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# **Hypori Virtual Mobile Infrastructure Platform 4.2.0 Client (Android) Security Target**

Version 1.0  
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## 1. Security Target Introduction

This section identifies the Target of Evaluation (TOE) along with identification of the Security Target (ST) itself. The section includes documentation organization, ST conformance claims, and ST conventions.

The TOE is the Hypori Client (Android) component of the Virtual Mobile Infrastructure Platform version 4.2 provided by Hypori, LLC.

The Security Target contains the following additional sections:

- Security Target Introduction (Section 1)
- TOE Description (Section 2)
- Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
- Security Objectives (Section 4)
- IT Security Requirements (Section 5)
- TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
- Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)
- Rationale (Section 8).
- Appendix: Android APIs (Section 9).

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### 1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification

**ST Title** – Hypori Virtual Mobile Infrastructure Platform 4.2.0 Client (Android) Security Target

**ST Version** – Version 1.0

**ST Date** – January 12, 2021

**TOE Identification** – Hypori Client (Android) 4.2.0

**TOE Developer** – Hypori, LLC.

**Evaluation Sponsor** – Hypori, LLC.

**CC Identification** – *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017*

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### 1.2 Conformance Claims

This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:

This ST is conformant to the *Protection Profile for Application Software*, Version 1.3, 2019-03-01 [PP\_APP\_v1.3].

The following NIAP Technical Decisions apply to the security target or the evaluation assurance activities.

- [TD0561](#): Signature verification update
- [TD0554](#): iOS/iPadOS/Android AppSW Virus Scan
- [TD0548](#): Integrity for installation tests in AppSW PP 1.3
- [TD0544](#): Alternative testing methods for FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.1
- [TD0521](#): Updates to Certificate Revocation (FIA\_X509\_EXT.1)
- [TD0515](#): Use Android APK manifest in test
- [TD0498](#): Application Software PP Security Objectives and Requirements Rationale
- [TD0495](#): FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2 Test Clarification
- [TD0486](#): Removal of PP-Module for VPN Clients from allowed with list
- [TD0445](#): User Modifiable File Definition

- [TD0444](#): IPsec selections
- [TD0437](#): Supported Configuration Mechanism
- [TD0427](#): Reliable Time Source
- [TD0416](#): Correction to FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Test Activity

The following NIAP Technical Decisions are list on the NIAP website, but are not applicable to this evaluation:

- [TD0543](#): FMT\_MEC\_EXT.1 evaluation activity update
- [TD0540](#): Expanded AES Modes in FCS\_COP
- [TD0519](#): Linux symbolic links and FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1
- [TD0510](#): Obtaining random bytes for iOS/macOS
- [TD0473](#): Support for Client or Server TOEs in FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT
- [TD0465](#): Configuration Storage for .NET Apps
- [TD0435](#): Alternative to SELinux for FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.3
- [TD0434](#): Windows Desktop Applications Test

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.

- Part 2 Extended

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.

- Part 3 Extended

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## 1.3 Conventions

The following conventions have been applied in this document:

- Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
  - Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST, iteration is indicated by a number in parentheses placed at the end of the component. For example, FDP\_ACC.1(1) and FDP\_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP\_ACC.1 requirement, (1) and (2).
  - Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [**assignment**]). Note that an assignment within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [*selected-assignment*]).
  - Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [*selection*]).
  - Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “... **all** objects ...” or “... ~~some big~~ things ...”). Note that ‘cases’ that are not applicable in a given SFR have simply been removed without any explicit identification.
- Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.

### 1.3.1 Terminology

[PP\_APP\_v1.3] provides definitions for terms specific to the application software technology as well as general Common Criteria terms. The technology-specific terms are:

- Address Space Layout Randomization
- Application
- Application Programming Interface
- Credential
- Data Execution Prevention
- Developer
- Mobile Code
- Operating System
- Personally Identifiable Information
- Platform
- Sensitive Data
- Stack Cookie
- Vendor

Terms from the Common Criteria are:

- Common Criteria
- Common Evaluation Methodology
- Protection Profile
- Security Target
- Target of Evaluation
- TOE Security Functionality
- TOE Summary Specification
- Security Functional Requirement
- Security Assurance Requirement

This ST does not include additional technology-specific terminology.

### 1.3.2 Abbreviations

This section identifies abbreviations and acronyms used in this ST.

API	Application Programming Interface
App	Software application
ASLR	Address Space Layout Randomization
CC	Common Criteria
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
CTLs	Certificate Trust Lists
DEP	Data Execution Prevention
DoD	Department of Defense
OS	Operating System
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PP	Protection Profile
PP_APP_v1.3	Protection Profile for Application Software
SAR	Security assurance requirement

SFR	Security functional requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSS	TOE Summary Specification
VMI	Virtual Mobile Infrastructure


## 2. TOE Description

After a brief overview of the Hypori Virtual Mobile Infrastructure product, this section describes its Hypori Client (Android) component, which is the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The description covers TOE architecture, logical boundaries, and physical boundaries.

### 2.1 Product Overview

In the Hypori Virtual Mobile Infrastructure (VMI) platform, end users running a Hypori Client (Android) on their mobile device access a virtual Android device running on a server in the cloud. The virtual device on the server contains the operating system, the data, and the applications, using TLS 1.2 encryption to communicate securely with the Hypori Client (Android). The Hypori Android thin client application provides secure access to the remote Android virtual device and brokers access between the mobile device’s sensors and the applications executing in the virtual device on a Hypori server. The client applications are agnostic to the version of Android executing in the virtual device.

The following diagram shows the Hypori system, including its components and networks. Unlike many software solutions, some of the Hypori servers are installed on virtual servers while others are installed on physical servers.





### Figure 1 Hypori Virtual Mobile Infrastructure (VMI)

The Hypori VMI platform includes the following components:

- **Hypori Client:** This is an Android-based thin client that installs on the end user's mobile device and communicates with the Hypori Virtual Device on the server through secure encrypted protocols.
- **Hypori Virtual Device:** This is an Android-based virtualized mobile device executing on a server in the cloud.
- **Hypori Servers:** This is the cloud server cluster that hosts the Hypori Virtual Devices.
- **Hypori Admin Console:** This is a browser-based administration user interface that is used to manage the Hypori system.

## 2.2 TOE Overview


The TOE is the Android-based Hypori Client. The following diagram shows how the TOE interacts with a Hypori Device running applications on a Hypori Server. The Hypori Client is a thin client that communicates only with a Hypori Virtual Device on a Hypori Server and not with other servers or applications.



Figure 2 Hypori Client as Part of VMI Platform

## 2.3 TOE Architecture

The section describes the TOE architecture including physical and logical boundaries. Figure 3 shows the relationship of the TOE to its operational environment along with the TOE boundary. The security functional requirements identify the libraries included in the application package.



**Figure 3 TOE Boundary for Android Devices**

### 2.3.1 Physical Boundaries

The TOE consists of a Hypori Client application as defined in the Hypori Client installation package. The Hypori Client is an Android-based thin client that only communicates with the Hypori server. The Hypori server, applications running on the Hypori server, and any functions not specified in this security target are outside the scope of the TOE.

#### 2.3.1.1 Software Requirements

The TOE was evaluated on Android releases 8.1, 9, and 10.

#### 2.3.1.2 Hardware Requirements

The TOE imposes no hardware requirements beyond the Android operating system requirements.

### 2.3.2 Logical Boundaries

This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:

- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security management
- Privacy
- Protection of the TSF
- Trusted path/channels

### **2.3.2.1 Cryptographic support**

The TOE establishes secure communication with the Hypori server using TLS. The client uses cryptographic services provided by the platform. TOE stores credentials and certificates for mutual authentication in the platform's key chain.

### **2.3.2.2 User data protection**

The TOE informs a user of hardware and software resources the TOE accesses. It uses the platform's permission mechanism to get a user's approval for access as part of the installation process. The user initiates a secure network connection to the Hypori server using the TOE. In general, sensitive data resides on the Hypori server and not the Hypori Client, although the client does store credentials as per section 2.3.2.1.

