National Information Assurance Partnership

Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme

Validation Report

for

One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7

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1 Executive Summary

This Validation Report (VR) documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the evaluation of One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7 (the Target of Evaluation, or TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied.

This VR is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent for that end-user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their environment. End-users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were evaluated and tested and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST. Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.

The evaluation was performed by Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, USA, and was completed in June 2021. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report written by Leidos. The evaluation determined that the TOE is:

- Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant

and demonstrates exact conformance to:

- *collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices*, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 ([5])

as clarified by all applicable Technical Decisions.

The TOE is One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7.

The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5). The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the ST. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced. Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct.

The Leidos evaluation team determined that the TOE is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile (PP) and, when installed, configured and operated as specified in the evaluated guidance documentation, satisfies all the security functional requirements stated in the ST ([7]).

2 Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) use the Common Criteria (CC) and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM) to conduct security evaluations, in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliant List (PCL).

Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:

- The TOE—the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated
- The ST—the unique identification of the document describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product
- The conformance result of the evaluation
- The PP/PP-Modules to which the product is conformant
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.

Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers

Item	Identifier
Evaluation Scheme	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE	One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7
Security Target	One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7 Security Target, Version 1.0, 12 April 2021
Sponsor & Developer	One Identity 4 Polaris Way Aliso Viejo, CA 92656
Completion Date	June 2021
CC Version	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Release 5, April 2017
CEM Version	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, Release 5, April 2017
PP	collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2021
Conformance Result	PP Compliant, CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
CCTL	Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory 6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive Columbia, MD 21046

Item	Identifier
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3 TOE Architecture

Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST.

The TOE is One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7, comprising a standalone hardware appliance and pre-installed firmware—One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords 3000 Appliance with Safeguard for Privileged Passwords firmware v6.7.

The TOE communicates with managed systems, termed “assets” in the TOE documentation. An asset is a computer, server, network device, or application managed by a Safeguard for Privileged Passwords Appliance. The TOE supports secure communication channels with assets via HTTPS or TLS.

The TOE includes a Windows 10 IoT Enterprise operating system with Bitlocker v2.0, a v2.0 Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and an Intel Xeon E3-1275 v6 processor with Kaby Lake microarchitecture.

The TOE provides Web UI and REST API management interfaces that an administrator can access via Ethernet ports. Along with the TOE, One Identity provides a desktop client application that uses the REST API for TOE administration. It is considered part of the TOE’s operational environment, along with any computer on which it is installed. Local management of the TOE is possible by directly connecting a computer (such as a laptop) to the appliance’s XO port via an Ethernet cable. The management interfaces are protected with HTTPS and are limited to users assigned an authorized administrator role. Regardless of the method used to access the TOE appliance, no general-purpose computing interface (e.g., Remote Desktop, PowerShell) is available.

The TOE provides a local password-based and X.509 certificate based identification and authentication methods. No other authentication methods offered by the product (e.g., LDAP, AD, external authentication servers) were covered in the evaluation and their use is excluded in the evaluated configuration.

The TOE is evaluated as a network device offering CAVP certified cryptographic functions, security auditing, secure administration, trusted updates, self-tests, and secure connections with external IT entities (assets and audit server), protected using TLS or HTTPS.

4 Security Policy

The TOE enforces the following security policies as described in the ST.

Note: Much of the description of the security policy has been derived from the ST and the Final ETR.

4.1 Security Audit

The TOE generates security relevant audit records, stores them locally, and can be configured to forward them to a syslog server over TLS. The locally stored audit records are protected from unauthorized access.

4.2 Cryptographic Support

The TOE includes FIPS-approved cryptographic libraries with CAVP certificates for their cryptographic algorithms. The TOE uses its Windows cryptographic libraries for all HTTPS, TLS and certificate functionality. Cryptographic services include key management, random bit generation, symmetric encryption and decryption, digital signature, and secure hashing.

4.3 Identification and Authentication

The TOE displays a configurable warning banner and allows automated generation of cryptographic keys prior to a user being successfully identified and authenticated. No other actions are permitted until the user is authenticated. The TOE provides: username/password and X.509 certificate-based identification and authentication methods; password management functions; and authentication failure management functions.

4.4 Security Management

The TOE provides Web UI and REST API management interfaces that an administrator can access via a network port. The TOE's REST API can be accessed from the desktop client application or may be invoked directly if desired. Local management of the TOE is possible by directly connecting a computer to the appliance's XO port via Ethernet cable. The management interfaces are protected with HTTPS and are limited users assigned an authorized administrator role.

