



# Xerox Multi-Function Device Security Target

Xerox® AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 /  
B8090

**Prepared by:**



Xerox Corporation  
800 Phillips Road  
Webster, New York 14580

DXC.technology  
10830 Guilford Road, Suite 308  
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701

©2019 Xerox Corporation. All rights reserved. Xerox and the sphere of connectivity design are trademarks of Xerox Corporation in the United States and/or other countries.

All copyrights referenced herein are the property of their respective owners. Other company trademarks are also acknowledged.

Document Version: 0.9 (October 2019).

Table of Contents

- 1. INTRODUCTION .....1**
  - 1.1. ST AND TOE IDENTIFICATION ..... 1
  - 1.2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..... 2
    - 1.2.1. *Common Criteria Claims*..... 2
    - 1.2.2. *Protection Profile Claims* ..... 2
    - 1.2.3. *Package Claims* ..... 2
  - 1.3. CONVENTIONS..... 3
- 2. TOE OVERVIEW .....4**
  - 2.1. TOE DESCRIPTION ..... 4
  - 2.2. TOE ARCHITECTURE..... 4
    - 2.2.1. *Physical Boundary* ..... 5
    - 2.2.2. *Logical Boundary*..... 5
    - 2.2.3. *Evaluated Configuration* ..... 7
    - 2.2.4. *Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware* ..... 7
  - 2.3. TOE DOCUMENTATION ..... 8
- 3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION .....9**
  - 3.1. THREATS ..... 9
  - 3.2. ASSUMPTIONS..... 9
  - 3.3. ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..... 10
- 4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..... 11**
  - 4.1. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ..... 11
  - 4.2. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..... 12
- 5. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ..... 13**
  - 5.1. EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ..... 13
  - 5.2. SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ..... 14
    - 5.2.1. *FAU\_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation* ..... 14
    - 5.2.2. *FAU\_GEN.2 User Identity Association* ..... 14
    - 5.2.3. *FAU\_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage* ..... 14
    - 5.2.4. *FAU\_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss*..... 15
    - 5.2.5. *FAU\_STG\_EXT.1 Extended: External Audit Trail Storage*..... 15
    - 5.2.6. *FCS\_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)* ..... 15
    - 5.2.7. *FCS\_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)*..... 15
    - 5.2.8. *FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction* ..... 15

**Xerox Multi-Function Device Security Target**

5.2.9. FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction ..... 15

5.2.10. FCS\_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption) ..... 15

5.2.11. FCS\_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/ verification) ..... 16

5.2.12. FCS\_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) ..... 16

5.2.13. FCS\_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication) ..... 16

5.2.14. FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1(a) Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) ..... 16

5.2.15. FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1(b) Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) ..... 16

5.2.16. FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected ..... 17

5.2.17. FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected ..... 17

5.2.18. FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining ..... 18

5.2.19. FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected ..... 18

5.2.20. FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected ..... 19

5.2.21. FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control ..... 19

5.2.22. FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control ..... 19

5.2.23. FDP\_DSK\_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk ..... 23

5.2.24. FDP\_FXS\_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation ..... 23

5.2.25. FDP\_RIP.1(a) Subset residual information protection ..... 23

5.2.26. FDP\_RIP.1(b) Subset residual information protection ..... 23

5.2.27. FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling ..... 23

5.2.28. FIA\_ATD.1 User attribute definition ..... 23

5.2.29. FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management ..... 23

5.2.30. FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication ..... 24

5.2.31. FIA\_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback ..... 24

5.2.32. FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification ..... 24

5.2.33. FIA\_USB.1 User-subject binding ..... 24

5.2.34. FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition ..... 24

5.2.35. FMT\_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior ..... 25

5.2.36. FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes ..... 25

5.2.37. FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization ..... 25

5.2.38. FMT\_MTD.1 Management of TSF data ..... 25

5.2.39. FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ..... 26

5.2.40. FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles ..... 27

5.2.41. FPT\_KYP\_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material ..... 27

5.2.42. FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data ..... 27

5.2.43. FPT\_STM.1 Reliable time stamps ..... 27

5.2.44. FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing ..... 27

**Xerox Multi-Function Device Security Target**

- 5.2.45. *FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update* .....27
- 5.2.46. *FTA\_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination* .....28
- 5.2.47. *FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel*.....28
- 5.2.48. *FTP\_TRP.1(a) Trusted path (for Administrators)* .....28
- 5.2.49. *FTP\_TRP.1(b) Trusted path (for non-administrators)* .....28
- 5.3. SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.....29
- 6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .....30**
- 6.1. TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS.....30
  - 6.1.1. *Identification and Authentication* .....30
  - 6.1.2. *Security Audit*.....32
  - 6.1.3. *Access Control*.....33
  - 6.1.4. *Security Management*.....34
  - 6.1.5. *Trusted Operation*.....36
  - 6.1.6. *Encryption*.....37
  - 6.1.7. *Trusted Communication*.....40
  - 6.1.8. *PSTN Fax-Network Separation* .....44
  - 6.1.9. *Data Clearing and Purging*.....45
- 7. RATIONALE .....47**
- 7.1. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE .....47
- 8. GLOSSARY.....50**
- 9. ACRONYMS.....54**

## List of Figures

FIGURE 1: XEROX® ALTALINK™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090.....4

## List of Tables

TABLE 1: ST AND TOE IDENTIFICATION ..... 1  
TABLE 2: XEROX MFP'S .....5  
TABLE 3: SYSTEM USER AND ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE .....8  
TABLE 4: HCD PP THREATS ADDRESSED.....9  
TABLE 5: HCD PP ASSUMPTIONS ADDRESSED .....9  
TABLE 6: HCD PP OSPs ADDRESSED.....10  
TABLE 7: HCD PP OSPs ADDRESSED.....11  
TABLE 8: SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT .....12  
TABLE 9: AUDITABLE EVENTS .....14  
TABLE 10: D.USER.DOC ACCESS CONTROL SFP .....20  
TABLE 11: D.USER.JOB ACCESS CONTROL SFP .....21  
TABLE 12: MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA.....25  
TABLE 13: MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS .....26  
TABLE 14: ASSURANCE COMPONENTS .....29  
TABLE 15: CRYPTOGRAPHIC CERTIFICATES .....39  
TABLE 16: SECURITY FUNCTIONS VS. REQUIREMENTS MAPPING .....47  
TABLE 17: ACRONYMS.....54

## 1. Introduction

This Security Target (ST) specifies the security claims of the Xerox® AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090 in accordance with the requirements of the Common Criteria (CC).

This section introduces the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and provides the Security Target (ST) and TOE identification, ST and TOE conformance claims, ST conventions, glossary and list of abbreviations.

- TOE Description (Section 2) — provides an overview of the TOE and describes the physical and logical boundaries of the TOE
- Security Problem Definition (Section 3) — describes the threats and assumptions that define the security problem to be addressed by the TOE and its environment
- Security Objectives (Section 4) — describes the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment necessary to counter the threats and satisfy the assumptions that define the security problem
- IT Security Requirements (Section 5) — specifies the security functional requirements (SFRs) and security assurance requirements (SARs) to be met by the TOE
- TOE Summary Specification (Section 6) — describes the security functions of the TOE and how they satisfy the SFRs
- Rationale (Section 7) — provides mappings and rationale for the security problem definition, security objectives, security requirements, and security functions to justify their completeness, consistency, and suitability.
- Glossary (Section 8) — terms that have a specific meaning within the context of the ST and the TOE.
- Acronyms (Section 9) — abbreviations and acronyms that are used in this document.

### 1.1. ST and TOE Identification

Table 1 below presents key identification details relevant to the CC evaluation of the Xerox® AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090.

**Table 1: ST and TOE identification**

<b>ST Title:</b>	Xerox Multi-Function Device Security Target, Xerox® AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090
<b>ST Version:</b>	0.9
<b>Publication Date:</b>	October 2019
<b>Authors:</b>	DXC.technology, Xerox Corporation

<b>TOE Identification:</b>	Xerox® AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090 System Software version: 101.008.019.20200 with Software Patch 417710v1.dlm
<b>ST Evaluator:</b>	DXC.technology Security Testing/Certification Laboratories
<b>Keywords:</b>	Xerox, Multi-Function Device, Image Overwrite, WorkCentre, Printer, Scanner, Copier, Facsimile, Fax, Document Server, Document Storage and Retrieval, Disk overwrite, All-In-One, MFD, MFP, ISO/IEC 15408, Common Criteria, FIPS, Protection Profile, Security Target

## 1.2. Conformance Claims

### 1.2.1. Common Criteria Claims

The ST is based upon the following, referenced hereafter as [CC]:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 4
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components; Version 3.1, Revision 4
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components; Version 3.1, Revision 4

This ST claims the following CC conformance:

- Part 2 extended
- Part 3 conformant

### 1.2.2. Protection Profile Claims

This ST and the TOE it describes are conformant to the following Protection Profile:

- Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Version 1.0, 10 September 2015 ([HCDPP]). The following NIAP Technical Decisions apply to this PP and have been accounted for in the ST development and the conduct of the evaluation:
  - **TD0074: FCS\_CKM.1(a) Requirement in HCD PP v1.0**
  - **TD0157: FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.1 - Testing SPDs**
  - **TD0176: FDP\_DSK\_EXT.1.2 - SED Testing (does not apply as the TOE does not use self-encrypting drives)**
  - **TD0219: NIAP Endorsement of Errata for HCD PP v1.0**
  - **TD0253: Assurance Activities for Key Transport (does not apply as the TOE does not claim FCS\_COP.1(i))**
  - **TD0261: Destruction of CSPs in flash**
  - **TD0299: Update to FCS\_CKM.4 Assurance Activities**
  - **TD0393: Require FTP\_TRP.1(b) only for printing**

### 1.2.3. Package Claims

None.



### 1.3. Conventions

The following conventions have been applied in this document:

- Security Functional Requirements—Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
  - Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In this ST, iteration is indicated by a number in parentheses placed at the end of the component. For example, FCS\_CKM.1(a) and FCS\_CKM.1(b) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FCS\_CKM.1 requirement.
  - Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using bold underlines and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [**assignment**]). Note that an assignment within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold underlined brackets (e.g., [***selected-assignment***]).
  - Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [***selection***]).
  - Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold for additions and strike-through for deletions (e.g., “... **all objects** ...” or “... ~~some big things~~ ...”).
- Other sections of the ST—other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.

## 2. TOE Overview

### 2.1. TOE Description

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Xerox multi-function device (MFD) Xerox® AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090. The TOE copies and prints with scan and fax capabilities. The Xerox Embedded Fax Accessory provides local analog fax capability over Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) connections and also enables LanFax<sup>1</sup>.

