

National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme



Validation Report

**Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-
Slot Software Encryption Layer v3.0.1**

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1 Executive Summary

This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer solution provided by Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.

The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was completed in August 2020. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3

Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 and collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.

The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 1.2, 08/13/2020 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.

2 Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Validated Products List.

Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:

- The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.

- The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
- The conformance result of the evaluation.
- The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.

Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers

Item	Identifier
Evaluation Scheme	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Protection Profile	Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer (Specific models identified in Section 8) collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0, 09 September 2016 and collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0, 09 September 2016
ST	Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 1.2, 08/13/2020
Evaluation Technical Report	Evaluation Technical Report for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, August 13, 2020
CC Version	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, rev 5
Conformance Result	CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor	Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
Developer	Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
Common Criteria Testing Lab (CCTL)	Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc. Catonsville, MD
CCEVS Validators	Jerry Myers, The Aerospace Corporation John Butterworth, The MITRE Corporation Anne Gugel, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory Richard Toren, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory

3 Architectural Information

Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security Target.

The DTS1 Software Encryption Layer (hereafter referred to as the TOE) is a rugged Network Attached Storage (NAS) file server for use in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), and Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. The TOE operates at the firmware level. Easily integrated into network centric systems, the DTS1 is an easy to use, turnkey, rugged network File Server that houses one Removable Memory Cartridge (RMC) that provides quick off load of data. The RMC can be easily removed from one

DTS1 and installed into any other DTS1 providing full, seamless data transfer between one or more networks in separate locations (e.g. ground => vehicle => ground). In addition to the software/firmware-based FDE layer provided by the DTS1, the DTS1 provides a hardware-based Full Drive Encryption (FDE) layer to encrypt the drive within the RMC. The hardware-based FDE layer is addressed in a separate evaluation.

The DTS1 supports protocols including CIFS, NFS, FTP, HTTP, DHCP, SNMP, and iSCSI. The DTS1 enables CIFS and NFS disables all other protocols by default. The TOE also supports SSH, which is always enabled. The administrator can enable or disable the desired protocols to support their use-case and application. It is suggested that a customer using the product consider the impact of utilizing remote administration via SSH across the network (rather than through the console) based upon their specific use case. The customer should factor into their risk management decision the environment in which TOE operates (dedicated, segregated, private network versus residing in a DMZ accessible to the Internet), and the value of data to be protected.

3.1 TOE Architecture

The TOE provides a software Full Drive Encryption solution that can accept a Removable Memory Cartridge (RMC) which contains a data drive within.

3.2 Physical Boundaries

The TOE's physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE provides a ruggedized solution to secure Data at Rest (DAR).

4 Security Policy

This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:

1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Security management
4. Protection of the TSF

4.1 Cryptographic support

The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and block-based encryption including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key derivation. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.

4.2 User data protection

The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on the entire drive (so that no plaintext exists) and does so without user intervention.

4.3 Security management

The TOE provides each of the required management services necessary to manage the full drive encryption using a command line interface.

4.4 Protection of the TSF

The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects key and key material, and includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fails, the TOE will not go into an operational mode.

5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope

Assumptions

The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following documents:

- collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
- collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019

That information has not been reproduced here and the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E should be consulted if there is interest in that material.

The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

Clarification of scope

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:

- As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the Full Drive Encryption Protection Profiles and performed by the evaluation team).

- This evaluation covers only the specific device models and hardware as identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
- This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
- The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.

6 Documentation

The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:

- Curtiss-Wright DTS1 Data Transport System (Network File System) User Guide, DDOC0099-000-AH

7 IT Product Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, August 13, 2020 (AAR).

7.1 Developer Testing

No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.

7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing

The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification document and ran the tests specified in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E including the tests associated with optional requirements.

8 Results of the Evaluation

The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Data Transport System 1-

Slot Software Encryption Layer TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E.

8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)

The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer product that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)

The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)

The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)

The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)

The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)

The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual vulnerability.

The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database (<https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search>) and Vulnerability Notes Database (<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/>) on 08/13/2020 with the following search terms: : "disk encryption", "drive encryption", "key destruction", "key sanitization", "Opal management software", "SED management software", "Password caching", "Key caching", "Curtiss Wright", "DTS1", "Defense Solutions Data Transport System", "Linux Unified Key Setup", "LUKS", "Libgrypt", "openssl", "CentOS", "kernel cryptography".

The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results

The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

9 Validator Comments/Recommendations

As was noted in the Architectural Information and Clarification of Scope sections of this report, the devices provide more functionality than was covered by the evaluation. Only the functionality claimed in the SFR's in the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions should be drawn as to their effectiveness, nor can any claims be made relative to their security based upon this evaluation.

The validation team advises that special care be taken in a networked environment; the protection profile does not take into consideration the case for Network Attached Storage. Thus, the application of the network-related protocols themselves are not part of this evaluation.

The DTS1 supports protocols including SSH, CIFS, NFS, FTP, HTTP, DHCP, SNMP, and iSCSI. It is recommended that the administrator enable or disable the supported protocols to support their use-case and application.

It is recommended that a customer using the product consider the impact of utilizing remote administration via SSH across the network (rather than through the console) based upon their specific use case.

The customer should factor into their risk management decision the environment in which the TOE operates (dedicated, segregated, private network versus residing in a DMZ accessible to the Internet), and the value of data to be protected.

In addition to the software/firmware-based FDE layer provided by the DTS1, the DTS1 provides a hardware-based Full Drive Encryption (FDE) layer to encrypt the drive within the RMC. The hardware-based FDE layer is addressed in a separate evaluation, VID11096.

10 Annexes

Not applicable

11 Security Target

The Security Target is identified as: *Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 1.2, 08/13/2020.*

12 Glossary

The following definitions are used throughout this document:

- **Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL).** An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
- **Conformance.** The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
- **Evaluation.** The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
- **Evaluation Evidence.** Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
- **Feature.** Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
- **Target of Evaluation (TOE).** A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
- **Validation.** The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
- **Validation Body.** A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.

13 Bibliography

The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2017.
- [2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2017.
- [3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, September 2107.
- [4] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
- [5] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019.
- [6] Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 1.2, 08/13/2020 (ST).

- [7] Assurance Activity Report (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, August 13, 2020 (AAR).
- [8] Detailed Test Report (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, August 13, 2020 (DTR).
- [9] Evaluation Technical Report for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Software Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, August 13, 2020 (ETR)