4.5 Protection of the TSF

The TOE implements features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features, including protection of sensitive data and provision of timing mechanisms to ensure that reliable time information is available for the TOE's own use (e.g., for log accountability).

The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it can detect when it is failing and transition to a secure, maintenance state. It also includes a mechanism to verify TOE updates to prevent malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.

4.6 TOE Access

The TOE displays a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message prior to establishing an administrative user session. The TOE terminates local and remote administrator interactive sessions after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity. The TOE allows administrator-initiated termination of the administrator's own interactive session.

4.7 Trusted Path/Channels

The TOE provides trusted paths and channels for remote administrators and trusted IT entities. The TOE can be configured to send audit records to external syslog server(s) using TLS in real-time.

5 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

5.1 Assumptions

The ST references the PP to which it claims conformance for assumptions about the use of the TOE. Those assumptions, drawn from the claimed PP, are as follows:

- The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the device's physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP does not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For virtual Network Devices (vNDs), this assumption applies to the physical platform on which the virtual machine (VM) runs.
- The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).

  In the case of vNDs, the virtualization system (VS) is considered part of the TOE with only one vND instance for each physical hardware platform. The exception being where components of the distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. There are no other guest VMs on the physical platform providing non-Network Device functionality.
- A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).
- The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.

  For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE's trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification).
- The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
- The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are protected by the platform on which they reside.

- The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.

5.2 Clarification of Scope

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:

- As with any evaluation, this evaluation shows only that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the evaluation activities specified in *Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document: Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP*, Version 2.2, December 2019 ([6]) and performed by the evaluation team).
- This evaluation covers only the specific software distribution and version identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
- The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified in One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7 Security Target, Version 1.0, 12 April 2021 ([7]). Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product were not covered by this evaluation. In particular, the functionality mentioned in Section 8.2 of this document is excluded from the scope of the evaluation.
- This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
- The TOE must be installed, configured and managed as described in the documentation referenced in Section 6 of this VR.

6 Documentation

The vendor offers guidance documents describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance for subsequent administration and use of the applicable security features. The guidance documentation examined during the evaluation and delivered with the TOE is as follows:

- *One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7 Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide (CCECG)*, Version 1.0, 12 April 2021 ([8])
- *Safeguard for Privileged Passwords 6.7 Administration Guide*, Version 6.7, Updated 28 Aug 2020 ([9])
- *One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords 6.7 User Guide*, Version 6.7, Updated 28 Aug 2020 ([10])
- *Safeguard for Privileged Passwords 6.7 Appliance Setup Guide*, Version 6.7, Updated 28 Aug 2020 ([11]).

To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in this documentation.

Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that which may be available online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon to configure or operate the TOE as evaluated. Consumers are encouraged to download the evaluated administrative guidance documentation from the NIAP website.

7 IT Product Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information contained in the following proprietary document:

- *One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7 Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures*, Version 1.0, 7 June 2021 ([14])

A non-proprietary description of the tests performed and their results is provided in the following document:

- *Assurance Activities Report for One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7*, Version 1.0, 7 June 2021 ([13])

The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE security functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product that claims conformance to *collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices*, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 ([5]).

The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Test Activities specified in *Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document: Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP*, Version 2.2, December 2019 ([6]). The Test Plan described how each test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment. The evaluation team executed the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the results in the team test report listed above.

Independent testing took place at Leidos CCTL facilities in Columbia, Maryland, from August 1, 2020 through April 12, 2021. In response to check-out comments, some final tests were run between May 14 and May 26, 2021.

The evaluators received the TOE in the form that customers would receive it, installed and configured the TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test Plan on equipment configured in the testing laboratory.

Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the testing requirements for *collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices* were fulfilled.

7.1 Test Configuration

The evaluation team established a test configuration comprising one instance of the TOE as follows:

- Safeguard for Privileged Passwords 3000 Appliance (SPP)
- Safeguard for Privileged Passwords firmware v6.7.

The test configuration included the following devices in the operational environment of the TOE:

Figure 1: TOE Test Configuration



- TLS Tool Server 1—used to test TLS client, TLS server, X.509 requirements, and as the external audit server. It included the following software:
  - Ubuntu 18.04
  - OpenSSL 1.1.1
  - Wireshark 3.4.5
  - CCTL's custom TLS Server and TLS Client test tools
- TLS Tool Server 2—used to test TLS client, TLS server, X.509 requirements. It included the following software:
  - Unbuntu 18.04
  - OpenSSL 1.1.1
  - Wireshark 3.4.5
  - CCTL's custom TLS Server and TLS Client test tools
- CRL Server—used to test X.509 certificate revocation checking. It included the following software:
  - Kali 2019.3
  - OpenSSL 1.1.1c
- Admin Laptop—used to administer TOE, both locally (when directly connected to XO port on TOE appliance) and remotely (via test network infrastructure). It included Windows 10 Pro 18363.1500 Version 1909 operating system and Wireshark 3.4.5.

