National Information Assurance Partnership

Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme

TM

Validation Report

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

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Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6

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1 Executive Summary

This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Galaxy Devices on Android 6 solution provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.

The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was completed in June 2016. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.

The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6 (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 0.6, May 10, 2016 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.

2 Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities that are interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Validated Products List.

Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:

- The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
- The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
- The conformance result of the evaluation.
- The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.

Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers

Item	Identifier
Evaluation Scheme	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE:	Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6
Protection Profile	Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September 2014
ST:	Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6 (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 0.6, May 10, 2016
Evaluation Technical Report	Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6, version 0.4, June 1, 2016
CC Version	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, rev 4
Conformance Result	CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor	Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Developer	Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria Testing Lab (CCTL)	Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators	Meredith Hennan Jerome Myers Aerospace Corporation

3 Architectural Information

Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security Target.

The TOE is a mobile operating system based on Android 6.0.1 with modifications made to increase the level of security provided to end users and enterprises. The TOE is intended to be used as part of an enterprise messaging solution providing mobile staff with enterprise connectivity.

The TOE includes a Common Criteria mode (or "CC mode") that an administrator can invoke through the use of an MDM or through a dedicated administrative application (see the Guidance for instructions to obtain the application). The TOE must meet the following prerequisites in order for an administrator to transition the TOE to CC mode.

- Require a screen lock password (swipe, PIN, pattern, or facial recognition screen locks are not allowed).
- The maximum password failure retry policy should be less than or equal to ten.
- Device encryption must be enabled or a screen lock password required to decrypt data on boot.
- Revocation checking must be enabled.
- External storage must be encrypted.
- Password recovery policy must not be enabled.
- Password history length must not be set.

When CC mode has been enabled, the TOE behaves as follows.

- The TOE sets the system wide Android CC mode property to "Enabled" if all the prerequisites have been met.
- The TOE performs power-on self-tests.
- The TOE performs secure boot integrity checking of the kernel and key system executables.
- The TOE prevents loading of custom firmware/kernels and requires all updates occur through FOTA (Samsung's Firmware Over The Air firmware update method)
- The TOE uses CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers when joining and communicating with wireless networks.
- The TOE utilizes CAVP approved cryptographic ciphers for TLS.
- The TOE ensures FOTA updates utilize 2048-bit PKCS #1 RSA-PSS formatted signatures (with SHA-512 hashing).

The TOE includes a containerization capability, KNOX. This container provides a way to segment applications and data into two separate areas on the device, such as a personal area and a work area, each with its own separate apps, data and security policies. For this effort the TOE was evaluated both without and with a KNOX container created (and to create a KNOX container, one must purchase an additional license). Thus, the evaluation includes several KNOX-specific claims that apply to a KNOX container when created.

There are different models of the TOE, the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6. These models differ physically in their internal components (as described in the table below) in addition to the following functional differences.

1. The Galaxy S6 does not support external SD cards.

The model numbers of the mobile device used during the evaluation are as follows:

Device Name	Model Number	Chipset/CPU	Build Arch/ISA	Android Version	Kernel Version	Build Number
Galaxy Note 4	SM-N910F	Qualcomm APQ8084	ARMv7	6.0.1	3.10.40	MMB29M
Galaxy Note 4	SM-N910C	Exynos 5433	ARMv7	6.0.1	3.10.9	MMB29K
Galaxy S6 Edge	SM-G925V	Exynos 7420	A64	6.0.1	3.10.61	MMB29K
Galaxy S7 Edge	SM-G935F	Exynos 8890	A64	6.0.1	3.18.14	MMB29K
Galaxy S7 Edge	SM-G935A	Qualcomm MSM8996	A64	6.0.1	3.18.20	MMB29M

Based on the evaluated devices, a number of other devices are being claimed through equivalence. These claimed devices have all previously been evaluated or claimed in prior evaluations with Android 5 (Lollipop) installed and are utilizing the same hardware as one of the models that have been tested directly. The following table lists these claimed models. The differences between the evaluated devices and the equivalent ones do not relate to security claims in the evaluated configuration. The Wi-Fi chipsets are the same for each series of common devices.

