

FORTINET[®]

FortiGate/FortiOS 7.0

Security Target

Version 1.5

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Document prepared by



www.lightshipsec.com

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Table of Contents

1	Introduction	5
1.1	Overview	5
1.2	Identification	5
1.3	Conformance Claims.....	5
1.4	Terminology.....	8
2	TOE Description	9
2.1	Type	9
2.2	Usage	9
2.3	Logical Scope / Security Functions.....	10
2.4	Physical Scope.....	11
3	Security Problem Definition.....	17
3.1	Threats	17
3.2	Assumptions.....	21
3.3	Organizational Security Policies.....	23
4	Security Objectives.....	23
4.1	Security Objectives for the TOE.....	23
4.2	Security Objectives for the Environment.....	25
5	Security Requirements.....	26
5.1	Conventions	26
5.2	Extended Components Definition.....	26
5.3	Functional Requirements	26
5.4	Assurance Requirements.....	50
6	TOE Summary Specification.....	51
6.1	Security Audit	51
6.2	Cryptographic Support	51
6.3	HTTPS/TLS	56
6.4	SSH.....	57
6.5	IPsec	58
6.6	Residual Data Protection	59
6.7	Identification and Authentication	59
6.8	X509 Certificates.....	60
6.9	Security Management	61
6.10	Protection of the TSF	62
6.11	TOE Access	64
6.12	Trusted Path/Channels	64
6.13	Stateful Traffic/Packet Filtering.....	65
7	Rationale.....	68
7.1	Conformance Claim Rationale	68
7.2	Security Objectives Rationale	68
7.3	Security Requirements Rationale.....	68
Annex A: Extended Components Definition.....		69
Annex B: CAVP Certificates		70
Annex B.1: SFR Coverage		70
Annex B.2: CAVP Hardware Mapping		75
Annex B.3: CAVP Virtual Appliance Coverage.....		75

List of Tables

Table 1: Evaluation identifiers	5
Table 2: NIAP Technical Decisions	5
Table 3: Terminology	8
Table 4: TOE Hardware Models	12
Table 5: TOE Virtual Appliance and Related Hardware	16
Table 6: Threats (CPP_ND)	17
Table 7: Threats (MOD_CPP_FW).....	18
Table 8: Threats (MOD_VPNGW)	19
Table 9: Assumptions (CPP_ND)	21
Table 10: Assumptions (MOD_VPNGW)	23
Table 11: Organizational Security Policies (CPP_ND).....	23
Table 12: Security Objectives for the TOE (MOD_CPP_FW)	23
Table 13: Security Objectives for the TOE (MOD_VPNGW)	24
Table 14: Security Objectives for the Environment (CPP_ND)	25
Table 15: Security Objectives for the Environment (MOD_VPNGW).....	26
Table 16: Summary of SFRs	26
Table 17: SFRs and Auditable Events	29
Table 18: Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements (MOD_VPNGW)	33
Table 19: Security Assurance Requirements	50
Table 20: Key Generation Methods.....	52
Table 21: Key Establishment Methods	52
Table 22: Cryptographic Methods	52
Table 23: Keys and CSPs	54
Table 24: CAVP SFR Coverage Mapping	70

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

- 1 This Security Target (ST) defines the Fortinet FortiGate/FortiOS 7.0 Target of Evaluation (TOE) for the purposes of Common Criteria (CC) evaluation.
- 2 FortiGate next-generation firewall (NGFW) appliances running FortiOS software are designed to provide high performance, multilayered security functionality as described in section 2.3 and allows for granular visibility and protection of enterprise network traffic.

1.2 Identification

Table 1: Evaluation identifiers

Target of Evaluation	FortiGate/FortiOS 7.0 Version 7.0.12 (FIPS-CC-70-16)
Security Target	FortiGate/FortiOS 7.0 Security Target, v1.5

1.3 Conformance Claims

- 3 This ST supports the following conformance claims:
 - a) CC version 3.1 revision 5
 - b) CC Part 2 extended
 - c) CC Part 3 conformant
 - d) PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and Virtual Private Network Gateways, Version 1.3 (CFG_NDcPP-FW-VPNGW_V1.3)
This PP-Configuration includes the following components:
 - i) Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e (CPP_ND_V2.2E)
 - ii) PP-Module: PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4e (MOD_FW_V1.4E)
 - iii) PP-Module: PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3 (MOD_VPNGW_V1.3)
 - e) NIAP Technical Decisions per Table 2

Table 2: NIAP Technical Decisions

TD #	Name	Source	Applicability Rationale
TD0527	Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing (FIA_X509_EXT.1)	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0528	NIT Technical Decision for Missing EAs for FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Not Applicable - The TOE does not claim NTP

TD #	Name	Source	Applicability Rationale
TD0536	NIT Technical Decision for Update Verification Inconsistency	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0537	NIT Technical Decision for Incorrect reference to FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0545	NIT Technical Decision for Conflicting FW rules cannot be configured (extension of Rfl#201837)	MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E	Applicable
TD0546	NIT Technical Decision for DTLS - clarification of Application Note 63	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Not Applicable – The TOE does not claim FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1
TD0547	NIT Technical Decision for Clarification on developer disclosure of AVA_VAN	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0551	NIT Technical Decision for Incomplete Mappings of OEs in FW Module v1.4+Errata	MOD_CPP_FW_V1.4E	Applicable
TD0555	NIT Technical Decision for RFC Reference incorrect in TLSS Test	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0556	NIT Technical Decision for RFC 5077 question	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0563	NiT Technical Decision for Clarification of audit date information	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0564	NiT Technical Decision for Vulnerability Analysis Search Criteria	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0569	NIT Technical Decision for Session ID Usage Conflict in FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0570	NiT Technical Decision for Clarification about FIA_AFL.1	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0571	NiT Technical Decision for Guidance on how to handle FIA_AFL.1	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0572	NiT Technical Decision for Restricting FTP_ITC.1 to only IP address identifiers	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0580	NIT Technical Decision for clarification about use of DH14 in NDcPPv2.2e	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0581	NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic curve-based key establishment and NIST SP 800-56Arev3	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable

TD #	Name	Source	Applicability Rationale
TD0591	NIT Technical Decision for Virtual TOEs and hypervisors	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0592	NIT Technical Decision for Local Storage of Audit Records	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0631	NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of public key authentication for SSH Server	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0632	NIT Technical Decision for Consistency with Time Data for vNDs	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0635	NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server and Key Agreement Parameters	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0636	NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of Public Key User Authentication for SSH	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Not Applicable - The TOE does not claim FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
TD0638	NIT Technical Decision for Key Pair Generation for Authentication	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0639	NIT Technical Decision for Clarification for NTP MAC Keys	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0670	NIT Technical Decision for Mutual and Non-Mutual Auth TLSC Testing	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0738	NIT Technical Decision for Link to Allowed-With List	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0781	Correction to FIA_PSK_EXT.3 EA for MOD_VPNGW_v1.3	MOD_VPNGW_V1.3	Not Applicable – The TOE does not claim FIA_PSK_EXT.3
TD0790	NIT Technical Decision: Clarification Required for testing IPv6	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0792	NIT Technical Decision: FIA_PMG_EXT.1 – TSS EA not in line with SFR	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0800	Updated NIT Technical Decision for IPsec IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance	CPP_ND_V2.2E	Applicable
TD0811	Correction to Referenced SFR in FIA_PSK_EXT.3 Test	MOD_VPNGW_V1.3	Not Applicable – The TOE does not claim FIA_PSK_EXT.3
TD0824	Aligning MOD_VPNGW 1.3 with NDcPP 3.0E	MOD_VPNGW_v1.3	Not Applicable – The TOE does not claim CPP_ND_V3.0E

TD #	Name	Source	Applicability Rationale
TD0827	Aligning MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4E with CPP_ND_V3.0E	MOD_CPP_FW_v1.4e	Not Applicable – The TOE does not claim CPP_ND_V3.0E

1.4 Terminology

Table 3: Terminology

Term	Definition
BGP	Border Gateway Protocol
CC	Common Criteria
CLI	Command Line Interface
cPP	Collaborative Protection Profile
FW	Firewall
FortiGate	Fortinet NGFW hardware appliance(s)
FortiOS	Fortinet NGFW operating system
GUI	Graphical User Interface
NDcPP	collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
NGFW	Next-Generation Firewall
OSPF	Open Shortest Path First
PP	Protection Profile
RIP	Routing Information Protocol
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
VDOM	Virtual Domain
VPN	Virtual Private Network

2 TOE Description

2.1 Type

4 The TOE is a firewall with next-generation firewall (NGFW) capabilities including secure Virtual Private Networks (VPN).

2.2 Usage

2.2.1 Deployment

5 As shown in Figure 1, the TOE (enclosed in red) is typically deployed as a gateway between two networks, such as an internal office network and the internet.




Figure 1: Example TOE deployment

2.2.2 Interfaces

6 The TOE interfaces are shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: TOE interfaces

7 The logical TOE interfaces are as follows:

- a) **CLI.** Administrative CLI via direct serial connection or SSH.
- b) **GUI.** Administrative web GUI via HTTPS.
- c) **Remote Logging.** Forwarding of TOE audit events to a remote audit server, which is a Fortinet FortiAnalyzer, via TLS.
- d) **CRL.** Certificate revocation communication via HTTP.
- e) **VPN Gateway.** VPN connections via IPsec.
- f) **WAN/Internet.** External IP interface.
- g) **LAN/Internal.** Internal IP interface.

8 **Note:** FortiAnalyzer is the only remote audit server supported for this evaluation because it supports a TLS channel.

2.3 Logical Scope / Security Functions

9 The TOE provides the following security functions:

- a) **Security Audit.** The TOE generates logs for auditable events. These logs can be stored locally in protected storage and/or exported to an external audit server via a secure channel.
- b) **Cryptographic Support.** The TOE implements a variety of key generation and cryptographic methods to provide protection of data both in transit and at rest within the TOE. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is in FIPS mode to support the cryptographic functionality. The TOE implements cryptographic protocols such as SSH, TLS, HTTPS, and IPsec.
- c) **Residual Data Protection.** The TOE ensures that data cannot be recovered once deallocated. Data is removed through zeroization.
- d) **Identification and Authentication.** The TOE implements mechanisms to ensure that users are both identified and authenticated before any access to TOE functionality or TSF data is granted. Remote login attempts are limited to an administrator-configured threshold, after which the user must wait for a defined period of time before login attempts can be made. It provides the ability to both assign attributes (user names, passwords and roles) and to authenticate users against these attributes. The TOE also provides X.509 certificate validation for its TLS and IPsec connections.
- e) **Security Management.** The TOE provides a suite of management functionality, allowing for full configuration of the TOE by an authorized administrator.
- f) **Protection of the TSF.** The TOE implements a number of protection mechanisms (including authentication requirements, self-tests and trusted update) to ensure the protection of the TOE and all TSF data. The TOE maintains its own time source free from outside interference for the purpose of generating logs and executing time sensitive operations.
- g) **TOE Access.** The TOE provides session management functions for local and remote administrative sections. Administrative sessions have a defined lifetime for both local and remote sessions, users connecting to the TOE will be presented with a warning and consent banner prior to authentication.
- h) **Trusted Path/Channels.** The TOE provides secure channels between itself and local/remote administrators and other devices to ensure data security during transit.
- i) **Stateful Traffic and Packet Filtering.** The TOE allows for the configuration and enforcement of stateful packet filtering/firewall rules on all traffic traversing the TOE.

2.3.1 Functions not included in the TOE Evaluation

10 The FortiGate appliances are capable of a variety of functions and configurations which are not covered by the claimed PP-Configuration.

11 The following features have not been examined as part of this evaluation:

- a) High-Availability;
- b) FortiExplorer client;
- c) FortiGuard Anti-spam, Firmware, Anti-Virus, Content Filtering, Web Filtering, EndPoint Control, and FortiSandbox services;
- d) Use of syslog;
- e) FortiToken and FortiSSO Authentication;
- f) Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), BGP, RIP, and OSPF protocols;
- g) Usage of the boot-time configuration menu to upgrade the TOE;
- h) Policy-based VPN;
- i) SSL VPN;
- j) Logging to FortiCloud;
- k) NTP;
- l) External Threat Feeds;
- m) Explicit Web Proxy with Form-Based Authentication;
- n) REST API;
- o) Traffic Shaping;
- p) SMTP;
- q) SNMP;
- r) LDAP;
- s) Windows AD;
- t) RADIUS;
- u) USB Interface (other than Entropy Token for VM);
- v) Diagnostics interface;
- w) DHCP, DDNS, or DNS;
- x) Traffic offloading to FortiASIC NPx network processors.
- y) IPS
- z) HTTP GUI
- aa) Telnet (TOE acting as client or server)
- bb) TFTP (TOE acting as client)

2.4 Physical Scope

12 The physical boundary of the TOE includes the FortiGate hardware models shown in Table 4 and the virtual appliances and related hardware shown in Table 5 running FortiOS software identified in Table 1. The TOE is shipped to the customer via commercial courier. The virtual

appliances' deployment packages can be downloaded from the Customer Service & Support site at <https://support.fortinet.com/>.