Xerox's Workflow Scanning Accessory is part of the TOE configuration. This accessory allows documents to be scanned at the device with the resulting image being sent via email, transferred to a remote file repository or kept in a private (scan) mailbox.

The TOE can integrate with an IPv4 network with native support for DHCP. The hardware included in the TOE is shown in the figure below.

### 2.2. TOE Architecture



**Figure 1: Xerox® AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090**

---

<sup>1</sup> LanFax enables fax jobs to be submitted from the desktop via printing protocols.

The Xerox MFP's within the scope of the evaluation are shown in the table below.

**Table 2: Xerox MFP's**

Model	Firmware Version	Operating System
AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090	101.008.019.20200 with Software Patch 417710v1.dlm	Wind River 6 Linux 3.10

All Xerox® AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090 security settings and operational aspects are exactly the same. The only differences amongst different models are print speed and hard drive capacity. Testing was conducted on the B8055 model.

### 2.2.1. Physical Boundary

The TOE is an MFD (Xerox® AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090) that consists of a printer, copier, scanner, fax and associated administrator and user guidance. The TOE comprises all software and firmware within the MFD enclosure.

Users can determine version numbers and whether the Xerox Embedded Fax Accessory, Xerox Workflow Scan Accessory and Image Overwrite Security Package are installed by reviewing the TOE configuration report.

### 2.2.2. Logical Boundary

The TOE provides the following security features:

#### 2.2.2.1. Identification and Authentication

In the evaluated configuration, the TOE requires users and system administrators to authenticate before granting access to user (copy, print, fax, etc.) or system administration functions via the Web User Interface (Web UI) or the Local User Interface (LUI). The user or system administrator must enter a username and password at either the Web UI or the LUI. The password is obscured as it is being entered. The TOE provides role based access control as configured by the system administrator.

The TOE also supports smart card and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) for network authentication.

#### 2.2.2.2. Security Audit

The TOE generates audit logs that track events/actions (e.g., print/scan/fax job submission) to identified users. The audit logs, which are stored locally in a 15000 entry circular log, are available to TOE administrators and can be exported in comma separated format for viewing and analysis.

#### 2.2.2.3. Access Control

The TOE enforces a system administrator defined role based access control policy. Only authenticated users assigned to roles with the necessary privileges are allowed to perform copy, print, scan or fax on the TOE via the Web UI or the LUI.

Unauthenticated users can submit print or LanFax jobs to the TOE via printing protocols. Release of unauthenticated print jobs to the hardcopy output handler is dependent on the system administrator defined policy.

The TOE allows filtering rules to be specified for IPv4 network connections based on IP address and port number.

#### **2.2.2.4. Security Management**

A Local User, via the local user interface, or a Remote User, via the browser-based interface, with administrative privileges can configure the security settings of the TOE. The TOE has the capability to assign Users to roles that distinguish Users who can perform administrative functions from Users who can perform User functions via a role based access control policy. The TOE also has the capability to protect its security settings from unauthorized disclosure and alteration when they are stored in the TOE and in transit to or from the browser-based interface.

#### **2.2.2.5. Trusted Operation**

The TOE includes a software image verification feature and Embedded Device Security which employs McAfee software to detect and prevent unauthorized execution and modification of TOE software.

#### **2.2.2.6. Encryption**

The TOE utilizes digital signature generation and verification (RSA), data encryption (AES), key establishment (RSA) and cryptographic checksum generation and secure hash computation (HMAC, SHA-1) in support of disk encryption, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS, TLS/SMTP and IPsec. The TOE also provides random bit generation in support of cryptographic operations.

The TOE stores temporary image data created during a copy, print, scan and fax job on the single shared hard disk drive (HDD) that is field replaceable. This temporary image data consists of the original data submitted and additional files created during a job. All partitions of the HDD used for spooling temporary files are encrypted. The hard drive encryption key is derived from a BIOS saved passphrase and is the same value after each power-up (see KMD for details).

#### **2.2.2.7. Trusted Communication**

The TOE provides support for a number of secure communication protocols:

- Transport Layer Security (TLS) support is available for protecting communication over the Web User Interface (Web UI) and SMTP email communications.
- Secure Shell (SSH) File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) and TLS are available for protecting document transfers to a remote file depository.
- Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) support is available for protecting communication over IPv4 networks.

- TLS support is available for protecting communication with a remote authentication server.

#### **2.2.2.8. PSTN Fax-Network Separation**

The TOE provides separation between the fax processing board and the network interface and therefore prevents an interconnection between the PSTN and the internal network. This separation is realized in software, as by design, these interfaces may only communicate via an intermediary.

#### **2.2.2.9. Data Clearing and Purging**

The image overwrite feature overwrites temporary image files created during a copy, print, scan or fax job when those files are no longer needed. Overwrite is also invoked at the instruction of a job owner or administrator and at start-up. The purge feature allows an authorized administrator to permanently delete all customer-supplied data on the TOE. This addresses residual data concerns when the TOE is decommissioned from service or redeployed to a different environment.

#### **2.2.3. Evaluated Configuration**

To implement the security features identified in Section 2.2.2 of this Security Target, the TOE must be configured in accordance with the Secure Installation and Operation guidance document (see Table 2).

The following components are included in the evaluated configuration:

- Xerox Embedded Fax Accessory
- Smart card authentication

No claims are made regarding security features that are not explicitly identified in this Security Target.

Please see <http://www.xerox.com/information-security/product/enus.html> for the latest Xerox security information, bulletins and advisory responses.

#### **2.2.3.1. Features not tested**

The following functionality present in the PAM product was not covered by the evaluation:

- Workflow Scanning using SFTP (only HTTPS permitted);
- Xerox Secure Access and Convenience Authentication are not permitted in the evaluation configuration; and,
- SNMPv3 for device management.

#### **2.2.4. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware**

The TOE does not require any additional hardware, software or firmware in order to function as a multi-function hard copy device. Additional features require non-TOE support as follows:

- Network security and fax flow features are only useful in environments where the TOE is connected to a network or PSTN.
- Network identification is only available when LDAP remote authentication services are present in the environment.
- Smart card authentication requires Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201 Personal Identity Verification Common Access Card (PIV-CAC) compliant smart cards and readers or equivalent. In support of smart card authentication, a Windows Domain Controller must also be present in the environment.
- The TOE may be configured to reference an NTP server for time.

**2.3. TOE Documentation**

The administrator and user guidance included in the TOE are listed in Table 2.

**Table 3: System User and Administrator Guidance**

Title	Version	Date
Xerox® AltaLink® Series Multifunction Printers System Administrator Guide	1.0	May 2017
Xerox® AltaLink™ B80XX Series Multifunction Printer User Guide	1.0	May 2017
Secure Installation and Operation of Your AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090 Multifunction Printer and AltaLink™ C8030 / C8035 / C8045 / C8055 / C8075 Color Multifunction Printer	1.8	September 12, 2019

### 3. Security Problem Definition

The security problem definition consists of the threats, organizational security policies, and usage assumptions as they relate to the Xerox® AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090.

#### 3.1. Threats

Known or presumed threats to protected resources that are addressed by Xerox® AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090 based on conformance to the HCDPP are presented below.

**Table 4: HCD PP Threats addressed**

ID	Threats
<b>T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS</b>	An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete) User Document Data or change (modify or delete) User Job Data in the TOE through one of the TOE's interfaces.
<b>T.TSF_COMPROMISE</b>	An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF Data in the TOE through one of the TOE's interfaces.
<b>T.TSF_FAILURE</b>	A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security if the TOE is permitted to operate.
<b>T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE</b>	An attacker may cause the installation of unauthorized software on the TOE.
<b>T.NET_COMPROMISE</b>	An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise compromise the security of the TOE by monitoring or manipulating network communication.

#### 3.2. Assumptions

The core security aspects of the environment in which Xerox® AltaLink™ B8045 / B8055 / B8065 / B8075 / B8090 is intended to be used is presented below. It includes information about the physical, personnel, procedural, and connectivity aspects of the environment.

The following specific conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is employed in order to conform to the HCDPP.

**Table 5: HCD PP Assumptions addressed**

ID	Assumptions
<b>A.PHYSICAL</b>	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
<b>A.NETWORK</b>	The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
<b>A.TRUSTED_ADMIN</b>	TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE according to site security policies.

<b>A.TRAINED_USERS</b>	Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to site security policies.
------------------------	--

### 3.3. Organizational Security Policies

An organizational security policy (OSP) is a set of rules or procedures imposed by an organization upon its operations to protect its sensitive data or IT assets. organizational security policies which are necessary for conformance to the HCDPP are below.

**Table 6: HCD PP OSPs addressed**

ID	Organizational Security Policy
<b>P.AUTHORIZATION</b>	Users must be authorized before performing Document Processing and administrative functions.
<b>P.AUDIT</b>	Security-relevant activities must be audited and the log of such actions must be protected and transmitted to an External IT Entity.
<b>P.COMMS_PROTECTION</b>	The TOE must be able to identify itself to other devices on the LAN.
<b>P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION (conditionally mandatory)</b>	If the TOE stores User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data on Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt such data on those devices.
<b>P.KEY_MATERIAL (conditionally mandatory)</b>	Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or any other values that contribute to the creation of encryption keys for Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage of User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data must be protected from unauthorized access and must not be stored on that storage device.
<b>P.FAX_FLOW (conditionally mandatory)</b>	If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will ensure separation between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.
<b>P.IMAGE_OVERWRITE (optional)</b>	Upon completion or cancellation of a Document Processing job, the TOE shall overwrite residual image data from its Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices.
<b>P.PURGE_DATA (optional)</b>	The TOE shall provide a function that an authorized administrator can invoke to make all customer-supplied User Data and TSF Data permanently irretrievable from Nonvolatile Storage Devices.



#### 4. Security Objectives

The Security Objectives have been taken from the [HCDPP] and are reproduced for the convenience of the reader.

##### 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE

The following Security Objectives for the TOE are drawn directly from the [HCDPP].

**Table 7: HCD PP OSPs addressed**

ID	Security Objective for the TOE
<b>O.USER_I&amp;A</b>	The TOE shall perform identification and authentication of Users for operations that require access control, User authorization, or Administrator roles.
<b>O.ACCESS_CONTROL</b>	The TOE shall enforce access controls to protect User Data and TSF Data in accordance with security policies.
<b>O.USER_AUTHORIZATION</b>	The TOE shall perform authorization of Users in accordance with security policies.
<b>O.ADMIN_ROLES</b>	The TOE shall ensure that only authorized Administrators are permitted to perform administrator functions.
<b>O.UPDATE_VERIFICATION</b>	The TOE shall provide mechanisms to verify the authenticity of software updates.
<b>O.TSF_SELF_TEST</b>	The TOE shall test some subset of its security functionality to help ensure that subset is operating properly.
<b>O.COMMS_PROTECTION</b>	The TOE shall have the capability to protect LAN communications of User Data and TSF Data from Unauthorized Access, replay, and source/destination spoofing.
<b>O.AUDIT</b>	The TOE shall generate audit data, and be capable of sending it to a trusted External IT Entity. Optionally, it may store audit data in the TOE.
<b>O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION (conditionally mandatory)</b>	If the TOE stores User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data in Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage devices, then the TOE shall encrypt such data on those devices.
<b>O.KEY_MATERIAL (conditionally mandatory)</b>	The TOE shall protect from unauthorized access any cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or other values that contribute to the creation of encryption keys for storage of User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data in Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices; The TOE shall ensure that such key material is not stored in cleartext on the storage device that uses that material.
<b>O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION (conditionally mandatory)</b>	If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, then the TOE shall ensure separation of the PSTN fax telephone line and the LAN, by system design or active security function.