### **2.3.2.3 Identification and Authentication**

The TOE uses the platform's certification validation services to authenticate the X.509 certificate the Hypori server presents as part of establishing a TLS connection.

### **2.3.2.4 Security management**

Security management consists of setting Hypori Client configuration options. The TOE uses the platform's mechanisms for storing the configuration settings.

### **2.3.2.5 Privacy**

The TOE does not transmit PII over a network.

### **2.3.2.6 Protection of the TSF**

The TOE uses security features and APIs that the platform provides. The TOE leverages package management for secure installation and updates. The TOE package includes only those third-party libraries necessary for its intended operation.

### **2.3.2.7 Trusted path/channels**

The TOE invokes the platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted data using TLS 1.2 for all communication with the Hypori server.

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## **2.4 TOE Documentation**

The TOE includes the following Hypori Client documentation.

- Hypori Virtual Mobility User Guide – Android, Client Release 4.2 – v1.1
- Hypori User Guide Common Criteria Configuration and Operation, Version 4.2.0

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### 3. Security Problem Definition

This security target includes by reference the Security Problem Definition from the [PP\_APP\_v1.3]. The Security Problem Definition consists of threats that a conformant TOE is expected to address and assumptions about the operational environment of the TOE.

In general, the [PP\_APP\_v1.3] has presented a Security Problem Definition appropriate for application software that runs on mobile devices, as well as on desktop and server platforms. The Hypori Client is an Android application running on a mobile device. As such, the [PP\_APP\_v1.3] Security Problem Definition applies to the TOE.

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## 4. Security Objectives

Like the Security Problem Definition, this security target includes by reference the Security Objectives from the [PP\_APP\_v1.3]. The [PP\_APP\_v1.3] security objectives for the operational environment are reproduced below, since these objectives characterize technical and procedural measures each consumer must implement in their operational environment.

In general, the [PP\_APP\_v1.3] has presented a Security Objectives statement appropriate for application software that runs on mobile devices, as well as on desktop and server platforms. Consequently, the [PP\_APP\_v1.3] security objectives are suitable for the Hypori Client TOE (Android).

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### 4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

OE.PLATFORM	The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This includes the underlying operating system and any discrete execution environment provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER	The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN	The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

## 5. IT Security Requirements

This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.

The security functional requirements have all been drawn from: *Protection Profile for Application Software*, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 [PP\_APP\_v1.3]. As a result, refinements and operations already performed in that PP are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from that PP and any residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, [PP\_APP\_v1.3] made a number of refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the CC. [PP\_APP\_v1.3] should be consulted to identify those changes if necessary.

The security assurance requirements are the set of SARs specified in [PP\_APP\_v1.3].

### 5.1 Extended Requirements

All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the [PP\_APP\_v1.3]. The [PP\_APP\_v1.3] defines the following extended SFRs. Since these SFRs are not redefined in this ST, readers should consult [PP\_APP\_v1.3] for more information in regard to these CC extensions.

- FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
- FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
- FCS\_STO\_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
- FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
- FDP\_NET\_EXT.1 Network Communications
- FDP\_DEC\_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
- FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
- FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
- FMT\_MEC\_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
- FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
- FPR\_ANO\_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
- FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
- FPT\_API\_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
- FPT\_IDV\_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
- FPT\_LIB\_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
- FPT\_IDV\_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
- FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit

### 5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the Hypori Client TOE.

**Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components**

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
	FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>FCS: Cryptographic support</b>	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
	FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
<b>FDP: User data protection</b>	FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
	FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
	FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
<b>FIA: Identification and authentication</b>	FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
	FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
<b>FMT: Security management</b>	FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
	FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
<b>FPR: Privacy</b>	FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
<b>FPT: Protection of the TSF</b>	FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
	FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
	FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
	FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
	FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
	FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
<b>FTP: Trusted path/channels</b>	FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit

## 5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

### 5.2.1.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services (FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1)

**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*generate no asymmetric cryptographic keys*].

### 5.2.1.2 Random Bit Generation Services (FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1)

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*use no DRBG functionality*] for its cryptographic operations.

### 5.2.1.3 Storage of Credentials (FCS\_STO\_EXT.1)

**FCS\_STO\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store [user TLS client key and server account password]*] to non-volatile memory.

## 5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

### 5.2.2.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data (FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1)

**FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS\_STO\_EXT.1,*] in nonvolatile memory.

### 5.2.2.2 Access to Platform Resources (FDP\_DEC\_EXT.1)

**FDP\_DEC\_EXT.1.1** The application shall restrict its access to [

- *network connectivity,*
- *camera,*
- *microphone,*
- *location services,*
- *[Wi-Fi,*
- *Phone]*

].

**FDP\_DEC\_EXT.1.2** The application shall restrict its access to [  
• *no sensitive information repositories*  
].

### 5.2.2.3 Network Communications (FDP\_NET\_EXT.1)

**FDP\_NET\_EXT.1.1** The application shall restrict network communication to [  
• *user-initiated communication for [connecting to the Hypori server],*  
• *respond to [push notifications from Google's FCM platform by polling the Hypori server for notifications],*  
• *[polling the Hypori server for notifications],*  
].

## 5.2.3 Security Management (FMT)

### 5.2.3.1 Secure by Default Configuration (FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1)

**FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1.1** The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured with default credentials or no credentials.

**FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1.2** The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application's binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.

### 5.2.3.2 Supported Configuration Mechanism (FMT\_MEC\_EXT.1)

**FMT\_MEC\_EXT.1.1<sup>1</sup>** The application shall  
• *[invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and setting configuration options].*

### 5.2.3.3 Specification of Management Functions (FMT\_SMF.1)

**FMT\_SMF.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [[  
• *setting configuration options*  
• *applying configuration policies from the Hypori server]*  
].

## 5.2.4 Privacy

### 5.2.4.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information (FPR\_ANO\_EXT.1)

**FPR\_ANO\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*not transmit PII over a network*].

## 5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

### 5.2.5.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs (FPT\_API\_EXT.1)

**FPT\_API\_EXT.1.1** The application shall use only documented platform APIs.

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<sup>1</sup> This SFR was modified per NIAP TD0437.



### 5.2.5.2 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities (FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1)

- FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.1** The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no exceptions].
- FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.2** The application shall [*not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions*].
- FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.3** The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.
- FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.4** The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.
- FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.5** The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.

### 5.2.5.3 Integrity for Installation and Update (FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1)

- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*leverage the platform*] to check for updates and patches to the application software.
- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2** The application shall [*provide the ability*] to query the current version of the application software.
- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.3** The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.4<sup>2</sup>** Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.5** The application is distributed [*as an additional software package to the platform OS*].

### 5.2.5.4 Integrity for Installation and Update (FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2)

- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.1** The application shall be distributed using the format of the platform-supported package manager.
- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.2** The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2.3<sup>3</sup>** The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.

### 5.2.5.5 Use of Third Party Libraries (FPT\_LIB\_EXT.1)

- FPT\_LIB\_EXT.1.1** The application shall be packaged with only [
- **Opus Audio Codec v1.1**
  - **Protobuf v2.5.0**
  - **Zxing core 3.2.1**
  - **Yubico**
  - **Spongycastle**
- ].

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<sup>2</sup> Modified per TD0561

<sup>3</sup> Modified per TD0561

### 5.2.5.6 Software Identification and Versions (FPT\_IDV\_EXT.1)

**FPT\_IDV\_EXT.1.1** The application shall be versioned with *[[Android application version identifier, internal build information]]*.

## 5.2.6 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

### 5.2.6.1 Protection of Data in Transit (FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1)

**FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1.1<sup>4</sup>** The application shall [*invoke platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted data with [TLS]*] between itself and another trusted IT product.