- 13 The virtual appliances are evaluated as virtual Network Devices (vND), which is case 1 of Section 1.2 of NDcPP v2.2e.
- 14 Fortinet Virtual Domains (VDOMs) are supported by default on the appliances listed in Table 4. Multi-VDOM mode with Independent VDOM configuration was included in the evaluated configuration.

Table 4: TOE Hardware Models

Model	CPU	Architecture	RAM	Boot	Storage	ASIC	Entropy	CAVP
FG-61E	Fortinet SoC3	ARMv7-A	2 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 Lite	SoC3	A2229 A2270 A2241
FG-61F	Fortinet SoC4	ARMv8	2 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 XLite	SoC4	A2229 A2270 A2242
FWF-61E	Fortinet SoC3	ARMv7-A	2 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 Lite	SoC3	A2229 A2270 A2241
FWF-61F	Fortinet SoC4	ARMv8	2 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 XLite	SoC4	A2229 A2270 A2242
FG-71F	Fortinet SoC4	ARMv8	4 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 XLite	SoC4	A2229 A2270 A2242
FG-81E	Fortinet SoC3	ARMv7-A	2 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 Lite	SoC3	A2229 A2270 A2241
FG-81E-PoE	Fortinet SoC3	ARMv7-A	2 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 Lite	SoC3	A2229 A2270 A2241
FG-81F	Fortinet SoC4	ARMv8	4 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 XLite	SoC4	A2229 A2270 A2242
FG-81F-PoE	Fortinet SoC4	ARMv8	4 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 XLite	SoC4	A2229 A2270 A2242
FWF-81F-2R	Fortinet SoC4	ARMv8	4 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 Lite	SoC4	A2229 A2270 A2242

Model	CPU	Architecture	RAM	Boot	Storage	ASIC	Entropy	CAVP
FWF-81F-2R-3G4G-PoE	Fortinet SoC4	ARMv8	4 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 Lite	SoC4	A2229 A2270 A2242
FWF-81F-2R-PoE	Fortinet SoC4	ARMv8	4 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 Lite	SoC4	A2229 A2270 A2242
FG-91E	Fortinet SoC3	ARMv7-A	2 GB	8GB	128GB	CP9 Lite	SoC3	A2229 A2270 A2241
FG-101E	Fortinet SoC3	ARMv7-A	4 GB	8GB	480GB	CP9 Lite	SoC3	A2229 A2270 A2241
FG-101F	Fortinet SoC4	ARMv8	4 GB	8GB	480GB	CP9 XLite	SoC4	A2229 A2270 A2242
FG-201E	Intel Celeron G1820	Haswell	4GB	16G B	480GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-201F	Intel Xeon D-1627	Hewitt Lake	8GB	30G B	480GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-301E	Intel i5-6500	SkyLake	8GB	16G B	480GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-401E	Intel i5-8500	Coffee Lake	8GB	16G B	480GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-401E-DC	Intel i5-8500	Coffee Lake	8GB	16G B	480GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-401F	Intel Xeon E-2336	Cypress Cove (Rocket Lake)	16G B	30G B	960GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-501E	Intel i7-6700	SkyLake	16G B	16G B	480GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240

Model	CPU	Architecture	RAM	Boot	Storage	ASIC	Entropy	CAVP
FG-601E	Intel i7-8700	Coffee Lake	16 GB	16G B	480GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-601F	Intel Xeon E-2386G	Cypress Cove (Rocket Lake)	16 GB	30G B	480GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-1101E	Intel Xeon E-2186G	Coffee Lake	16 GB	16G B	960GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-1801F	Intel Xeon W-3223	Cascade Lake	24G B	30G B	2TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-1801F-DC	Intel Xeon W-3223	Cascade Lake	24G B	30G B	2TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-2000E	Intel Xeon E5-1660v4	Broadwell	32 GB	16G B	480GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-2201E	Intel Xeon Gold 6126	SkyLake	24 GB	16G B	2TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-2500E	Intel Xeon E5-1650v3	Haswell	32 GB	16G B	480GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-2601F	Intel Xeon Gold 6208U	Cascade Lake	48 GB	30 GB	2 TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-2601F-DC	Intel Xeon Gold 6208U	Cascade Lake	48 GB	30 GB	2 TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-3001F	AMD EPYC 7502P (Rome)	Zen 2	128 GB	30G B	2TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-3301E	Intel Xeon Gold 5118	SkyLake	96 GB	16G B	2TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240

Model	CPU	Architecture	RAM	Boot	Storage	ASIC	Entropy	CAVP
FG-3401E	Intel Xeon Gold 6130	SkyLake	96 GB	16G B	2TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-3401E-DC	Intel Xeon Gold 6130	SkyLake	96 GB	16G B	2TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-3501F	AMD EPYC 7542 (Rome)	Zen 2	256 GB	30G B	4TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-3601E	Intel Xeon Gold 6152	SkyLake	96 GB	16G B	2TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-4201F	Intel Xeon Gold 6248	Cascade Lake	384 GB	30 GB	4 TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-4201F-DC	Intel Xeon Gold 6248	Cascade Lake	384 GB	30 GB	4 TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-4401F	Intel Xeon Gold 6248	Cascade Lake	384 GB	30 GB	4 TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-4401F-DC	Intel Xeon Gold 6248	Cascade Lake	384 GB	30 GB	4 TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-5001E1	Intel Xeon E5-2690v4	Broadwell	64G B	16G B	480 GB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-6300F	Intel Xeon D-1567	Broadwell	192G B	16G B	2 TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-6301F	Intel Xeon D-1567	Broadwell	192G B	16G B	2 TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-6500F	Intel Xeon D-1567	Broadwell	320G B	16G B	2 TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240
FG-6501F	Intel Xeon D-1567	Broadwell	320G B	16G B	2 TB	CP9	CP9	A2229 A2270 A2240

Table 5: TOE Virtual Appliance and Related Hardware

Model	License	Hypervisor	CPU*	Entropy	CAVP
FortiGate-VM (FG-VM)	VM01 (1x vCPU core and unlimited RAM)	VMware ESXi 6.7	Intel Xeon D-1559 (Broadwell)	Token via USB pass-through**	A2292 A2299
	VM02 (2x vCPU cores and unlimited RAM)		Intel Xeon E3-1515MV5 (Skylake)		
	VM04 (4x vCPU cores and unlimited RAM)		Intel Xeon E-2276ME (Coffee Lake)		
	VM08 (8x vCPU cores and unlimited RAM)				
	VM16 (16x vCPU cores and unlimited RAM)				
	VM32 (32x vCPU cores and unlimited RAM)				
	VMUL (Unlimited vCPU cores and RAM)				

* Provided with PacStar 451/455

** The Araneus Alea II is used in FortiGate VM deployments to seed the RBG.

2.4.1 Guidance Documents

15

The TOE includes the following guidance documents (PDF):

- a) FortiOS 7.0 and FortiGate NGFW Appliances FIPS 140-2 and NDcPP Common Criteria Technote, 01-7012-0901346-20240715 | July 15, 2024
- b) FortiOS 7.0.12 Administration Guide, Version 7.0.12, 01-7012-700620-20231020
- c) FortiOS 7.0.12 CLI Reference, Version 7.0.12, 01-7012-709094-20230728
- d) FortiOS 7.0.12 Log Reference, Version 7.0.12, 01-7012-709077-20230608
- e) FortiOS 7.0.12 Hardware Acceleration Guide, Version 7.0.12 01-7012-538746-20230727
- f) NDcPP Logging Addendum for FortiOS 7.0 and FortiGate NGFW Appliances 01-712-922520-20240410 | April 10, 2024
- g) FortiOS 6.4.0 Parallel Path Processing, 01-640-619132-20210125
- h) Virtualization Guides:
 - i) FortiOS 7.0 VMware ESXi Administration Guide, 01-700-705048-20220830

2.4.2 Non-TOE Components

16

The TOE operates with the following components in the environment:

- a) **Admin's Workstation.** The TOE makes use of a separate workstation for administrative purposes.
- b) **Audit Server.** The TOE makes use of a FortiAnalyzer for remote logging.
- c) **VPN Endpoints.** The TOE supports FortiGate VPN endpoints.
- d) **CRL Web Server.** Web server capable of serving up CRLs over HTTP.
- e) **Hypervisor Environment.** The TOE virtual appliances can be deployed to:
 - i. Private VM environments (hypervisors) such as VMware ESXi/KVM/Xen/Hyper-V.

Note: The evaluated configuration includes the VMware ESXi 6.7 Hypervisor as the private VM environment that the TOE virtual appliances deployed on. Other VM appliances have not been tested under this evaluated configuration. A full list of hypervisors and marketplaces to which the TOE's virtual appliances can be deployed can be found on page 4 of the following document:

<https://www.fortinet.com/content/dam/fortinet/assets/data-sheets/fortigate-vm.pdf>

3 Security Problem Definition

17

The Security Problem Definition is reproduced from the claimed Protection Profiles.

3.1 Threats

Table 6: Threats (CPP_ND)

Identifier	Description
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS	Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the Network Device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions between Network Devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY	Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS	Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do not use standardized secure tunnelling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the Network Device itself.

Identifier	Description
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS	Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g. a shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the Network Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE	Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY	Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality of the Network Device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE	Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access to the Network Device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING	Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with other Network Devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE	An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or security functionality of the device.

Table 7: Threats (MOD_CPP_FW)

Identifier	Description
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE	An attacker may attempt to “map” a subnet to determine the machines that reside on the network, and obtaining the IP addresses of machines, as well as the services (ports) those machines are offering. This information could be used to mount attacks to those machines via the services that are exported.

Identifier	Description
T.NETWORK_ACCESS	With knowledge of the services that are exported by machines on a subnet, an attacker may attempt to exploit those services by mounting attacks against those services.
T.NETWORK_MISUSE	An attacker may attempt to use services that are exported by machines in a way that is unintended by a site's security policies. For example, an attacker might be able to use a service to "anonymize" the attacker's machine as they mount attacks against others.
T.MALICIOUS_TRAFFIC	An attacker may attempt to send malformed packets to a machine in hopes of causing the network stack or services listening on UDP/TCP ports of the target machine to crash.

Table 8: Threats (MOD_VPNGW)

Identifier	Description
T.DATA_INTEGRITY	Devices on a protected network may be exposed to threats presented by devices located outside the protected network that may attempt to modify the data without authorization. If known malicious external devices are able to communicate with devices on the protected network or if devices on the protected network can communicate with those external devices then the data contained in the communications may be susceptible to a loss of integrity.
T.NETWORK_ACCESS	<p>Devices located outside the protected network may seek to exercise services located on the protected network that are intended to only be accessed from inside the protected network or only accessed by entities using an authenticated path into the protected network. Devices located outside the protected network may, likewise, offer services that are inappropriate for access from within the protected network.</p> <p>From an ingress perspective, VPN gateways can be configured so that only those network servers intended for external consumption by entities operating on a trusted network (e.g., machines operating on a network where the peer VPN gateways are supporting the connection) are accessible and only via the intended ports. This serves to mitigate the potential for network entities outside a protected network to access network servers or services intended only for consumption or access inside a protected network.</p> <p>From an egress perspective, VPN gateways can be configured so that only specific external services (e.g., based on destination port) can be accessed from within a protected network, or moreover are accessed via an encrypted channel. For example, access to external mail services can be blocked to enforce corporate policies against accessing uncontrolled e-mail servers, or, that access to the mail server must be done over an encrypted link.</p>
T.NETWORK_DISCLOSURE	Devices on a protected network may be exposed to threats presented by devices located outside the protected network, which may attempt to conduct unauthorized activities. If known malicious external devices are able to communicate with devices on the protected

