National Information Assurance Partnership

Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme



Validation Report

for

Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update)

Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10752-2017 Dated: April 12, 2017 Version: 1.0

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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1 Executive Summary

This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent for that enduser to determine the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their environment. Endusers should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific security claims are made, as well as this Validation Report (VR), which describes how those security claims were evaluated, tested, and any restrictions that may be imposed upon the evaluated configuration, to help in that determination. Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 4 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.

This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the evaluation of Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update) and Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) with Microsoft Surface Book, Microsoft Surface Pro 4, Microsoft Surface Pro 3, Microsoft Surface 3, Microsoft Surface 3 with LTE, Microsoft Lumia 950, Microsoft Lumia 950 XL, Microsoft Lumia 650, HP Elite x3, and Dell Latitude 5580. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST.

The evaluation of Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update) and Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) with Microsoft Surface Book, Microsoft Surface Pro 4, Microsoft Surface Pro 3, Microsoft Surface 3, Microsoft Surface 3 with LTE, Microsoft Lumia 950, Microsoft Lumia 950 XL, Microsoft Lumia 650, HP Elite x3, and Dell Latitude 5580 was performed by Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, in the United States and was completed in April 2017. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 3.1, revision 4 and the assurance activities specified in the *Protection Profile for Mobility Device Fundamentals*, version 2.0. The evaluation was consistent with NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) policies and practices as described on their web site (www.niap-ccevs.org).

The Leidos evaluation team determined that Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update) and Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) with Microsoft Surface Book, Microsoft Surface Pro 4, Microsoft Surface Pro 3, Microsoft Surface 3, Microsoft Surface 3 with LTE, Microsoft Lumia 950, Microsoft Lumia 950 XL, Microsoft Lumia 650, HP Elite x3, and Dell Latitude 5580 is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile (PP) and, when installed, configured and operated as specified in the evaluated guidance documentation, satisfied all of the security functional requirements stated in the ST. The information in this VR is largely derived from the publically available Assurance Activities Report (AAR) and the associated proprietary test report produced by the Leidos evaluation team.

The TOE is a hardware and software solution that consists of Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update) and Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) editions running on the following devices:

- Microsoft Surface Book, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro
- Microsoft Surface Pro 4, Windows 10 Enterprise and Pro
- Microsoft Surface Pro 3, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro
- Microsoft Surface 3, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro
- Microsoft Surface 3 with LTE, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro
- Microsoft Lumia 950, Windows 10 Mobile
- Microsoft Lumia 950 XL, Windows 10 Mobile

- Microsoft Lumia 650, Windows 10 Mobile
- HP Elite x3, Windows 10 Mobile
- Dell Latitude 5580, Windows 10 Enterprise and Pro

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation evidence, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the evaluation results produced by the evaluation team. The validation team found that the evaluation results showed that all assurance activities specified in the claimed PP had been completed successfully and that the product satisfied all of the security functional and assurance requirements as stated in the ST. Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.

| Item | Identifier |
|------------------------|--|
| Evaluated Product | Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) Pro Edition (64-bit version) |
| | Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) Enterprise Edition (64-bit version) |
| | Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update) |
| Sponsor & Developer | Michael Grimm Microsoft Corporation |
| CCTL | Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory 6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive Columbia, MD 21046 |
| Completion Date | April 2017 |
| CC | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 |
| Interpretations | There were no applicable interpretations used for this evaluation. |
| СЕМ | Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 |
| РР | Protection Profile for Mobility Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0 |
| Evaluation Class | None |
| Disclaimer | The information contained in this Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) mobile devices by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of Microsoft Windows 10 mobile devices is either expressed or implied. |
| Evaluation Personnel | Gregory Beaver Gary Grainger Kevin Steiner |

Table 1: Evaluation Details

| Item | Identifier |
|----------------------|--|
| Validation Personnel | Stelios Melachrinoudis, Lead Validator |
| | Jean Petty, Senior Validator |

2 Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliant List (PCL).