ID	Security Objective for the TOE
<b>O.IMAGE_OVERWRITE (optional)</b>	Upon completion or cancellation of a Document Processing job, the TOE shall overwrite residual image data from its Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices.
<b>O.PURGE_DATA (optional)</b>	The TOE provides a function that an authorized administrator can invoke to make all customer-supplied User Data and TSF Data permanently irretrievable from Nonvolatile Storage Devices.

#### 4.2. Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The following Security Objectives for the Operational Environment assist the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality. These track with the assumptions about the environment.

**Table 8: Security Objectives for the Environment**

ID	Security Objective for the TOE
<b>OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION</b>	The Operational Environment shall provide physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it stores or processes.
<b>OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION</b>	The Operational Environment shall provide network security to protect the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
<b>OE.ADMIN_TRUST</b>	The TOE Owner shall establish trust that Administrators will not use their privileges for malicious purposes.
<b>OE.USER_TRAINING</b>	The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of site security policies and have the competence to follow them.
<b>OE.ADMIN_TRAINING</b>	The TOE Owner shall ensure that Administrators are aware of site security policies and have the competence to use manufacturer’s guidance to correctly configure the TOE and protect passwords and keys accordingly.

## 5. IT Security Requirements

This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that represent the security claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and scope the evaluation effort.

All the SFRs have been drawn from HCDPP. As such, operations already performed in that PP are not identified here. Instead, the requirements have been copied from the PP and any incomplete selections or assignments have been performed herein. Of particular note, the PP makes a number of refinements and completes some SFR operations defined in the CC, so it should be consulted if necessary to identify those changes.

The SARs are the set of SARs specified in [HCDPP].

### 5.1. Extended Requirements

All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the [HCDPP]. The [HCDPP] defines the following extended SFRs and since they are not redefined in this ST, the [HCDPP] should be consulted for more information in regard to those CC extensions.

- **FAU\_STG\_EXT.1: Extended:** External Audit Trail Storage
- **FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4: Extended:** Cryptographic Key Destruction
- **FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1: Extended:** Cryptographic operation (random bit generation)
- **FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1: Extended:** IPsec selected
- **FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1: Extended:** HTTPS selected
- **FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1: Extended:** SSH selected
- **FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1: Extended:** TLS selected
- **FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1: Extended:** Pre-Shared Key Composition
- **FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1 Extended:** Key Chaining
- **FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1: Extended:** Password Management
- **FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1: Extended:** Protection of TSF Data
- **FPT\_TST\_EXT.1: Extended:** TSF Testing
- **FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1: Extended:** Trusted update
- **FPT\_KYP\_EXT.1 Extended:** Protection of Key and Key Material
- **FDP\_DSK\_EXT.1 Extended:** Protection of Data on Disk
- **FDP\_FXS\_EXT.1 Extended:** Fax separation

## 5.2. Security Functional Requirements

### 5.2.1. FAU\_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation

**FAU\_GEN.1.1** The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the **not specified** level of audit; and
- c) All auditable events specified in Table 9, [**no other auditable events**].

**FAU\_GEN.1.2** The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, **additional information specified in Table 9, [no other relevant information]**.

**Table 9: Auditable Events**

Auditable Events	Relevant SFR	Additional Information
Job completion	FDP_ACF.1	Type of job
Unsuccessful User authentication	FIA_UAU.1	None
Unsuccessful User identification	FIA_UID.1	None
Use of management functions	FMT_SMF.1	None
Modification to the group of Users that are part of a role	FMT_SMR.1	None
Changes to the time	FPT_STM.1	None
Failure to establish session	FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1(a), FTP_TRP.1(b)	Reason for failure

### 5.2.2. FAU\_GEN.2 User Identity Association

**FAU\_GEN.2.1** For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

### 5.2.3. FAU\_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

**FAU\_STG.1.1** The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.

**FAU\_STG.1.2** The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

*Application Note: FAU\_STG.1 applies to local audit storage on the MFD.*

#### 5.2.4. FAU\_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

**FAU\_STG.4.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall [*overwrite the oldest stored audit records*] and [**generate an email warning at 90%**] if the audit trail is full.

*Application Note: FAU\_STG.4 applies to local audit storage on the MFD.*

#### 5.2.5. FAU\_STG\_EXT.1 Extended: External Audit Trail Storage

**FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an External IT Entity using a trusted channel according to FTP\_ITC.1.

#### 5.2.6. FCS\_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)

**FCS\_CKM.1.1(a) Refinement:** The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys **used for key establishment** in accordance with [*NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" for finite field-based key establishment schemes*] and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits.

#### 5.2.7. FCS\_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)

**FCS\_CKM.1.1(b) Refinement:** The TSF shall generate **symmetric** cryptographic keys **using a Random Bit Generator** as specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key sizes [*128 bit, 256 bit*] that meet the following: **No Standard.**

#### 5.2.8. FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

**FCS\_CKM.4.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall **destroy** cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key **destruction** method

**[For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [*removal of power to the memory*].**

**For non-volatile memory the destruction shall be executed by a [*ST author defined multi-pass*] overwrite consisting of [*pseudo-random pattern*] that meets the following: *No Standard.*]**

#### 5.2.9. FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction

**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1** The TSF shall destroy **all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and cryptographic critical security parameters** when no longer needed.

#### 5.2.10. FCS\_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption)

**FCS\_COP.1.1(a) Refinement:** The TSF shall perform **encryption and decryption** in accordance with a specified cryptographic **algorithm AES operating in [CBC]** and cryptographic key sizes **128-bits and 256-bits** that meets the following:

- **FIPS PUB 197, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)"**
- **[NIST SP 800-38B, NIST SP 800-38C, NIST SP 800-38D]**

#### 5.2.11. FCS\_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/ verification)

**FCS\_COP.1.1(b) Refinement:** The TSF shall perform **cryptographic signature services** in accordance with a **[RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [2048 bits]]** that meets the following [Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”].

#### 5.2.12. FCS\_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

**FCS\_COP.1.1(d)** The TSF shall perform data encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in **[CBC]** mode and cryptographic key sizes **[256 bits]** that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3, **[CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116]**.

**Application Note:** This SFR is for the FDP\_DSK\_EXT.1 requirement.

#### 5.2.13. FCS\_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)

**FCS\_COP.1.1(g) Refinement:** The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-**[SHA-1, SHA-256]**, key size **[160 and 256]**, and message digest sizes **[160, 256]** bits that meet the following: FIPS PUB 198-1, “The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, and FIPS PUB 180-3, “Secure Hash Standard.”

**Application Note:** This SFR is for the FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.4 requirement.

#### 5.2.14. FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1(a) Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1(a):** The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with **[NIST SP 800-90A]** using **[CTR\_DRBG (AES)]**.

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2(a):** The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from **[2 hardware-based noise source(s)]** with a minimum of **[128 bits]** of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

**Application Note:** This iteration applies to the OpenSSL DRBG.

#### 5.2.15. FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1(b) Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1(b):** The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with **[NIST SP 800-90A]** using **[CTR\_DRBG (AES)]**.

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2(b):** The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from **[2 hardware-based noise source(s)]** with a minimum of **[128 bits, 256 bits]** of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

**Application Note:** This iteration applies to the Mocana RBG.

#### 5.2.16. FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall implement [*tunnel mode, transport mode*].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is otherwise unmatched, and discards it.

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using [*the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-CBC-256 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC*].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall implement the protocol: [*IKEv1, using Main Mode for Phase 1 exchanges, as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [no other RFCs for extended sequence numbers], and [no other RFCs for hash functions]*].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.6** The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [*IKEv1*] protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 3602 and [*no other algorithm*].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.7** The TSF shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main mode.

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.8** The TSF shall ensure that: [*IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be established based on [length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]*].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.9** The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14 (2048-bit MODP), and [*no other DH groups*].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.10** The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform Peer Authentication using the [*RSA*] algorithm and Pre-shared Keys.

**Application Note:** IPsec is used by FTP\_TRP.1(a) and FTP\_TRP.1(b) for print jobs submitted to the TOE.

#### 5.2.17. FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS as specified in FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1.

**Application Note:** HTTPS is used by FTP\_TRP.1(a) and FTP\_TRP.1(b) for print transmitted to and from the TOE and for administrator management of the TOE.

### 5.2.18. FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining

**FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [*one, using a submask as the BEV or DEK*] while maintaining an effective strength of [*256 bits*].

### 5.2.19. FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected

**FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols [*TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)*] supporting the following ciphersuites:

Mandatory Ciphersuites:

- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA

Optional Ciphersuites:

- [TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA]

**Application Note:** *TLS is used by FTP\_TRP.1(a) and FTP\_TRP.1(b) for print and scans jobs transmitted to and from the TOE and for HTTPS communication to the TOE. TLS is used by FTP\_ITC.1 communication LDAP to and from the TOE.*



#### 5.2.20. FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected

**FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, and [no other RFCs].

**FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, password-based.

**FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [0] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

**FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, [no other algorithms].

**FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [SSH\_RSA] and [no other public key algorithms] as its public key algorithm(s).

**FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.6** The TSF shall ensure that data integrity algorithms used in SSH transport connection is [HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA1-96, HMAC-SHA2-512].

**FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1.7** The TSF shall ensure that diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and [no other methods] are the only allowed key exchange method used for the SSH protocol.

**Application Notes:** *SSH is used by FTP\_ITC.1 for audit log transmission from the TOE via SFTP. The MFP only transmits audit logs data and does not receive any data; therefore any data packet received by the MFP will be dropped. SFTP Packets are not dropped for transmission, as the layered communications protocol code when receiving larger than the maximum size data from local applications requesting transmission, segments the data requests into several data packets of no larger than 16384 bytes each. Incoming data packets, other than those associated with the small transmission acknowledgments, are dropped, as the TOE does not receive files over SFTP.*

#### 5.2.21. FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

**FDP\_ACC.1.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP on subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects specified in Table 10 and Table 11.

