National Information Assurance Partnership

TM

Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report

CA ACF2 r16

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1 Executive Summary

This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of CA ACF2, provided by CA Technologies, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.

The evaluation was performed by the Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Annapolis Junction, Maryland, United States of America, and was completed in June 2017. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Booz Allen. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements set forth in the Enterprise Security Management Access Control Protection Profile (ACPP) and Enterprise Security Management Policy Management Protection Profile (PMPP).

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is CA ACF2 version r16. CA ACF2 is a mainframe software access control product that includes a policy management capability for administering access control policy enforcement. The TOE applies host-based access control rules to protect objects that reside on a z/OS mainframe system and define the permissions that individual users have to interact with the system.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the ACPP and PMPP. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report is consistent with the evidence provided.

The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units of the ETR for the ACPP and PMPP Assurance Activities. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). The validation team has reviewed the findings presented by the CCTL, and has concluded that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.

The technical information included in this report was obtained from the CA ACF2 Security Target, Version 1.0, June 23, 2017 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.

2 Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities that are interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliance List.

Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:

- Target of Evaluation (TOE): fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
- Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
- The conformance result of the evaluation.
- The Protection Profiles to which the product is conformant.
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.

Table 1 – Evaluation Identifiers

Item	Identifier
Evaluation Scheme	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE	CA ACF2 r16
Protection Profile	Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Access Control v2.1 Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Access Control v2.1
Security Target	CA ACF2 r16 Security Target, Version 1.0, June 23, 2017
Evaluation Technical Report	Evaluation Technical Report for a Target of Evaluation "CA ACF2 r16" Evaluation Technical Report v1.0 June 30, 2017
CC Version	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4
Conformance Result	CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor	CA Technologies, Inc.
Developer	Booz Allen Hamilton, Annapolis Junction, Maryland
Common Criteria Testing Lab (CCTL)	Booz Allen Hamilton, Annapolis Junction, Maryland
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3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

3.1 Assumptions

The following assumptions about the operational environment are made regarding its ability to provide security functionality.

- The TOE will use cryptographic primitives provided by the Operational Environment to perform cryptographic services.
- The TOE will be able to establish connectivity to other ESM products in order to share security data.
- The TOE will be capable of receiving access control policy data from its Operational Environment. Note that since the TOE claims both access control and policy management functionality, access control policy data may originate from within the TSF.
- The TOE will receive identity data from the Operational Environment.
- There will be a competent and trusted administrator who will follow the guidance provided in order to install the TOE.
- There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to install, configure, and operate the TOE.
- The TOE will receive reliable time data from the Operational Environment.

3.2 Threats

The following lists the threats addressed by the TOE. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Basic.

- T.ADMIN_ERROR (from PMPP) – An administrator may unintentionally install or configure the TOE incorrectly, resulting in ineffective security mechanisms.
- T.CONTRADICT (from PMPP) – A careless administrator may create a policy that contains contradictory rules for access control enforcement.
- T.DISABLE (from ACPP) – A malicious user or careless user may suspend or terminate the TOE's operation, thus making it unable to enforce its access controls upon the environment or TOE-protected data.
- T.EAVES (from ACPP and PMPP) – A malicious user could eavesdrop on network traffic to gain unauthorized access to TOE data.
- T.FALSIFY (from ACPP) – A malicious user can falsify the TOE's identity, giving the Policy Management product false assurance that the TOE is enforcing a policy.
- T.FORGE (from ACPP) – A malicious user may create a false policy and send it to the TOE to consume, adversely altering its behavior.