The following table identifies the evaluated Security Target and TOE.

| Name | Description |
|-------------------------|---|
| ST Title | Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) and Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update) Security Target |
| ST Version | 0.08 |
| Publication Date | March 24, 2017 |
| Vendor and ST Author | Microsoft |
| TOE Reference | Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) |
| TOE Hardware | Microsoft Surface Book, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro |
| Models | Microsoft Surface Pro 4, Windows 10 Enterprise and Pro |
| | Microsoft Surface Pro 3, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro |
| | Microsoft Surface 3, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro |
| | Microsoft Surface 3 with LTE, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro |
| | Microsoft Lumia 950, Windows 10 Mobile |
| | Microsoft Lumia 950 XL, Windows 10 Mobile |
| | Microsoft Lumia 650, Windows 10 Mobile |
| | HP Elite x3, Windows 10 Mobile |
| | Dell Latitude 5580, Windows 10 Enterprise and Pro |
| TOE Software | Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) Pro Edition (64-bit version) |
| Version | Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) Enterprise Edition (64-bit version) |
| | Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update) |
| Keywords | Mobility Device |

2.1 Threats

The ST identifies the following threats that the TOE and its operational environment are intended to counter:

• If positioned on a wireless communications channel or elsewhere on the network, attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the Mobile Device and other endpoints.

- An attacker may initiate communications with the Mobile Device or alter communications between the Mobile Device and other endpoints.
- Loss of confidentiality of user data and credentials may be a result of an attacker gaining physical access to a Mobile Device.
- Malicious or exploitable code could be used knowingly or unknowingly by a developer, possibly resulting in the capability of attacks against the platform's system software.
- An attacker gains and continues to have access the device, resulting it loss of integrity and possible control by both an adversary and legitimate owner.

2.2 Organizational Security Policies

There are no Organizational Security Policies for the Mobile Device protection profile.

3 Architectural Information

The TOE is a hardware and software solution that consists of Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) Operating System editions running on the following devices:

- **Microsoft Surface Book**, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro, 64-bit, Intel Core i7, Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
- **Microsoft Surface Pro 4**, Windows 10 Enterprise and Pro, 64-bit, Intel Core i7, Marvell 8897, IEEE 801.11 Wi-Fi b/g/n adapter, Intel TPM 2.0, Bluetooth 4.0
- **Microsoft Surface Pro 3**, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro, 64-bit, Intel Core i7, Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
- **Microsoft Surface 3**, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro, 64-bit, Intel Atom Z8700, Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
- **Microsoft Surface 3 with LTE**, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro, 64-bit, Intel Atom Z8700, LTE, Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, 3G/4G Mobile Broadband (GSM, HSPA and LTE protocol support), Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0 [one variant for Verizon networks, one variant which is SIM-unlocked]
- **Microsoft Lumia 950**, Windows 10 Mobile, Qualcomm Snapdragon 808, GSM, WCDMA, LTE, Qualcomm WCN3620, IEEE 801.11 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Qualcomm TPM 2.0, Bluetooth 4.1
- Microsoft Lumia 950 XL, Windows 10 Mobile, Qualcomm Snapdragon 810, GSM, WCDMA, LTE, Qualcomm WCN3620, IEEE 801.11 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Qualcomm TPM 2.0, Bluetooth 4.1
- Microsoft Lumia 650, Windows 10 Mobile, Qualcomm Snapdragon 210, GSM, WCDMA, LTE, Qualcomm WCN3620, IEEE 801.11 Wi-Fi b/g/n adapter, Qualcomm TPM 2.0
- HP Elite x3, Windows 10 Mobile, Qualcomm Snapdragon 820, GSM, WCDMA, LTE, Qualcomm MSM8996, IEEE 801.11 Wi-Fi a/c adapter, Qualcomm TPM 2.0
- **Dell Latitude 5580**, Windows 10 Enterprise and Pro, 64-bit, Intel Core i7, Intel 8265 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Nuvoton TPM 2.0

The Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update) and Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) editions are preemptive multitasking, multiprocessor, and multi-user operating systems. In general, operating systems provide users with a convenient interface to manage underlying hardware. They control the allocation and manage computing resources such as processors, memory, and Input/Output (I/O) devices. Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update) and Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) also referred to as "Windows", expands these basic operating system capabilities to controlling the allocation and managing higher level IT resources such as security principals (user or machine accounts), files, printing objects, services, window station, desktops, cryptographic keys, network ports traffic, directory objects, and web content. Multi-user operating systems such as Windows keep track of which user is using which resource, grant resource requests, account for resource usage, and mediate conflicting requests from different programs and users.

The TOE includes the following variants of Windows:

- Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) Pro Edition (64-bit version)
- Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) Enterprise Edition (64-bit version)
- Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update)

Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update)

The TOE includes both physical and logical boundaries. Its operational environment is that of a networked environment with IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), mobile broadband networks (3G/4G and LTE), and Bluetooth networks.

The Security Functional Requirements were evaluated with respect to the TOE configurations listed above; however, there are a few variations in requirement specifics and applicability between the Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update) Edition-based TOEs (Mobile Edition) and the Windows 10 Pro and Enterprise Edition-based (Anniversary Update) TOEs. These differences are summarized in the following table:

| SFR | Windows 10 Mobile | Windows 10 Enterprise and Pro |
|-----------------|---|--|
| FAU_GEN.1 | Was not included in this evaluation. | Was included in this evaluation. |
| FAR_SAR.1 | Was not included in this evaluation. | Was included in this evaluation. |
| FAU_SEL.1 | Was not included in this evaluation. | Was included in this evaluation. |
| FAU_STG.1 | Was not included in this evaluation. | Was included in this evaluation. |
| FAU_STG.4 | Was not included in this evaluation. | Was included in this evaluation. |
| FCS_COP.1(PBKD) | The iteration count is 3,300. | The iteration count is 8,000. |
| FDP_DAR_EXT.1 | Data at rest encryption uses AES-CBC. | Data at rest encryption can use either AES-CBC or AES-XTS. |
| FDP_DAR_EXT.2 | Was included in this evaluation. | Was not included in this evaluation. |
| FMT_SMF_EXT.2 | Will offer to wipe protected data when being unenrolled, in addition to alerting the administrator and removing Enterprise applications. | Only alerts the administrator and removes Enterprise applications upon unenrollment. |

4 Assumptions

The ST identifies the following assumptions about the use of the product:

- It is assumed that the TOE's security functions are configured correctly in a manner to ensure that the TOE security policies will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.
- It is assumed that the mobile user will immediately notify the administrator if the Mobile Device is lost or stolen.
- It is assumed that the mobile user exercises precautions to reduce the risk of loss or theft of the Mobile Device.

4.1 Clarification of Scope

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:

- 1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the claimed PPs and performed by the evaluation team).
- 2. This evaluation covers only the specific device models, operating system editions, and software versions identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. For example, functionality that is offered in Windows 10 Home edition was not evaluated.
- 3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the product were not covered by this evaluation. Any additional non-security related functional capabilities of the product, even those described in the ST, were not covered by this evaluation.
- 4. Accordingly, the functionality offered by applications outside the Windows Store was not tested. The MDFPP has requirements it places on TOE system services that applications can leverage and this evaluation used only apps from the Windows Store to comply with those requirements. In particular, users and administrators should install applications from the Windows Store or via an MDM; otherwise the device will be outside the evaluated configuration.
- 5. Windows implements IPsec however it was not included in the Mobile Device Fundamentals PP evaluation because there is a separate protection profile for IPsec VPN clients. The native IPsec functionality provided by Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) has been evaluated against the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.4, 21 October 2013 (VID10753).
- 6. Device manufacturers, OS developers, and mobile carriers provide many applications that provide capabilities outside of what is required in the MDF PP. AVA_VAN.1 in Section 6.6 of MDFPP V2.0 limits the scope of vulnerability search activities. Hence, identifying and inspecting data collected and transmitted by applications is beyond the scope of MDFPP V2.0.
- 7. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not "obvious" or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an "obvious" vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.