## 5.2.7 Identification and authentication (FIA)

### 5.2.7.1 X.509 Certificate Validation (FIA\_X509\_EXT.1)

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1<sup>5</sup>** The application shall [*invoked platform-provided functionality*] to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
- The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
- The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met
- The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field
- The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [*OCSP as specified in RFC 6960, a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759*].
- The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to the following rules:
  - Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.<sup>6</sup>
  - Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
  - Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
  - S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.<sup>7</sup>
  - OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.

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<sup>4</sup> The SFR was modified per TD0444.

<sup>5</sup> Modified per TD0521.

<sup>6</sup> The Hypori Client does not check extended key usage for Code Signing. The Hypori Client relies on the platform update mechanism. While Hypori signs each installation package with a Code Signing certificate, the platform verifies the certificate and package.

<sup>7</sup> The Hypori Client does not check extended key usage for Email Protection, since the Hypori Client does not perform email encryption or email signature verification.

- Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.<sup>8</sup>

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2** The application shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

**5.2.7.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication (FIA\_X509\_EXT.2)**

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1<sup>9</sup>** The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [TLS].

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2** When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the application shall [*not accept the certificate*].

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### 5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements in Table 2 are included in this ST by reference from the [PP\_APP\_v1.3].

**Table 2 Assurance Components**

Requirement Class	Requirement Component
<b>ADV: Development</b>	ADV FSP.1 Basic functional specification
<b>AGD: Guidance documents</b>	AGD OPE.1: Operational user guidance
	AGD PRE.1: Preparative procedures
<b>ALC: Life-cycle support</b>	ALC CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
	ALC CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
	ALC TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
<b>ATE: Tests</b>	ATE IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
<b>AVA: Vulnerability assessment</b>	AVA VAN.1 Vulnerability survey

These assurance requirements imply the following requirements from CC class ASE: Security Target Evaluation.

- ASE\_CCL.1 Conformance claims
- ASE\_ECD.1 Extended components definition
- ASE\_INT.1 ST introduction
- ASE\_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
- ASE\_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
- ASE\_TSS.1 TOE summary specification

Consequently, the assurance activities specified in [PP\_APP\_v1.3] apply to the TOE evaluation.

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<sup>8</sup> The Hypori Client does not check extended key usage for CMC Registration Authority, since the Hypori Client does not perform Enrollment over Secure Transport.

<sup>9</sup> The SFR was modified per TD0444.

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## 6. TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes the security functions:

- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Certificate validation
- Security management
- Privacy
- Protection of the TSF
- Trusted path/channels

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### 6.1 Cryptographic support

The Hypori Client makes use of the platform for cryptographic services. The Hypori Client uses platform TLS services for secure communication with the Hypori server, including mutual authentication. The client uses TLS client certificates and keys along with a CA certificate for the server. The user stores these certificates in the platform's key store during installation. The user need not install a CA certificate when the CA is a platform trusted CA.

The TOE relies on the platform to provide all of its cryptographic functionality. The following Android evaluations are conformant to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (ISO Standard 15408) and are listed at the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) Product Compliant List.

Android 8.1 – VID11001 ([https://www.niap-ccvcs.org/MMO/Product/st\\_vid11001-st.pdf](https://www.niap-ccvcs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11001-st.pdf))

- Supported ciphersuites
  - TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
  - TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
  - TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
  - TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
  - TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
  - TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
  - TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289

Android 9– VID10979 ([https://www.niap-ccvcs.org/MMO/ProductAM/st\\_vid10979-st-2.pdf](https://www.niap-ccvcs.org/MMO/ProductAM/st_vid10979-st-2.pdf))

- Supported ciphersuites
  - TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
  - TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
  - TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
  - TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
  - TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
  - TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
  - TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289

Android 10 – VID11042 ([https://www.niap-ccvcs.org/MMO/ProductAM/st\\_vid11042-st-2.pdf](https://www.niap-ccvcs.org/MMO/ProductAM/st_vid11042-st-2.pdf))

- Supported ciphersuites

- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289

Each of these OS evaluations listed on the NIAP Product Compliant List is capable of presenting the supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client using the secp384r1 NIST curve.

### 6.1.1 FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1

The Hypori Client does not generate cryptographic keys. As part of installation, a user adds a Hypori server TLS client certificate and key to the platform's key store. The Hypori Client relies on the platform for TLS support. The platform generates all ephemeral TLS keys without direct Hypori Client action.

### 6.1.2 FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1

The Hypori Client relies on the platform for cryptographic services. Consequently, the Hypori Client itself uses no DRBG functions.

### 6.1.3 FCS\_STO\_EXT.1

Table 3 lists each Hypori Client persistent credential along with how the client uses and stores each credential.

**Table 3: Persistent Credential Use and Storage**

Credential	Purpose	Storage
User TLS client key	Authenticates Hypori Client when establishing TLS connection to Hypori server	Android Keystore System
Server account password	Authenticates user to Hypori server	Android Keystore System

## 6.2 User data protection

The Hypori Client uses the platform's permission mechanisms to inform the user of hardware and software resources the client accesses. The client presents the required permissions to the user for approval during installation. A user initiates network connections to the Hypori server. In general, sensitive data resides on the Hypori server and is not stored on the Hypori Client. Sensitive data on the Hypori Client is limited to credentials, which the client stores as described in section 6.1. The client does not maintain Personally Identifiable Information (PII).

### 6.2.1 FDP\_DAR\_EXT.1

Hypori Client sensitive data consist of user TLS client key and server account password credentials. FCS\_STO\_EXT.1 Storage of Secrets specifies the platform's Android Keystore System for protecting keys and credentials (see <https://developer.android.com/training/articles/keystore> for details on the Android Keystore System). In accordance with FCS\_STO\_EXT.1, the Hypori Client stores these credentials in the platform's Android Keystore System as described in section 6.1.3. Administrators can decide to provision credentials using the Android Keystore System (either the system-wide Android KeyChain or the application-only Android Keystore Provider).

The Hypori Client stores application account options using Android's SharedPreferences. The SharedPreferences files are accessed using the MODE\_PRIVATE flag, even though the application account options do not contain sensitive data.

### 6.2.2 FDP\_NET\_EXT.1

The Hypori Client relies on user-initiated network communication to connect to the Hypori Virtual Device. The Hypori Client uses remote-initiated network communication to check for notifications and display them to the user when the system is configured for push notifications. The Hypori Client uses application-initiated network communication to periodically check for notifications and display them to the user when the system is configured for notification polling.

### 6.2.3 FDP\_DEC\_EXT.1

The installer presents to the user the permissions required by the Hypori Client. A user must accept the permissions to complete installation. Table shows the permissions required by the Hypori Client:

Permission	Description
INTERNET	Open network sockets.
USE_FINGERPRINT	Use fingerprint hardware.
WAKE_LOCK	Use PowerManager WakeLocks to maintain connection.
RECORD_AUDIO	Enable audio recording.
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION	Access precise location.
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS	Access extra location provider commands.
READ_SYNC_SETTINGS	Read the sync settings.
WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS	Write the sync settings.
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE	Access information about networks.
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE	Change network connectivity state.
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE	Access information about Wi-Fi networks.
MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS	Modify global audio settings.
READ_PHONE_STATE	Read only access to phone state, including the phone number of the device, current cellular network information, the status of any ongoing calls.
CAMERA	Access the mobile device's camera.
INSTALL_SHORTCUT	Install a shortcut in the Launcher.
UNINSTALL_SHORTCUT	Uninstall a shortcut in the Launcher.
BLUETOOTH	Connect to paired Bluetooth devices.
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN	Discover and pair Bluetooth devices.
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED	Receive notification after the system finishes booting.
CALL_PHONE	Initiate a phone call bypassing the Dialer interface to confirm the call.
VIBRATE	Access to the mobile device's vibrator.
FLASHLIGHT	Access to the mobile device's flashlight.
GET_ACCOUNTS (Deprecated)	Access to the list of accounts in the Accounts Service.
MANAGE_ACCOUNTS (Deprecated)	Allow app to add and remove accounts.
AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS (Deprecated)	Use the account authenticator capabilities of the AccountManager.