Identifier	Description
	<p>network, or if devices on the protected network can establish communications with those external devices (e.g., as a result of a phishing episode or by inadvertent responses to email messages), then those internal devices may be susceptible to the unauthorized disclosure of information.</p> <p>From an infiltration perspective, VPN gateways serve not only to limit access to only specific destination network addresses and ports within a protected network, but whether network traffic will be encrypted or transmitted in plaintext. With these limits, general network port scanning can be prevented from reaching protected networks or machines, and access to information on a protected network can be limited to that obtainable from specifically configured ports on identified network nodes (e.g., web pages from a designated corporate web server). Additionally, access can be limited to only specific source addresses and ports so that specific networks or network nodes can be blocked from accessing a protected network thereby further limiting the potential disclosure of information.</p> <p>From an exfiltration perspective, VPN gateways serve to limit how network nodes operating on a protected network can connect to and communicate with other networks limiting how and where they can disseminate information. Specific external networks can be blocked altogether or egress could be limited to specific addresses and/or ports. Alternately, egress options available to network nodes on a protected network can be carefully managed in order to, for example, ensure that outgoing connections are encrypted to further mitigate inappropriate disclosure of data through packet sniffing.</p>
T.NETWORK_MISUSE	<p>Devices located outside the protected network, while permitted to access particular public services offered inside the protected network, may attempt to conduct inappropriate activities while communicating with those allowed public services. Certain services offered from within a protected network may also represent a risk when accessed from outside the protected network.</p> <p>From an ingress perspective, it is generally assumed that entities operating on external networks are not bound by the use policies for a given protected network. Nonetheless, VPN gateways can log policy violations that might indicate violation of publicized usage statements for publicly available services.</p> <p>From an egress perspective, VPN gateways can be configured to help enforce and monitor protected network use policies. As explained in the other threats, a VPN gateway can serve to limit dissemination of data, access to external servers, and even disruption of services – all of these could be related to the use policies of a protected network and as such are subject in some regards to enforcement. Additionally, VPN gateways can be configured to log network usages that cross between protected and external networks and as a result can serve to identify potential usage policy violations.</p>
T.REPLAY_ATTACK	<p>If an unauthorized individual successfully gains access to the system, the adversary may have the opportunity to conduct a “replay” attack. This method of attack allows the individual to capture packets traversing throughout the network and send the packets at a later</p>

Identifier	Description
	<p>time, possibly unknown by the intended receiver. Traffic is subject to replay if it meets the following conditions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cleartext: an attacker with the ability to view unencrypted traffic can identify an appropriate segment of the communications to replay as well in order to cause the desired outcome. • No integrity: alongside cleartext traffic, an attacker can make arbitrary modifications to captured traffic and replay it to cause the desired outcome if the recipient has no means to detect these.

3.2 Assumptions

Table 9: Assumptions (CPP_ND)

Identifier	Description
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION	<p>The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP does not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the physical platform on which the VM runs.</p>
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY	<p>The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).</p> <p>If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following Case 2 vNDs as specified in Section 1.2, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one vND instance for each physical hardware platform. The exception being where components of a distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. In Case 2 vND, no non-TOE guest VMs are allowed on the platform.</p>
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION	<p>A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).</p>

Identifier	Description
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR	<p>The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.</p> <p>For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE's trust store (aka 'root store', 'trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification).</p>
A.REGULAR_UPDATES	The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE	The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION	The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.
A.VS_TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR (applies to vNDs only)	The Security Administrators for the VS are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes not interfering with the correct operation of the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious VS Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
A.VS_REGULAR_UPDATES (applies to vNDs only)	The VS software is assumed to be updated by the VS Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.VS_ISOLATION (applies to vNDs only)	For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS provides, and is configured to provide sufficient isolation between software running in VMs on the same physical platform. Furthermore, it is assumed that the VS adequately protects itself from software running inside VMs on the same physical platform.
A.VS_CORRECT_CONFIGURATION (applies to vNDs only)	For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS and VMs are correctly configured to support ND functionality implemented in VMs.

Table 10: Assumptions (MOD_VPNGW)

Identifier	Description
A.CONNECTIONS	It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a manner that ensures that the TOE security policies will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.

3.3 Organizational Security Policies

Table 11: Organizational Security Policies (CPP_ND)

Identifier	Description
P.ACCESS_BANNER	The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the TOE.

4 Security Objectives

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

Table 12: Security Objectives for the TOE (MOD_CPP_FW)

Identifier	Description
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION	The TOE shall implement measures to ensure that any previous information content of network packets sent through the TOE is made unavailable either upon deallocation of the memory area containing the network packet or upon allocation of a memory area for a newly arriving network packet or both.
O.STATEFUL_TRAFFIC_FILTERING	<p>The TOE shall perform stateful traffic filtering on network packets that it processes. For this the TOE shall support the definition of stateful traffic filtering rules that allow to permit or drop network packets. The TOE shall support assignment of the stateful traffic filtering rules to each distinct network interface. The TOE shall support the processing of the applicable stateful traffic filtering rules in an administratively defined order. The TOE shall deny the flow of network packets if no matching stateful traffic filtering rule is identified.</p> <p>Depending on the implementation, the TOE might support the stateful traffic filtering of Dynamic Protocols (optional).</p>

Table 13: Security Objectives for the TOE (MOD_VPNGW)

Identifier	Description
O.ADDRESS_FILTERING	To address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, inappropriate access to services, misuse of services, disruption or denial of services, and network-based reconnaissance, compliant TOE's will implement packet filtering capability. That capability will restrict the flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on network addresses of the network nodes originating (source) and/or receiving (destination) applicable network traffic as well as on established connection information.
O.AUTHENTICATION	To further address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, a compliant TOE's authentication ability (IPSec) will allow a VPN peer to establish VPN connectivity with another VPN peer. VPN endpoints authenticate each other to ensure they are communicating with an authorized external IT entity.
O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS	To address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, inappropriate access to services, misuse of services, disruption of services, and network-based reconnaissance, compliant TOE's will implement a cryptographic capabilities. These capabilities are intended to maintain confidentiality and allow for detection and modification of data that is transmitted outside of the TOE.
O.FAIL_SECURE	There may be instances where the TOE's hardware malfunctions or the integrity of the TOE's software is compromised, the latter being due to malicious or non-malicious intent. To address the concern of the TOE operating outside of its hardware or software specification, the TOE will shut down upon discovery of a problem reported via the self-test mechanism and provide signature-based validation of updates to the TSF.
O.PORT_FILTERING	To further address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, etc., a compliant TOE's port filtering capability will restrict the flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on the originating (source) and/or receiving (destination) port (or service) identified in the network traffic as well as on established connection information.
O.SYSTEM_MONITORING	To address the issues of administrators being able to monitor the operations of the VPN gateway, it is necessary to provide a capability to monitor system activity. Compliant TOEs will implement the ability to log the flow of network traffic. Specifically, the TOE will provide the means for administrators to configure packet filtering rules to 'log' when network traffic is found to match the configured rule. As a result, matching a rule configured to 'log' will result in informative event logs whenever a match occurs. In addition, the establishment of security associations (SAs) is auditable, not only between peer VPN gateways, but also with certification authorities (CAs).

Identifier	Description
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION	Compliant TOEs will provide the functions necessary for an administrator to configure the packet filtering rules, as well as the cryptographic aspects of the IPsec protocol that are enforced by the TOE.

4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment

Table 14: Security Objectives for the Environment (CPP_ND)

Identifier	Description
OE.PHYSICAL	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE	<p>There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE.</p> <p>Note: For vNDs the TOE includes only the contents of the its own VM, and does not include other VMs or the VS.</p>
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION	The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN	<p>Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted manner. For vNDs, this includes the VS Administrator responsible for configuring the VMs that implement ND functionality.</p> <p>For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the TOE's trust store in case such certificate can no longer be trusted.</p>
OE.UPDATES	The TOE firmware and software is updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE	The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they reside.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION	<p>The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.</p> <p>For vNDs, this applies when the physical platform on which the VM runs is removed from its operational environment.</p>

Identifier	Description
OE.VM_CONFIGURATION (applies to vNDs only)	<p>For vNDs, the Security Administrator ensures that the VS and VMs are configured to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • reduce the attack surface of VMs as much as possible while supporting ND functionality (e.g., remove unnecessary virtual hardware, turn off unused inter-VM communications mechanisms), and • correctly implement ND functionality (e.g., ensure virtual networking is properly configured to support network traffic, management channels, and audit reporting). <p>The VS should be operated in a manner that reduces the likelihood that vND operations are adversely affected by virtualisation features such as cloning, save/restore, suspend/resume, and live migration.</p> <p>If possible, the VS should be configured to make use of features that leverage the VS's privileged position to provide additional security functionality. Such features could include malware detection through VM introspection, measured VM boot, or VM snapshot for forensic analysis.</p>

Table 15: Security Objectives for the Environment (MOD_VPNGW)

Identifier	Description
OE.CONNECTIONS	The TOE is connected to distinct networks in a manner that ensures that the TOE security policies will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.

5 Security Requirements

5.1 Conventions

18 This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC:

- a) **Assignment.** Indicated with italicized text.
- b) **Refinement.** Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs.
- c) **Selection.** Indicated with underlined text.
- d) **Assignment within a Selection:** Indicated with italicized and underlined text.

5.2 Extended Components Definition

19 Refer to Annex A of this ST.

5.3 Functional Requirements

Table 16: Summary of SFRs

Requirement	Title	Source
FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation	CPP_ND MOD_CPP_FW
FAU_GEN.1/VPN	Audit Data Generation (VPN Gateway)	MOD_VPNGW
FAU_GEN.2	User identity association	CPP_ND
FAU_STG_EXT.1	Protected Audit Event Storage	CPP_ND
FCS_CKM.1	Cryptographic key generation	CPP_ND
FCS_CKM.1/IKE	Cryptographic key generation (for IKE peer authentication)	MOD_VPNGW
FCS_CKM.2	Cryptographic key establishment	CPP_ND
FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic key destruction	CPP_ND
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	Cryptographic operation (AES data encryption/decryption)	CPP_ND MOD_VPNGW
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	Cryptographic operation (Signature generation and verification)	CPP_ND
FCS_COP.1/Hash	Cryptographic operation (Hash algorithm)	CPP_ND
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	Cryptographic operation (Keyed hash algorithm)	CPP_ND
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Random bit generation	CPP_ND
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	HTTPS protocol	CPP_ND
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	SSH server protocol	CPP_ND
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	TLS Client protocol	CPP_ND
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication	CPP_ND
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	TLS Server protocol	CPP_ND
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1	IPsec protocol	CPP_ND MOD_VPNGW
FDP_RIP.2	Full residual information protection	MOD_CPP_FW
FIA_AFL.1	Authentication Failure Management	CPP_ND
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	Password management	CPP_ND
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	Password-based authentication mechanism	CPP_ND

Requirement	Title	Source
FIA_UAU.7	Protected authentication feedback	CPP_ND
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	User identification and authentication	CPP_ND
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	X.509 certificate validation	CPP_ND
FIA_X509_EXT.2	X.509 certificate authentication	CPP_ND MOD_VPNGW
FIA_X509_EXT.3	X.509 certificate requests	CPP_ND
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Management of security functions behaviour (Trusted Update)	CPP_ND
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	Management of security functions behaviour	CPP_ND
FMT_MOF.1/Services	Management of security functions behaviour	CPP_ND
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	Management of TSF data	CPP_ND
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	Management of TSF data	CPP_ND MOD_VPNGW
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of management functions	CPP_ND
FMT_SMF.1/FFW	Specification of Management Functions	MOD_CPP_FW
FMT_SMF.1/VPN	Specification of Management Functions (VPN Gateway)	MOD_VPNGW
FMT_SMR.2	Restrictions on security roles	CPP_ND
FPT_APW_EXT.1	Protection of administrator passwords	CPP_ND
FPT_FLS.1/SelfTest	Fail secure (Self-test failures)	MOD_VPNGW
FPT_TST_EXT.1	TSF testing	CPP_ND MOD_VPNGW
FPT_TST_EXT.3	Self-Test with Defined Methods	MOD_VPNGW
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	Protection of TSF data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)	CPP_ND
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Trusted updates	CPP_ND MOD_VPNGW
FPT_STM_EXT.1	Reliable time stamps	CPP_ND

Requirement	Title	Source
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	TSF-initiated session locking	CPP_ND
FTA_SSL.3	TSF-initiated termination	CPP_ND
FTA_SSL.4	User-initiated termination	CPP_ND
FTA_TAB.1	Default TOE access banners	CPP_ND
FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF Trusted Channel	CPP_ND
FTP_ITC.1/VPN	Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (VPN Communications)	MOD_VPNGW
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Trusted path	CPP_ND
FFW_RUL_EXT.1	Stateful traffic filtering	MOD_CPP_FW
FPF_RUL_EXT.1	Rules for Packet Filtering	MOD_VPNGW