5 Security Policy

The TOE enforces the following security policies as described in the ST.

5.1 Security Audit

Windows 10 has the ability to collect audit data, review audit logs, protect audit logs from overflow, and restrict access to audit logs. Audit information generated by the system includes the date and time of the event, the user identity that caused the event to be generated, and other event specific data. Authorized administrators can review audit logs and have the ability to search and sort audit records. Authorized Administrators can also configure the audit system to include or exclude potentially auditable events to be audited based on a wide range of characteristics. In the context of this evaluation, the protection profile requirements cover generating audit events, selecting which events should be audited, and providing secure storage for audit event entries.

5.2 Cryptographic Support

Windows provides CAVP validated cryptographic functions that support encryption/decryption, cryptographic signatures, cryptographic hashing, cryptographic key agreement (which is not studied in this evaluation), and random number generation. The TOE additionally provides support for public keys, credential management and certificate validation functions and provides support for the National Security Agency's Suite B cryptographic algorithms. Windows also provides a key isolation service designed to limit the potential exposure of secret and private keys. In addition to using cryptography for its own security functions, Windows offers access to the cryptographic support functions for user-mode and kernel-mode programs. Public key certificates generated and used by Windows to authenticate users and machines as well as protect both user and system data in transit.

- *Software-based disk encryption:* Windows implements BitLocker to provide encrypted data storage for fixed and removable volumes and protects the disk volume's encryption key with one or more intermediate keys and authorization factor
- *IPsec:* Windows implements IPsec to provide protected, authenticated, confidential, and tamper-proof networking between two peer computers.¹

5.3 User Data Protection

In the context of this evaluation Windows protects user data at rest and provides secure storage of X.509v3 certificates.

5.4 Identification and Authentication

In the context of this evaluation, Windows provides the ability to use, store, and protect X.509 certificates that are used for TLS and authenticates the user to their mobile device.

5.5 Security Management

Windows includes several functions to manage security policies. Policy management is controlled through a combination of access control, membership in administrator groups, and privileges.

¹ Windows implements IPsec however it was not included in the Mobile Device Fundamentals PP evaluation because there is a separate protection profile for IPsec VPN clients.

5.6 Protection of the TSF

Windows provides a number of features to ensure the protection of TOE security functions. Windows protects against unauthorized data disclosure and modification by using a suite of Internet standard. Windows ensures process isolation security for all processes through private virtual address spaces, execution context, and security context. The Windows data structures defining process address space, execution context, memory protection, and security context are stored in protected kernel-mode memory. Windows includes self-testing features that ensure the integrity of executable program images and its cryptographic functions. Finally, Windows provides a trusted update mechanism to update Windows binaries itself.

5.7 TOE Access

Windows provides the ability for a user to lock their session either immediately or after a defined interval. Windows constantly monitors the mouse, keyboard, and touch display for activity and locks the computer after a set period of inactivity. Windows allows an authorized administrator to configure the system to display a logon banner before the logon dialog.

5.8 Trusted Path/Channels

Windows uses a suite of protocols to provide a Virtual Private Network Connection (VPN) between itself, acting as a VPN client, and a VPN gateway in addition to providing protected communications for HTTPS and TLS.

6 Documentation

Microsoft offers a number of guidance documents along with a CC-specific supplemental document describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance for subsequent use and administration of the applicable security features.

The guidance documentation examined during the course of the evaluation and delivered with the TOE is as follows:

• Microsoft Windows Common Criteria Evaluation Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) Mobile Device Operational Guidance, Version 1.0, March 16, 2017.

The above document is considered to be part of the evaluated TOE. Any additional customer documentation delivered with the TOE or made available through electronic downloads should not be relied upon for using the TOE in its evaluated configuration.