Note, for the sake of completeness, a second administrative workstation, comprising a virtualized Windows 10 Enterprise running on ESXi 6.7, was used in the early stages of testing before being replaced due to performance issues by the Admin Laptop identified above.

8 TOE Evaluated Configuration

8.1 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7, comprising the Safeguard for Privileged Passwords 3000 Appliance with Safeguard for Privileged Passwords firmware v6.7. The TOE is evaluated as a single standalone network device and cluster configurations are not included.

Depending on configuration, the TOE in its evaluated configuration may require the following components in its operational environment:

- A TLS-protected syslog server that receives audit events from the TOE,
- Supported organizational assets (ACF2, Active Directory, AWS, Windows, etc.),
- Desktop Client workstation for administrator access to API.
    - A supported operating system: Windows 2008 Server, Windows 7, Windows 2012 Server, Windows 2012 R2 Server, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows 2016, or any recent version of Linux.
    - SPP Desktop Client software version 6.7, and
    - SSH Client software.
- A supported browser for access to the web UI: Mozilla Firefox (minimum version 69); Google Chrome (minimum version 80); or Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based, minimum version 80). The browser must support TLS-encrypted HTTPS connections, and JavaScript/cookies must be enabled. For any of the supported browsers, the latest patched version should be used.

8.2 Excluded Functionality

The following features and capabilities of the One Identity SPP product are not covered by the evaluation:

- The product's functionality for automating, controlling, and securing the process of granting privileged credentials with role-based access management and automated workflows.
- The use of the product to automate the issuance and management of privileged passwords for organizational assets.
- The product's ability to ensure that password data is up-to-date based on policies provisioned internally on the product was not covered by the evaluation.

The table below identifies features or protocols that are not evaluated or must be disabled and the rationale why.

Feature	Description
SPP Serial Port	SPP has a serial port used for Recovery Kiosk functionality. The interface itself is unauthenticated but some functions are challenge-response to One Identity (e.g. reset admin password). This is not included in the evaluated configuration.

Feature	Description
Recovery Kiosk	The use of Recovery Kiosk is permitted only to enable the built-in Bootstrap Administrator account in order to then unlock a locked admin account in the event all admin accounts are locked.
Telnet and Custom HTTP	Telnet and HTTP are disabled by default and must not be enabled in the evaluated configuration. Telnet and HTTP are insecure protocols, which allow for plaintext passwords to be transmitted.
Archive Server	The use of an archive server for storing backup files, session recordings, and audit records is out of the scope of the evaluation.
External Authentication Servers	Starling, Active Directory, LDAP, RADIUS, and FIDO2 are excluded from the evaluation and should not be used.
Communication with SPS	SPP is capable of providing credentials to Safeguard for Privileged Sessions (SPS) in the operational environment for secondary non-admin user authentication. This capability was not evaluated and in the evaluated configuration this interface must be disabled.
Communication with Assets using SSH	SSH is supported by the solution but was not evaluated and is outside the TOE boundary.
NTP	Although the product supports NTP, the use of NTP was not evaluated and it is excluded from the evaluated configuration.
Safeguard for Privileged Passwords virtual appliances and cloud applications	One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords may be deployed as virtual appliances and cloud applications. However, neither of these configurations were tested and are not in the evaluated configuration.

9 Results of the Evaluation

The results of the evaluation of the TOE against its target assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary Evaluation Technical Report for One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7, Part 2 ([12]). The reader of this VR can assume that all assurance activities and work units received passing verdicts.

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1, revision 5 ([1], [2], [3]) and CEM version 3.1, revision 5 ([4]), and the specific evaluation activities specified in *Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document: Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP*, Version 2.2, December 2019 ([6]). The evaluation determined the TOE satisfies the conformance claims made in the One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7 Security Target, of Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant. The TOE satisfies the requirements specified in:

- *collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020* ([5]).

The Validators reviewed all the work of the evaluation team and agreed with their practices and findings.