#### 5.2.22. FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

**FDP\_ACF.1.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to objects based on the following: subjects, objects, and attributes specified in Table 10 and Table 11.

**FDP\_ACF.1.2 Refinement:** The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects specified in Table 10 and Table 11.

**FDP\_ACF.1.3 Refinement:** The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules that do not conflict with the

User Data Access Control SFP, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects].

**FDP\_ACF.1.4 Refinement:** The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules that do not conflict with the User Data Access Control SFP, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].

**Table 10: D.USER.DOC Access Control SFP**

		"Create"	"Read"	"Modify"	"Delete"
<b>Print</b>	<i>Operation:</i>	<i>Submit a document to be printed</i>	<i>Release printed output</i>	<i>Modify stored document</i>	<i>Delete stored document</i>
	<b>Job owner</b>	(note 1) allowed	(note 5) allowed	denied	allowed
	<b>U.ADMIN</b>	allowed	(note 5) denied	denied	allowed
	<b>U.NORMAL</b>	allowed	denied	denied	Denied
	<b>Unauthenticated</b>	(condition 1) allowed	denied	denied	Denied
<b>Scan</b>	<i>Operation:</i>	<i>Submit a document for scanning</i>	<i>View scanned image</i>	<i>Modify stored image</i>	<i>Delete stored image</i>
	<b>Job owner</b>	(note 2) allowed	(note 5) denied	denied	allowed
	<b>U.ADMIN</b>	allowed	(note 5) denied	denied	allowed
	<b>U.NORMAL</b>	allowed	denied	denied	Denied
	<b>Unauthenticated</b>	denied	denied	denied	Denied
<b>Copy</b>	<i>Operation:</i>	<i>Submit a document for copying</i>	<i>Release printed copy output</i>	<i>Modify stored image</i>	<i>Delete stored image</i>
	<b>Job owner</b>	(note 2) allowed	(note 5) allowed	denied	denied
	<b>U.ADMIN</b>	allowed	(note 5) allowed	denied	allowed
	<b>U.NORMAL</b>	allowed	denied	denied	Denied
	<b>Unauthenticated</b>	denied	denied	denied	Denied

		"Create"	"Read"	"Modify"	"Delete"
Fax send	<i>Operation:</i>	<i>Submit a document to send as a fax</i>	<i>View scanned image</i>	<i>Modify stored image</i>	<i>Delete stored image</i>
	Job owner	(note 2) allowed	denied	denied	denied
	U.ADMIN	allowed	denied	denied	allowed
	U.NORMAL	allowed	denied	denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	denied	denied	denied	Denied
Fax receive (note 6)	<i>Operation:</i>	<i>Receive a fax and store it</i>	<i>Release printed fax output</i>	<i>Modify image of received fax</i>	<i>Delete image of received fax</i>
	Fax owner	denied	denied	denied	denied
	U.ADMIN	denied	(note 5) allowed	denied	allowed
	U.NORMAL	denied	denied	denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	denied	denied	denied	Denied

Table 11: D.USER.JOB Access Control SFP

		"Create" *	"Read"	"Modify"	"Delete"
Print	<i>Operation:</i>	<i>Create print job</i>	<i>View print queue/log</i>	<i>Modify print job</i>	<i>Cancel print job</i>
	Job owner	(note 1) allowed	allowed	denied	allowed
	U.ADMIN	allowed	allowed	denied	allowed
	U.NORMAL	allowed	allowed	denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	allowed	allowed	denied	Denied
Scan	<i>Operation:</i>	<i>Create scan job</i>	<i>View scan status/log</i>	<i>Modify scan job</i>	<i>Cancel scan job</i>
	Job owner	(note 2) allowed	allowed	denied	allowed
	U.ADMIN	allowed	allowed	denied	allowed
	U.NORMAL	allowed	allowed	denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	denied	allowed	denied	Denied

		"Create" *	"Read"	"Modify"	"Delete"
Copy	<i>Operation:</i>	<i>Create copy job</i>	<i>View copy status/log</i>	<i>Modify copy job</i>	<i>Cancel copy job</i>
	Job owner	(note 2) allowed	allowed	denied	denied
	U.ADMIN	allowed	allowed	denied	allowed
	U.NORMAL	allowed	allowed	denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	denied	allowed	denied	Denied
Fax send	<i>Operation:</i>	<i>Create fax send job</i>	<i>View fax job status/log</i>	<i>Modify fax send job</i>	<i>Cancel fax send job</i>
	Job owner	(note 2) allowed	allowed	denied	denied
	U.ADMIN	allowed	allowed	denied	allowed
	U.NORMAL	allowed	allowed	denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	denied	allowed	denied	Denied
Fax receive	<i>Operation:</i>	<i>Create fax receive job</i>	<i>View fax receive status/log</i>	<i>Modify fax receive job</i>	<i>Cancel fax receive job</i>
	Fax owner	denied	allowed	denied	denied
	U.ADMIN	denied	allowed	denied	allowed
	U.NORMAL	denied	allowed	denied	Denied
	Unauthenticated	denied	allowed	denied	Denied

**Application notes:**

**Condition 1:** Jobs submitted by unauthenticated users must contain a credential that the TOE can use to identify the Job Owner.

See also the following Notes that are referenced in Table 10 and Table 11:

**Note 1:** Job Owner is identified by a credential or assigned to an authorized User as part of the process of submitting a print or storage Job.

**Note 2:** Job Owner is assigned to an authorized User as part of the process of initiating a scan, copy, fax send, or retrieval Job.

**Note 3:** Job Owner of received faxes is assigned by default or configuration. Minimally, ownership of received faxes is assigned to a specific user or U.ADMIN role.

**Note 4:** PSTN faxes are received from outside of the TOE, they are not initiated by Users of the TOE.

**Note 5:** Viewing is not permitted and releasing the document is permitted.

**Note 6:** Secure Fax must be enabled.

#### 5.2.23. FDP\_DSK\_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk

**FDP\_DSK\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall [*perform encryption in accordance with FCS\_COP.1(d)*], such that any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device contains no plaintext User Document Data and no plaintext Confidential TSF Data.

**FDP\_DSK\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.

#### 5.2.24. FDP\_FXS\_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation

**FDP\_FXS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols.

#### 5.2.25. FDP\_RIP.1(a) Subset residual information protection

**FDP\_RIP.1.1(a) Refinement:** The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable **by overwriting data** upon the **deallocation of the resource from** the following objects: **D.USER.DOC**.

#### 5.2.26. FDP\_RIP.1(b) Subset residual information protection

**FDP\_RIP.1.1(b) Refinement:** The TSF shall ensure that any previous **customer-supplied** information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the **request of an Administrator** to the following objects: **D.USER, D.TSF**.

#### 5.2.27. FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

**FIA\_AFL.1.1** The TSF shall detect when [3] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [*when a user attempts to login through the WebUI or local UI*].

**FIA\_AFL.1.2** When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [*surpassed*], the TSF shall [*lock the user for 5 minutes*].

#### 5.2.28. FIA\_ATD.1 User attribute definition

**FIA\_ATD.1.1** The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [**username, password, and configured roles**].

#### 5.2.29. FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management

**FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for User passwords:

- Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [*“!”*, *“@”*, *“#”*, *“\$”*, *“%”*, *“^”*, *“&”*, *“\*”*, *“(“*, *“)”*, **and other printable ISO 8859-15 set and Unicode/UTF-8 set characters except “>”**];

- Minimum password length shall be settable by an Administrator, and have the capability to require passwords of 15 characters or greater.

#### 5.2.30. FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

**FIA\_UAU.1.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall allow [**job requests to be received via printing protocols**] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

**FIA\_UAU.1.2** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

#### 5.2.31. FIA\_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

**FIA\_UAU.7.1** The TSF shall provide only [**asterisks**] to the user while the authentication is in progress.

#### 5.2.32. FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

**FIA\_UID.1.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall allow [**job requests to be received via printing protocols**] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

**FIA\_UID.1.2** The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

#### 5.2.33. FIA\_USB.1 User-subject binding

**FIA\_USB.1.1** The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [**user ID, roles**].

**FIA\_USB.1.2** The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [**user's roles is associated with the user at initial authentication to the TOE**].

**FIA\_USB.1.3** The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [**only an administrator with the proper role may reconfigure another user's roles**].

#### 5.2.34. FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition

**FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.

**FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that are: 22 characters in length and [**lengths from 1 to 32 characters**]; composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters (that include: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "\*", "(", and ")").

**FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using [**SHA-1, SHA-256**] and be able to [**use no other pre-shared keys**].

**Application Note:** FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1 is required by FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.4.

**5.2.35. FMT\_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior**

**FMT\_MOF.1.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall restrict the ability to [*determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of*] the functions [functions listed in Table 12] to U.ADMIN.

**5.2.36. FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes**

**FMT\_MSA.1.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall enforce the **User Data Access Control SFP** to restrict the ability to [*change\_default, query, modify, delete*] the security attributes [role and associated access permission] to [U.ADMIN].

**5.2.37. FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization**

**FMT\_MSA.3.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall enforce the **User Data Access Control SFP** to provide [*permissive*] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

**FMT\_MSA.3.2 Refinement:** The TSF shall allow the [*U.ADMIN*] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

**5.2.38. FMT\_MTD.1 Management of TSF data**

**FMT\_MTD.1.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall restrict the ability to **perform the specified operations on the specified TSF Data to the roles specified in Table 12.**

**Table 12: Management of TSF Data**

Data	Operation	Authorised Role(s)
<b>TSF Data owned by U.NORMAL or associated with documents or jobs owned by U.NORMAL.</b>		
Login password for authenticated user	Modify	U.NORMAL (Authenticated user)
Authenticated user roles to copy, print, scan or fax on the TOE via the Web UI or the Local UI.	query	U.NORMAL (Authenticated user)
Authenticated user roles to copy, print, scan or fax on the TOE via the Web UI or the Local UI.	Modify, Change default	U.ADMIN (System Administrator)
<b>TSF Data not owned by a U.NORMAL</b>		
Login password for system administrator	Modify	U.ADMIN (System Administrator)
<b>Software, firmware, and related configuration data</b>		
Audit Log	Query, modify behavior of	U.ADMIN
X.509 Certificate (TLS)	Modify, query, delete	U.ADMIN
IP filter table (rules)	Modify, query, delete	U.ADMIN

Email Addresses for fax forwarding	Modify, query, delete	U.ADMIN
------------------------------------	-----------------------	---------

**5.2.39. FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions**

**FMT\_SMF.1.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management function: [Management functions listed in Table 13].