- T.FORGE (from PMPP) – A malicious user may exploit a weak or nonexistent ability for the TOE to provide proof of its own identity in order to send forged policies to an Access Control product.
- T.MASK (from ACPP and PMPP) – A malicious user may attempt to mask their actions, causing audit data to be incorrectly recorded or never recorded.
- T.NOROUTE (from ACPP) – A malicious or careless user may cause the TOE to lose connection to the source of its enforcement policies, adversely affecting access control behaviors.
- T.OFLOWS (from ACPP) – A malicious user may attempt to provide incorrect policy data to the TOE in order to alter its access control policy enforcement behavior.
- T.UNAUTH (from ACPP) – A malicious or careless user may access an object in the Operational Environment that causes disclosure of sensitive data or adversely affects the behavior of a system.
- T.UNAUTH (from PMPP) – A malicious user could bypass the TOE's identification, authentication, or authorization mechanisms in order to illicitly use the TOE's management functions.
- T.WEAKIA (from PMPP) – A malicious user could be illicitly authenticated by the TSF through brute-force guessing of authentication credentials.
- T.WEAKPOL (from PMPP) – A Policy Administrator may be incapable of using the TOE to define policies in sufficient detail to facilitate robust access control, causing an Access Control product to behave in a manner that allows illegitimate activity or prohibits legitimate activity.

3.3 Objectives

The following identifies the security objectives of the TOE. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to counter identified threats and/or comply with any security policies identified.

- O.ACCESSID (from PMPP) – The TOE will include the ability to validate the identity of other ESM products prior to distributing data to them.
- O.AUDIT (from PMPP) – The TOE will provide measures for generating and recording security relevant events that will detect access attempts to TOE-protected resources by users.
- O.AUTH (from PMPP) – The TOE will provide a mechanism to securely validate requested authentication attempts and to determine the extent to which any validated subject is able to interact with the TSF.
- O.CONSISTENT (from PMPP) – The TSF will provide a mechanism to identify and rectify contradictory policy data.

- O.DATAPROT (from ACPP) – The TOE will protect data from unauthorized modification by enforcing an access control policy produced by a Policy Management product.
- O.DISTRIB (from PMPP) – The TOE will provide the ability to distribute policies to trusted IT products using secure channels.
- O.INTEGRITY (from ACPP) – The TOE will contain the ability to verify the integrity of transferred data from Operational Environment components.
- O.INTEGRITY (from PMPP) – The TOE will contain the ability to assert the integrity of policy data.
- O.MAINTAIN (from ACPP) – The TOE will be capable of maintaining policy enforcement if disconnected from the Policy Management product.
- O.MANAGE (from PMPP) – The TOE will provide the ability to manage the behavior of trusted IT products using secure channels.
- O.MNGRID (from ACPP) – The TOE will be able to identify and authorize a Policy Management product prior to accepting policy data from it.
- O.MONITOR (from ACPP) – The TOE will monitor the behavior of itself for anomalous activity (e.g., provide measures for generating and recording security relevant events that will detect access attempts to TOE-protected resources by users).
- O.OFLOWS (from ACPP) – The TOE will be able to recognize and discard invalid or malicious input provided by users.
- O.POLICY (from PMPP) – The TOE will provide the ability to generate policies that are sufficiently detailed to satisfy the Data Protection requirements for one or more technology types in the Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Access Control.
- O.PROTCOMMS (from ACPP and PMPP) – The TOE will provide protected communication channels for administrators, other parts of a distributed TOE, and authorized IT entities.
- O.ROBUST (from PMPP) – The TOE will provide mechanisms to reduce the ability for an attacker to impersonate a legitimate user during authentication.
- O.SELFID (from ACPP) – The TOE will be able to confirm its identity to the Policy Management product while sending receipt of a new policy arrival.
- O.SELFID (from PMPP) – The TOE will be able to confirm its identity to the ESM deployment upon sending data to other processes within the ESM deployment.

3.4 Clarification of Scope

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:

- As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation is defined within the Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Access Control v2.1, 24 October 2013 and Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Policy Management v2.1, 24 October 2013 to which this evaluation claimed exact compliance.
- Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profiles, this evaluation did not specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not "obvious" or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an "obvious" vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
- The functionality evaluated **is scoped exclusively** to the security functional requirements specified in the Section 6 of the Security Target and their operation with respect to the TOE is described in Section 8 of the Security Target. **Any other functions provided by CA ACF2 need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness from this evaluation.**
- As this is an Enterprise System Management product, the assumption is that Command Propagation Facility (CPF) is being used to manage one or more access control points (in other words, the monolithic machine is not the typical usage; rather, the product is used to control multiple nodes in an enterprise).

