 2012;
- e. Cascade® Sensor and Cascade® Gateway Appliance User's Guide, Version 9.6, July 2012; and
- f. Riverbed Technology Cascade Profiler v9.6 Guidance Documentation Supplement, Document Version: 0.2, August 7, 2012

10 Evaluation Analysis Activities

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of Cascade Profiler v9.6, including the following areas:

Development: The evaluators analyzed the Cascade Profiler v9.6 functional specification and design documentation; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the TSF subsystems and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the Cascade Profiler v9.6 security architectural description and determined that the initialization process is secure and that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass. The evaluators also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents are correct.

Guidance Documents: The evaluators examined the Cascade Profiler v9.6 preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Life-cycle support: An analysis of the Cascade Profiler v9.6 configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the Cascade Profiler v9.6 configuration items were clearly marked and that the access control measures as described in the configuration management documentation are effective in preventing unauthorized access to the configuration items. The developer's configuration management system was also observed during the site visit, and it was found to be mature and well-developed.

During the site visit the evaluators examined the development security procedures and determined that they detailed sufficient security measures for the development environment to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the Cascade Profiler v9.6 design and implementation. The evaluators confirmed that the developer used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle and that the life-cycle model provides for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the TOE.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of Cascade Profiler v9.6 during distribution to the consumer.

The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by Riverbed Technology for Cascade Profiler v9.6. During a site visit, the evaluators examined the evidence generated by adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded that the procedures are adequate to

track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and corrections to consumers of the product.

Vulnerability assessment: The evaluators conducted an independent vulnerability analysis of Cascade Profiler v9.6. Additionally, the evaluators conducted a review of public domain vulnerability databases, and a search of all evaluation deliverables. The evaluators identified potential vulnerabilities for testing applicable to Cascade Profiler v9.6 in its operational environment.

All these evaluation activities resulted in **PASS** verdicts.

11 ITS Product Testing

Testing at EAL 3 consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.

11.1 Assessment of Developer Tests

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR^2 .

The evaluators analyzed the developer's test coverage and depth analysis and found them to be complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification and TOE design was complete.

11.2 Independent Functional Testing

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance documentation, examining the developer's test documentation, executing a sample of the developer's test cases, and creating test cases that augmented the developer tests.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. Resulting from this test coverage approach is the following list of EWA-Canada test goals:

- a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The objective of this test goal is to repeat a subset of the developer's tests;
- b. Web Interface Access: The objective of this test case is to verify that logins to the web interface can be restricted to specific IP addresses;

 $^{^{2}}$ The ETR is a CCS document that contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.

- c. Concurrent Logins: The objective of this test case is to verify that multiple concurrent logins through the web interface with the same user is disallowed; and
- d. Unintended Power Loss: The objective of this test case is to verify that changes made to TSF data just before an unintended power loss will not remain intact if not confirmed.

11.3 Independent Penetration Testing

Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:

- a. Port Scan: The objective of this test goal is to scan the TOE using a port scanner to reveal any potential avenues of attack;
- b. Vulnerability Identification: The objective of this test goal is to scan the TOE for vulnerabilities using automated scanning tools; and
- c. Information Leakage Verification: The objective of this test goal is to monitor the TOE for leakage during start-up, shutdown, login, and other scenarios using a packet sniffer.

The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.

11.4 Conduct of Testing

Cascade Profiler v9.6 was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The testing took place at the Information Technology Security Evaluation and Test (ITSET) Facility at EWA-Canada. The CCS Certification Body witnessed a portion of the independent testing. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.

11.5 Testing Results

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, giving assurance that Cascade Profiler v9.6 behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification and TOE design.

12 Results of the Evaluation

This evaluation has provided the basis for an EAL 3+ level of assurance. The overall verdict for the evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

13 Evaluator Comments, Observations and Recommendations

The evaluated configuration requires that the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module v2.0rc1 operate in FIPS Mode.

14 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Initializations

Acronym/Abbreviation/	Description		
Initialization	-		
CCEF	Common Criteria Evaluation Facility		
CCS	Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and		
	Certification Scheme		
CPL	Certified Products list		
СМ	Configuration Management		
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level		
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report		
IT	Information Technology		
ITSET	Information Technology Security Evaluation		
	and Testing		
PALCAN	Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories		
	- Canada		
SFR	Security Functional Requirement		
ST	Security Target		
TOE	Target of Evaluation		
TSF	TOE Security Functionality		
WAN	Wide Area Network		

15 References

This section lists all documentation used as source material for this report:

- a. CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October 2010.
- b. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
- c. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
- d. Riverbed Technology Cascade Profiler v9.6 Security Target, version 0.26, 07 February 2013.

e. Evaluation Technical Report for EAL 3+ Common Criteria Evaluation of Riverbed Technology Riverbed Cascade Profiler v9.6 Document No. 1727-000-D002, version 1.2, 07 February 2013.