**Table 13: Management Functions**

Management Functions	Enable	Disable	Determine Behavior	Modify Behavior
Enable/disable Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO)	X	X	X	
Enable/disable and configure smart card use	X	X	X	
Manage receive fax (job) passcodes			X	
Configure WebUI and LUI session timeout	X	X	X	X
Configure users, roles, privileges and passwords	X	X	X	X
Configure network authentication	X	X	X	
Enable/disable Disk Encryption	X	X	X	
Configure (specify the IP address and/or IP address range, port and port range for remote trusted IT products (presumed) allowed to connect to the TOE via the network interface) IP filtering	X	X	X	X
Enable/disable and configure IPsec	X	X	X	X
Enable/disable and configure 802.1x	X	X	X	X
Create/upload/download X.509 certificates	X	X	X	
Enable/disable TLS	X	X	X	X
Configure email addresses for audit exhaustion warnings	X	X	X	
Transfer the audit records (if audit is enabled) to a remote trusted IT product	X	X	X	
Configure SFTP	X	X	X	X
Enable/disable audit function	X	X	X	
Create a recurrence schedule for ODIO	X	X	X	
Invoke ODIO	X	X		
Invoke data purge function	X	X		
Enable/disable USB ports	X	X		



Enable/disable and configure fax forwarding to email	X	X	X	
Configure NTP	X	X	X	
Configure SMTP over TLS	X	X	X	
Enable/disable and configure Enhanced Device Security	X	X	X	

**Application Note:** All management functions in Table 13 are only accessible to system administrators.

#### 5.2.40. FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

**FMT\_SMR.1.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall maintain the roles **U.ADMIN**, **U.NORMAL**.

**FMT\_SMR.1.2** The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

**Application Note:** *U.ADMIN* role applies to user with system administrator permissions. *U.NORMAL* applies to other authenticated users.

#### 5.2.41. FPT\_KYP\_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material

**FPT\_KYP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall not store plaintext keys that are part of the keychain specified by FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1 in **any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device**.

#### 5.2.42. FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data

**FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

#### 5.2.43. FPT\_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

**FPT\_STM.1.1** The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

#### 5.2.44. FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (and power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.

#### 5.2.45. FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the current version of the TOE firmware/software.

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate updates to TOE firmware/software.

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a digital signature mechanism and [**no other functions**] prior to installing those updates.

#### 5.2.46. FTA\_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination

**FTA\_SSL.3.1** The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [the Local UI will terminate any session that has been inactive for 1 minute and the Web UI will terminate any session that has been inactive for 60 minutes].

#### 5.2.47. FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

**FTP\_ITC.1.1 Refinement:** The TSF shall use **[SSH, TLS]** to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: [authentication server]** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.

**FTP\_ITC.1.2 Refinement:** The TSF shall permit the TSF, **or the authorized IT entities**, to initiate communication via the trusted channel

**FTP\_ITC.1.3 Refinement:** The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [audit transmission and user authentication service].

#### 5.2.48. FTP\_TRP.1(a) Trusted path (for Administrators)

**FTP\_TRP.1.1(a) Refinement:** The TSF shall use **[TLS/HTTPS]** to provide a **trusted** communication path between itself and remote administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data**.

**FTP\_TRP.1.2(a) Refinement:** The TSF shall permit **remote administrators** to initiate communication via the trusted path

**FTP\_TRP.1.3(a) Refinement:** The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for **initial administrator authentication and all remote administration actions**.

*Application Note: This is only for the use of remote management functions over the Web GUI.*

#### 5.2.49. FTP\_TRP.1(b) Trusted path (for non-administrators)

**FTP\_TRP.1.1(b) Refinement:** The TSF shall use **[IPsec, TLS, and TLS/HTTPS]** to provide a **trusted** communication path between itself and remote users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data**.

**FTP\_TRP.1.2(b) Refinement:** The TSF shall permit **[the TSF and remote users]** to initiate communication via the trusted path

**FTP\_TRP.1.3(b) Refinement:** The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for **initial user authentication and all remote user actions**.

*Application Note: This includes sending secure print jobs, scan jobs, and mailbox retrieval for any remote user.*

### 5.3. Security Assurance Requirements

This section specifies the SARs for the TOE. The SARs are included by reference from [HCDPP].

**Table 14: Assurance Components**

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
ADV: Development	ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage
ATE: Tests	ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing – Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability Survey

## 6. TOE Summary Specification

This section presents an overview of the security functions implemented by the TOE.

### 6.1. TOE Security Functions

This section presents the security functions performed by the TOE to satisfy the identified SFRs in Sections 5.2.

- Identification and Authentication
- Security Audit
- Access Control
- Security Management
- Trusted Operation
- Encryption
- Trusted Communication
- PSTN Fax-Network Separation
- Data Clearing and Purging

#### 6.1.1. Identification and Authentication

<b>FIA_AFL.1</b>	<p><b>WebUI Login</b></p> <p>After three unsuccessful login attempts, where the login name or password were incorrect, the TOE shall impose a Lockout Period of five minutes for that session only.</p> <p>When the user's session is locked out for the WebUI login, the user shall receive a message stating: "Login is currently locked: too many invalid login attempts. Please try again later." so that the user knows that the credentials were not necessarily wrong but they were locked out and they should try later.</p> <p>The Lockout Period time is initiated from the time of the third failed attempt. Further login attempts do not extend this period.</p> <p><b>Local UI Login</b></p> <p>After three successive failed attempts to login at Local UI (i.e. the user acknowledged the error, and submitted incorrect data three times without canceling out of the authentication process) the device shall lockdown Touch UI Authentication.</p> <p>The Local UI shall continue to display the login prompt after the lockdown has been initiated</p>
------------------	--

	<p>All attempts to login at the Local UI shall fail after the lockdown has been initiated, even if a valid username and password are provided</p> <p>The Local UI lockdown shall last for five minutes.</p> <p>The Local UI lockdown only applies to the Local. Therefore, if a user were locked out at the LUI, then Web UI would still allow a user to log in.</p> <p>The lockdown of Touch UI Authentication shall not impact a walk-up user’s ability to access Local UI Pathways, Services, and Features that are accessible (not locked) to a non-logged-in user (guest). The lockdown shall only impact the things that require a walk-up user to authenticate</p>
FIA_ATD.1	<p>The TOE maintains username and password credentials for each authenticated user and associated roles configured for the authenticated user.</p>
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	<p>The valid character set for setting up passwords for accounts is the printable ISO 8859-15 set and Unicode/UTF-8 set, including: “!”, “@”, “#”, “\$”, “%”, “^”, “&amp;”, “*”, “(”, “)”, but not allowing the ‘&gt;’ character.</p> <p>The maximum Password field length is limited by the device to a string of 63 octets (plus NULL1 ).</p> <p>The administrator can set whether the password shall be required to contain at least one numeric character. The administrator can set the minimum required password length to be anywhere between 1 and 63 characters.</p>
FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1	<p>The TOE provides the following means to identify and authenticate to the TOE:</p> <p><b>Local UI (operation panel) and Web UI (browser based)</b> – uses a local information database for users</p> <p><b>Network Authentication via an external authentication service</b> – uses LDAP to identify and authenticate users</p> <p><b>Smartcard Authentication</b> – Smart Card pin</p> <p>By default unauthenticated users (Guest users) can execute the following actions: Copy, Print, Fax, Scan to Destination, Scan to Email.</p> <p>The only operation permitted prior to successful identification and authentication is job requests can be received via printing protocols.</p>

FIA_UAU.7	When a user enters passwords at the WebUI or Local UI, asterisks are displayed rather than the entered character in order to obscure password.
FIA_USB.1	<p>The TOE implements a role based access control system. The TOE ships with three pre-configured roles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>System Administrator.</b> Has access to all pathways, services and features including all management functions on the TOE.</li> <li>• <b>Logged-in User.</b> Non-administrative users who have authenticated to the TOE. The System Administrator may create custom roles for Logged-In Users and assign MFD function privileges.</li> <li>• <b>Accounting Administrator.</b> Has access to all device services and pathways except for the tools pathway (which is used for system administrator functions).</li> </ul> <p>The TOE also maintains a fourth category for Non-Logged-In (unauthenticated) users, enabling the system administrator to specify what functions if any are available to unauthenticated users.</p> <p>Upon successful authentication, users are granted access based on their role. Only a system administrator is allowed full access to the TOE including all the system administration functions.</p>
FTA_SSL.3	By default, the LUI will terminate any session that has been inactive for 1 minute. By default, the Web UI will terminate any session that has been inactive for 60 minutes. The system administrator can configure both the LUI and Web UI session timeouts to terminate an inactive session after some other period of time.

### 6.1.2. Security Audit

FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2	<p>The TOE generates audit logs that track events/actions (e.g., print/scan/fax job submission) to logged-in users, and each log entry contains a timestamp. The audit log also tracks user identification and authentication, administrator actions (including creation and modification of users and associated roles), and failure of trusted channels.</p> <p>The audit events are specified in Table 9 and the full list of auditable events can be found in Appendix A of the Xerox®</p>
-------------------------	--

	AltaLink® Series Multifunction Printers System Administrator Guide.
FAU_STG_EXT.1	The TOE has the ability to be transfer, or “push” the audit log file to a designated file server in the IT environment. This will be possible via SFTP protocol only. The audit log transfer will be automated daily audit log file transmissions, as well as a ‘send now’ function. Configuring the transfer or using the ‘send now’ feature will be available via TOE Web UI only.
FAU_STG.1	The audit log may be downloaded from the MFP through the Web UI or the LUI. The system administrator must be logged in to download the audit log and is the only user with authorized access to the audit log.
FAU_STG.4	The TOE can store a maximum of 15,000 audit log entries. The TOE overwrites oldest events first if the maximum is reached. When the TOE reaches 13,500 entries (90% full) an email warning is sent to a set of administrator defined email addresses. Subsequent warnings will be emailed after every 15,000 entries if the audit log has not been cleared.
FPT_STM.1	During initial device configuration the initial date and time are set. The TOE maintains the date and time to provide reliable timestamps.

