CCEVS APPROVED ASSURANCE CONTINUITY MAINTENANCE REPORT

ASSURANCE CONTINUITY MAINTENANCE REPORT FOR

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The Boeing Company Boeing Black with Hardware ID v.6.0.2 and PureSecure v1.3

Maintenance Report Number: CCEVS – VR-VID10615-2015b

Date of Activity: 3 April 2015

References:

Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Publication #6 "Assurance Continuity: Guidance for Maintenance and Re-evaluation" Version 2, September 8, 2008

Common Criteria Document CCIMB-2004-02-009 "Assurance Continuity: CCRA Requirements" Version 1, February 2004

The Boeing Company Boeing Black (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 1.1, March 2, 2015

The Boeing Company Boeing Black (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 1.2, March 30, 2015

Boeing PureSecure Administrator Guidance v.1.0.6 for PureSecure v.1.3, March 2, 2015

Boeing PureSecure Administrator Guidance v1.0.7 for PureSecure v1.3.1, March 30, 2015

Evaluation Technical Report for Boeing Black (MDFPP20), Version 0.3, February 20, 2015

Impact Analysis Report for The Boeing Company Boeing Black, Revision 1.1, March 30, 2015

Boeing PureSecure 1.3.1 Software Test Report, February 23, 2015 (Proprietary)

Affected Evidence:

Boeing PureSecure Administrator Guidance v.1.0.6 for PureSecure v.1.3, March 2, 2015

The Boeing Company Boeing Black (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 1.1, March 2, 2015.

Updated Developer Evidence:

The Boeing Company Boeing Black (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 1.2, March 30, 2015

Boeing PureSecure Administrator Guidance v1.0.7 for PureSecure v1.3.1, March 30, 2015

Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report:

Gossamer Security Solutions CCTL on behalf of The Boeing Company, submitted an Impact Analysis Report to CCEVS for approval. The IAR is intended to satisfy requirements outlined in Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Publication #6 "Assurance Continuity: Guidance for Maintenance and Re-evaluation" Version 2, September 8, 2008. In accordance with those requirements, the IAR describes the changes made to the certified TOE, the evidence that was updated as a result of those changes, and the security impact of those changes.

Changes to TOE:

The TOE has been updated in the following areas:

The TOE has been revised from the evaluated Boeing Black with Hardware ID v6.0.2 and PureSecure v1.3 to Boeing Black with Hardware ID v6.0.2 and PureSecure v1.3.1.

This release addresses the following:

1. Fixed a bug that was causing false self-test failures most prevalently when the device battery was low. The code change removed a single line of code that executed a redundant self-test.

The Security Target has been updated to identify the new version number and guidance document. No other changes were necessary to the Security Target to reflect the product change. Boeing PureSecure Administrator Guidance v1.0.6 for PureSecure 1.3 has been updated to identify the new version.

Vendor Conclusion:

The Boeing Black was revised to fix a bug. PureSecure v1.3.1 removes a redundant check of the result of the secure element (SE) self-test. The check removed was a redundant self-test check and the required self-test check still exists. Since the SE is running in FIPS mode, it performs self-tests internally upon power on. If the internal self-test fails then the SE will transition to the terminated state. If there is a failure in the self-test the system will have detected the fault and reacted before Android has booted enough to check the result. Although this is related to a security function requirement, the change addressed a redundant check and the required check still exists.

Validation Team Conclusion:

The validation team examination of the bug fix found that although the fix was related to a security functional requirement in the Security Target, that the bug fix could be considered a minor change. The fix applied to the TOE software did not affect the functionality consistent with the certified functionality. To support this claim, the vendor developed and performed their standard regression test cases to ensure the changes did not negatively impact the existing functionality. NIAP has reviewed the vendors regression testing and considers it sufficient.

The validation team reviewed the changes and concur the changes are minor and that certificate maintenance is the correct path for assurance continuity as defined in Scheme Process #6. Therefore, CCEVS agrees that the original assurance is maintained for the above cited version of the product.