The evaluated configuration of the TOE is the CA ACF2 software product. The TOE includes all the code that enforces the policies identified (see Section 5).

4 Architectural Information

Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security Target.

4.1 TOE Introduction

CA ACF2 (also referred to as the TOE) is host-based access control product for z/OS mainframe systems. It interacts with the IBM System Authorization Facility (SAF) to evaluate operations being attempted against the mainframe system and applies access control policy rules to the request in order to determine if the requested operations should be permitted. It provides its own policy management capability to allow administrators to define access control rules to be enforced on the system. Through the use of the Command Propagation Facility (CPF), multiple distinct LPARs/systems can be administered simultaneously through the ability of an administrator to use ACF2 to issue commands to remote instances of the product.

4.2 Physical Boundary

The physical boundary of the TOE includes the CA ACF2 software that is installed on top of the z/OS operating system. The TOE does not include the hardware or operating systems of the systems on which it is installed. It also does not include the third-party software that is required for the TOE to run. The following table lists the software components that are required for the TOE's use in the evaluated configuration. These Operational Environment components are expected to be patched to include the latest security fixes for each component.

Component	Requirement
Platform	IBM System z mainframe (zEC12, z114, z196, z9 series, z10 series, z13)
Disk Storage	700 MB or greater
Operating System	IBM z/OS, version 2.1 RSU1506 (Recommended Service Upgrade) or higher
System Components	• INIT/JOB • JES2 • TSO • TCP/IP • VTAM • CA Common Services for z/OS r14.1 or above • CA LDAP Server for z/OS r16
Cryptographic Capabilities	• IBM ICSF • IBM System SSL • IBM Ported Tools for z/OS - OpenSSH

In addition to the mainframe requirements, a TN3270e terminal emulator is required for any system used to administer the TOE via TSO or JES2. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE was tested using QWS3270 over an SSH tunnel that was established using the CA Common Services and ICSF environmental components.

The TOE includes support for authentication using RSA SecurID tokens. Use of RSA requires the installation of an RSA Agent on the IBM z/OS, as well as deployment of RSA Authentication Manager in the enterprise environment.

5 Security Policy

5.1 Enterprise Security Management

CA ACF2 provides enterprise security management through its ability to define and enforce access control policies. The TOE provides the ability to define these policies through ISPF panels and the command line. Policies can be defined to control access to processes, files, system configuration, and use of the authentication function for mainframe systems. The TOE also defines subject attributes for mainframe users that can affect how access control policies are audited for specific users. Since the TOE can enforce access control against the mainframe's authentication function, it ensures that all users and administrators are identified and authenticated prior to accessing any objects that reside on the system, including the TSF itself.

5.2 Security Audit

The TOE generates audit records of its behavior and administrator activities. Audit data includes date, time, event type, subject identity, and other data as required. Audit data is written to the mainframe's SYSLOG and SMF audit storage repositories in the Operational Environment. The administrator has some degree of control over the types of events that are audited for access control functionality in order to minimize the volume of audit data.

5.3 Communications

The TOE can communicate policy rules to remote instances of ACF2 that are located on distributed systems or LPARs using the Command Propagation Facility (CPF). CPF provides transaction receipts to administrators so that the implementation status of transmitted policy rules can be determined. If a remote node is unavailable to receive CPF commands, they will be queued and transmission will be periodically retried until the node is available.