6.1.3. Access Control

FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1	<p>Users (U.NORMAL) require explicit authorization from system administrators (U.ADMIN (System Administrator)) for them to be allowed to perform the following TOE Functions referenced in Table 10 and Table 11 via the Web UI or the Local UI:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Print</li> <li>• Scan</li> <li>• Fax (receive and send)</li> <li>• Copy</li> </ul> <p>Any User who is authorized to establish a connection with the TOE through the ethernet port is able to perform the following TOE functions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Print</b> - Any host / authorized user on the network can submit print jobs, however, release of print jobs submitted by unknown/unauthenticated users to the</li> </ul>
-------------------------	--

	<p>hardcopy output handler is dependent on the system administrator defined policy.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Fax</b> - Any host / authorized user on the network can submit LanFax jobs.</li> </ul>
--	--

#### 6.1.4. Security Management

<p>FMT_MOF.1, FMT_SMF.1</p>	<p>Table 13 describes the management functions permitted by the TOE. All management functions are only usable by the system administrator. The table specifies whether the function can be enabled, disabled, and determine or modify the behavior of the function.</p>
<p>FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3</p>	<p>During initial configuration of the TOE, the administrator must modify the access configuration for the different types of jobs at the local user interface. Initial values are permissive to unauthenticated users, and the administrator must set more restrictive settings to prevent access by unauthenticated users.</p> <p><b>Copy</b></p> <p>Copy has to be performed at the local user interface. A user can only read physical copies of the documents (D.USER.DOC +CPY Read). During job setup, a copy job (D.USER.FUNC +CPY Delete, Modify) or image (D.DOC +CPY Read, Delete) can be read, modified or deleted. Once a job is committed, the job (D.FUNC +CPY Delete, Modify) can only be canceled (deleted) during its execution. Once completed, the job is removed</p> <p><b>Print</b></p> <p>Print jobs can be submitted remotely via printing protocols (e.g. lpr, port 9100) or from the WebUI. Once submitted to the TOE, there is no way for anyone to modify the job (D.FUNC +PRT Modify) or the document (D.DOC +PRT Delete). None of the jobs will be processed until the job owner starts a user session at the local user interface. The authenticated job owner can release printing of the document (D.DOC +PRT Read) or delete the print job (D.FUNC +PTR Delete) at the local user interface. The owner may also choose to delete a job (submitted from the Web UI) through the Web UI before it is released.</p> <p>Users have the option to assign a passcode to a print job during its submission (known as Secure Print). When required to enter the passcode, the user will need to be authenticated</p>



at the LUI in order to do so. The TOE can be configured to release Secure Print jobs with or without the associated passcode for the job owner who is authenticated at the LUI. User deletion of a Secure Print job requires knowledge of the associated passcode.

A system administrator has the capability to delete (D.FUNC +PRT Delete) print jobs at the LUI or Web UI. The Web UI only allows deletion of jobs submitted via the Web UI.

### **Scan**

Documents can only be scanned at the Local User Interface. During job setup, document image (D.DOC +SCN Read, Delete) may be read or deleted. Once the job is committed, the owner may send the image via email, transfer the image to a remote (TLS scan) repository, keep the image in their private mailbox or print the image.

(Scan to) Mailboxes are created and owned by individual users. Only the owner is allowed to locate and access the mailbox, and this access to mailboxes is further restricted with a passcode which the owner creates and owns. System Administrators have access to all the (scan) mailboxes. (Scan) Images saved in a mailbox (D.DOC +DSR and +SCN Read, Delete) may only be downloaded via the Web UI or deleted. A user with proper access may choose to delete the mailbox together with all images stored inside the mailbox.

### **Fax**

Faxes can be submitted at the Local User Interface or remotely as LanFax (through the same interfaces as for printing). During job setup, created document images may be read or deleted (D.DOC +faxOUT Read, Delete). Once a job is submitted, only a system administrator can delete the job before it is fully completed, in the case of delayed send for example (D.FUNC +faxOUT Delete).

Access to receive faxes is restricted to the system administrators (D.DOC +faxIN Read, Delete). All received faxes will be stored locally and assigned a system administrator predefined passcode. The system administrator can print or delete secure received faxes by entering the appropriate passcode. Once printed, the faxes are automatically deleted. Alternatively, the system administrator may also choose to designate email addresses for receiving fax images. Once the

	<p>fax job is forwarded as an attachment to an email, the job is automatically deleted.</p>
<p>FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMR.1</p>	<p>Table 12 specifies the management of TSF data and what each role is permitted to do for the TSF data.</p> <p>The TOE enforces a system administrator defined role based access control policy. Only authenticated users assigned to roles with the necessary privileges are allowed to perform copy, print, scan or fax on the TOE via the Web UI or the LUI.</p> <p>The TOE maintains two roles, authenticated users and system administrators. Authenticated user roles and permissions can only be modified by a system administrator. An authenticated user may only change their password. Access control rules for authenticated users are assigned by the system administrator and can only be modified by the system administrator.</p> <p>Other security related rules related to logon failure and logon timeout setting are not modifiable by any user.</p> <p>The system administrator can enable or disable TLS and import new X509 certificates, modify or set new IP filter rules, update or modify email addresses for fax forwarding, and update time and date.</p>

#### 6.1.5. Trusted Operation

<p>FPT_TST_EXT.1</p>	<p>The McAfee embedded module test performs a startup test where if any whitelisted executable has been modified by an extraneous method or non-updater, the device will indicate an error and halt.</p> <p>When in FIPS mode, on OpenSSL invocation a self test is performed to ensure that the openssl crypto module has not been altered. If altered, an error is indicated and the module aborts.</p> <p>On invocation of the Mocana data encryption and IPsec code a self test is performed to ensure that the Mocana crypto module has not been altered. If altered, an error is indicated and the module aborts.</p> <p>Before encryption can be performed a Health Test is performed on entropy. Please see the KMD for details.</p>
<p>FPT_TUD_EXT.1</p>	<p>The TOE provides a Web UI page that shows the Software Version, allows a print of the Configuration Report which contains the Software Version and Local UI access to display</p>

	<p>the Software Version. The Web UI provides a system administrator the function to upgrade the software image.</p> <p>The TSF performs an RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signature verification of any software upgrade image.</p> <p>Image files are encrypted using the AES 256 cipher. The key that was used to encrypt with AES 256 is encrypted itself by use of a RSA 2048 bit private key.</p> <p>The encrypted image file is hashed and signed using the SHA-256 hash cipher, and a protected, non user accessible RSA 2048 bit private key. On the TOE, prior to image installation, the corresponding RSA 2048 bit public key is used to decrypt the hash and the SHA 256 cipher is used to verify the hash.</p>
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	<p>All private and symmetric keys stored on TOE removable storage areas are encrypted, either specifically, or as a result of the hard drive partitions on which they reside being encrypted, or both.</p> <p>The TOE does not allow the user, either of admin, or non-admin privileges, through any customer provided interface to view, or obtain any pre-shared key, private key, or symmetric key.</p>

**6.1.6. Encryption**

<p>The TOE uses two crypto modules, Mocana and OpenSSL for separate purposes. The operating system is Wind River 6 using 3.10 Linux kernel running on a Intel(R) Atom(TM) CPU E3845 @ 1.91GHz.</p> <p><b>Mocana</b></p> <p>The TOE uses Mocana v6.4.1f (CMVP Cert #2859). The Mocana crypto module is used for hard disk encryption/decryption and encryption/decryption services for the IPSec protocol and for RSA Key Generation.</p> <p><b>OpenSSL</b></p> <p>The TOE uses OpenSSL v1.0.2r using OpenSSL FIPS Object Module SE 2.0.9 (CMVP Cert #2398). The OpenSSL crypto module is used for HTTPS/TLS and SSH encryption/decryption services.</p> <p><b>Note</b></p> <p>The BEV Key used for hard disk encryption/decryption is generated using the Mocana DRBG.</p>	
FCS_CKM.1(a)	<p>Refer to the Key Management Description (KMD)</p> <p>See Table 15 for Mocana Certificate for RSA Key Generation</p>
FCS_CKM.1(b)	<p>Refer to the Key Management Description (KMD)</p>

	See Table 15 for OpenSSL Certificate
FCS_CKM.4	Keys and keying material when no longer used or replaced are securely deleted. When 'securely deleted' the material is overwritten three times with a random or static pattern, and then deleted.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4	<p>Temporary files that contain keys or keying material are securely deleted when no longer used. When the device certificate is regenerated, all certificate based keys are destroyed. When the IPsec passphrase is changed, or server certificate removed or replaced, the old passphrase and certificate keys are destroyed. There are no situations where key destruction may be delayed at the physical layer.</p> <p>Keys or keying material that are deleted during a software upgrade process are securely deleted when no longer used. All keys and key material stored on the HDD are securely deleted before the HDD is wiped during a software upgrade that performs a HDD wipe. These upgrade types include all altboot upgrades (PWS, regardless of flags) and PSR wipe upgrades.</p> <p>When a private key or passphrase is no longer needed for current or future usage it shall be securely deleted, these being listed here:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TLS certificate keys</li> <li>• IPsec certificate keys</li> <li>• IPsec preshared passphrase</li> </ul> <p>Log Files residing on the hard drive when deleted are securely deleted.</p>
FCS_COP.1(a)	See Table 15 for OpenSSL Certificate
FCS_COP.1(b)	See Table 15 for Mocana Certificate
FCS_COP.1(d)	See Table 15 for OpenSSL Certificate
FCS_COP.1(g)	See Table 15 for Mocana Certificate
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a), FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b)	<p>Both crypto modules use a SP800-90A AES-256 CTR DRBG.</p> <p>Both crypto modules draw from the same entropy source in the Linux kernel, using the native Linux source /dev/random and /dev/urandom. The entropy source draws from two component sources hard disk events and processor interrupt events. The entropy source will draw at least 128 bits of</p>

	<p>entropy and will draw 256 bits of entropy for the hard drive encryption key.</p> <p>The OpenSSL DRBG is used for generating hard drive encryption keys, TLS keys, and SSH keys. The Mocana DRBG is used for generating IPsec keys.</p>
FPT_KYP_EXT.1, FCS_KYC_EXT.1	The TOE generates a BEV output of 256 bits from the OpenSSL DRBG for input into the AES256 encryption algorithm for disk encryption.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1	<p>Disk encryption is enabled by default at the factory when the device is first delivered.</p> <p>All files and meta data for the file system will be written in blocks by the file system code, those block are passed through a block i/o driver to loopaes, which then encrypts each block sending the encrypted block to the hard disk drive controller driver that sends it to the disk drive controller. The file system doesn't know about encryption, it just reads and writes the disk blocks and loopaes takes care of the encrypting/decrypting to/from the hard drive.</p> <p>User writes file data -&gt; file system writes data in blocks -&gt; loopaes gets block and encrypts -&gt; drive block controller writes block (which is encrypted data) to disk drive</p> <p>The device does not encrypt data in these partitions named: boot, root, opt, and swap. Details on encrypted partitions are in the KMD.</p>

**Table 15: Cryptographic Certificates**

Requirement	Algorithm	OpenSSL Cert (CMVP Cert #2398)	Mocana Cert (CMVP Cert #2859)
FCS_CKM.1 (a)	RSA Key Gen 186-4		CAVP Cert #2296
	CVL		CAVP Cert #1007
	DSA		CAVP Cert #1140
FCS_CKM.1 (b)	CTR_DRBG	CAVP Cert #845	CAVP Cert #1336
	AES	CAVP Cert #3451	CAVP Cert #4265
FCS_RBG.1 (a)	CTR_DRBG	CAVP Cert #845	
FCS_RBG.1 (b)	CTR_DRBG		CAVP Cert #1336
FCS_COP.1 (a)	AES CBC Mode	CAVP Cert #3451	

FCS_COP.1 (b)	RSA Sig Gen/Ver 186-4	Xerox CAVP Cert #2690	
	SHS	CAVP Cert #2847	
FCS_COP.1 (d)	AES CBC mode		CAVP Cert #4265
FCS_COP.1 (g)	HMAC		CAVP Cert #2810
	SHS		CAVP Cert #3511

**Note 1:** The TOE acts as a receiver in the RSA key establishment scheme for LDAP TLS connections and acts as a server in web browser TLS connections.