5.3.1 Security Audit (FAU)

FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU_GEN.1.1

The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
- c) *All administrative actions comprising:*
 - o *Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for Administrators).*
 - o *Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).*
 - o *Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).*
 - o *Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).*
 - o *[[Starting and stopping services]];*
- d) *Specifically defined auditable events listed in ~~Table 2~~ Table 17.*

Table 17: SFRs and Auditable Events

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1	None.	None.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.2	None.	None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.1	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.2	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.4	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	None.	None.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	Failure to establish a HTTPS Session	Reason for failure
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1	Failure to establish an IPsec SA.	Reason for failure
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session	Reason for failure
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	Failure to establish a TLS session	Reason for failure
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	Failure to establish a TLS Session	Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	None	None
FDP_RIP.2	None	None
FIA_AFL.1	Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU.7	None.	None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate	Reason for failure of certificate validation

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
	Any addition, replacement or removal of trust anchors in the TOE's trust store	Identification of certificates added, replaced or removed as trust anchor in the TOE's trust store
FIA_X509_EXT.2	None	None
FIA_X509_EXT.3	None	None
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Any attempt to initiate a manual update	None.
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	None.	None.
FMT_MOF.1/Services	None.	None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	None.	None.
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	None.	None.
FMT_SMF.1	All management activities of TSF data.	None.
FMT_SMF.1/FFW	All management activities of TSF data (including creation, modification and deletion of firewall rules).	None.
FMT_SMR.2	None.	None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success or failure)	None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1	Discontinuous changes to time – either Administrator actuated or changed via an automated process. (Note that no continuous changes to time need to be logged. See also application note on FPT_STM_EXT.1)	For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change time for success and failure (e.g., IP address).
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	The termination of a local session by the session locking mechanism.	None.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
(if “terminate the session” is selected)		
FTA_SSL.3	The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism.	None.
FTA_SSL.4	The termination of an interactive session.	None.
FTA_TAB.1	None.	None.
FTP_ITC.1	Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions.	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Initiation of the trusted path. Termination of the trusted path. Failure of the trusted path functions.	None.
FFW_RUL_EXT.1	Application of rules configured with the ‘log’ operation	Source and destination addresses Source and destination ports Transport Layer Protocol TOE Interface

FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and

For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the cPP/ST, *information specified in column three of ~~Table 2~~ Table 17.*

FAU_GEN.1/VPN Audit Data Generation (VPN Gateway)

FAU_GEN.1.1/VPN The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
- b) Indication that TSF self-test was completed
- c) Failure of self-test
- d) All auditable events for the *[not specified]* level of audit; and
- e) *[auditable events defined in the Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements table].*

FAU_GEN.1.2/VPN The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [additional information defined in the Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements table for each auditable event, where applicable].

Table 18: Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements (MOD_VPNGW)

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1 /VPN	No events specified.	N/A
FCS_CKM.1/IKE	No events specified.	N/A
FMT_SMF.1/VPN	All administrative actions	No additional information.
FPF_RUL_EXT.1	Application of rules configured with the 'log' operation	Source and destination addresses Source and destination ports Transport Layer Protocol
FPT_FLS.1/SelfTest	No events specified.	N/A
FPT_TST_EXT.3	No events specified.	N/A
FTP_ITC.1/VPN	Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions.	No additional information. No additional information. Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt.

FAU_GEN.2

User Identity Association

FAU_GEN.2.1

For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

FAU_STG_EXT.1

Protected Audit Event Storage

FAU_STG_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.

FAU_STG_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition [

- The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally]

FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: [delete the oldest stored audit logs]] when the local storage space for audit data is full.

5.3.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [

- RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;
- ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4;
- FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: “NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [RFC 3526]

~~and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].~~

FCS_CKM.1/IKE Cryptographic Key Generation (for IKE Peer Authentication)

FCS_CKM.1.1/IKE The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys **used for IKE peer authentication** in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [

- FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” Appendix B.3 for RSA schemes
- FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” Appendix B.4 for ECDSA schemes, and implementing “NIST curves” P-384 and [P-256, P-521]]

and [

- no other key generation algorithm]

and specified cryptographic key sizes [*equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits*].

FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall **perform** cryptographic **key establishment** in accordance with a specified cryptographic key **establishment** method: [

- Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;

- FFC Schemes using “safe-prime” groups that meet the following: ‘NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [groups listed in RFC 3526]

~~] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].~~

Application Note: This SFR has been modified by TD0580 and TD0581.

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method:

- *For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single overwrite consisting of [zeroes]];*
- *For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single] overwrite consisting of [zeroes]];*

that meets the following: *No Standard.*

FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in **[CBC, GCM] and [no other]** mode and cryptographic key sizes **[128 bits, 256 bits], and [no other cryptographic key sizes]** that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, **[CBC as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772], and [no other standards]**.

Application Note: *This SFR has been modified from its definition in the NDcPP to support this PP-Module’s IPsec requirements by mandating support for at least one of CBC or GCM modes and at least one of 128-bit or 256-bit key sizes at minimum. Other selections may be made by the ST author but they are not required for conformance to this PP-Module.*

FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)

FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform *cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- *RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048 bits],*
- *Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes [256, 384, and 521 bits]*

] that meet the following: [

- *For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3,*

- For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4].

FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)

FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform *cryptographic hashing services* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and **message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits** that meet the following: *ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004*.

FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)

FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform *keyed-hash message authentication* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] and **message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits** that meet the following: *ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”*.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random bit generation

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [1 platform-based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS protocol

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3 If a peer certificate is presented, the TSF shall [not require client authentication] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol in accordance with: RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [6668].

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following user authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based [password based].

Application Note: This SFR was altered by TD0631.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [262144] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc].
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [ssh-rsa] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1] and [no other methods] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
- FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client protocol

- FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites: [
- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
-] and no other ciphersuites.
- FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches [the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6, IPv4 address in SAN].
- FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [
- Not implement any administrator override mechanism].

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall [present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension with the following curves/groups: [secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1] and no other curves/groups] in the Client Hello.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall support TLS communication with mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server protocol

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites: [

- TLS ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289

] and no other ciphersuites.

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and [none].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using [ECDHE curves [secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1] and no other curves].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall support [session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC 5077].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec protocol

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is otherwise unmatched and discards it.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall implement [transport mode, tunnel mode].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using the cryptographic algorithms [AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (specified in RFC 3602), AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 (specified in RFC 4106)] and [no other algorithm] together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC [HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512].

Application Note: *This element has been modified from its definition in the NDcPP by mandating either 128 or 256 bit key sizes for AES-CBC or AES-GCM, thereby disallowing for the sole selection of 192 bit key sizes. When an AES-CBC algorithm is selected, at least one SHA-based HMAC must also be chosen. If only an AES-GCM algorithm is selected, then a SHA-based HMAC is not required since AES-GCM satisfies both confidentiality and integrity functions. IPsec may use a truncated version of the SHA-based HMAC functions contained in the selections. Where a truncated output is used, this is described in the TSS.*

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [

- IKEv1, using Main Mode for Phase 1 exchanges, as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [RFC 4304 for extended sequence numbers], and [RFC 4868 for hash functions]
- IKEv2 as defined in RFC 5996 and [with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in RFC 5996, section 2.23], and [RFC 4868 for hash functions]].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [IKEv1, IKEv2] protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms [AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (specified in RFC 3602)].

Application Note: *This element is changed from its definition in the Base-PP to remove AES-GCM-192, which is not recommended. AES-CBC implementation for IPsec is specified in RFC 3602. AES-GCM implementation for IPsec is specified in RFC 5282.*

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [

- IKEv1 Phase 1 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on [
 - length of time, where the time values can be configured within [120 seconds to 48] hours;]
- IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on [
 - length of time, where the time values can be configured within [120 seconds to 48] hours]].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [

- IKEv1 Phase 2 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on [
 - number of bytes
 - length of time, where the time values can be configured within [120 seconds to 48] hours;]
- IKEv2 Child SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on [
 - number of bytes
 - length of time, where the time values can be configured within [120 seconds to 48] hours]].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE Diffie-Hellman key exchange (" x " in $g^x \text{ mod } p$) using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, and having a length of at least [224, 256, 384] bits.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall generate nonces used in [IKEv1, IKEv2] exchanges of length [

- at least 128 bits in size and at least half the output size of the negotiated pseudorandom function (PRF) hash].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 The TSF shall ensure that IKE protocols implement DH Groups

- **19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP) according to RFC 5114 and [**
- **[14 (2048-bit MODP)] according to RFC 3526].**

Application Note:

This element has been modified from its definition in the NDcPP by mandating DH groups 19 and 20, both of which are selectable in the original definition of the element. Any groups other than 19 and 20 may be selected by the ST author but they are not required for conformance to this PP-Module.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 The TSF shall be able to ensure by default that the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the [IKEv1 Phase 1, IKEv2 IKE_SA] connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the [IKEv1 Phase 2, IKEv2 CHILD_SA] connection.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 The TSF shall ensure that [IKEv1, IKEv2] protocols perform peer authentication using [RSA, ECDSA] that use X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945 and [no other method].

Application Note:

This SFR is modified from its definition in the Base-PP by adding new selections for IKE versions and authentication methods.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 The TSF shall only establish a trusted channel if the presented identifier in the received certificate matches the configured reference identifier, where the presented and reference identifiers are of the following fields and types: **Distinguished Name (DN), [no other reference identifier types]**.

Application Note:

This PP-Module requires DN to be supported for certificate reference identifiers at minimum. Other selections may be made by the ST author but they are not required for conformance to this PP-Module.

5.3.3 User data protection (FDP)

FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection

FDP_RIP.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [allocation of the resource to] all objects.

5.3.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management

FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [1-10] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to *Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password*.

FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed].

FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password management

- FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:
- a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [“!”, “@”, “#”, “\$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”];
 - b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [8] and [64] characters.

FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based authentication mechanism

- FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local [password-based] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.

FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

- FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only *obscured feedback* to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress at the local console.

FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User identification and authentication

- FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:

- Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
- [no other actions]

- FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X509 certificate validation

- FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation **supporting a minimum path length of three certificates**.
 - The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
 - The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
 - The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3].
 - The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
 - *Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*

- *Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*
- *Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*
- *OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*

FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

FIA_X509_EXT.2 X509 certificate authentication

FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for **IPsec and [HTTPS, TLS]**, and [[support for client-side certificates for TLS mutual authentication with a FortiAnalyzer Audit Server]].

Application Note: *The Base-PP allows the ST author to specify the TSF's use of X.509 certificates. Because this PP-Module mandates IPsec functionality, the SFR has been refined to force the inclusion of it. Other functions specified by the Base-PP may be chosen without restriction.*

FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall accept the certificate.

FIA_X509_EXT.3 X509 certificate requests

FIA_X509_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request Message as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and [Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country].

FIA_X509_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate Response.

5.3.5 Security management (FMT)

FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of Security Functions Behaviour

FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security Administrators.

FMT_MOF.1/Functions Management of security functions behaviour

FMT_MOF.1.1/Functions The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the functions [transmission of audit data to an external IT entity] to *Security Administrators*.

FMT_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behaviour

FMT_MOF.1.1/Services The TSF shall restrict the ability to **start and stop** ~~the functions-services~~ to *Security Administrators*.

FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.

FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data

FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys The TSF shall restrict the ability to *[[manage]]* the *[cryptographic keys **and certificates used for VPN operation]*** to *[Security Administrators]*.

Application Note: *This SFR, defined in the NDcPP as selection-based, is mandated for inclusion in this PP-Module because the refinements to FMT_SMF.1 mandate its inclusion. Note that it is also refined to refer specifically to keys and certificates used for VPN operation.*

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- *Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;*
- *Ability to configure the access banner;*
- *Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;*
- *Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital signature] capability prior to installing those updates;*
- *Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;*
- *[*
 - *Ability to start and stop services;*
 - *Ability to modify the behaviour of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity;*
 - *Ability to manage the cryptographic keys;*
 - *Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;*
 - *Ability to configure the lifetime for IPsec SAs;*
 - *Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;*
 - *Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer;*
 - *Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors;*
 - *Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;*
 - *Ability to manage the trusted public keys database;].*

Application Note: *This SFR was altered by TD0631*

FMT_SMF.1/FFW Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1/FFW The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- *Ability to configure firewall rules;*

FMT_SMF.1/VPN Specification of Management Functions (VPN Gateway)

FMT_SMF.1.1/VPN The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [

- *Definition of packet filtering rules*
- *Association of packet filtering rules to network interfaces*
- *Ordering of packet filtering rules by priority*

[

- *No other capabilities]*.

FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles

FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:

- *Security Administrator.*

FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions

- *The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;*
- *The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely*

are satisfied.