5.4 User Data Protection

The TOE has the ability to enforce access control against files, processes, system configuration objects, and the authentication function of a mainframe system. Access control policy rules can be written against arbitrarily-defined subjects and objects so that anything that resides on the system can be protected as needed. The TSF implements a rule sorting algorithm in order to give better matched rules higher priority that prevents rules from coming into conflict with one another. The TSF also defines several exceptions to the rule enforcement engine so that specific overrides can be granted as appropriate for the Enterprise. By default, the TOE considers the system objects that comprise itself to be protected so that an untrusted user is unable to bypass, terminate, or control the behavior of the access control enforcement mechanism.

5.5 Identification and Authentication

The TOE provides mechanisms to minimize the likelihood of a successful brute force attack against the mainframe's authentication function. Specifically, the TSF can suspend a user account after it has exceeded a certain number of failed authentication attempts in

a given day. Subject attributes are associated with users based on the user's definition in the mainframe's internal user database regardless of whether that user is defined by manual administrative commands or by the environmental LDAP server translating LDAP queries into actions that configure the mainframe user database.

The TOE enables administrators to log into the ACF2 with token-based authentication using RSA's SecurID product, in addition to username/password. Use of the SecurID token requires the installation of an RSA Agent on the z/OS operating system, as well as the presence of an instance of the RSA Authentication Manager in the enterprise environment. Use of RSA SecurID also requires an administrative mapping between logonid records and RSA token identities to be performed. Once configured, the TOE interfaces with the RSA Agent resident on the z/OS platform.

5.6 Security Management

The TOE is managed by authorized administrators using Interactive System Productivity Facility (ISPF) menu selections or through command line interpreter (CLI) commands. CLI commands can be issued in batch jobs or interactively using TSO. The TSF provides the ability to manage the TOE's functionality as well as the access control policies that are enforced by the TSF, both on the local system and on remote nodes using CPF. There are several distinct administrative roles with differing levels of privilege to interact with the TSF.

5.7 Protection of the TSF

The TOE does not provide a mechanism to view administrator credential data and does not store any key data. The TOE is able to use the Common Services and ICSF environmental components to encrypt CPF commands sent to remote nodes, preventing replay attacks against transmitted policy data. In a CPF environment, the loss of communications between distributed nodes does not affect the TOE's ability to enforce the access control policy rules that it has consumed.

5.8 Resource Utilization

In a CPF environment, the TOE will queue CPF commands that fail to reach a remote node during a period of communications outage and will periodically attempt to transmit them so that up-to-date configuration of the TSF can be performed automatically once communications are restored.

5.9 TOE Access

The TOE's access control enforcement mechanism can deny session establishment to users and administrators based on policy rules such as day, time, and the method used to access the mainframe system.

5.10 Trusted Path/Channels

The TOE does not provide its own cryptography. In the evaluated configuration, CA Common Services in the operational environment is invoked to provide TCP/IP configurations between the TOE and remote entities and ICSF is used to establish trusted communications over TCP/IP connections. The TSF is able to rely on the Operational

Environment to secure remote CPF commands using TLS and remote administrative sessions using SSH.

6 Documentation

The vendor provides standard guidance documentation that covers the core functionality of the product, available online at https://docops.ca.com/ca-acf2-for-z-os/16-0/en. Additionally, "CA ACF2 r16 Supplemental Administrative Guidance for Common Criteria, Version 1.0, June 23, 2017" was created to emphasize the core functionality of the TOE based on the claims made in the Security Target and to identify the security-relevant sections of the existing guidance documentation.

7 Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration, as defined in the Security Target, is the CA ACF2 software installed on IBM z/OS. The minimum system requirements and product dependencies are listed in section 4.2 of this document.

To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in the CA ACF2 r16 Supplemental Administrative Guidance for Common Criteria document.

8 IT Product Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived from information contained in the *Evaluation Technical Report for a Target of Evaluation "CA ACF2 r16" Evaluation Technical Report v1.0 dated June 30, 2017,* which is not publicly available.

8.1 Test Configuration

The evaluation team installed and configured the TOE according to the CA ACF2 r16 Supplemental Administrative Guidance for Common Criteria document for testing.