Evaluated Device	Processor	Equivalent Devices	Differences
Galaxy S7 Edge (Qualcomm)	Qualcomm MSM8996	Galaxy S7 (Qualcomm)	Curved screen vs. Flat screen
Galaxy S7 Edge (Qualcomm)	Qualcomm MSM8996	Galaxy S7 Active (Qualcomm)	Curved screen vs. Flat screen S7 Active has a IP68 & MIL-STD-810G certified body No fingerprint sensor
Galaxy S7 Edge (System LSI)	Exynos 8890	Galaxy S7 (System LSI)	Curved screen vs. Flat screen
Galaxy S6	Exynos 7420	Galaxy S6 Edge	Flat screen vs. Curved screen
Galaxy S6	Exynos 7420	Galaxy S6 Edge+	Flat screen vs. Curved screen Edge+ is larger
Galaxy S6	Exynos 7420	Galaxy Note 5	Note 5 is larger Note 5 includes stylus & functionality to take advantage of it for input (not security related)
Galaxy S6	Exynos 7420	Galaxy S6 Active	S6 Active has a IP68 & MIL-STD-810G certified body No fingerprint sensor
Galaxy Note 4 (Qualcomm)	Qualcomm APQ8084	Galaxy Note Edge (Qualcomm)	Flat screen vs. Curved screen

The following table shows the Security software versions for all the devices.

Device Name	MDF Version	MDF Release	VPN v1.4 Release	KNOX Release
All Devices	2.0	6	6.0	2.6

The devices include a final letter or number at the end of the name that denotes that the device is for a specific carrier (for example, V = Verizon Wireless and A = AT&T, which were used during the evaluation). The following list of letters/numbers denotes the specific models which may be validated:

V – Verizon Wireless,
P - Sprint,
R4 – US Cellular,
S – SK Telecom,
L – LG Uplus,
K - KT, Korea Telecom
A – AT&T,
T – T-Mobile,
C/I/F - International

For each device there are specific models which are validated. This table lists the specific carrier models which have the validated configuration.

Device Name	Base Model Number	Carrier Models
Galaxy S7 (Qualcomm)	SM-G930	T, P, R4, V, A
Galaxy S7 (System LSI)	SM-G930	F, S, K, L
Galaxy S7 Edge (Qualcomm)	GM-G935	A, T, P, R4, V
Galaxy S7 Edge (System LSI)	GM-G935	F, S, K, L
Galaxy S7 Active	SM-G891	A, None
Galaxy S6 Edge+	SM-G928	F, I, A, T, P, R4, V, S, K, L
Galaxy Note 5	SM-N920	I, A, T, P, R4, V, S, K, L
Galaxy S6	SM-G920	F, I, A, T, P, R4, V, S, K, L
Galaxy S6 Edge	SM-G925	F, I, A, T, P, R4, V, S, K, L
Galaxy S6 Active	SM-G890	A, None
Galaxy Tab S2 8” Wi-Fi	SM-T710	None
Galaxy Tab S2 8” LTE (EU Open)	SM-T715	None
Galaxy Tab S2 10” Wi-Fi	SM-T810	None
Galaxy Tab S2 10” LTE (EU/AU Open)	SM-T815	None
Galaxy Tab S2 10” LTE (US Models)	SM-T817	A, T, V
Galaxy Note 4 (Qualcomm)	SM-N910	F, A, T, P, R4, V
Galaxy Note 4 (System LSI)	SM-N910	C, S, K, L
Galaxy Note Edge (Qualcomm)	SM-N915	F, A, T, P, R4, V
Galaxy Note Edge (System LSI)	SM-N915	S, K, L

Where “None” is listed that means a device without a carrier model designation suffix can also be placed into the validated configuration.

3.1 TOE Architecture

The TOE combines with a Mobile Device Management solution that enables the enterprise to watch, control and administer all deployed mobile devices, across multiple mobile service providers as well as facilitate secure communications through a VPN. This partnership provides a secure mobile environment that can be managed and controlled by the environment and reduce the risks that can be introduced through a Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) model.

Data on the TOE is protected through the implementation of Samsung On-Device Encryption (ODE) which utilizes a CAVP certified cryptographic algorithms to encrypt device storage. This functionality is combined with a number of on-device policies including local wipe, remote wipe, password complexity, automatic lock and privileged access to security configurations to prevent unauthorized access to the device and stored data.

The Samsung Enterprise Software Development Kit (SDK) builds on top of the existing Android security model by expanding the current set of security configuration of options to more than 390 configurable policies and including additional security functionality such as application whitelisting and blacklisting.

KNOX provides the ability to enhance the BYOD model by creating a separate container for the Enterprise. Within this container, the Enterprise can provision separate applications and ensure they are kept separate from anything the user may do outside the KNOX container. The Enterprise can use policy controls to manage the device as a whole or the KNOX container specifically, as needed by the organization.

3.2 Physical Boundaries

The TOE is a multi-user operating system based on Android (6.0.1) that incorporates the Samsung Enterprise SDK. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the operating system, but does include controls that limit application behavior. The TOE is used as a mobile device within an enterprise environment where the configuration of the device is managed through a compliant device management solution.

The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data networks to establish network connectivity, and the through that connectivity interacts with MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.