5.3.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)**FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of administrator passwords**

FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.

FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.

FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing

FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on power on)] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: **noise source health tests**, [

- *CPU and Memory BIOS self-tests;*
- *Boot loader image verification;*
- *FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Known Answer Tests (KAT)].*

Application Note: *This SFR is modified by MOD_VPNGW_v1.3 from its original definition in the NDcPP by requiring noise source health tests to be performed regardless of what other testing is claimed.*

FPT_TST_EXT.3 Self-Test with Defined Methods

FPT_TST_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [*when loaded for execution*] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [*integrity verification of stored executable code*].

FPT_TST_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall execute the self-testing through [a TSF-provided cryptographic service specified in FCS_COP.1/SigGen].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted updates

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [no other TOE software/firmware version].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a **digital signature mechanism and [no other mechanisms]** prior to installing those updates.

Application Note: *This SFR is modified by MOD_VPNGW_v1.3 from its original definition in the NDcPP by requiring the digital signature method to be selected at minimum.*

FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)

FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable time stamps

FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time].

FPT_FLS.1/SelfTest Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Self-Test Failures)

FPT_FLS.1.1/SelfTest The TSF shall **shut down** when the following types of failures occur: [failure of the power-on self-tests, failure of integrity check of the TSF executable image, failure of noise source health tests].

Application Note: *This SFR defines the expected TSF response to failures of the self-tests defined in the Base-PP.*

5.3.7 TOE access (FTA)

FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated session locking

FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [

- terminate the session

] after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination

FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate a **remote** interactive session after a *Security Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity*.

FTA_SSL.4 **User-initiated termination**

FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow **Administrator**-initiated termination of the **Administrator's** own interactive session.

FTA_TAB.1 **Default TOE access banners**

FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an **administrative user** session the TSF shall display a **Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent** warning message regarding use of the TOE.

5.3.8 Trusted path (FTP)

FTP_ITC.1 **Inter-TSF Trusted Channel**

FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall **be capable of using [TLS] to provide** a trusted communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [no other capabilities]** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.

FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit **the TSF or the authorized IT entities** to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for *[audit server]*.

FTP_ITC.1/VPN **Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (VPN Communications)**

FTP_ITC.1.1/VPN The TSF shall **be capable of using IPsec to provide** a communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting VPN communications** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.

FTP_ITC.1.2/VPN The TSF shall permit *[the authorized IT entities]* to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/VPN The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [remote VPN gateways or peers].

FTP_TRP.1/Admin **Trusted path**

FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin The TSF shall be **capable of using [SSH, HTTPS] to provide** a communication path between itself and **authorized remote Administrators** that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from **disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data**.

FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all remote administration actions.

5.3.9 Stateful traffic filtering (FFW)

FFW_RUL_EXT.1 Stateful traffic filtering

FFW_RUL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform stateful traffic filtering on network packets processed by the TOE.

FFW_RUL_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall allow the definition of stateful traffic filtering rules using the following network protocol fields:

- *ICMPv4*
 - *Type*
 - *Code*
- *ICMPv6*
 - *Type*
 - *Code*
- *IPv4*
 - *Source address*
 - *Destination Address*
 - *Transport Layer Protocol*
- *IPv6*
 - *Source address*
 - *Destination Address*
 - *Transport Layer Protocol*
 - *[no other field]*
- *TCP*
 - *Source Port*
 - *Destination Port*
- *UDP*
 - *Source Port*
 - *Destination Port*

and distinct interface.

FFW_RUL_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall allow the following operations to be associated with stateful traffic filtering rules: permit or drop with the capability to log the operation.

FFW_RUL_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall allow the stateful traffic filtering rules to be assigned to each distinct network interface.

- FFW_RUL_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall:
- a) accept a network packet without further processing of stateful traffic filtering rules if it matches an allowed established session for the following protocols: TCP, UDP, [ICMP] based on the following network packet attributes:
 1. *TCP: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, sequence number, Flags;*
 2. *UDP: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports;*
 3. *[ICMP: source and destination addresses, type, [code]].*
 - b) Remove existing traffic flows from the set of established traffic flows based on the following: [session inactivity timeout, completion of the expected information flow].

- FFW_RUL_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall enforce the following default stateful traffic filtering rules on all network traffic:
- a) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of [logging] packets which are invalid fragments;*
 - b) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of [logging] fragmented packets which cannot be re-assembled completely;*
 - c) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging packets where the source address of the network packet is defined as being on a broadcast network;*
 - d) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging packets where the source address of the network packet is defined as being on a multicast network;*
 - e) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets where the source address of the network packet is defined as being a loopback address;*
 - f) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets where the source or destination address of the network packet is defined as being unspecified (i.e. 0.0.0.0) or an address "reserved for future use" (i.e. 240.0.0.0/4) as specified in RFC 5735 for IPv4;*
 - g) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets where the source or destination address of the network packet is defined as an "unspecified address" or an address "reserved for future definition and use" (i.e. unicast addresses not in this address range: 2000::/3) as specified in RFC 3513 for IPv6;*
 - h) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets with the IP options: Loose Source Routing, Strict Source Routing, or Record Route specified; and*
 - i) *[no other rules].*

- FFW_RUL_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall be capable of dropping and logging according to the following rules:
- a) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets where the source address of the network packet is equal to the address of the network interface where the network packet was received;*
 - b) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets where the source or destination address of the network packet is a link-local address;*
 - c) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets where the source address of the network packet does not belong to the networks associated with the network interface where the network packet was received.*

- FFW_RUL_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall process the applicable stateful traffic filtering rules in an administratively defined order.
- FFW_RUL_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall deny packet flow if a matching rule is not identified.
- FFW_RUL_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall be capable of limiting an administratively defined number of *half-open TCP connections*. In the event that the configured limit is reached, new connection attempts shall be dropped and the drop event shall be *[logged]*.

5.3.10 Packet filtering (FPF)

FPF_RUL_EXT.1 Packet Filtering Rules

FPF_RUL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform packet filtering on network packets processed by the TOE.

FPF_RUL_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall allow the definition of packet filtering rules using the following network protocols and protocol fields:

- *IPv4 (RFC 791)*
 - *Source address*
 - *Destination address*
 - *Protocol*
- *IPv6 (RFC 8200)*
 - *Source address*
 - *Destination address*
 - *Next header (protocol)*
- *TCP (RFC 793)*
 - *Source port*
 - *Destination port*
- *UDP (RFC 768)*
 - *Source port*
 - *Destination port*

FPF_RUL_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall allow the following operations to be associated with packet filtering rules: permit and drop with the capability to log the operation.

FPF_RUL_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall allow the packet filtering rules to be assigned to each distinct network interface.

FPF_RUL_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall process the applicable packet filtering rules (as determined in accordance with FPF_RUL_EXT.1.4) in the following order: *[Administrator-defined]*.

FPF_RUL_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall drop traffic if a matching rule is not identified.

5.4 Assurance Requirements

20 The TOE security assurance requirements are summarized in Table 19.

Table 19: Security Assurance Requirements

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Security Target (ASE)	Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1)
	Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD.1)
	ST Introduction (ASE_INT.1)
	Security Objectives for the Operational Environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
	Stated Security Requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
	Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
	TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV)	Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance Documents (AGD)	Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
	Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life Cycle Support (ALC)	Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
	TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE)	Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)	Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)

21 In accordance with CPP_ND, the following refinement is made to ASE:

- a) **ASE_TSS.1.1C Refinement:** The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR. **In the case of entropy analysis, the TSS is used in conjunction with required supplementary information on Entropy.**

6 TOE Summary Specification

6.1 Security Audit

SFRs:	FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.1/VPN, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_STG_EXT.1
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- 22 The TOE generates audit records as identified in section 5.3.1.
- 23 For each auditable event, the TOE records the date and time of the event, subject identity (i.e. administrative user), type of event and/or reaction and (where applicable) the success or failure of the event.
- 24 Specific audit events required by FAU_GEN.1 and generated by the TOE can be found in Table 17. Specific audit events required by FAU_GEN.1/VPN and generated by the TOE can be found in Table 18.
- 25 The TOE consists of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally. Logs are written to the FortiGate unit hard disk. The amount of audit data that can be stored is dependent on the capacity of the device (see Table 4).
- 26 If a hypervisor is used to deploy a TOE virtual appliance, then the logs are written to the hypervisor's storage.
- 27 Local log files can only be deleted via the CLI by an authorized administrator. No editing of log data is permitted.
- 28 In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is configured to transmit log data to an external FortiAnalyzer platform. Log data is cached before immediately being transmitted to FortiAnalyzer. This process occurs in real-time. This data is transmitted via TLS.
- 29 If the local storage for audit logs is filled, the oldest stored logs will be deleted in a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) order to allow for the saving of new event.
- 30 If one of the TOE interfaces is overwhelmed by traffic, then blocking the anomaly occurs as specified in the TOE DoS Policy. Packets are dropped when an Administrator-configurable threshold is met.
- 31 The following information is logged as a result of the Security Administrator generating/importing or deleting cryptographic keys:
- a) **Generate SSH key-pair.** Action and key reference (Name or ID).
 - b) **Generate CSR.** Action and key reference (Name or ID).
 - c) **Import Certificate.** Action and key reference (Name or ID).
 - d) **Import CA Certificate.** Action and key reference (Name or ID).

6.2 Cryptographic Support

SFRs:	FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption, FCS_COP.1/SigGen, FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.1/IKE, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.4
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- 32 The following tables identify the cryptographic algorithms and methods implemented by the TOE. CAVP certificates are identified at Annex B: CAVP Certificates.

Table 20: Key Generation Methods

Method	Key Size (bits)	Curves	Standard
RSA	2048	N/A	FIPS 186-4, Appendix B.3 The TOE implements all “shall” and “should” statements and does not implement any “shall not” or “should not” statements. Details of “should” statements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pg. 64 & 65 – If an error is encountered during the generation process invalid values are returned.
Elliptic-curve	256 384 521	P-256 P-384 P-521	FIPS 186-4, Appendix B.4 The TOE implements all “shall” and “should” statements and does not implement any “shall not” or “should not” statements. Details of “should” statements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pg. 63 – If an error is encountered during the generation process invalid values are returned.
FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14	2048	N/A	RFC 3526, Section 3

Table 21: Key Establishment Methods

Method	Usage	Services
Elliptic-curve schemes	Used in TLS and IPsec. TOE is both sender and receiver.	TLS (Audit Server) TLS/HTTPS (GUI) IPsec (VPN)
Diffie-Hellman group 14	Used in TLS, SSH and IPsec. The TOE meets RFC 3526 Section 3 by implementing the 2048-bit Modular Exponential (MODP) Group.	TLS (Audit Server) IPsec (VPN) SSH (Admin CLI)

Table 22: Cryptographic Methods

Operation	Algorithm	Key size(bits)	Digest size	Block size	Standard(s)
Encryption and decryption	AES in CBC or GCM modes	128 256	n/a	128	ISO 18033-3 ISO 10116 ISO 19772
	RSA	2048	n/a	n/a	FIPS 186-4

Operation	Algorithm	Key size(bits)	Digest size	Block size	Standard(s)
Signature generation and verification					ISO/IEC 9796-2
	ECDSA	256 384 521	n/a	n/a	FIPS 186-4 ISO/IEC 14888-3
Hashing	SHA	n/a	160	512	ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004
			256	512	
			384	1024	
			512	1024	
Keyed-hash message authentication	HMAC-SHA	160 256 384 512	160	512	ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 Section 7
			256	512	
			384	1024	
			512	1024	
Random bit generation	CTR_DRBG	n/a	n/a	n/a	ISO/IEC 18031:2011

6.2.1 Hash Usage

33 SHA is implemented in the following functions of the TOE:

- a) TLS;
- b) SSH;
- c) IPsec;
- d) Digital signature verification as part of trusted update validation;

6.2.2 Keys and CSPs

34 The TOE only stores keys in memory, either in RAM or Flash memory. The TOE provides the following zeroization methods for cryptographic keys and other material:

- a) **Volatile memory (SDRAM).** The TOE performs a single direct overwrite consisting of zeroes, followed by a read-verify. If the read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the process repeats.
- b) **Non-volatile flash memory (Flash RAM).** The TOE performs a single, direct overwrite consisting of zeroes, which is followed by a followed by a read-verify. If the read-verification fails, the process repeats.

35 Zeroization of cryptographic keys is performed via the OS kernel and invoked via the Command Line Interface (CLI). There are no interfaces available that are designed specifically for the purpose of viewing keys and passwords in plaintext.

36 The following table lists the keys/CSPs used by the TOE, their storage location and format and their associated zeroization method, per the description above.