The following environment components and test tools* were utilized during the testing:

- IBM z/OS 2.2 running on IBM model 2827 (zEC12 series) mainframe
- CA Chorus Software Manager
- CA LDAP Server r15.1
- CA Common Services r14.1
- CA WebAdmin r15
- TCP/IP v4.0 for IBM z/OS
- IBM Integrated Cryptographic Services Facility (ICSF)
- IBM System SSL
- IBM Ported Tools for z/OS: OpenSSH, Version 1 Release 3
- JES2 v2.1
- TSO v4.1
- CICS r5.1
- QWS3270

*Only the test tools utilized for functional testing have been listed.

8.2 Developer Testing

No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.

8.3 Evaluation Team Independent Testing

The evaluation team conducted all testing activities for CA ACF2 with the vendor's assistance at CA's facility in Lisle, IL during May of 2017. This testing effort included executing independent functional tests and executing vulnerability or penetration testing. The results of this testing effort are documented in the "Booz Allen – CA ACF2 Common Criteria Evaluation Test Plan" and the "Vulnerability Analysis CA ACF2 Version 1.0".

The test team's approach was to test the security mechanisms of the CA ACF2 software by exercising the external interfaces to the TOE and viewing the TOE behavior on the platform. Each TOE external interface was described in the relevant design documentation (e.g., ST and AGD) in terms of the claims on the TOE that can be tested through the external interface. The laboratory produced an overall test plan that provides information about the test environment and the method for labeling and interpreting the test evidence. The laboratory divided the test activities for each functional class into separate test procedure files and recorded the results into separate corresponding test matrices. These were used to demonstrate test coverage of all SFR testing assurance activities as defined by the ACPP and PMPP for all security relevant TOE external interfaces. TOE external interfaces that were determined to be security relevant are interfaces that satisfy any of the following criteria:

- Change the security state of the product.
- Permit an object access or information flow that is regulated by the security policy.
- Are restricted to subjects with privilege or behave differently when executed by subjects with privilege.
- Invoke or configure a security mechanism.

Security functional requirements were determined to be applicable to a particular interface if the behavior of the TOE that supported the requirement could be invoked or observed through that interface.

In order to determine that the TSF sufficiently addressed the requirements for host-based access control as defined by ACPP, the evaluators identified the z/OS system objects that represented the objects defined in ACPP (programs, files, host configuration, and authentication function). The evaluators then identified types of access control policy rules that ACF2 can define in order to control access to these objects. These policy rules were considered to be within the scope of the TOE. The evaluators then tested these rules by demonstrating the ability of mainframe users and started tasks to access (or not access) arbitrarily chosen examples of the tested system objects based on access control rules written against these objects.

8.4 Evaluation Team Vulnerability Testing

The vulnerability analysis is in a proprietary report prepared by the lab. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual vulnerabilities.

The vulnerability search did not yield any readily apparent security flaws in the TOE or any of the major z/OS components that it interfaces with; however, the search process allowed the evaluators to focus on several generic vulnerabilities upon which to build a test suite. These tests were created specifically with the intent of exploiting these vulnerabilities within the TOE or its configuration.

The team tested the following areas:

- Escalation of Privileges – The evaluators attempted to escalate their own privileges as defined by the TSF by attempting to modify the in-storage access rules in memory and by attempting to circumvent the access control SFP by taking valid privileges to modify a system object and passing them to a program that uses those privileges to gain unauthorized access to a different object.
- Virtual Storage Access Method (VSAM) IDCAMS Utility – The evaluators used the IDCAMS utility to attempt to dump raw data from the ACF2 databases into a flat file in order to see if any TSF data is disclosed without authorization.
- Auditing SMF Records – The evaluators reviewed raw unformatted dumps of audit data to search their contents for data that could be used to gain unauthorized access to the TOE or to the underlying system protected by the TSF.
- System Penetration – The evaluators performed several small miscellaneous tests that did not pertain to specific categories that collectively attempted to circumvent the TOE's access control enforcement mechanisms.
    - Use of AMASPZAP service aid to attempt to dynamically dump program data to see if a program's runtime execution can be modified in a way that could potentially bypass access control checking.
    - Attempt to issue a console command using a batch job to determine what privileges are applied to the request. If a user is not authorized to issue console commands, attempting to do so through an intermediary may bypass access control checking.
    - Attempt to issue protected console commands with both privileged and non-privileged user accounts as well as attempt to issue a command to the TSF from the console. Use of the console interface could potentially grant additional authorizations above and beyond what is granted to the user.