Permission	Description
GET_TASKS (Deprecated)	Allow the app to retrieve information about currently and recently running tasks

Updates to the Hypori Client may automatically add additional capabilities within each group. A user must accept new permissions to complete any update that includes permissions not in the list above.

A user initiates a network connection to the Hypori server by starting the Hypori Client and entering account information. After the Hypori Client connects to the Hypori server, the applications the user accesses run on the Hypori Device in the Hypori server, not on the mobile device. The Hypori Client does not listen on any ports for inbound connection requests. The Hypori Client interacts only with the Hypori server. When a Hypori Device application needs information from a server (such as a map server), the Hypori Device – not the Hypori Client – communicates with the server (which may be an internal, enterprise server).

The Hypori Client does not maintain PII. Hence, it does not transmit PII over any network.<sup>10</sup> As per the claimed PP, the TOE is not considered to maintain PII unless it provides an interface intended specifically to collect such data; general-purpose communications interfaces may contain PII supplied by the user that the TSF is not expected to treat in a special manner.

The TOE does not contain sensitive information repositories as defined in the [PP\_APP\_v1.3].

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## 6.3 Identification and authentication

The Android platform follows RFC 5280 *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile* for certification path validation. The Hypori Client uses the Android certification validation services to authenticate the X.509 certificate the Hypori server presents as part of the establishing a TLS connection.

### 6.3.1 FIA\_X509\_EXT.1

The Android platform performs certificate path validation in accordance with RFC 5280 as part of the TLS service. It recursively builds certificate chains until a valid chain is found or all possible paths are exhausted. The chain begins at the leaf certificate and ends in the final trusted root certificate<sup>11</sup>.

The Hypori Client relies on the platform for TLS services and package updates. Hence, the platform checks extended key usage for Server Authentication, Client Authentication, and Code Signing purposes. The Hypori Client performs validation of the revocation status using the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 provided by the CRL distribution point specified in the certificates.

The Android platform validates the revocation status of the certificate using the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960. When the platform cannot establish a connection to an OCSP server providing the status to determine certificate validity, the platform will reject the connection.

The Hypori Client does not perform email encryption, email signature verification, and Enrollment over Secure Transport. Consequently, no check is made for extended key usage Email Protection and CMC Registration Authority purposed.

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<sup>10</sup> The Hypori Client accesses user credentials. In particular, the Hypori Client transmits a user's account name and TLS client certificate when connecting to the Hypori Server. However, **Error! Reference source not found.** distinguishes credentials from PII.

<sup>11</sup> The platform certificate path algorithm is described by its Android platform source code, available at: <https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:external/conscrypt/common/src/main/java/org/conscrypt/TrustManagerImpl.java>. See the checkTrusted() method at line 267 and line 275 for older Android versions for the algorithm.

### 6.3.2 FIA\_X509\_EXT.2

The Hypori Client presents the TLS client certificate and key to the Hypori server to authenticate a TLS connection. During account setup, the user identifies which certificate to present for each account. The user selects a certificate from the certificate store. The user can change the selection from Client Certificate under Connection on the Settings page. The TLS client certificate is an X.509 certificate. The user stores a CA certificate for the server certificates in the platform's key store during installation. (The user need not install a CA certificate when the CA is a platform trusted CA.)

The user stores a CA certificate for the server certificates in the platform's key store during installation. (The user need not install a CA certificate when the CA is a platform trusted CA.) On Android devices, the Hypori Client uses Android platform certificate path validation services with the CA certificate to validate the certificate presented by the Hypori server. The Hypori Client extracts the CRL distribution point from the certificate, contacts the server to download the CRL, and validates that the certificate is not revoked. The TOE also supports revocation checking of the certificate presented using OCSP (as specified in RFC 6960). If the CRL/OCSP server fails to respond or there is an error, the Hypori Client will not accept the certificate (invalid) and not establish the connection.

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## 6.4 Security management

Security management consists of setting Hypori Client configuration options. The client uses Android mechanisms for storing the configuration settings.

### 6.4.1 FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1

Hypori Client credentials consist of user TLS client key and server account password. The Hypori Client installer does not include a default client key or server account password. A user installs a TLS client certificate and private key from a certificate file using the platform's certificate services. A user's IT group provides the user with a server account password. The user is not able to access any TOE functionality prior to installing the TLS client certificate and private key, and entering the server account password.

The default file permissions protect the application's binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.

The "default permissions" are those provided by Android. In particular, the base apk permission is 644, which breaks down to the following:

- it is able to be read + written to by owner
- it is able to be read by group,
- it is able to be read by others.

The shared library files permissions are 755 as required by Android, which break down to:

- the owner which is root will read, write and execute in the directory,
- the group will only read and execute in the directory,
- others will only read and execute in the directory.

All of these files are owned by system/system.

Preferences/options files are stored in the shared\_prefs directory with permissions 660, which breaks down to the following:

- the owner can read and write but not execute,
- the group is able to read and write but not execute,
- others cannot read, write or execute,

The preferences/options files are owned by the uid/gid associated with the application (varies per installation). These are all defined by Android.



### 6.4.2 FMT\_MEC\_EXT.1

The Hypori Client invokes the recommended Android mechanisms for storing account settings files. On Android devices, the client uses SharedPreferences and extends PreferenceActivity.

### 6.4.3 FMT\_SMF.1

For each account, the Hypori Client provides the capability to set the Hypori server IP address, Hypori server port, account name, and TLS client certificate (key). The Hypori Client can enable the Remember Password setting for each account. The operational guidance recommends that the user disable this functionality. The Hypori Client Remember Password setting can also be disabled by policies received from the Hypori server.

The Hypori Client does not require any configuration to use ports and protocol. The Hypori Client does not listen on any ports for inbound connection requests. The Hypori Client interacts only with the Hypori server. When a Hypori Device application needs information from a server (such as a map server), the Hypori Device – not the Hypori Client – communicates with the server (which may be an internal, enterprise server).

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## 6.5 Privacy

The Hypori Client does not transmit PII over a network.

### 6.5.1 FPR\_ANO\_EXT.1

The Hypori Client does not transmit PII over a network.

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## 6.6 Protection of the TSF

The Hypori Client uses security features and APIs that the platform provides. This includes address space layout randomization, data execution protection, Security Enhancements for Android, and stack-based buffer overflow protection. The client leverages Android package management for secure installation and updates. The Hypori Client package includes only those third-party libraries necessary for its intended operation.

### 6.6.1 FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1

Hypori enables address space layout randomization (ASLR) in the Android Hypori Client using `-fpic` when building the application with Android Native Development Kit (NDK r15c) using `gcc`. The Hypori Client is a Java application that includes Java Native Interface (JNI) libraries. Hypori enables stack-based buffer overflow protection using `-fstack-protector-strong`. The Hypori Client does not invoke `mmap` or `mprotect` from the Android NDK.

### 6.6.2 FPT\_API\_EXT.1

The Hypori Client uses the Android APIs listed in Section 9 Appendix: Android APIs and Section 10. Appendix: Java Library APIs.

### 6.6.3 FPT\_IDV\_EXT.1

The TOE is the Hypori Client (Android) v 4.2.0. The TOE is identified and versioned by the Android application version identifiers as well as the internal Hypori build information.

The values listed below are provided for illustration purposes:

- Version name: 4.2.0 (on Play Store and in App)
- Version code: 401140004 (hidden inside app, not exposed to user)
- Internal build code (created by build system, shown in App)

Below is an example of version string as shown in Hypori UI:

- 4.1.14 (407000019-a53904e)

Versionname = (internal build code)

The versionname string is also provided in Google Play Store and the Android App Info for installed apps.

The Hypori (Android) Client 4.2.0 version is interpreted as a major.minor.maintenance-release format.

#### 6.6.4 FPT\_LIB\_EXT.1

The Hypori Client package includes only the third-party libraries listed in the security functional requirements.