Table 23: Keys and CSPs

Key/CSP	Storage location and method	Usage	Zeroization
IPSec Session Authentication Key	Plaintext in RAM	IPsec peer-to-peer authentication using HMAC-SHA-256	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
IPSec Session Encryption Key	Plaintext in RAM	VPN traffic encryption/decryption using AES (128-,256-bit)	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
IKE SKEYSEED	Plaintext in RAM	Used to generate IKE protocol keys	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
IKE Authentication Key	Plaintext in RAM	IKE peer-to-peer authentication using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
IKE Key Generation Key	Plaintext in RAM	IPsec SA keying material	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
IKE Session Encryption Key	Plaintext in RAM	Encryption of IKE peer-to-peer key negotiation using or AES (128-, 256-bit)	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
RSA Private Key	Plaintext in Flash (generated with CSR or imported)	RSA private key used in IKE (2048-bit signatures)	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
ECDSA Private Key	Plaintext in Flash (generated with CSR or imported)	ECDSA private key used in IKE (signatures using P-256, -384 and -521 curves)	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
Diffie-Hellman Keys	Plaintext in RAM	Key agreement and key establishment	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
EC Diffie-Hellman Keys	Plaintext in RAM	Key agreement and key establishment	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
Firmware Update Key	Plaintext in RAM	Verification of firmware integrity when updating to new firmware versions using RSA public key	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
HTTPS/TLS Server/Host Key	Plaintext in Flash	RSA & ECDSA private keys used in the HTTPS/TLS protocols	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
HTTPS/TLS Client/Host Key	Plaintext in Flash	RSA & ECDSA private keys used in the HTTPS/TLS protocols	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.

Key/CSP	Storage location and method	Usage	Zeroization
HTTPS/TLS Session Authentication Key	Plaintext in RAM	HMAC SHA-1, -256 or -384 key used for HTTPS/TLS session authentication	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
HTTPS/TLS Session Encryption Key	Plaintext in RAM	AES (128-, 256-bit) key used for HTTPS/TLS session encryption	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
SSH Server/Host Key	Plaintext in Flash	RSA private key used in the SSH protocol (key establishment, 2048 -bit)	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
SSH Session Authentication Key	Plaintext in RAM	HMAC-SHA2-256, or HMAC-SHA2-512 key used for SSH session authentication	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
SSH Session Encryption Key	Plaintext in RAM	AES (128-, 256-bit) key used for SSH session encryption	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
SSH Public Key	Plaintext in Flash	RSA public key used in SSH protocol (key establishment, 2048 -bit)	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
Locally Stored Passwords	AES-128 encrypted in configuration file (in FIPS mode)	User authentication	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.
Configuration Encryption Key	Plaintext in Flash	AES 128-bit key used to encrypt CSPs on the Boot device	Overwritten with zeroes when no longer needed.

6.2.3 Entropy and DRBG

37 As shown in Table 4 (Entropy column) and Table 5 (Entropy column), the entropy source in use varies between TOE models and can be one of:

- a) **Token.** Wide-band radio frequency (RF) white noise source provided by the Fortinet Entropy Token. In the case of virtual appliances, USB passthrough provides access to the token entropy source.
- b) **SoC3.** Oscillator based entropy source.
- c) **SoC4.** Oscillator based entropy source.
- d) **CP9.** Oscillator based entropy source.

38 Additional detail regarding these entropy sources is provided with the proprietary Entropy Description.

39 In all models, the TOE contains a CTR_DRBG that is seeded from a hardware entropy source. Entropy from the noise source is extracted, conditioned and used to seed the DRBG with 256 bits of full entropy.

6.3 HTTPS/TLS

SFRs:	FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
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6.3.1 HTTPS

40 The TOE web GUI is accessed via an HTTPS connection using the TLS implementation described by FCS_TLSS_EXT.1. The TOE does not use HTTPS in a client capacity. The TOE's HTTPS protocol complies with RFC 2818.

41 RFC 2818 specifies HTTP over TLS. The majority of RFC 2818 is spent on discussing practices for validating endpoint identities and how connections must be set up and torn down. The TOE web GUI operates on an explicit port designed to natively speak TLS: it does not attempt STARTTLS or similar multi-protocol negotiation which is described in section 2.3 of RFC 2818. The web server uses a variant of OpenSSL which attempts to send closure Alerts prior to closing a connection in accordance with section 2.2.2 of RFC 2818.

6.3.2 TLS Server

42 The TOE operates as a TLS server for the web GUI trusted path.

43 The server only allows TLS protocol versions 1.1 and 1.2 (rejecting any other protocol version, including SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 and any other unknown TLS version string supplied) and is restricted to the following ciphersuites:

- a) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- b) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- c) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- d) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- e) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- f) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- g) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- h) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

44 Ciphersuites are not user-configurable.

45 The TLS server is capable of negotiating ciphersuites that include ECDHE key agreement schemes. The ECDHE key agreement parameters use secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1 and are hardcoded into the server.

46 The TLS server supports session resumption based on session tickets. Session tickets adhere to the structural format provided in section 4 of RFC 5077. Session tickets are encrypted according to the TLS negotiated symmetric encryption algorithm described in FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption and Section 6.2. Session resumption is based on a single context and operates according to the applicable RFCs. Sessions can be reused providing all session properties are still valid and parameters are otherwise not accepted by the TOE. If the latter occurs, a full handshake would be performed.

6.3.3 TLS Client

47 The TOE operates as a TLS client for the trusted channel with the FortiAnalyzer Server.

- 48 TLS 1.1 and 1.2 are allowed and ciphersuites are restricted to:
- a) TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 - b) TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 - c) TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 - d) TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 - e) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 - f) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 - g) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 - h) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 - i) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 - j) TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 - k) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 - l) TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- 49 Ciphersuites are not user-configurable.
- 50 The reference identifier for the FortiAnalyzer Server is configured by the administrator using the web GUI (IP address) or CLI (IP address or DNS name).
- 51 When the TLS client receives an X.509 certificate from the server, the client will compare the reference identifier with the established Subject Alternative Names (SANs) in the certificate. If a SAN is available and does not match the reference identifier, then the verification fails and the channel is terminated. If there are no SANs of the correct type (IP address or DNS name) in the certificate, then the TOE will compare the reference identifier to the CN (DNS name) in the certificate Subject. If there is no CN, then the verification fails and the channel is terminated. If the CN exists and does not match, then the verification fails and the channel is terminated. Otherwise, the reference identifier verification passes and additional verification actions can proceed. The TOE supports wildcards for DNS names in the CN and SAN.
- 52 The TLS client does not support certificate pinning or administrator override of certificate validation failures.
- 53 The TLS client will transmit the Supported Elliptic Curves extension in the Client Hello message by default with support for the following NIST curves: P-256, P-384, and P-521. The non-TOE server can choose to negotiate the elliptic curve from this set for any of the mutually negotiable elliptic curve ciphersuites.
- 54 The TOE supports presentation of an X.509v3 client certificate for authentication as required by the FortiAnalyzer Audit Server.

6.4 SSH

SFRs:	FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
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- 55 The TOE implements SSH in compliance with RFCs 4251 through 4254 and 6668.
- 56 The TOE implements SSH-RSA host keys.
- 57 The TOE supports public key (SSH-RSA) or password-based client authentication.
- 58 The TOE examines the size of each received SSH packet. If the packet is greater than 256KB, it is automatically dropped.
- 59 The TOE utilizes AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256 for SSH encryption.

- 60 The TOE provides data integrity for SSH connections via HMAC-SHA2-256 and HMAC-SHA2-512.
- 61 The TOE supports Diffie-Hellman Group 14 SHA-1 (diffie-hellman-group14-sha1) for SSH key exchanges.
- 62 The TOE will re-key SSH connections after 1 hour or after no more than 1 gig of data has been encrypted with a given key (whichever occurs first).
- 63 The TOE establishes a user identity by either verifying that the SSH client's present public key matches the one that is stored within the SSH server's authorized keys file, or by confirming the validity of the username and password presented.

6.5 IPsec

SFRs:	FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1
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- 64 The TOE implements IPsec in accordance with RFC 4301.
- 65 Incoming packets are inspected against the session database. Sessions that match all the security attributes and do not exceed the TTL are automatically passed on to their destination and are sent via a VPN interface where applicable. Packets that do not match the attributes in the session database are then compared to the defined firewall rules for that interface identifier based on their unique numerical order. Packets that are permitted are passed to their destination, packets marked for logging are written to the audit log and packets marked for dropping are discarded.
- 66 The TOE permits three actions to be assigned to packet rules – BYPASS (allow the packet to flow through the TOE with no protection), DISCARD (drop the packet with no further processing) and PROTECT (encrypt the packet).
- 67 SPD entries are enforced in an administrator-defined order. If no rules matching the inbound traffic are present within the SPD, the default “no-match” rule will be applied.
- 68 The TOE can be configured to establish VPN connections in transport mode or tunnel mode.
- 69 The TOE implements the ESP protocol as defined in RFC 4303. The TOE implements AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256 (per RFC 3602) and AES-GCM-128 and AES-GCM-256 (per RFC 4106) in conjunction with the following truncated versions of Secure Hash Algorithm-based HMAC algorithms to provide encryption services for ESP: HMAC-SHA-256-128, HMAC-SHA-384-192, and HMAC-SHA-512-256.
- 70 The TOE implements both IKEv1 (as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409 and 4109 with RFC 4304 for extended sequence numbers) and IKEv2 (as defined in RFC 5996, with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in RFC 5996 and RFC 4868 for hash functions). IKE Peer-to-peer authentication uses HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512.
- 71 The TOE does not use aggressive mode for IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges and only main mode is permitted in the evaluated configuration.
- 72 The TOE implements AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256 (per RFC 3602) to provide payload encryption for IKEv1 and IKEv2.
- 73 The TOE permits the configuration of IKEv1 Phase 1 SA and IKEv2 SA lifetimes in seconds, between 120 and 172800 (48 hours).
- 74 The TOE permits the configuration of IKEv1 Phase 2 SA and IKEv2 Child SA lifetimes in number of bytes between 5KB and 4GB, or seconds, between 120 and 172800 (48 hours).
- 75 The TOE utilises CTR-DRBG with AES (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1) to generate the exponents used in IKE key exchanges, having the possible lengths of 224, 256 or 384 bits,

corresponding to each of the supported DH groups. Nonces used in IKE are generated in this same way for negotiated PRF hashes. Nonce sizes are:

- a) 128 bits for SHA-1 and SHA-256;
- b) 256 bits for SHA-384 and SHA-512.

- 76 The TOE supports Diffie-Hellman groups 14, 19 and 20. The specific group to be used for any given IPsec connection is specified in the IPsec policy configuration.
- 77 The TOE provides encryption algorithms with a strength between 128 and 256 bits for use in IKE and ESP exchanges. When negotiating Phase 2 (IKEv1) or CHILD_SA (IKEv2) ciphersuites, the TOE checks to ensure that the encryption strengths (in bits) for the selected algorithms are less than or equal to the encryption strengths of the algorithms selected for the Phase 1 (IKEv1) or IKE_SA (IKEv2) connection.
- 78 The TOE permits peer authentication via RSA or ECDSA public keys (X509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945).
- 79 When using certificates for peer authentication, the TOE will only establish a trusted channel to peers that provide a valid certificate. The TOE will compare the reference identifier of the peer against the reference identifier stored in the associated certificate. If the two values are not a match, the TOE will not establish the connection. The TOE supports DN reference identifiers.

6.6 Residual Data Protection

SFRs:	FDP_RIP.2
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- 80 The TOE ensures that no information from previously processed information flows is transferred to subsequent information flows. This applies both to information that is input to the TOE from an external source and to information (e.g., padding bits) that might be added by the TOE during processing of the information from the external source. The removal of any previous residual information is done through the zeroization of data when the memory structure is initially created and strict bounds checking on the data prior to it being assigned in memory.