The Security Target used is:

• *Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) and Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update) Security Target, Version 0.08, March 24, 2017.*

7 Independent Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information contained in the following proprietary documents:

• Windows 10 Anniversary Update Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures for Mobility Device Fundamentals PP, Version 1.1, March 8, 2017

A non-proprietary version of the tests performed and samples of the evidence that was generated is summarized in the following document:

• Microsoft Windows 10 Anniversary Update with Microsoft Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3, Surface 3, Surface 3 with LTE, Lumia 950, Lumia 950 XL, Lumia 650, HP Elite x3, and Dell Latitude 5580 Common Criteria Assurance Activities Report, Version 1.1 March 31, 2017

The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE security functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product claiming conformance to PP MDF v2.0.

The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Assurance Activities specified in PP MDF. The Test Plan described how each test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment. The evaluation team executed the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the results in the team test report listed above.

Testing of the TOE was performed from August 29, 2016 through September 2, 2016 and January 9, 2017 through January 13, 2017 on developer site in Redmond, WA and July 14, 2016 through January 20, 2017 at the Leidos CCTL in Columbia, MD. During the onsite the evaluator was given full access to the TOE and developer test tools to use throughout testing.

Prior to testing, the evaluation team performed an onsite evaluation per NIAP Labgram #078/Valgram #098: CCTL Evaluation Test Requirements. The vendor site controlled access to the test facility. Only the employees who were involved in testing were allowed in the testing facility. The testing was performed on an isolated network to prevent tampering. The test environment was verified to be functioning properly before being used as part of testing.

The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed and configured the TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test Plan on equipment configured in the testing laboratory.

Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the testing requirements for PP MDF v2.0 were fulfilled.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated version of the TOE consists of the following software and hardware device combinations.

TOE Software Identification: The following Windows Operating System editions are included in the evaluation:

- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Pro edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface book
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Enterprise edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface Book
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Pro edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface Pro 4
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Enterprise edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface Pro 4
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Pro edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface Pro 3
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Enterprise edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface Pro 3
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Pro edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface 3
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Enterprise edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface 3
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Pro edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface 3 with LTE
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Enterprise edition (64-bit version) on Microsoft Surface 3 with LTE
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Mobile on Microsoft Lumia 950
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Mobile on Microsoft Lumia 950 XL
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Mobile on Microsoft Lumia 650
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Mobile on HP Elite x3
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Pro edition (64-bit version) on Dell Latitude 5580
- Microsoft Windows 10 AU Enterprise edition (64-bit version) on Dell Latitude 5580

The following security updates must be applied to the above Windows 10 products:

• All critical updates as of December 31, 2016.

TOE Hardware Identification: The following hardware devices and components are included in the evaluation:

- **Microsoft Surface Book**, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro, 64-bit, Intel Core i7, Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
- **Microsoft Surface Pro 4**, Windows 10 Enterprise and Pro, 64-bit, Intel Core i7, Marvell 8897, IEEE 801.11 Wi-Fi b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0 Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
- **Microsoft Surface Pro 3**, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro, 64-bit, Intel Core i7, Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
- **Microsoft Surface 3**, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro, 64-bit, Intel Atom Z8700, Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0
- **Microsoft Surface 3 with LTE**, Windows 10 Enterprise and Windows 10 Pro, 64-bit, Intel Atom Z8700, GSM, LTE, HSPA, Marvell 8897 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, , Bluetooth 4.0, Bluetooth LE, Intel TPM 2.0 [one variant for Verizon networks, one variant which is SIM-unlocked]
- **Microsoft Lumia 950,** Windows 10 Mobile, Qualcomm Snapdragon 808, GSM, WCDMA, LTE, Qualcomm WCN3620, IEEE 801.11 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Qualcomm TPM 2.0, Bluetooth 4.1