4 Security Policy

This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:

1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access

7. Trusted path/channels

4.1 Cryptographic support

The TOE includes a cryptographic module with CAVP certified algorithms for a wide range of cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key generation and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement security protocols such as TLS, IPsec, and HTTPS and also to encrypt the media (including the generation and protection of data and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications running on the TOE.

4.2 User data protection

The TOE is designed to control access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE is designed to protect user and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The functionality provided by a KNOX container enhances the security of user data by providing an additional layer of separation between apps and data while the device is in use.

4.3 Identification and authentication

The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display and the frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords between 4 and 16 characters are supported.

The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can use X509v3 and validate certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec exchanges.

4.4 Security management

The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it removes all MDM policies and disables CC mode.

4.5 Protection of the TSF

The TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It is also designed to protect itself from modification by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another to protect those applications.

The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.

4.6 TOE access

The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when users unlock the TOE for use.

The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.

4.7 Trusted path/channels

The TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec to secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.

5 Assumptions

The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2, 17 September 2014 (MDFPP). That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP should be consulted if there is interest in that material.

6 Clarification of Scope

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.

Note that:

- As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and performed by the evaluation team).
- This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
- This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not "obvious" or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an "obvious" vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
- The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the MDFPP and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.

7 Documentation

The following documentation was used as evidence for the evaluation of the Galaxy Devices on Android 6:

- Samsung Android 6 on Galaxy Devices Guidance Documentation, version 2.4, April 19, 2016
- Samsung Android 6 on Galaxy Devices User Guidance Documentation, version 2.4, March 23, 2016

Any additional customer documentation delivered with the product or available through download was not included in the scope of the evaluation and hence should not be relied upon when using the products as evaluated.

8 IT Product Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived from information contained in the Detailed Test Report (MDFPP20) for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6, version 0.3, June 1, 2016 (DTR), and summarized in the Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP20) For Samsung Electronics Co., LTD. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6, version 0.4, June 01, 2016 (AAR), which is publically available.

The following diagrams depict the test environments used by the evaluators.



Figure 1 Evaluator Test Setup 1



Figure 2 Evaluator Test Setup 2

8.1 Developer Testing

No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.

8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing

The evaluation team verified the product according the Samsung Android 6 on Galaxy Devices Guidance Documentation, version 2.4, April 19, 2016 and Samsung Android 6 on Galaxy Devices User Guidance Documentation, version 2.4, March 23, 2016 documents and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP.

9 Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration consists of the Galaxy Devices on Android 6.

To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in Samsung Android 6 on Galaxy Devices Guidance Documentation, version 2.4, April 19, 2016 and Samsung Android 6 on Galaxy Devices User Guidance Documentation, version 2.4, March 23, 2016.

10 Results of the Evaluation

The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the MDFPP.

10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)

The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the Galaxy Devices on Android 6 on Android 6 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)

The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)

The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,

the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)

The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)

The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the Assurance Activities Report.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)

The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the proprietary Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities including the following terms: Samsung Note 4, Galaxy Note 4, Note 4, Galaxy S6, Samsung S6, S6, Galaxy S7, Samsung S7, S7, Knox, Samsung, and Android. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual vulnerability.

The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: "Samsung Note 4", "Galaxy Note 4", "Note 4", "Galaxy S6", "Samsung S6", "S6", "Galaxy S7", "Samsung S7", "S7", "Knox", "Samsung", "Android".

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results

The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

11 Validator Comments/Recommendations

The evaluated configuration requires that software updates to the TOE be restricted to FOTA. The evaluators were unable to directly exercise this mechanism since it would have involved placing invalid updates on the live public servers that are currently in use by present customers. Hence, the evaluators had to take the products out of the evaluated configuration to test the update features.

The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration of the device(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the SFR's within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the devices, to include software that was not part of the evaluated configuration, needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

Furthermore, the evaluation includes several KNOX-specific claims that apply to a KNOX container when created, which requires purchase of an additional license.

12 Annexes

Not applicable

13 Security Target

The Security Target is identified as: *Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6 (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 0.6, May 10, 2016*.

14 Glossary

The following definitions are used throughout this document:

- **Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL)**. An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.

- **Conformance**. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
- **Evaluation**. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
- **Evaluation Evidence**. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
- **Feature.** Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
- **Target of Evaluation (TOE)**. A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
- **Validation**. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
- **Validation Body**. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.

15 Bibliography

The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:

[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012

[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012

[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102

[4] Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September 2014

[5] Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6 (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 0.6, May 10, 2016 (ST)

[6] Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP20) for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6, version 0.4, June 1, 2016 (AAR)

[7] Detailed Test Report (MDFPP20) for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 6, version 0.3, June 1, 2016 (DTR)