9 Results of the Evaluation

The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all Assurance Activities and work units received a passing verdict.

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC Version 3.1 Rev 4, CEM Version 3.1 Rev 4, and the assurance activities defined in the Protection Profiles with which the ST claimed conformance. The evaluation determined the CA ACF2 TOE to be Part 2 extended and that it meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the ACPP and PMPP.

The following evaluation results are extracted from the non-proprietary Evaluation Technical Report provided by the CCTL, and are augmented with the validator's observations thereof.

9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)

The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the TOE that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally the evaluators performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the ACPP and PMPP.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)

The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit specified in the ACPP and PMPP (the work units are identical between the two). The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The functional specification is inferred through the TOE functionality described in the Security Target and administrative guidance and is sufficient to determine all security-relevant external interfaces of the TOE.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities as defined by the CEM and specified in the ACPP and the PMPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)

The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit specified in the ACPP and PMPP (the work units are identical between the two). The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the ACPP and PMPP related to the examination of the information contained in the operational guidance documents.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities as defined by the CEM and specified in the ACPP and the PMPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)

The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit specified in the ACPP and PMPP (the work units are identical between the two), as well as the Assurance Activities specified for ALC_CMC.1 and ALC_CMS.1. The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and specified in the ACPP and the PMPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)

The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit specified in the ACPP and PMPP (the work units are identical between the two). The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the ACPP and PMPP and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities as defined in the CEM and specified in the ACPP and PMPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)

The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit specified in the ACPP and PMPP (the work units are identical between the two). The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with the TOE.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities as defined in the CEM and specified in the ACPP and PMPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results

The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities as defined in the CEM and specified in the ACPP and PMPP, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

10 Validator Comments

1) The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the CA ACF2 Supplemental Administrative Guidance for Common Criteria.

2) Note that the functionality evaluated **is scoped exclusively** to the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. **All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.**

3) The TOE provides support for token-based authentication in addition to the username/password authentication available in prior TOE versions. Specifically, the evaluated configuration includes support for the use of RSA SecurID authentication tokens to enable administrators to log into the ACF2. Support for this capability requires the installation of an RSA Agent on the TOE platform as well as the deployment of the RSA Authentication Manager in the enterprise environment. Customers are encouraged to consult the CA ACF2 Supplemental Administrative Guide documentation, as well as the associated documentation from CA and RSA to correctly and securely deploy and configure the TOE for their environments.

4) The validators note that the audit data that is generated by the TOE is formatted as mainframe SYSLOG and SMF data. This audit data is machine-readable and is typically converted to a human-readable format by third-party utilities. Customers are cautioned that familiarity with the mainframe log formats is recommended in order to decipher the audit trail data.

5) The validators noted that understanding and working with this product, including the ability to validate the test evidence, requires familiarity with mainframe language/syntax, processes, and procedures. Support of Subject Matter Experts may be required.

11 Annexes

Not applicable

12 Security Target

The security target for this product's evaluation is CA ACF2 r16 Security Target, Version 1.0, June 23, 2017.