- Microsoft Lumia 950 XL, Windows 10 Mobile, Qualcomm Snapdragon 810, GSM, WCDMA, LTE, Qualcomm WCN3620, IEEE 801.11 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Qualcomm TPM 2.0, Bluetooth 4.1
- **Microsoft Lumia 650**, Windows 10 Mobile, Qualcomm Snapdragon 212, GSM, WCDMA, LTE, Qualcomm WCN3620, IEEE 801.11 Wi-Fi b/g/n adapter, Qualcomm TPM 2.0, Bluetooth 4.1
- **HP Elite x3,** Windows 10 Mobile, Qualcomm Snapdragon 820, GSM, WCDMA, LTE, Qualcomm MSM8996, IEEE 801.11 Wi-Fi a/c adapter, Qualcomm TPM 2.0
- **Dell Latitude 5580,** Windows 10 Enterprise and Pro, 64-bit, Intel Core i7, Intel 8265 Wi-Fi a/b/g/n adapter, Bluetooth 4.0, Nuvoton TPM 2.0

The TOE must be deployed as described in Section 4 Assumptions of this document and be configured in accordance with the *Microsoft Windows Common Criteria Evaluation Microsoft Windows 10* (*Anniversary Update*) Mobile Device Operational Guidance, Version 1.0, March 16, 2017.

Per Policy Letter #22, user installation of vendor-delivered bug fixes and security patches is encouraged between completion of the evaluation and the Assurance Maintenance Date; with such updates properly installed, the product is still considered by NIAP to be in its evaluated configuration.

9 Results of the Evaluation

The evaluation was conducted based upon the assurance activities specified in *Protection Profile for Mobility Device Fundamentals*, Version 2.0, in conjunction with version 3.1, revision 4 of the CC and the CEM. A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements.

The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the assurance activities in the claimed PPs, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

The details of the evaluation are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), which is controlled by the Leidos CCTL. The security assurance requirements are listed in the following table.

| Assurance Component ID | Assurance Component Name |
|------------------------|---|
| ASE_CCL.1 | Conformance claims |
| ASE_ECD.1 | Extended components definition |
| ASE_INT.1 | ST introduction |
| ASE_OBJ.1 | Security objectives for the operational environment |
| ASE_REQ.1 | Stated security requirements |
| ASE_SPD.1 | Security Problem Definition |
| ASE_TSS.1 | TOE summary specification |
| ADV_FSP.1 | Basic functional specification |
| AGD_OPE.1 | Operational user guidance |
| AGD_PRE.1 | Preparative procedures |
| ALC_CMC.1 | Labeling of the TOE |
| ALC_CMS.1 | TOE CM coverage |
| ALC_TSU_EXT.1 | Timely Security Updates |
| ATE_IND.1 | Independent testing – conformance |
| AVA_VAN.1 | Vulnerability survey |

 Table 3: TOE Security Assurance Requirements

10 Validator Comments/Recommendations

The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the SFR's within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the Microsoft Windows 10 Mobile (Anniversary Update) and Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update), to include software that was not part of the evaluated configuration, needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

For all Microsoft Surface, Surface Pro, and Surface Book devices, as well as the Latitude 5580, evaluators discovered that Windows displays the following warning when the user is about to surpass the policy for failed authentication attempts:

"If you keep entering the wrong password, you'll be locked out to help protect your data. To unlock, you'll need a BitLocker recovery key."

It is important for users, customers, and sponsors to understand that until an update is issued to modify this warning to one that better reflects the evaluated configuration, the warning must be disregarded as of the completion of this evaluation. There is no BitLocker recovery key created, utilized, or transmitted anywhere when Windows 10 is in its evaluated configuration, including as a recovery mechanism. Consequently, when the maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been surpassed, the user is not "locked out" but instead the user and organizational data on the device is wiped.

According to the Operational Guidance, the cipher suite selection and priority may be configured on the server side of a connection. Cipher suite selection is made according to the default order for Windows 10. Additionally, Windows 10 devices may be configured to trust a Certificate Authority by using policy pushed to the device by an MDM. The TOE comes preloaded with root certificates for various Certificate Authorities. Additional Certificate Authorities may be managed on the Windows 10 device using workplace enrollment and an MDM.