#### 6.6.5 FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1, FPT\_TUD\_EXT.2

Hypori distributes the Hypori Client as a .APK file for Android devices. A user may obtain the installation package through Google Play or the enterprise IT group of the user. A user obtains Hypori Client updates using the platform's update mechanism or from the user's IT group. Hypori digitally signs the installation package as well as updates and includes the corresponding public key certificate in the package. Android will install an update only when the certificate in the update matches the certificate in the installed client. The client is signed with a unique certificate. It can be delivered via the Google Play store, MDM, or other enterprise app stores.

A user can see the current version of the Hypori Client by checking the footer information on all screens.

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### 6.7 Trusted path/channels

The Hypori Client uses TLS 1.2 for all communication with Hypori server.

#### 6.7.1 FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1

The Hypori server is the only trusted IT product the Hypori Client communicates with. For all communication with the Hypori server, the Hypori Client connects to the server using TLS 1.2 provided by the platform.

The TOE uses the platform `android.net.SSLCertificateSocketFactory` and `javax.net.ssl.SSLSocket` calls to invoke the functionality.

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### 6.8 Timely Security Updates

#### 6.8.1 ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1

Hypori provides customers with timely updates. A customer chooses their preferred communication. The Hypori Support Department will notify customers of updates using each customer's preferred communication mechanism. Application changes may be pushed to end users via the Google Play Store like any other application or via an enterprise application store internal to a customer. Typical delivery times for security updates are 5 to 10 business days.

Hypori maintains a Security Portal online. Every customer is registered with the Support Portal. Hypori notifies each customer of a new security report on the Support portal using the customers preferred communication mechanism. Hypori secures the Support Portal via SSL and user authentication. Each customer contact must log in with their specific credentials in order to see the security reports.

## 7. Protection Profile Claims

This ST conforms to the *Protection Profile for Application Software*, Version 1.3, 2019-03-01 [PP\_APP\_v1.3].

As explained in Section 3, Security Problem Definition, the Security Problem Definition of the [PP\_APP\_v1.3] has been included by reference into this ST.

As explained in Section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of the [PP\_APP\_v1.3] have been included by reference into this ST.

The following table identifies all the security functional requirements in this ST. Each SFR is reproduced from the [PP\_APP\_v1.3] and operations completed as appropriate.

**Table 4 SFR Protection Profile Sources**

Requirement Class	Requirement Component	Source
<b>FCS: Cryptographic support</b>	FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials	[PP_APP_v1.3]
<b>FDP: User data protection</b>	FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications	[PP_APP_v1.3]
<b>FIA: Identification and authentication</b>	FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication	[PP_APP_v1.3]
<b>FMT: Security management</b>	FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	[PP_APP_v1.3]
<b>FPR: Privacy</b>	FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information	[PP_APP_v1.3]
<b>FPT: Protection of the TSF</b>	FPT_AEX_EXT.1 AntiExploitation Capabilities	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FPT_API_EXT.1.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update	[PP_APP_v1.3]
	FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update	[PP_APP_v1.3]
<b>FTP: Trusted path/channels</b>	FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit	[PP_APP_v1.3]

## 8. Rationale

This security target includes by reference the [PP\_APP\_v1.3] Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives, and Security Assurance Requirements. The security target makes no additions to the [PP\_APP\_v1.3] assumptions. [PP\_APP\_v1.3] security functional requirements have been reproduced with the [PP\_APP\_v1.3] operations completed. Operations on the security requirements follow [PP\_APP\_v1.3] application notes and assurance activities. Consequently, [PP\_APP\_v1.3] rationale applies but is incomplete. The TOE Summary Specification rationale below serves to complete the rationale required for the security target.

### 8.1 Dependency Rationale

The Protection Profile for Application Software [PP\_APP\_v1.3] contains all the requirements claimed in this Security Target. As such, the dependencies are not applicable since the PP has been approved.

### 8.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale

Each subsection in Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, describes a security function of the TOE. Each description is followed with rationale that indicates which requirements are satisfied by aspects of the corresponding security function. The security functions work together to satisfy all of the security functional requirements. Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary in order for the TSF to provide the required security functionality.

This section in conjunction with Section 6 TOE Summary Specification provides evidence that the security functions are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements. The collection of security functions works together to provide all of the security requirements. The security functions described in the TOE summary specification are all necessary for the required security functionality in the TSF. Table 5 demonstrates the relationship between security requirements and security functions.

**Table 5 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping**

	Cryptographic support	User data protection	Identification and authentication	Security management	Privacy	Protection of the TSF	Trusted path/channels
FCS_CKM_EXT.1	X						
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	X						
FCS_STO_EXT.1	X						
FDP_DAR_EXT.1		X					
FDP_NET_EXT.1		X					
FDP_DEC_EXT.1		X					
FIA_X509_EXT.1			X				
FIA_X509_EXT.2			X				
FMT_CFG_EXT.1				X			
FMT_MEC_EXT.1				X			
FMT_SMF.1				X			
FPR_ANO_EXT.1					X		
FPT_AEX_EXT.1						X	
FPT_API_EXT.1						X	
FPT_IDV_EXT.1						X	
FPT_LIB_EXT.1						X	
FPT_TUD_EXT.1						X	

	Cryptographic support	User data protection	Identification and authentication	Security management	Privacy	Protection of the TSF	Trusted path/channels
<b>FPT_TUD_EXT.1</b>						X	
<b>FTP_DIT_EXT.1</b>							X

---

## 9. Appendix: Android APIs

The Hypori Client uses the following Android APIs:

1. android.accounts.AbstractAccountAuthenticator
2. android.accounts.Account
3. android.accounts.AccountAuthenticatorResponse
4. android.accounts.AccountManager
5. android.accounts.AccountManagerCallback
6. android.accounts.AccountManagerFuture
7. android.accounts.AccountsException
8. android.accounts.NetworkErrorException
9. android.accounts.OperationCanceledException
10. android.animation.Animator
11. android.animation.AnimatorListenerAdapter
12. android.animation.ValueAnimator
13. android.annotation.SuppressLint
14. android.annotation.TargetApi
15. android.app.ActionBar
16. android.app.Activity
17. android.app.ActivityManager
18. android.app.ActivityManager.RunningTaskInfo
19. android.app.AlertDialog
20. android.app.Application
21. android.app.Application.ActivityLifecycleCallbacks
22. android.app.Dialog
23. android.app.DialogFragment
24. android.app.IntentService
25. android.app.KeyguardManager
26. android.app.ListActivity
27. android.app.Notification
28. android.app.NotificationChannel
29. android.app.NotificationChannelGroup
30. android.app.NotificationManager
31. android.app.PendingIntent
32. android.app.ProgressDialog
33. android.app.SearchManager
34. android.app.SearchableInfo
35. android.app.Service

36. android.app.UiModeManager
37. android.app.admin.DeviceAdminReceiver
38. android.app.admin.DevicePolicyManager
39. android.bluetooth.BluetoothAdapter
40. android.bluetooth.BluetoothClass
41. android.bluetooth.BluetoothDevice
42. android.bluetooth.BluetoothGatt
43. android.bluetooth.BluetoothGattCallback
44. android.bluetooth.BluetoothGattCharacteristic
45. android.bluetooth.BluetoothGattDescriptor
46. android.bluetooth.BluetoothGattService
47. android.bluetooth.BluetoothProfile
48. android.bluetooth.BluetoothServerSocket
49. android.bluetooth.BluetoothSocket
50. android.content.AbstractThreadedSyncAdapter
51. android.content.ActivityNotFoundException
52. android.content.BroadcastReceiver
53. android.content.ComponentName
54. android.content.ContentProvider
55. android.content.ContentProviderClient
56. android.content.ContentResolver
57. android.content.ContentUris
58. android.content.ContentValues
59. android.content.Context
60. android.content.DialogInterface
61. android.content.DialogInterface.OnClickListener
62. android.content.Intent
63. android.content.Intent.ShortcutIconResource
64. android.content.IntentFilter
65. android.content.ServiceConnection
66. android.content.SharedPreferences
67. android.content.SharedPreferences.Editor
68. android.content.SharedPreferences.OnSharedPreferenceChangeListener
69. android.content.SyncResult
70. android.content.UriMatcher
71. android.content.pm.ActivityInfo
72. android.content.pm.ApplicationInfo