13 List of Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
AC	Access Control
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CICS	Customer Information Control System
CLI	Command Line Interface
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CPF	Command Propagation Facility
DASD	Direct Access Storage Device
DSN	Dataset Name
ESM	Enterprise Security Management (note that the acronym 'ESM' also commonly refers to External Security Manager in the context of mainframe security products such as ACF2)
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
GSO	Global System Option
ICSF	Integrated Cryptographic Services Facility
IPL	Initial Program Load
ISPF	Interactive System Productivity Facility
JCL	Job Control Language
JES	Job Entry Subsystem
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LPAR	Logical Partition
NDT	Node Descriptor Table
OS	Operating System
OSP	Organizational Security Policy
PM	Policy Management
PP	Protection Profile
SAF	System Authorization Facility
SFP	Security Functional Policy
SMF	System Management Facility
SSH	Secure Shell
STC	Started Task
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSO	Time Sharing Option
VOL	Volume
VSAM	Virtual Storage Access Method
VTAM	Virtual Terminal Access Method

14 Terminology

Term	Definition
Administrator	Individuals interacting with ACF2 in a capacity where they are attempting to view or modify the functions or security attributes of ACF2 or of other administrators or users.
Command Propagation Facility	A mechanism by which commands issued on one mainframe system are simultaneously transmitted to other systems.
Database	In the context of ACF2, a database is one of three that collectively comprise the Security Database: Infostorage, Logonid, or Rule. Stored as a VSAM file.
Dataset	A filesystem object residing on the mainframe system
Direct Access Storage Device	Any semi-permanent storage mechanism such as a hard disk, magnetic, or optical storage.
Initial Program Load	Synonymous with system startup for z/OS systems.
Interactive System Productivity Facility	A mechanism for abstracting CLI commands behind a more user-friendly menu-driven interface.
Logonid	The username used by an administrator, user, or started task to access the mainframe system
Logonid Record	A record maintained by ACF2 that contains authorization and diagnostic data for an administrator or user. Includes the logonid field.
LPAR	Short for logical partition. One mainframe system can be running multiple instances of z/OS in separate LPARs. Used for redundancy or parallel processing.
Object	Programs, files, configuration settings, and authentication capabilities that exist on z/OS and can be protected by the TOE's access control policy.
Resource	General term for items or functions on the mainframe system other than datasets. Includes but is not limited to TSO accounts, TSO procedures, commands, programs, transactions, and storage areas.
Role	An administrative grouping that gives all members the same authorizations. An administrator can simultaneously belong to multiple roles.
RSRCVLD	An attribute that can be applied to a resource that supersedes the authorizations of a user that is assigned global read/write access privileges.
Ruleset	A collection of individual rules.
RULEVLD	An attribute that can be applied to a dataset that supersedes the authorizations of a user that is assigned global read/write access privileges.
SAFDEF	A type of record that ACF2 uses to automatically process specific SAF calls made to z/OS without additional rule processing.
Started Task	An address space that runs unattended following execution of a START command, analogous to a UNIX daemon.

Subject	A user or a program operating on behalf of a user.
SYSID	A unique identifier for a mainframe system in a given environment.
SYSLOG	z/OS system log.
System Authorization Facility	An internal interface that is provided as part of IBM z/OS that is used to identify when system activity is taking place so that this activity can be routed to a security product (such as ACF2) for adjudication.
System Management Facility	A standardized audit log format developed by IBM that is used to present log data from various mainframe applications in a uniform manner.
Time Sharing Option	An application provided by a mainframe system that allows for Unix-like command-line interaction with the system.
UID	Also known as Expanded UID. Contains a user or administrator's logonid as well as organizationally defined attributes (such as department or geographic region). Can serve as identifying information as a subject rather than the logonid in cases where more granular access control rules are desired.
User	Individuals interacting with ACF2 in a capacity where they are attempting to interact with mainframe resources and ACF2 is adjudicating their actions against its access control policy.
Virtual Telecommunications Access Method	A subsystem provided by z/OS to facilitate networking. Used to provide a common interface for applications that are used to access a mainframe remotely.
Volume	A logical identifier used in z/OS for a specific area of physical storage. Analogous to Windows drive letters.
Virtual Storage Access Method	A specific method of file I/O provided by z/OS. Can also refer generically to a file that uses VSAM.

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