**Note 2:** The Mocana cryptographic module was FIPS 140-2 validated on Wind River 6.0 (<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm#2859>). The OpenSSL cryptographic module as FIPS 140-2 validated on Linux Kernel 3.10 (<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm#2398>). The Xerox AltaLink firmware runs on WindRiver 6 which contains a Linux 3.10 Linux kernel. The OpenSSL CMVP Cert #2398/RSA CAVP Cert #1928 does not have FIPS 186-4 signature generation and verification, Xerox conducted a private CAVP certification of FIPS 186-4 signature generation and verification with CAVP certificate #2690.

#### 6.1.7. Trusted Communication

FTP_ITC.1	The TOE supports the following secure communication protocols: HTTPS/TLS for Web UI; TLS for document transfers to the remote file depository; IPsec for communication over IPv4 and IPv6; SMTP over TLS for email; and LDAP over TLS for remote authentication.
FTP_TRP.1(a)	The TOE enforces communications over HTTPS for a secure channel for administrators managing the TOE via the WebUI interface. The communication channel is protected by the secure mechanisms of TLS. It is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data.
FTP_TRP.1(b)	The TOE uses no security protocol other than IPsec, TLS, and HTTPS to provide a trusted communications path for non-administrator TOE users.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	The use of HTTPS for securing data channels can be configured at the TOE for use of all traffic to and from a client and the WebUI service. HTTPS is enforced on WebUI pages that require Administrative access and are security sensitive.  HTTPS is implemented on the TOE according to RFC 2818. TOE can act as an HTTPS client to connect to external servers using

	<p>HTTPS over TLS for LDAP connections and the TOE acts as HTTPS Server for browsers connections using HTTPS over TLS.</p>
<p>FCS_TLS_EXT.1</p>	<p>The use of a ciphersuite is negotiated in a TLS connection between client and server. The TOE can be a client or server depending on the feature used. For example, for WebUI access, the TOE acts as a server, and for scanning to repositories the TOE acts as a client.</p> <p>The TOE as a client presents the ciphersuites it supports in the negotiation, and as a server the TOE selects an appropriate, supported ciphersuit from that presented.</p> <p>These suites are supported:</p> <p>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256          TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256          TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256          TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256          TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256          TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384          TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256          TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384          TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256          TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384          TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256          TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384          TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</p>

	<p>TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</p> <p>TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA</p>
<p>FCS_SSH_EXT.1</p>	<p>Authentication to the SFTP server can be with username and password, or by way of private/public key pair as derived from certificates. Either of these methods is configurable at the TOE.</p> <p>The SSH transport supported algorithms are AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256 only. Public key algorithm supported is SSH_RSA only. The data integrity algorithms allowed in SSH transport connection is HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA1-96, HMAC-SHA2-512.</p> <p>The TSF ensures that diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 is the only allowed key exchange method used for the SSH protocol. This is hardcoded into the SSH implementation by the TSF.</p> <p>There is no configuration at the TOE to restrict or select any of the above protocols/algorithms, other than username vs certificate. The TOE will indicate to the server in SSH negotiation sequences that all above algorithms are supported in SSH protocol handshaking and will accept any of the above that the server selects.</p> <p>For outgoing SFTP packets, the code splits data requests to maximum SFTP data packets of 16384 bytes. Packets are not dropped as the code when receiving data transmission requests of larger than the maximum size, segment the data requests into several data packets of no larger than 16384 bytes each.</p> <p>Incoming data packets, other than those associated with the small transmission acknowledgments, are dropped, as the TOE does not receive files over SFTP.</p>
<p>FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1</p>	<p>The TOE implements an IPsec Security Policy Database (SPD) and allows configuration to discard, bypass, and protect packets.</p> <p>By use of the concept of filtering the user can configure IPsec on the TOE to selectively manage which hosts (IPv4 address or IPv6 address or DNS names) and protocols to use with IPsec, and which packets to pass through (bypass), drop (discard), or to which to apply cryptography (protect).</p> <p>Policies are configured at the TOE WebUI configuration pages. In the configuration, Policies consist of combinations of three parts: Host Group, Protocol Group, and Actions (bypass, discard, protect). Several policies can be configured and are</p>



listed in order on the WebUI in the IPsec configuration page. The SPD which consists of these policies is consulted during the processing of all traffic, both inbound and outbound. The entries in the SPD are ordered as displayed on the policy list on the WebUI. A match is made when the host/host group, and protocol/protocol group in the SPD policy matches these values in an incoming or outgoing packet. As a packet is analyzed, the policies are consulted in order and the first matched policy will be used to process the traffic, and the associated action applied. Unless configured otherwise, for any packet not fitting any of the defined policies, the default action is to bypass (pass through) the packet.

For the evaluated configuration, only inbound connections are supported for reception and handling of print jobs; outbound connections for transmission of scan jobs are not supported. A final policy is configured such that by default any non matching packet results in the packet being discarded. These IPsec policies, set up via the WebUI IPsec configuration page, correspond to the desired evaluated configuration. The evaluated configuration is set up in order to test all possible actions of bypass, drop, and applied cryptography.

Components of Policies (host/host group, protocol/protocol group, action):

**Host/Host Group:** A host group is a non-empty set of addresses over which to apply the policy. Three types of hosts can be set: Any, a subnet, or a specific address. Subnet and individual settings may be simultaneously set.

**Protocol/Protocol Group:** The Protocol Groups section defines the upper layer protocols that are to be part of the defined policy. Valid choices include All, FTP, HTTP, SMTP, IPP, and others that can be selected from a list at the WebUI, or manually entered as TCP/UDP and port number.

**Action: Action of Protect:** The following cryptographic protocols are supported:

- Authentication Header (AH)—Allows authentication of the sender of data.
- Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)—Supports both sender authentication and data encryption.

Both transport and tunnel mode are supported and are configuration options when configuring up IPsec.

	<p>IKEv1 is implemented with main mode being used in IKEv1 and no use of aggressive mode implemented.</p> <p>IKEv1 Phase 1 associated key lifetime can be configured in seconds, minutes, or hours, with the maximums being 86400, 1440, and 24 respectively. DH Group 14(2048-bit MODP) is the only DH group allowed.</p> <p>IKEv1 Phase 2 associated key lifetime can be configured in seconds, minutes, or hours, with the maximum values being 28800, 480, and 8 respectively. Phase 2 peer negotiations use RSA certificates along the DH mode configured (DH group 14) or via preshared keys generated from the passphrase configured.</p> <p>The encryption algorithms supported are AES 128 and AES 256 (when AES is selected as the encryption algorithm) and are included in the negotiation with the IPsec peer device. SHA-1 and SHA-256 are supported and independently selectable.</p>
FIA_PSK_EXT.1	<p>Pre-shared key is configurable with an ASCII text string with range of 1 – 32 octets. This includes the construction of the 22 octet length pre-shared key. The entry of the pre-shared key is masked so that onlookers will not see the values, and the values cannot be displayed at any time. The pre-shared key is initially conditioned using a SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash and then encrypted with AES 256 algorithm, and securely destroyed with overwrites on deletion or replacement.</p>

**6.1.8. PSTN Fax-Network Separation**

FDP_FXS_EXT.1	<p>The only communication via the fax interface allowed is that of transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols. There is connection between the fax modem and the Ethernet or wireless interfaces.</p> <p>The TOE provides separation between the fax processing board and the network interface and therefore prevents an interconnection between the PSTN and the internal network. This separation is realized in software, as by design, these interfaces may only communicate via an intermediary. All internal command calls (API) and response messages for both the network and fax interfaces are statically defined within the TOE. No user or system administrator is able to change their formats or functionalities.</p>
---------------	---

	<p>The fax software runs two independent processes, for sending and receiving job data through the fax card respectively. There is no internal communication between these two processes.</p> <p>The same job data will never be active on both the fax interface and network interface at the same time. For network interface to fax interface (LanFax) jobs, the entire job must be received as an image and buffered in memory before it is sent out through the fax interface. Likewise, for fax interface to network interface (fax forwarding to email) jobs, the entire job must be received from the fax interface and buffered in memory before it is transformed by an intermediary subsystem into an email attachment and sent out through the network interface.</p>
--	---

### 6.1.9. Data Clearing and Purging

<p>FDP_RIP.1(a)</p>	<p>The TOE implements an image overwrite security function (using a three pass overwrite procedure consistent with U.S. Department of Defense National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual – DoD 5220.22-M – requirements) to overwrite all temporary files created during processing of jobs, files (images) of completed or deleted jobs or any files that are deleted<sup>2</sup>.</p> <p>The TOE spools and processes documents to be printed or scanned. Temporary files are created as a result of this processing on a reserved section of the hard disk drive. The definition of this reserved section is statically stored within the TOE and cannot be manipulated. Immediately after the job has completed, the files are overwritten, and this is called Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO).</p> <p>The TOE automatically starts an IIO procedure for all abnormally terminated copy, print, scan or fax jobs stored on the HDD prior to coming “on line” when any of the following occurs: a reboot or once the MFD is turned back on after a power failure/disorderly shutdown.</p> <p>The image overwrite security function can also be invoked manually (on demand) by the system administrator (ODIO). Once invoked, the ODIO cancels all jobs, halts the printer</p>
---------------------	--

---

<sup>2</sup> Files are stored inside mailboxes. They may be deleted by their owner through individual file deletions or deletion of the mailbox.