6.7 Identification and Authentication

SFRs:	FIA_AFL.1, FIA_PMG_EXT.1, FIA_UAU_EXT.2, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UIA_EXT.1
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- 81 The TOE permits administrators to set a positive integer for failed remote authentication attempts. When this limit is met, the remote user must wait for a defined period of time before further authentication attempts can be made. The local console does not implement the lockout mechanism.
- 82 The TOE enforces a password policy. Administrative passwords are configurable to enforce a minimum password length of at least 8 characters and at most 64 characters and may be comprised of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "*", "(", and ")".
- 83 Administrators connecting via a local connection (console) or remote (HTTPS or SSH) must provide a valid username and password, or recognized public key to complete the authentication process. The TOE provides no feedback while authentication is in progress at the console. The logon process is as follows:
- a) The local administrator connects to the TOE via the console port.
 - b) For remote connections, the remote administrator connects via SSH or the web GUI (HTTPS). Key exchange and session establishment actions take place;

- c) The administrator is prompted for their username and password, which they enter (this step may be skipped if the TOE is configured to use public-key based authentication for SSH).
- d) If the username and password provided is incorrect (or ssh-rsa authentication fails), the administrator is presented with an error. See above for the TOE's behavior if the number of unsuccessful attempts exceeds the defined threshold; or
- e) If the username and password provided are correct (and/or ssh-rsa authentication succeeds), the TOE shall end the logon process and give the administrator access to TOE functionality (a successful logon).

6.8 X509 Certificates

SFRs:	FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FIA_X509_EXT.3
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84 The TOE performs X.509 certificate validation at the following points:

- a) TLS client validation of server certificates;
- b) IPsec peer authentication;
- c) When certificates are loaded into the TOE, such as when importing CAs, certificate responses and other device-level certificates (such as the web server certificate presented by the TOE TLS web GUI).

85 In all scenarios, certificates are checked for several validation characteristics:

- a) If the certificate 'notAfter' date is in the past, then this is an expired certificate which is considered invalid;
- b) The certificate chain must terminate with a trusted CA certificate;
- c) Server certificates consumed by the TOE TLS client must have a 'serverAuthentication' extendedKeyUsage purpose;

86 A trusted CA certificate is defined as any certificate loaded into the TOE trust store that has, at a minimum, a basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.

87 Certificate revocation checking for the above scenarios is performed using a CRL.

88 As X.509 certificates are not used for trusted updates, firmware integrity self-tests, client authentication, or OCSP, the code-signing, clientAuthentication, and OCSP signing purpose is not checked in the extendedKeyUsage for related certificates.

89 The TOE has a trust store where root CA and intermediate CA certificates can be stored. The trust store is not cached: if a certificate is deleted, it is immediately untrusted. If a certificate is added to the trust store, it is immediately trusted for its given scope.

90 Revocation checking is performed on both leaf and intermediate CA certificates when a leaf certificate is presented to the TOE as part of the certificate chain during authentication.

91 The X.509 certificates for each of the given scenarios are validated using the certificate path validation algorithm defined in RFC 5280, which can be summarized as follows:

- a) The public key algorithm and parameters are checked
- b) The current date/time is checked against the validity period revocation status is checked
- c) Issuer name of X matches the subject name of X+1
- d) Name constraints are checked
- e) Policy OIDs are checked
- f) Policy constraints are checked; issuers are ensured to have CA signing bits

- g) Path length is checked
- h) Critical extensions are processed

92 If, during the trust chain verification activity, any certificate under review fails a verification check, then the certificate is deemed untrusted and the connection is rejected.

93 The TOE uses the leaf certificate presented by an external IT entity to authenticate the external IT entity. The TOE uses any presented and stored intermediate CA certificates to build a trust chain as described above. The certificates used by the TOE are determined by those configured by the administrator.

94 As part of the verification process, CRL is used to determine whether the certificate is revoked or not. If the CRL cannot be obtained, then the TOE will use the last cached information available about the certificate to either accept or not accept the certificate. If no cached information is available, the certificate is accepted. CRLs are obtained from a web server over HTTP and are refreshed according to the following schedule:

- a) By default they are refreshed based on the “next update” field in the CRL;
- b) If the CRL update-interval in the TOE CLI is set to non-zero value (N), then it will refresh every N seconds.

95 Instructions for configuring the trusted IT entities to supply appropriate X.509 certificates are captured in the guidance documents.

96 For the Certificate Signing Request, a CN is required and maybe an IP address, DNS name or email address. SANs are optional and may be email, IP address, URI, DNS name or directory name.

6.9 Security Management

SFRs:	FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate, FMT_MOF.1/Functions, FMT_MOF.1/Services, FMT_MTD.1/CoreData, FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMF.1/FFW, FMT_SMF.1/VPN, FMT_SMR.2
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97 The TOE restricts the management functions in this section to the Security Administrator.

98 The TOE does not permit access to any functions (other than the warning/consent banner and authentication interface) prior to login.

99 The TOE permits the Security Administrator to manage (generate, import, delete) the following keys: IKE RSA and IKE ECDSA keys used for VPN operations, in addition to HTTPS/TLS and SSH server host key pairs, and TLS client key pairs.

100 The TOE defines a single role, which is that of the Security Administrator. The Security Administrator is able to start and stop the trusted path / trusted channels via the GUI (HTTPS), the local CLI, and remote CLI (SSH). The Security Administrator is able to perform the following functions via GUI interfaces, local CLI, and remote CLI:

- a) Administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- b) Configure the access banner;
- c) Configure the session inactivity time before session termination;
- d) Configure authentication failure parameters;
- e) Update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing those updates;
- f) Configure the cryptographic functionality;
- g) Generate and delete cryptographic keys. In particular, a security administrator can generate and delete the cryptographic keys associated with CSRs;

- h) Configure the IPsec functionality;
- i) Import X.509v3 certificates and manage the TOE's trust store;
- j) Ability to manage the trusted public keys database;
- k) Ability to start and stop services;
- l) Ability to modify (enable/disable) transmission of audit records to an external audit server;
- m) Ability to set the time;
- n) Ability to configure firewall rules;
- o) Ability to restart SSHD and HTTPSD services.
- p) Ability to define packet filtering rules and associate those rules to network interfaces and order them by priority.

6.10 Protection of the TSF

SFRs:	FPT_SKP_EXT.1, FPT_APW_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.3, FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPT_STM_EXT.1, FPT_FLS.1/SelfTest
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- 101 The TOE prevents the reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys stored within the TOE boundary.
- 102 Pre-shared keys, administrator passwords, and other credentials for the secure operation of the TOE are stored in the TOE's configuration file. Authorized administrators are allowed to enter this information through the communications paths such as the local console or HTTPS GUI. Once the password is entered, the TOE encrypts the password using AES-128 and writes the password to the configuration file permanently obscuring the contents. This configuration file containing encrypted passwords is available through the local console and HTTPS GUI by viewing a full configuration or backup of the configuration. The AES key for the protection of this configuration file and its passwords is generated by the TOE when the TOE is initialized and put into FIPS mode. There are no interfaces available that are designed specifically for the purpose of viewing keys and passwords in plaintext.
- 103 The TOE performs the following self-tests upon initialization:
- a) CPU and Memory BIOS self-tests
 - i) CPU and memory are initialized by exercising a set of known answer tests and the BIOS is compared against a known checksum of the image. The memory is zeroized and then has a random pattern written and read from the memory.
 - b) Boot loader image verification
 - i) The boot loader integrity check is done through a cyclic redundancy check (CRC). If the CRC fails, the FortiGate unit will encounter an error during the boot process. Firmware images are signed, and the signature is attached to the code as it is built. When upgrading an image, the running OS will generate a signature and compare it with the signature attached to the image. If the signatures do not match, the new OS will not load.
 - c) Noise source tests
 - i) The noise source is started, and pattern analysis is done on the output to ensure that the source is not stuck in a cryptographically weak state. These include both the repetition and adaptive proportion tests
 - d) FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Known Answer Tests (KAT)

- i) Comparison of various cryptographic functions against an expected set of values to verify the correct operation of the cryptographic functions necessary to fulfill the SFRs.

- 104 The above tests ensure that the CPU and memory utilized by the TOE are functioning as intended, the BIOS and boot loader image are authentic and stable, the noise source used for entropy generation is functioning at capability and that the cryptographic algorithms used by the TOE are operating correctly. Together, these tests ensure that the TOE is operating at its intended level of capability.
- 105 The TOE will enter the FIPS Error Mode where all network interfaces are shut down and traffic is blocked if any of the following self-tests fail:
- a) CPU and Memory BIOS tests
 - b) Boot loader image verification
 - c) Noise source tests
 - d) FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic KAT's
- 106 To resolve an error resulting from a test failure, a power cycle should be performed. When the device completes the boot up operation, this is evidence that the self-tests have passed, and the TOE including all cryptographic functions are operating correctly.
- 107 All cryptographic self-tests (including KATs) are performed in accordance with TSF-provided capabilities specified in FCS_COP.1/SigGen.
- 108 Additionally, the TOE may receive traffic above the capacity of the product it will drop all packets above this capacity. These events are logged to the audit log of the TOE.
- 109 The administrator may query the current version of the TOE via the GUI or CLI. From the GUI the administrator will also have the option to manually update the TOE.
- 110 Updates to the TOE are applied in accordance with the following process:
- a) The administrator downloads the upgrade image/package from the Fortinet website.
 - b) Once downloaded, the administrator must transfer the image to the TOE via a trusted path (e.g., the web interface).
 - c) Upon initiating the update process, the TOE will attempt to verify the integrity and authenticity of the update package. This is achieved via the verification of a 2048-bit RSA signature that is applied to the package by the Fortinet development team.
 - d) If the signature cannot be verified, or the integrity of the package cannot be confirmed, the upgrade will fail, and an audit log generated accordingly.
 - e) If the signature is verified correctly and the integrity of the package is confirmed, the upgrade will be applied, and the TOE restarted.
- 111 The TOE maintains its own time source, which is free from outside interference. The physical form factors have an internal battery-backed hardware clock for reliability. The virtual form factors rely on an internal hardware clock on the virtualization host system. The Security Administrator sets the date and time during initial TOE configuration and may change the time during operation. The TOE makes use of time for the following purposes:
- a) Generating audit logs (timestamps);
 - b) Session timeouts (lockout enforcement);
 - c) Cryptographic key regeneration intervals;
 - d) Certificate validation.

6.10.1 TOE Initialization

112 The Fortinet family of appliances provides a secure initialization procedure to ensure the integrity of the image and correct cryptographic functioning of the product prior to any information flowing. The product starts from a powered down state and no signals on the wire. The device then powers on and undergoes the following initialization process:

- a) Bootstrap and Boot Loader
- b) Verification of the kernel, firmware and software images via RSA 2048-bit signatures
- c) Loading and Initialization of:
 - i) Kernel;
 - ii) Firmware;
 - iii) Cryptographic known answer tests;
 - iv) Entropy gathering and DRBG initialization; and
 - v) Cryptographic module.

113 Once the kernel, firmware and cryptographic services have been initialized the TOE loads the configured firewall rules. The configuration file is then consulted and are initialized and configured with their network settings as specified and if appropriate transitioned to the link up state. At this point packets may begin flowing through the various network interfaces. The CLI daemon is then started followed by the Web and the TOE is available for login to accept administrative connections.

6.11 TOE Access

SFRs:	FTA_SSL_EXT.1, FTA_SSL.3, FTA_SSL.4, FTA_TAB.1
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114 TOE administrators may access the TOE remotely (via the HTTPS web GUI or SSH) or locally (via the console port).

115 The TOE permits administrators to define a session lifetime/inactive timer for both local and remote sessions. Once this time limit has been met, the TOE will automatically close the session (local or remote) that was inactive and require TOE administrators to re-authenticate before any access to TSF data is permitted. TOE administrators may also manually close their sessions. TOE administrators terminate their sessions via the Log Out button at the Web GUI and the exit command via the SSH and local CLI.

116 Users connecting to the TOE will be presented with a warning and consent banner prior to authentication.

6.12 Trusted Path/Channels

SFRs:	FTP_ITC.1, FTP_ITC.1/VPN, FTP_TRP.1/Admin
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117 The TOE provides an Inter-TSF trusted channel between itself and the following entities:

- a) Between the TOE and a FortiAnalyzer logging platform using TLS (initiated by the TOE); and
- b) Between the TOE and VPN endpoints using IPsec (initiated by the TOE or endpoints).

118 Administrators may utilize an IPsec tunnel on top of SSH or HTTPS when performing remote administration to provide additional transport security.

119 The TOE provides a trusted path between itself and remote administrative users using the following protocols:

- a) HTTPS (in compliance with RFC 2818) for the Web GUI; and
 - b) SSH in compliance with the following RFCs: 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254 and 6668.
- 120 These protocols implement cryptographic algorithms to provide data transport security and integrity, preventing unauthorized access to (or modification of) data sent between the TOE and remote administrative users.