73. android.content.pm.PackageInfo
74. android.content.pm.PackageManager
75. android.content.pm.PackageManager.NameNotFoundException
76. android.content.pm.ResolveInfo
77. android.content.pm.Signature
78. android.content.res.AssetFileDescriptor
79. android.content.res.AssetManager
80. android.content.res.Configuration
81. android.content.res.Resources
82. android.content.res.TypedArray
83. android.database.ContentObserver
84. android.database.Cursor
85. android.database.DataSetObserver
86. android.database.MatrixCursor
87. android.database.sqlite.SQLiteDatabase
88. android.database.sqlite.SQLiteException
89. android.database.sqlite.SQLiteOpenHelper
90. android.graphics.Bitmap
91. android.graphics.Bitmap.CompressFormat
92. android.graphics.BitmapFactory
93. android.graphics.Canvas
94. android.graphics.Color
95. android.graphics.ImageFormat
96. android.graphics.Matrix
97. android.graphics.Paint
98. android.graphics.Path
99. android.graphics.PixelFormat
100. android.graphics.Point
101. android.graphics.PointF
102. android.graphics.PorterDuff
103. android.graphics.Rect
104. android.graphics.RectF
105. android.graphics.SurfaceTexture
106. android.graphics.SurfaceTexture.OnFrameAvailableListener
107. android.graphics.Typeface
108. android.graphics.YuvImage
109. android.graphics.drawable.BitmapDrawable



110.android.graphics.drawable.ColorDrawable  
111.android.graphics.drawable.Drawable  
112.android.graphics.drawable.GradientDrawable  
113.android.graphics.drawable.LayerDrawable  
114.android.graphics.drawable.ShapeDrawable  
115.android.graphics.drawable.TransitionDrawable  
116.android.graphics.drawable.shapes.RoundRectShape  
117.android.hardware.Camera  
118.android.hardware.Camera.Area  
119.android.hardware.Camera.CameraInfo  
120.android.hardware.Camera.Face  
121.android.hardware.Camera.FaceDetectionListener  
122.android.hardware.Camera.Parameters  
123.android.hardware.Camera.PictureCallback  
124.android.hardware.Camera.Size  
125.android.hardware.Sensor  
126.android.hardware.SensorEvent  
127.android.hardware.SensorEventListener  
128.android.hardware.SensorManager  
129.android.location.GpsSatellite  
130.android.location.GpsStatus  
131.android.location.GpsStatus.Listener  
132.android.location.GpsStatus.NmeaListener  
133.android.location.Location  
134.android.location.LocationListener  
135.android.location.LocationManager  
136.android.location.LocationProvider  
137.android.media.AudioFormat  
138.android.media.AudioManager  
139.android.media.AudioRecord  
140.android.media.AudioTrack  
141.android.media.CamcorderProfile  
142.android.media.CameraProfile  
143.android.media.MediaActionSound  
144.android.media.MediaCodec  
145.android.media.MediaCodec.BufferInfo  
146.android.media.MediaCodecInfo

147.android.media.MediaCodecList  
148.android.media.MediaFormat  
149.android.media.MetadataRetriever  
150.android.media.MediaPlayer  
151.android.media.MediaRecorder  
152.android.media.ThumbnailUtils  
153.android.media.audiofx.AcousticEchoCanceller  
154.android.media.audiofx.AutomaticGainControl  
155.android.media.audiofx.NoiseSuppressor  
156.android.net.ConnectivityManager  
157.android.net.LinkAddress  
158.android.net.LinkProperties  
159.android.net.LocalSocket  
160.android.net.LocalSocketAddress  
161.android.net.Network  
162.android.net.NetworkInfo  
163.android.net.RouteInfo  
164.android.net.SSLCertificateSocketFactory  
165.android.net.Uri  
166.android.net.Uri.Builder  
167.android.net.wifi.WifiConfiguration  
168.android.net.wifi.WifiInfo  
169.android.net.wifi.WifiManager  
170.android.net.wifi.WifiManager.WifiLock  
171.android.opengl.EGL14  
172.android.opengl.EGLConfig  
173.android.opengl.EGLContext  
174.android.opengl.EGLDisplay  
175.android.opengl.EGLExt  
176.android.opengl.EGLSurface  
177.android.opengl.GLES11Ext  
178.android.opengl.GLES20  
179.android.opengl.GLSurfaceView  
180.android.opengl.GLSurfaceView.Renderer  
181.android.opengl.GLUtils  
182.android.opengl.Matrix  
183.android.os.AsyncTask

184.android.os.BatteryManager  
185.android.os.Binder  
186.android.os.Build  
187.android.os.Bundle  
188.android.os.Environment  
189.android.os.Handler  
190.android.os.HandlerThread  
191.android.os.IBinder  
192.android.os.Looper  
193.android.os.Message  
194.android.os.Parcel  
195.android.os.ParcelFileDescriptor  
196.android.os.ParcelFileDescriptor.AutoCloseOutputStream  
197.android.os.Parcelable  
198.android.os.PowerManager  
199.android.os.Process  
200.android.os.StatFs  
201.android.os.SystemClock  
202.android.os.UserHandle  
203.android.os.UserManager  
204.android.os.Vibrator  
205.android.preference.CheckBoxPreference  
206.android.preference.EditTextPreference  
207.android.preference.Preference  
208.android.preference.Preference.OnPreferenceChangeListener  
209.android.preference.Preference.OnPreferenceClickListener  
210.android.preference.PreferenceFragment  
211.android.preference.PreferenceGroup  
212.android.preference.PreferenceManager  
213.android.provider.ContactsContract  
214.android.provider.MediaStore  
215.android.provider.MediaStore.Images  
216.android.provider.MediaStore.Images.ImageColumns  
217.android.provider.MediaStore.MediaColumns  
218.android.provider.MediaStore.Video  
219.android.provider.MediaStore.Video.VideoColumns  
220.android.provider.Settings

221.android.provider.Settings.System  
222.android.security.KeyChain  
223.android.security.KeyChainAliasCallback  
224.android.security.KeyChainException  
225.android.service.notification.StatusBarNotification  
226.android.system.ErrnoException  
227.android.telephony.PhoneNumberUtils  
228.android.telephony.PhoneStateListener  
229.android.telephony.ServiceState  
230.android.telephony.SignalStrength  
231.android.telephony.TelephonyManager  
232.android.text.Html  
233.android.text.InputFilter  
234.android.text.Spannable  
235.android.text.SpannableString  
236.android.text.Spanned  
237.android.text.TextUtils  
238.android.text.format.DateFormat  
239.android.text.format.Time  
240.android.text.method.MovementMethod  
241.android.text.method.ScrollingMovementMethod  
242.android.text.style.StyleSpan  
243.android.util.AttributeSet  
244.android.util.Base64  
245.android.util.Base64OutputStream  
246.android.util.DisplayMetrics  
247.android.util.Log  
248.android.util.Range  
249.android.util.SparseArray  
250.android.util.TypedValue  
251.android.util.Xml  
252.android.view.Display  
253.android.view.GestureDetector  
254.android.view.Gravity  
255.android.view.InflateException  
256.android.view.InputDevice  
257.android.view.KeyEvent