While there is traditionally an option to disable or enable location services on an MDM system or by a local Windows 10 administrator on a Windows 10 device, the Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3, Surface 3 (LTE), and Latitude 5580 do not have a GPS radio. Instead, they determine the location from available network information. In addition, the Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3, Surface 3 (LTE), and Latitude 5580 do not have the ability to initiate or receive phone calls and so the devices do not contain a dialer or any USSD or MMI codes. As such, GPS and telephony capabilities are out of scope.

11 Annexes

Not applicable.

12 Security Target

| Name | Description |
|---------------------|---|
| ST Title | Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) and Windows 10 Mobile Security Target |
| ST Version | 0.08 |
| Publication Date | March 24, 2017 |

13 Abbreviations and Acronyms

| ACE | Access Control Entry |
|-----------|--|
| ACL | Access Control List |
| ACP | Access Control Policy |
| AD | Active Directory |
| ADAM | Active Directory Application Mode |
| AES | Advanced Encryption Standard |
| AGD | Administrator Guidance Document |
| AH | Authentication Header |
| ALPC | Advanced Local Process Communication |
| ANSI | American National Standards Institute |
| API | Application Programming Interface |
| APIC | Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller |
| BTG | BitLocker To Go |
| CA | Certificate Authority |
| CBAC | Claims Basic Access Control, see DYN |
| CBC | Cipher Block Chaining |
| CC | Common Criteria |
| CD-ROM | Compact Disk Read Only Memory |
| CIFS | Common Internet File System |
| CIMCPP | Certificate Issuing and Management Components For Basic Robustness |
| | Environments Protection Profile, Version 1.0, April 27, 2009 |
| CM | Configuration Management; Control Management |
| COM | Component Object Model |
| СР | Content Provider |
| CPU | Central Processing Unit |
| CRL | Certificate Revocation List |
| CryptoAPI | Cryptographic API |
| CSP | Cryptographic Service Provider |
| DAC | Discretionary Access Control |
| DACL | Discretionary Access Control List |
| DC | Domain Controller |
| DEP | Data Execution Prevention |
| DES | Data Encryption Standard |
| DH | Diffie-Hellman |
| DHCP | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol |
| DFS | Distributed File System |
| DMA | Direct Memory Access |
| DNS | Domain Name System |
| DS | Directory Service |
| DSA | Digital Signature Algorithm |
| DYN | Dynamic Access Control |
| EAL | Evaluation Assurance Level |
| ECB | Electronic Code Book |
| EFS | Encrypting File System |
| ESP | Encapsulating Security Protocol |
| FEK | File Encryption Key |
| FIPS | Federal Information Processing Standard |

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|-------------|--|
| FRS | File Replication Service |
| FSMO | Flexible Single Master Operation |
| FTP | File Transfer Protocol |
| FVE | Full Volume Encryption |
| GB | Gigabyte |
| GC | Global Catalog |
| GHz | Gigahertz |
| GPC | Group Policy Container |
| GPO | Group Policy Object |
| GPOSPP | US Government Protection Profile for General-Purpose Operating |
| | System in a Networked Environment |
| GPT | Group Policy Template |
| GPT | GUID Partition Table |
| GUI | Graphical User Interface |
| GUID | Globally Unique Identifiers |
| HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
| HTTPS | Secure HTTP |
| I/O | Input / Output |
| I&A | Identification and Authentication |
| IA | Information Assurance |
| ICF | Internet Connection Firewall |
| ICMP | Internet Control Message Protocol |
| ICS | Internet Connection Sharing |
| ID | Identification |
| IDE | Integrated Drive Electronics |
| IETF | Internet Engineering Task Force |
| IFS | Installable File System |
| IIS | Internet Information Services |
| IKE | Internet Key Exchange |
| IP | Internet Protocol |
| IPv4 | IP Version 4 |
| IPv6 | IP Version 6 |
| IPC | Inter-process Communication |
| IPI | Inter-process Interrupt |
| IPsec | IP Security |
| ISAPI | Internet Server API |
| IT | Information Technology |
| KDC | Key Distribution Center |
| LAN | Local Area Network |
| LDAP | Lightweight Directory Access Protocol |
| | Local Procedure Call |
| LSA | Local Security Authority |
| LSASS | LSA Subsystem Service |
| | Least-privilege User Account |
| MAC | Message Authentication Code |
| MB | Megabyte |
| MMC | Madal Cassifia Desister |
| MSK | (Ciaco) Network Administry Control |
| INAU NAD | (UISCO) NETWORK Admission Control |
| INAP | INCLWORK ACCESS PROJECTION |

| | Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) |
|--------|--|
| NAT | Network Address Translation |
| NIC | Network Interface Card |
| NIST | National Institute of Standards and Technology |
| NLB | Network Load Balancing |
| NMI | Non-maskable Interrupt |
| NTFS | New Technology File System |
| NTLM | New Technology LAN Manager |
| OS | Operating System |
| PAE | Physical Address Extension |
| PC/SC | Personal Computer/Smart Card |
| PIN | Personal Identification Number |
| PKCS | Public Key Certificate Standard |
| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
| PP | Protection Profile |
| RADIUS | Remote Authentication Dial In Service |
| RAID | Redundant Array of Independent Disks |
| RAM | Random Access Memory |
| RAS | Remote Access Service |
| RC4 | Rivest's Cipher 4 |
| RID | Relative Identifier |
| RNG | Random Number Generator |
| RPC | Remote Procedure Call |
| RSA | Rivest, Shamir and Adleman |
| RSASSA | RSA Signature Scheme with Appendix |
| SA | Security Association |
| SACL | System Access Control List |
| SAM | Security Assurance Measure |
| SAML | Security Assertion Markup Language |
| SAR | Security Assurance Requirement |
| SAS | Secure Attention Sequence |
| SD | Security Descriptor |
| SHA | Secure Hash Algorithm |
| SID | Security Identifier |
| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
| SIPI | Startup IPI |
| SF | Security Functions |
| SFP | Security Functional Policy |
| SFR | Security Functional Requirement |
| SMB | Server Message Block |
| SMI | System Management Interrupt |
| SMTP | Simple Mail Transport Protocol |
| SP | Service Pack |
| SPI | Security Parameters Index |
| SPI | Stateful Packet Inspection |
| SRM | Security Reference Monitor |
| SSL | Secure Sockets Layer |
| SSP | Security Support Providers |
| SSPI | Security Support Provider Interface |
| SI | Security Larget |
| SYSVOL | System Volume |

| | Microsoft Windows 10 (Anniversary Update) |
|--------|---|
| ТСР | Transmission Control Protocol |
| TDI | Transport Driver Interface |
| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
| TOE | Target of Evaluation |
| TPM | Trusted Platform Module |
| TSC | TOE Scope of Control |
| TSF | TOE Security Functions |
| TSS | TOE Summary Specification |
| UART | Universal Asynchronous Receiver / Transmitter |
| UI | User Interface |
| UID | User Identifier |
| UNC | Universal Naming Convention |
| US | United States |
| UPN | User Principal Name |
| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
| USB | Universal Serial Bus |
| USN | Update Sequence Number |
| v5 | Version 5 |
| VDS | Virtual Disk Service |
| VPN | Virtual Private Network |
| VSS | Volume Shadow Copy Service |
| WAN | Wide Area Network |
| WCF | Windows Communications Framework |
| WebDAV | Web Document Authoring and Versioning |
| WebSSO | Web Single Sign On |
| WDM | Windows Driver Model |
| WIF | Windows Identity Framework |
| WMI | Windows Management Instrumentation |
| WSC | Windows Security Center |
| WU | Windows Update |
| WSDL | Web Service Description Language |
| WWW | World-Wide Web |
| X64 | A 64-bit instruction set architecture |
| X86 | A 32-bit instruction set architecture |

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