9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ST) (ASE)

The evaluation team performed each TSS assurance activity and ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains an ST introduction, TOE overview, TOE description, security problem definition in terms of threats, policies and assumptions, description of security objectives for the operational environment, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the product that are consistent with the claimed Protection Profile, and security function descriptions that satisfy the requirements.

9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)

The evaluation team performed each ADV assurance activity and applied each ADV_FSP.1 CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the evaluation evidence and found it adequate to meet the requirements specified in the claimed Protection Profile for design evidence. The ADV evidence consists of the TSS descriptions provided in the ST and product guidance documentation providing descriptions of the TOE external interfaces.

9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)

The evaluation team performed each guidance assurance activity and applied each AGD work unit. The evaluation team determined the adequacy of the operational user guidance in describing how to operate the TOE in accordance with the descriptions in the ST. The evaluation team followed the guidance in the TOE preparative procedures to test the installation and configuration procedures to ensure the procedures result in the evaluated configuration. The guidance documentation was assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure it was complete.

9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)

The evaluation team performed each ALC assurance activity and applied each ALC_CMC.1 and ALC_CMS.1 CEM work unit, to the extent possible given the evaluation evidence required by the claimed Protection Profile. The evaluation team ensured the TOE is labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE identification in the evaluation evidence, and that the ST describes how timely security updates are made to the TOE.

9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)

The evaluation team performed each test activity and applied each ATE_FUN.1 CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the claimed PP and recorded the results in the Test Report, summarized in the AAR.

9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)

The evaluation team performed each AVA assurance activity and applied each AVA_VAN.1 CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a vulnerability analysis following the processes described in the claimed PP. This comprised a search of public vulnerability databases.

Searches of public vulnerability repositories were performed on 27 May 2021.

The evaluation team searched the following public vulnerability repositories.

- National Vulnerability Database (http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search)
- US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database (https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
- SecurityFocus Vulnerability Database (http://securityfocus.com).

The evaluation team used the following search terms in the searches of these repositories:

- One Identity
- One Identity Safeguard
- Safeguard for Privileged Passwords
- BitLocker v2.0
- Windows IoT Enterprise
- Intel Xeon E3-1275 v6
- Kaby Lake microarchitecture
- TPM (spec v2.0) – IFX 5.62.3126.0.

The results of these searches did not identify any vulnerabilities that are applicable to the TOE. The conclusion drawn from the vulnerability analysis is that no residual vulnerabilities exist that are exploitable by attackers with Basic Attack Potential as defined by the Certification Body in accordance with the guidance in the CEM.

9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results

The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met, sufficient to satisfy the assurance activities specified in the claimed Protection Profile. Additionally, the evaluation team's testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

10 Validator Comments/Recommendations

The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration of the TOE. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and the only evaluated functionality was that which was described by the SFRs claimed in the Security Target. All other functionality provided by the TOE needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness. In particular, the Rest API was tested only to the extent it is used by the TOE desktop client. Other capabilities of that API, even if security related, have not been covered by evaluation testing.

Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated configuration is established and maintained.

11 Security Target

The ST for this product's evaluation is *One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7 Security Target*, Version 1.0, 12 April 2021 ([7]).

12 Abbreviations and Acronyms

This section identifies abbreviations and acronyms used in this document.

AD	Active Directory
API	Application Programming Interface
CA	Certificate Authority
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CCTL	Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
cPP	collaborative Protection Profile
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IT	Information Technology
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
PCL	Product Compliant List
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SPP	Safeguard for Privileged Passwords
SSH	Secure Shell
ST	Security Target
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TPM	Trusted Platform Module
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSS	TOE Summary Specification
UI	User Interface
VM	Virtual Machine
vND	virtual Network Device
VR	Validation Report

13 Bibliography

The validation team used the following documents to produce this VR:

[1] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.

[2] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.

[3] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.

[4] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.

[5] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020.

[6] Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document: Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 2.2, December 2019

[7] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7 Security Target, Version 1.0, 12 April 2021

[8] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7 Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide (CCECG), Version 1.0, 12 April 2021

[9] Safeguard for Privileged Passwords 6.7 Administration Guide, Version 6.7, Updated 28 Aug 2020

[10] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords 6.7 User Guide, Version 6.7, Updated 28 Aug 2020

[11] Safeguard for Privileged Passwords 6.7 Appliance Setup Guide, Version 6.7, Updated 28 Aug 2020

[12] Evaluation Technical Report for One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7, Part 2 (Leidos Proprietary), Version 1.0, 7 June 2021.

[13] Assurance Activities Report for One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7, Version 1.0, 7 June 2021.

[14] One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Passwords v6.7 Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.0, 7 June 2021.