	<p>interface (network), performs the overwrites, and then the network controller reboots. A scheduling function allows ODIO to be executed on a recurring basis as set up by the System Administrator.</p> <p>A standard ODIO overwrites all files written to temporary storage areas of the HDD. A full ODIO overwrites those files as well as the Fax mailbox/dial directory and Scan to mailbox data.</p> <p>An ODIO cannot be aborted from either the Web UI or Local UI. For entire duration of ODIO process, Web UI and Local UI is offline and no user interaction available.</p> <p>The image overwrite function overwrites the contents of the reserved section on the hard disk using a three pass overwrite procedure.</p>
FDP_RIP.1(b)	<p>The purge function is invoked manually by the system administrator. Once invoked, the purge function overwrites all jobs that are actively being processed by the TOE or are being held on the TOE for later processing; overwrites all jobs and log files that are stored on the hard drive(s); overwrites all local authentication data stored on the internal database; overwrites all customer data stored in address books and accounting databases and resets the fax and copy controller NVM on the TOE to their factory default values. At the completion of the purge function the TOE will reformat the hard drive(s), print a confirmation page, reboots the TOE and re-install the system software release that was installed on the TOE when the purge function was invoked.</p>

## 7. Rationale

This ST includes by reference Security Assurance Requirements from Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Version 1.0, 10 September 2015. The ST makes no additions to the PP assumptions. The PP security functional requirements have been reproduced with the PP operations completed. Operations on the security requirements follow the PP application notes and assurance activities. Consequently, the PP rationale applies, but is incomplete. The TOE Summary Specification rationale below serves to complete the rationale required for the ST.

### 7.1. TOE Summary Specification Rationale

Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, describes how the security functions of the TOE meet the claimed SFRs. The following table provides a mapping of the SFRs to the security function descriptions to support the TOE Summary Specification.

**Table 16: Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping**

SFRs	Security Functions								
	Identification and Authentication	Security Audit	Access Control	Security Management	Trusted Operation	Encryption	Trusted Communication	PSTN Fax-Network Separation	Data Clearing and Purging
FIA_AFL.1	X								
FIA_ATD.1	X								
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	X								
FIA_UAU.1	X								
FIA_UID.1	X								
FIA_UAU.7	X								
FIA_USB.1	X								
FTA_SSL.3	X								
FAU_GEN.1		X							
FAU_GEN.2		X							

**Xerox Multi-Function Device Security Target**

	Security Functions								
	Identification and Authentication	Security Audit	Access Control	Security Management	Trusted Operation	Encryption	Trusted Communication	PSTN Fax-Network Separation	Data Clearing and Purging
<b>SFRs</b>									
FAU_STG_EXT.1		X							
FAU_STG.1		X							
FAU_STG.4		X							
FPT_STM.1		X							
FDP_ACC.1			X						
FDP_ACF.1			X						
FMT_MOF.1				X					
FMT_MSA.1				X					
FMT_MSA.3				X					
FMT_MTD.1				X					
FMT_SMF.1				X					
FMT_SMR.1				X					
FPT_TST_EXT.1					X				
FPT_TUD_EXT.1					X				
FPT_SKP_EXT.1					X				
FCS_CKM.1(a)						X			
FCS_CKM.1(b)						X			
FCS_CKM.4						X			
FCS_CKM_EXT.4						X			
FCS_COP.1(a)						X			
FCS_COP.1(b)						X			

**Xerox Multi-Function Device Security Target**

	Security Functions								
	Identification and Authentication	Security Audit	Access Control	Security Management	Trusted Operation	Encryption	Trusted Communication	PSTN Fax-Network Separation	Data Clearing and Purging
<b>SFRs</b>									
FCS_COP.1(d)						X			
FCS_COP.1(g)						X			
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a)						X			
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b)						X			
FPT_KYP_EXT.1						X			
FCS_KYC_EXT.1						X			
FDP_DSK_EXT.1						X			
FTP_ITC.1							X		
FTP_TRP.1(a)							X		
FTP_TRP.1(b)							X		
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1							X		
FCS_TLS_EXT.1							X		
FCS_SSH_EXT.1							X		
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1							X		
FIA_PSK_EXT.1							X		
FDP_FXS_EXT.1								X	
FDP_RIP.1(a)									X
FDP_RIP.1(b)									X

## 8. Glossary

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

**Access:** Interaction between an entity and an object that results in the flow or modification of data.

**Access Control:** Security service that controls the use of hardware and software resources and the disclosure and modification of stored or communicated data.

**Accountability:** Property that allows activities in an IT system to be traced to the entity responsible for the activity.

**Administrator:** A User who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions may affect the TSP. Administrators may possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override portions of the TSP.

**Asset:** An entity upon which the TOE Owner, User, or manager of the TOE places value.

**Authentication:** Security measure that verifies a claimed identity.

**Authentication data:** Information used to verify a claimed identity.

**Authorization:** Permission, granted by an entity authorized to do so, to perform functions and access data.

**Authorized User:** An authenticated User who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation, This includes Users who are permitted to perform some operations but may be able to attempt or perform operations that are beyond those permissions.

**Availability:** (A) A condition in which Authorized Users have access to information, functionality and associated assets when requested. (B) Timely (according to a defined metric), reliable access to IT resources.

**Channel:** Mechanisms through which data can be transferred into and out of the TOE.

**Confidentiality:** (A) A condition in which information is accessible only to those authorized to have access. (B) A security policy pertaining to disclosure of data.

**Enterprise:** An operational context typically consisting of centrally-managed networks of IT products protected from direct Internet access by firewalls. Enterprise environments generally include medium to large businesses, certain governmental agencies, and organizations requiring managed telecommuting systems and remote offices

**Evaluation Assurance Level:** An assurance package, consisting of assurance requirements drawn from CC Part 3, representing a point on the CC predefined assurance scale.

**External Interface:** A non-hardcopy interface where either the input is being received from outside the TOE or the output is delivered to a destination outside the TOE.

**Function:** an entity in the TOE that performs processing, storage, or transmission of data that may be present in the TOE.



**Hardcopy Device (HCD):** A system producing or utilizing a physical embodiment of an electronic document or image. These systems include printers, scanners, fax machines, digital copiers, MFPs (multifunction peripherals), MFDs (multifunction devices), “all-in-ones”, and other similar products. See also: multifunction device.

**Hardcopy Output Handler:** Mechanisms for transferring User Document Data in hardcopy form out of the HCD.

**Identity:** A representation (e.g., a string) uniquely identifying an Authorized User, which can either be the full or abbreviated name of that User or a pseudonym.

**Information assurance:** Information operations that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.

**Information Technology (IT):** The hardware, firmware and software used as part of a system to collect, create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process, store or control data or information.

**Integrity:** (A) A condition in which data has not been changed or destroyed in an unauthorized way. (B) A security policy pertaining to the corruption of data and security function mechanisms.

**Job:** A document processing task submitted to the hardcopy device. A single processing task may process one or more documents.

**Multifunction Device (MFD) and Multifunction Product (MFP):** A hardcopy device that fulfills multiple purposes by using multiple functions in different combinations to replace several, single function devices.

**Nobody:** A pseudo-role that cannot be assigned to any User.

**Nonvolatile storage:** Computer storage that is not cleared when the power is turned off.

**Normal User:** A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing functions of the TOE.

**Object:** A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

**Operation:** A specific type of action performed by a subject on an object.

**Operational Environment:** The total environment in which a TOE operates, including the consideration of the value of assets and controls for operational accountability, physical security and personnel.

**Operator Panel:** A local human interface used to operate the HCD. It typically consists of a keypad, keyboard, or other controls, and a display device.

**Organizational Security Policy (OSP):** A set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines imposed (or presumed to be imposed) now and/or in the future by an actual or hypothetical organization in the operational environment.

**Original Document Handler:** Mechanisms for transferring User Document Data in hardcopy form into the HCD.

**Own or Ownership:** May refer to a User Document or to User Function Data associated with .processing a User Document. Depending upon the implementation of conforming TOE applications, the Owner of a User Function Data associated with a User Document may be different or may have different access control rules. These should be specified in a conforming Security Target.

**Private-medium interface:** Mechanism for exchanging data that (1) use wired or wireless electronic methods over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is not accessed by multiple simultaneous users; or, (2) use Operator Panel and displays that are part of the TOE.

**Protected:** A condition in which data has not been changed or destroyed in an unauthorized way.

**Removable nonvolatile storage:** nonvolatile storage that is part of an evaluated TOE but is designed to be removed from the TOE by authorized personnel. See also Nonvolatile storage.

**Security attribute:** A property of subjects, users (including external IT products), objects, information, sessions and/or resources that is used in defining the SFRs and whose values are used in enforcing the SFRs.

**Security Function Policy (SFP):** A set of rules describing specific security behavior enforced by the TSF and expressible as a set of SFRs.

**Security Functional Requirement (SFR):** A functional requirement which is taken from Part 2 of the Common Criteria and provide the mechanisms to enforce the security policy.

**Security Target (ST):** An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

**SFR package:** A named set of security functional requirements.

**Shared-medium interface:** Mechanism for transmitting or receiving data that uses wired or wireless network or non-network electronic methods over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple users.

**Subject:** An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

**Target of Evaluation (TOE):** A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance.

**Telephone line:** An electrical interface used to connect the TOE to the public switch telephone network for transmitting and receiving facsimiles.

**Threat:** Capabilities, intentions and attack methods of adversaries, or any circumstance or event, with the potential to violate the TOE security policy.

**TSF Data:** Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE.

**TSF Confidential Data:** Assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User who is not an Administrator or the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE.

**TSF Protected Data:** Assets for which alteration by a User who is not an Administrator or the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable.

**TOE Owner:** A person or organizational entity responsible for protecting TOE assets and establishing related security policies.

**TOE security functionality (TSF):** A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

**User:** An entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.

**User Data:** Data created by and for the User, that do not affect the operation of the TOE security functionality.

**User Document Data:** The asset that consists of the information contained in a user's document. This includes the original document itself in either hardcopy or electronic form, image data, or residually-stored data created by the hardcopy device while processing an original document and printed hardcopy output.

**User Function Data:** The asset that consists of the information about a user's document or job to be processed by the HCD.

## 9. Acronyms

For the purposes of this document, the following acronyms and definitions apply.

**Table 17: Acronyms**

Acronym	Definition
ALT	Alteration
CAC	Common Access Card
CC	Common Criteria
CPY	Copy
DHCP	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DIS	Disclosure
DSR	Document Storage And Retrieval
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EIP	Extensible Interface Platform
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
HCD	Hardcopy Device
HDD	Hard Disk Drive
IEEE	Institute Of Electrical And Electronics Engineers
IIO	Immediate Image
IOT	Image Output Terminal
IPP	Internet Printing Protocol
IPsec	Internet Protocol Security
IT	Information Technology
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LPR	Line Printer Remote
LUI	Local User Interface
MFD	Multifunctional Device
MFP	Multifunctional Product / Peripheral / Printer
NVM	Nonvolatile Memory
ODIO	On-Demand Image Overwrite
OSP	Organizational Security Policy
PIV	Personal Identity Verification

*Xerox Multi-Function Device Security Target*

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Definition</b>
PPM	Page Per Minute
PP	Protection Profile
PRT	Print
PSTN	Public Switched Telephone Network
SCN	Scan
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SMI	Shared-Medium Interface
SSH	Secure Shell
ST	Security Target
Std	Standard
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target Of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSP	TOE Security Policy
USB	Universal Serial Bus