6.13 Stateful Traffic/Packet Filtering

SFRs:	FFW_RUL_EXT.1, FPF_RUL_EXT.1
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121 The TOE permits the configuration of stateful packet filtering policies. The following protocols and associated attributes are configurable within each policy:

- a) ICMPv4 (RFC 792)
 - i) Type; and
 - ii) Code
 - b) ICMPv6 (RFC 4443)
 - i) Type; and
 - ii) Code
 - c) IPv4 (RFC 791)
 - i) Source address;
 - ii) Destination Address; and
 - iii) Transport Layer Protocol
 - d) IPv6 (RFC 8200)
 - i) Source address;
 - ii) Destination Address;
 - iii) Transport Layer Protocol
 - e) TCP (RFC 793)
 - i) Source Port; and
 - ii) Destination Port
 - f) UDP (RFC 768)
 - i) Source Port; and
 - ii) Destination Port
- 122 The TOE does not support UDP-Lite for IPv4 or IPv6.
- 123 Rules can be configured to permit or drop traffic (with the generation of audit log entries for either option).
- 124 Each rule can be tied to a specific interface (port1, wan1, etc.).
- 125 Each packet that arrives on an interface is subject to the enforcement of stateful traffic filtering. This filtering verifies if the connection is part of an established session or if it is a new connection. If the security attributes of the incoming connection request match those already present for an entry in the state table of the TOE the information flow is automatically allowed. Otherwise, this is considered a new connection attempt.

- 126 For a new connection attempt a list of default rules, and then administrator-defined security rules are consulted in their sequence order until a match is found for that packet. The packet is then allowed, denied, or dropped based on the configuration of this rule.
- 127 The session database is consulted to see if an additional session can be created by examining how many currently exist in the database. If this number is below the hardware limit sessions are established by writing the attributes and a TTL into the session database. If the connection is allowed a new session is written into the list of established sessions and can be used to allow subsequent packets for this connection. If logging is enabled for the rule the audit event is sent in real time to the audit server.
- 128 Any new session will have the first packet of the exchange inspected according to the firewall table as described above, such as the TCP SYN packet during a typical TCP session negotiation for both the sender and receiver. The TOE will write to the session table the expected source and destination ports for this communication flow based on the observed IP headers.
- 129 For FTP, the initial handshake communication on port 21 for FTP will be inspected, as well as the server response indicating the expected data and control communication ports. A session will be written to the state table reflecting the expected source and destination ports based on this packet inspection.
- 130 The TOE utilizes a session database to track all active sessions using TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols. The following variables are utilized in the management of these sessions:
- a) TCP:
 - i) Source and Destination addresses
 - ii) Source and Destination ports
 - iii) Sequence number
 - iv) Flags
 - b) UDP:
 - i) Source and Destination addresses
 - ii) Source and Destination ports
 - c) ICMP:
 - i) Source and Destination addresses
 - ii) Type
 - iii) Code
- 131 Periodically old sessions exceeding their TTL are removed from the database. Sessions that have been closed are similarly removed from the database. UDP and ICMP are connectionless protocols that do not have connection or protocol states, therefore UDP and ICMP session timeouts determine how long UDP and ICMP session information is kept in the session table.
- 132 Each FortiGate™ appliance has a pre-defined number of sessions it can track and is specified on the specifications sheet.
- 133 When encountered by the TOE, the following packets will be automatically dropped and an audit log generated for each event:
- a) Packets which are invalid fragments (see below);
 - b) Fragments that cannot be completely re-assembled;
 - c) Packets where the source address is defined as being on a broadcast network;
 - d) Packets where the source address is defined as being on a multicast network;

- e) Packets where the source address is defined as being a loopback address;
 - f) Packets where the source or destination address of the network packet is defined as being unspecified (i.e. 0.0.0.0) or an address “reserved for future use” (i.e. 240.0.0.0/4) as specified in RFC 5735 for IPv4;
 - g) Packets where the source or destination address of the network packet is defined as an “unspecified address” or an address “reserved for future definition and use” (i.e. unicast addresses not in this address range: 2000::/3) as specified in RFC 3513 for IPv6;
 - h) Packets with the IP options: Loose Source Routing, Strict Source Routing, or Record Route specified.
 - i) Packets where the source address is equal to the address of the network interface where the network packet was received;
 - j) Packets where the source or destination address of the network packet is a linklocal address; and
 - k) Packets where the source address does not belong to the networks associated with the network interface where the network packet was received - the TOE implements Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF), also called Anti Spoofing. This prevents an IP packet from being forwarded if its source IP address either does not belong to a locally attached subnet (local interface), or be a hop on the routing between the TOE and another source (static route, RIP, OSPF, BGP).
- 134 The TOE is capable of detecting fragmented packets. When fragmented packets arrive at their destination, they are reassembled and read. If the fragments do not arrive together, they must be held until all of the fragments arrive. Reassembly of a packet requires all of the fragments. The TOE in the evaluated configuration will attempt to reassemble fragmented packets. When these packets arrive at the TOE they will be held by the TOE for reassembly until the TTL expires. Should the TOE detect that there is a missing or invalid fragment (i.e. first fragment is too small, fragment offset is too small or fragment is out of bounds) during the reassembly the packet will be dropped and logged. IP integrity header checking reads the packets to verify if a packet is a valid TCP, UDP, ICMP, SCTP or GRE packet. Verification is also performed to ensure the protocol header is the correct length. This behavior is not capable of being modified or overwritten by the TOE administrator.
- 135 Incoming packets are inspected against the session database. Sessions that match all the security attributes and do not exceed the TTL are automatically passed on to their destination. Packets that do not match the attributes in the session database are then compared to the defined firewall rules for that interface identifier based on their unique numerical order. Packets that are permitted are passed to their destination, packets marked for logging are written to the audit log and packets marked for dropping are discarded.
- 136 Packet rules are enforced in the order defined by the administrator. If no matching rule is found, the TOE will automatically deny the packets and generate a log entry accordingly.
- 137 The TOE maintains half-open TCP sessions in the same manner as full TCP sessions. Once the administrator-defined limit for total sessions is met, sessions (both valid and half-open) are automatically closed based on their timeout value (if not cleared manually by an administrator).
- 138 All received network packets are processed by the TOE policy engine. The policy engine does stateful filtering of the received network packets according to the configured firewall policies. The TOE kernel monitors the state of any running processes, including the policy engine and VPN processes.
- 139 The network interfaces of the TOE remain down until the self-tests have passed and all processes are up and running. The failure of any of the self-tests during operation results in the network interfaces being downed and all traffic blocked. During operation, if any of the processes fail or terminate unexpectedly, the kernel will block traffic - i.e. the TOE fails closed.

140 The TOE also implements a conserve mode as a self-protection measure if a memory shortage occurs. Conserve mode activates protection measures in order to recover memory space such as throttling traffic. In extreme cases conserve mode will cause any new connection requests to be dropped. When sufficient memory is recovered to resume normal operation, the TOE exits conserve mode state and releases the protection measures.

7 Rationale

7.1 Conformance Claim Rationale

141 The following rationale is presented with regard to the PP/PP-Modules conformance claims:

- a) **TOE type.** As identified in section 2.1, the TOE is firewall with VPN and packet filtering capabilities consistent with the claimed PP/PP-Modules.
- b) **Security problem definition.** As shown in section 3, the threats, OSPs and assumptions are reproduced directly from the claimed PP/PP-Modules.
- c) **Security objectives.** As shown in section 4, the security objectives are reproduced directly from the claimed PP/PP-Modules.
- d) **Security requirements.** As shown in section 5, the security requirements are reproduced directly from the claimed PP/PP-Modules. No additional requirements have been specified.

7.2 Security Objectives Rationale

142 All security objectives are drawn directly from the claimed PP/PP-Modules.

7.3 Security Requirements Rationale

143 All security requirements are drawn directly from the claimed PP/PP-Modules in accordance with exact conformance. No consistent SFR rationale is presented in the claimed PP/PP-Modules, therefore no rationale is reproduced in this ST.

Annex A: Extended Components Definition

144 Refer to the Extended Components Definition of the Protection Profile and Protection Profile Modules claimed in Section 1.3.

Annex B: CAVP Certificates

Annex B.1: SFR Coverage

Table 24: CAVP SFR Coverage Mapping

SFR	Selections	Usage	CAVP	Notes
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation	RSA	TLS, SSH	A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
	RSA KeyGen (186-4)		A2240	Fortinet FortiOS CP9 Cryptographic Library
			A2241	Fortinet FortiOS CP9Lite Cryptographic Library
		A2242	Fortinet FortiOS CP9XLite Cryptographic Library	
	ECC (ECDSA)	TLS, IPsec	A2270	Fortinet FortiOS SSL Cryptographic Library
ECDSA KeyGen (186-4)	A2299		Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library	
	FFC – DH Group 14	IPsec, TLS, SSH	n/a	
FCS_CKM.1/IKE Cryptographic Key Generation (for IKE Peer Authentication)	RSA	IPsec	A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
	RSA KeyGen (186-4)		A2240	Fortinet FortiOS CP9 Cryptographic Library
			A2241	Fortinet FortiOS CP9Lite Cryptographic Library
			A2242	Fortinet FortiOS CP9XLite Cryptographic Library

SFR	Selections	Usage	CAVP	Notes
	ECDSA	IPsec	A2270	Fortinet FortiOS SSL Cryptographic Library
	ECDSA KeyGen (186-4)		A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment	ECC	TLS, SSH	A2270	Fortinet FortiOS SSL Cryptographic Library
	KAS-ECC Component		A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
	KDF IKEv1 KDF IKEv2 KDF TLS KDF SSH	IPsec	A2270	Fortinet FortiOS SSL Cryptographic Library
			A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
DH Group 14	IPsec, TLS, SSH	n/a		
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	AES-CBC-128/256	TLS, SSH	A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
			A2240	Fortinet FortiOS CP9 Cryptographic Library
			A2241	Fortinet FortiOS CP9Lite Cryptographic Library
			A2242	Fortinet FortiOS CP9XLite Cryptographic Library

SFR	Selections	Usage	CAVP	Notes
		IPsec	A2292	Fortinet FortiOS-VM FIPS Cryptographic Library
			A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
			A2240	Fortinet FortiOS CP9 Cryptographic Library
			A2241	Fortinet FortiOS CP9Lite Cryptographic Library
			A2242	Fortinet FortiOS CP9XLite Cryptographic Library
	AES-GCM-128/256	TLS	A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
			A2240	Fortinet FortiOS CP9 Cryptographic Library
			A2241	Fortinet FortiOS CP9Lite Cryptographic Library
			A2242	Fortinet FortiOS CP9XLite Cryptographic Library
	IPsec	A2292	Fortinet FortiOS-VM FIPS Cryptographic Library	
		A2240	Fortinet FortiOS CP9 Cryptographic Library	
		A2241	Fortinet FortiOS CP9Lite Cryptographic Library	
		A2242	Fortinet FortiOS CP9XLite Cryptographic Library	

SFR	Selections	Usage	CAVP	Notes
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	RSA RSA SigGen (186-4)	IPsec, TLS, SSH, Trusted Update	A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
			A2240	Fortinet FortiOS CP9 Cryptographic Library
			A2241	Fortinet FortiOS CP9Lite Cryptographic Library
		A2242	Fortinet FortiOS CP9XLite Cryptographic Library	
	ECDSA ECDSA SigGen (186-4)	TLS	A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
			A2240	Fortinet FortiOS CP9 Cryptographic Library
			A2241	Fortinet FortiOS CP9Lite Cryptographic Library
			A2242	Fortinet FortiOS CP9XLite Cryptographic Library
		IPsec	A2270	Fortinet FortiOS SSL Cryptographic Library
			A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
A2240	Fortinet FortiOS CP9 Cryptographic Library			
	A2241	Fortinet FortiOS CP9Lite Cryptographic Library		
	A2242	Fortinet FortiOS CP9XLite Cryptographic Library		
FCS_COP.1/Hash	SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	IPsec, Password Hashing	A2270	Fortinet FortiOS SSL Cryptographic Library
			A2299	

SFR	Selections	Usage	CAVP	Notes
				Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
		TLS, SSH	A2270	Fortinet FortiOS SSL Cryptographic Library
			A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512	IPsec	A2270	Fortinet FortiOS SSL Cryptographic Library
			A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
		TLS, SSH	A2270	Fortinet FortiOS SSL Cryptographic Library
			A2299	Fortinet FortiOS-VM SSL Cryptographic Library
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	CTR_DRBG (AES)	TOE RBG	A2229	Fortinet FortiOS FIPS Cryptographic Library
			A2292	Fortinet FortiOS-VM FIPS Cryptographic Library

Annex B.2: CAVP Hardware Mapping

Refer Table 4: TOE Hardware Models for CAVP Hardware mapping.

Annex B.3: CAVP Virtual Appliance Coverage

Refer Table 5: TOE Virtual Appliance and Related Hardware for CAVP Virtual Appliance coverage.