258.android.view.LayoutInflater  
259.android.view.Menu  
260.android.view.MenuInflater  
261.android.view.MenuItem  
262.android.view.MenuItem.OnMenuItemClickListener  
263.android.view.MotionEvent  
264.android.view.OrientationEventListener  
265.android.view.SoundEffectConstants  
266.android.view.Surface  
267.android.view.SurfaceHolder  
268.android.view.SurfaceView  
269.android.view.VelocityTracker  
270.android.view.View  
271.android.view.View.OnClickListener  
272.android.view.View.OnTouchListener  
273.android.view.ViewConfiguration  
274.android.view.ViewGroup  
275.android.view.ViewGroup.LayoutParams  
276.android.view.ViewParent  
277.android.view.ViewTreeObserver  
278.android.view.Window  
279.android.view.WindowManager  
280.android.view.accessibility.AccessibilityEvent  
281.android.view.animation.AccelerateInterpolator  
282.android.view.animation.AlphaAnimation  
283.android.view.animation.Animation  
284.android.view.animation.Animation.AnimationListener  
285.android.view.animation.AnimationUtils  
286.android.view.animation.DecelerateInterpolator  
287.android.view.inputmethod.EditorInfo  
288.android.view.inputmethod.InputConnection  
289.android.view.inputmethod.InputMethodManager  
290.android.webkit.WebSettings  
291.android.webkit.WebView  
292.android.webkit.WebViewClient  
293.android.widget.AbsListView  
294.android.widget.Adapter

295.android.widget.AdapterView  
296.android.widget.AdapterView.OnItemClickListener  
297.android.widget.AdapterView.OnItemLongClickListener  
298.android.widget.ArrayAdapter  
299.android.widget.BaseAdapter  
300.android.widget.Button  
301.android.widget.CheckBox  
302.android.widget.CompoundButton  
303.android.widget.CompoundButton.OnCheckedChangeListener  
304.android.widget.CursorAdapter  
305.android.widget.EditText  
306.android.widget.Filter  
307.android.widget.Filterable  
308.android.widget.FrameLayout  
309.android.widget.GridView  
310.android.widget.HorizontalScrollView  
311.android.widget.ImageButton  
312.android.widget.ImageView  
313.android.widget.ImageView.ScaleType  
314.android.widget.LinearLayout  
315.android.widget.ListView  
316.android.widget.PopupMenu  
317.android.widget.PopupWindow  
318.android.widget.ProgressBar  
319.android.widget.RelativeLayout  
320.android.widget.ScrollView  
321.android.widget.SearchView  
322.android.widget.SimpleAdapter  
323.android.widget.Switch  
324.android.widget.TabWidget  
325.android.widget.TextView  
326.android.widget.Toast  
327.androidx.annotation.NonNull  
328.androidx.annotation.Nullable  
329.androidx.appcompat.app.AppCompatActivity  
330.androidx.biometric.BiometricManager  
331.androidx.biometric.BiometricPrompt

332.androidx.core.app.ActivityCompat  
333.androidx.core.app.NotificationCompat  
334.androidx.core.content.ContextCompat  
335.androidx.core.view.MotionEventCompat  
336.androidx.core.view.ViewConfigurationCompat  
337.androidx.drawerlayout.widget.DrawerLayout  
338.androidx.fragment.app.DialogFragment  
339.androidx.fragment.app.Fragment  
340.androidx.fragment.app.FragmentActivity  
341.androidx.fragment.app.FragmentManager  
342.androidx.fragment.app.FragmentStatePagerAdapter  
343.androidx.fragment.app.FragmentTransaction  
344.androidx.localbroadcastmanager.content.LocalBroadcastManager  
345.androidx.multidex.MultiDex  
346.androidx.multidex.MultiDexApplication  
347.androidx.recyclerview.widget.LinearLayoutManager  
348.androidx.recyclerview.widget.RecyclerView  
349.androidx.viewpager.widget.ViewPager  
350.com.google.android.gms.common.ConnectionResult  
351.com.google.android.gms.common.GoogleApiAvailability  
352.com.google.android.material.snackbar.Snackbar  
353.com.google.firebase.FirebaseApp  
354.com.google.firebase.FirebaseOptions  
355.com.google.firebase.iid.FirebaseInstanceId  
356.com.google.firebase.iid.FirebaseInstanceIdService  
357.com.google.firebase.messaging.FirebaseMessaging  
358.com.google.firebase.messaging.FirebaseMessagingService  
359.com.google.firebase.messaging.RemoteMessage  
360.org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParser  
361.org.xmlpull.v1.XmlPullParserException  
362.java.beans.PropertyChangeEvent  
363.java.beans.PropertyChangeListener  
364.java.io.BufferedInputStream  
365.java.io.BufferedOutputStream  
366.java.io.BufferedReader  
367.java.io.BufferedWriter  
368.java.io.ByteArrayInputStream

369.java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream  
370.java.io.Closeable  
371.java.io.DataInputStream  
372.java.io.DataOutputStream  
373.java.io.File  
374.java.io.FileDescriptor  
375.java.io.FileInputStream  
376.java.io.FileNotFoundException  
377.java.io.FileOutputStream  
378.java.io.FileReader  
379.java.io.FileWriter  
380.java.io FilenameFilter  
381.java.io.IOException  
382.java.io.InputStream  
383.java.io.InputStreamReader  
384.java.io.ObjectInputStream  
385.java.io.ObjectOutputStream  
386.java.io.OutputStream  
387.java.io.OutputStreamWriter  
388.java.io.PrintStream  
389.java.io.PrintWriter  
390.java.io.RandomAccessFile  
391.java.io.Serializable  
392.java.io.StringWriter  
393.java.io.UnsupportedEncodingException  
394.java.io.Writer  
395.java.lang.Thread.UncaughtExceptionHandler  
396.java.lang.annotation.ElementType  
397.java.lang.annotation.Retention  
398.java.lang.annotation.RetentionPolicy  
399.java.lang.annotation.Target  
400.java.lang.ref.WeakReference  
401.java.lang.reflect.Array  
402.java.lang.reflect.Constructor  
403.java.lang.reflect.Field  
404.java.lang.reflect.InvocationTargetException  
405.java.lang.reflect.Method



406.java.math.BigInteger  
407.java.net.ConnectException  
408.java.net.HttpURLConnection  
409.java.net.InetAddress  
410.java.net.MalformedURLException  
411.java.net.Socket  
412.java.net.SocketException  
413.java.net.URL  
414.java.net.URLEncoder  
415.java.net.UnknownHostException  
416.java.net.UnknownServiceException  
417.java.nio.BufferOverflowException  
418.java.nio.BufferUnderflowException  
419.java.nio.ByteBuffer  
420.java.nio.ByteOrder  
421.java.nio.CharBuffer  
422.java.nio.DoubleBuffer  
423.java.nio.FloatBuffer  
424.java.nio.IntBuffer  
425.java.nio.LongBuffer  
426.java.nio.ShortBuffer  
427.java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets  
428.java.security.GeneralSecurityException  
429.java.security.InvalidKeyException  
430.java.security.InvalidParameterException  
431.java.security.Key  
432.java.security.KeyFactory  
433.java.security.KeyManagementException  
434.java.security.KeyPair  
435.java.security.KeyPairGenerator  
436.java.security.KeyStore  
437.java.security.KeyStoreException  
438.java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException  
439.java.security.NoSuchProviderException  
440.java.security.Principal  
441.java.security.PrivateKey  
442.java.security.Provider

443.java.security.PublicKey  
444.java.security.SecureRandom  
445.java.security.SecureRandomSpi  
446.java.security.Security  
447.java.security.Signature  
448.java.security.SignatureException  
449.java.security.UnrecoverableKeyException  
450.java.security.cert.CRLException  
451.java.security.cert.CertPath  
452.java.security.cert.CertPathBuilder  
453.java.security.cert.CertPathBuilderException  
454.java.security.cert.CertPathValidatorException  
455.java.security.cert.CertStore  
456.java.security.cert.Certificate  
457.java.security.cert.CertificateEncodingException  
458.java.security.cert.CertificateException  
459.java.security.cert.CertificateExpiredException  
460.java.security.cert.CertificateFactory  
461.java.security.cert.CertificateNotYetValidException  
462.java.security.cert.CertificateParsingException  
463.java.security.cert.CertificateRevokedException  
464.java.security.cert.CollectionCertStoreParameters  
465.java.security.cert.PKIXBuilderParameters  
466.java.security.cert.PKIXCertPathBuilderResult  
467.java.security.cert.TrustAnchor  
468.java.security.cert.X509CRL  
469.java.security.cert.X509CertSelector  
470.java.security.cert.X509Certificate  
471.java.security.interfaces.ECPublicKey  
472.java.security.interfaces.RSAPublicKey  
473.java.security.spec.AlgorithmParameterSpec  
474.java.security.spec.ECParameterSpec  
475.java.security.spec.X509EncodedKeySpec  
476.java.text.DateFormat  
477.java.text.ParseException  
478.java.text.SimpleDateFormat  
479.java.util.ArrayDeque

480.java.util.ArrayList  
481.java.util.Arrays  
482.java.util.Calendar  
483.java.util.Collection  
484.java.util.Collections  
485.java.util.Comparator  
486.java.util.Date  
487.java.util.EmptyStackException  
488.java.util.EnumMap  
489.java.util.EnumSet  
490.java.util.Enumeration  
491.java.util.Formatter  
492.java.util.HashMap  
493.java.util.HashSet  
494.java.util.Hashtable  
495.java.util.Iterator  
496.java.util.LinkedList  
497.java.util.List  
498.java.util.Locale  
499.java.util.Map  
500.java.util.Map.Entry  
501.java.util.Random  
502.java.util.Set  
503.java.util.Stack  
504.java.util.StringTokenizer  
505.java.util.TimeZone  
506.java.util.Timer  
507.java.util.TimerTask  
508.java.util.TreeMap  
509.java.util.TreeSet  
510.java.util.UUID  
511.java.util.WeakHashMap  
512.java.util.concurrent.ArrayBlockingQueue  
513.java.util.concurrent.Callable  
514.java.util.concurrent.CopyOnWriteArrayList  
515.java.util.concurrent.CountDownLatch  
516.java.util.concurrent.Executor

517.java.util.concurrent.ExecutorService  
518.java.util.concurrent.Executors  
519.java.util.concurrent.Future  
520.java.util.concurrent.LinkedBlockingQueue  
521.java.util.concurrent.RejectedExecutionException  
522.java.util.concurrent.Semaphore  
523.java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit  
524.java.util.concurrent.TimeoutException  
525.java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean  
526.java.util.concurrent.locks.Condition  
527.java.util.concurrent.locks.Lock  
528.java.util.concurrent.locks.ReentrantLock  
529.java.util.regex.Matcher  
530.java.util.regex.Pattern  
531.javax.crypto.Cipher  
532.javax.microedition.khronos.egl.EGLConfig  
533.javax.microedition.khronos.opengles.GL10  
534.javax.net.ssl.HandshakeCompletedEvent  
535.javax.net.ssl.HandshakeCompletedListener  
536.javax.net.ssl.HostnameVerifier  
537.javax.net.ssl.HttpURLConnection  
538.javax.net.ssl.KeyManager  
539.javax.net.ssl.SSLContext  
540.javax.net.ssl.SSLException  
541.javax.net.ssl.SSLHandshakeException  
542.javax.net.ssl.SSLPeerUnverifiedException  
543.javax.net.ssl.SSLProtocolException  
544.javax.net.ssl.SSLSession  
545.javax.net.ssl.SSLSocket  
546.javax.net.ssl.TrustManager  
547.javax.net.ssl.TrustManagerFactory  
548.javax.net.ssl.X509ExtendedKeyManager  
549.javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager  
550.javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal  
551.javax.security.cert.CertificateException  
552.javax.security.cert.X509Certificate

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## 10. Appendix: Java Library APIs

The Hypori Client uses the following library APIs from the zxing, org.json, and spongycastle java libraries:

1. Google Protocol Buffers, zxing, yubico, spongycastle
2. com.google.protobuf.ByteString
3. com.google.protobuf.CodedInputStream
4. com.google.protobuf.CodedOutputStream
5. com.google.protobuf.GeneratedMessageLite
6. com.google.protobuf.InvalidProtocolBufferException
7. com.google.zxing.BarcodeFormat
8. com.google.zxing.BinaryBitmap
9. com.google.zxing.DecodeHintType
10. com.google.zxing.MultiFormatReader
11. com.google.zxing.PlanarYUVLuminanceSource
12. com.google.zxing.ReaderException
13. com.google.zxing.Result
14. com.google.zxing.ResultMetadataType
15. com.google.zxing.ResultPoint
16. com.google.zxing.ResultPointCallback
17. com.google.zxing.client.android.CaptureFragment
18. com.google.zxing.client.android.Contents
19. com.google.zxing.client.android.Intent
20. com.google.zxing.client.android.LocaleManager
21. com.google.zxing.client.android.camera.CameraManager
22. com.google.zxing.client.android.camera.FrontLightMode
23. com.google.zxing.client.android.camera.open.OpenCameraInterface
24. com.google.zxing.client.android.result.ResultHandler
25. com.google.zxing.client.android.result.ResultHandlerFactory
26. com.google.zxing.client.android.wifi.WifiConfigManager
27. com.google.zxing.client.result.AddressBookParsedResult
28. com.google.zxing.client.result.CalendarParsedResult
29. com.google.zxing.client.result.EmailAddressParsedResult
30. com.google.zxing.client.result.ExpandedProductParsedResult
31. com.google.zxing.client.result.GeoParsedResult
32. com.google.zxing.client.result.ISBNParsedResult
33. com.google.zxing.client.result.ParsedResult
34. com.google.zxing.client.result.ParsedResultType
35. com.google.zxing.client.result.ProductParsedResult
36. com.google.zxing.client.result.ResultParser
37. com.google.zxing.client.result.SMSParsedResult
38. com.google.zxing.client.result.TelParsedResult
39. com.google.zxing.client.result.URIParsedResult
40. com.google.zxing.client.result.WifiParsedResult
41. com.google.zxing.common.HybridBinarizer
42. com.yubico.yubikit.YubiKitManager

43. com.yubico.yubikit.apdu.ApduCodeException
44. com.yubico.yubikit.apdu.ApduException
45. com.yubico.yubikit.piv.Algorithm
46. com.yubico.yubikit.piv.InvalidPinException
47. com.yubico.yubikit.piv.PivApplication
48. com.yubico.yubikit.piv.Slot
49. com.yubico.yubikit.transport.usb.UsbConfiguration
50. com.yubico.yubikit.transport.usb.UsbSession
51. com.yubico.yubikit.transport.usb.UsbSessionListener
52. org.spongycastle.asn1.ASN1InputStream
53. org.spongycastle.asn1.ASN1ObjectIdentifier
54. org.spongycastle.asn1.ASN1Primitive
55. org.spongycastle.asn1.DERIA5String
56. org.spongycastle.asn1.DEROctetString
57. org.spongycastle.asn1.x509.AlgorithmIdentifier
58. org.spongycastle.asn1.x509.CRLDistPoint
59. org.spongycastle.asn1.x509.DistributionPoint
60. org.spongycastle.asn1.x509.DistributionPointName
61. org.spongycastle.asn1.x509.Extension
62. org.spongycastle.asn1.x509.GeneralName
63. org.spongycastle.asn1.x509.GeneralNames
64. org.spongycastle.cert.X509CertificateHolder
65. org.spongycastle.cert.jcajce.JcaCertStore
66. org.spongycastle.cms.CMSException
67. org.spongycastle.cms.CMSProcessableByteArray
68. org.spongycastle.cms.CMSSignedData
69. org.spongycastle.cms.CMSSignedDataGenerator
70. org.spongycastle.cms.CMSTypedData
71. org.spongycastle.cms.jcajce.JcaSignerInfoGeneratorBuilder
72. org.spongycastle.operator.ContentSigner
73. org.spongycastle.operator.DefaultDigestAlgorithmIdentifierFinder
74. org.spongycastle.operator.DefaultSignatureAlgorithmIdentifierFinder
75. org.spongycastle.operator.OperatorCreationException
76. org.spongycastle.operator.jcajce.JcaContentSignerBuilder
77. org.spongycastle.operator.jcajce.JcaDigestCalculatorProviderBuilder
78. org.spongycastle.util.Store