

# collaborative Protection Profile for Application Software

## Acknowledgements

This collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) was developed by the iTC for Application Software international Technical Community (iTC) also known as AppSW-iTC with representatives from industry, Government agencies, Common Criteria Test Laboratories, and members of academia.

## Revision History

Table 1. Revision history

Version	Date	Description
1.0	2022-04-06	Initial release.

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# Preface

## Objectives of Document

This document presents the Common Criteria (CC) collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) to express the security functional requirements (SFRs) and security assurance requirements (SARs) for application software. The Evaluation activities that specify the actions the evaluator performs to determine if a product satisfies the SFRs captured within this cPP, are described in [\[SD\]](#).

## Scope of Document

The scope of the cPP within the development and evaluation process is described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. In particular, a cPP defines the IT security requirements of a generic type of TOE and specifies the functional security measures to be offered by that TOE to meet stated requirements [\[\[CC1\], Section B.14\]](#).

## Intended Readership

The target audiences of this cPP are developers, CC consumers, system integrators, evaluators and schemes.

Although the cPP and SD may contain minor editorial errors, the cPP is recognized as living document and the iTC is dedicated to ongoing updates and revisions. Please report any issues to the AppSW-iTC.

## Related Documents

- [\[CC1\]](#) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [\[CC2\]](#) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [\[CC3\]](#) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [\[CEM\]](#) Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [\[CCADD\]](#) CC and CEM Addenda: Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs CCDB-2017-05-xxx, Version 0.5, May 2017
- [\[SD\]](#) Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document: Evaluation Activities for collaborative Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.0, February 2022
- [\[TLS Package\]](#) Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS) v1.1, March 2019
- [\[SSH Package\]](#) Functional Package for SSH Version 1.0, May 2021

For more see the [Common Criteria Portal](#).

# 1. PP Introduction

## 1.1. PP Reference Identification

- PP Reference: collaborative Protection Profile for Application Software
- PP Version: 1.0
- PP Date: 2022-04-06

## 1.2. TOE Overview

This is a Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) whose Target of Evaluation (TOE) is software applications. Under this cPP software applications can be categorized under the following broad categories:

1. Enterprise Server Applications
2. Enterprise Server Applications with their Agent(s)
3. Enterprise Desktop Applications
4. Enterprise-grade Mobile Applications

This cPP is the Base-PP against which all of the above categories of software applications may be evaluated. The Base-PP is sufficient to evaluate Enterprise Desktop Applications. Separate PP-Modules will provide additional requirements for Enterprise Server Applications and Enterprise-grade Mobile Applications

In addition to the above categories there are large number of applications (Desktop and Mobile) that fall under “Consumer-grade” category. While such applications could be evaluated under the Application Software cPP, it is not the intention of this iTC to specifically address this category. The iTC doesn’t believe the consumer grade app ecosystem would support the historical cost and timelines associated with a Common Criteria evaluation.

One more way (and perhaps a more useful way in the context of creating SFRs) to categorize apps is based on type of installation/deployment. The following categories are in scope of the first iteration of the cPP:

1. Traditional software running on an execution environment, e.g. enterprise agent applications/sensors
2. Software appliance type of applications, e.g. enterprise management application
3. Distributed applications, e.g. enterprise resource planning systems
4. Virtualized and Containerized applications (e.g. running in a Docker container)

The following categories are out of scope of the first iteration of the cPP:

1. Software defined network appliances



2. Web applications
3. Applications running on bare metal i.e. directly on hardware without an execution environment such as operating system.

Software defined network appliances are being covered by the Network iTC. Web applications are significantly different in terms of their construction, operation, and threat model and are not addressed in this cPP at this time.

### 1.3. TOE Boundary

The application, which consists of the software provided by its vendor, is installed onto the platform(s) it operates on. It executes on the platform, which may be an operating system (Figure 1), hardware environment, a software based execution environment such as a container, or some combination of these (Figure 2). Those platforms may themselves run within other environments, such as virtual machines or operating systems, that completely abstract away the underlying hardware from the application. The TOE is not accountable for security functionality that is implemented by platform layers that are abstracted away. Some evaluation activities are specific to the particular platform on which the application runs, in order to provide precision and repeatability. The only platforms currently recognized by the cPP are those specified in the [SD]. To test on a platform for which there are no EAs, an interested party may contact the iTC with proposed EAs. The iTC will determine if the proposed platform is appropriate for the PP and accept, reject, or develop EAs as necessary in coordination with the technical community.

The TOE includes all application binaries, libraries and other dependencies specifically for the application required to execute the application that are not provided by the TOE platform.

BIOS and other firmware, the operating system kernel, and other system software (such as drivers) provided as part of the platform are outside the scope of this document.

For containerized applications, the container is treated as the TOE. Services, libraries, or run-times that exist within the host OS are to be considered part of the TOE platform. At the time of this cPP publication, all containerized applications are implemented using Linux-type operating systems. When a containerized application claims conformance to this cPP, all EAs applicable to Linux platforms are to be satisfied.

As far as virtualized applications are concerned, this version of the cPP covers a very narrow type; applications that are installed on a virtualized instance of an OS/Platform are the only type of applications covered. An application that is bundled together with a general purpose operating system via a virtual machine is not considered substantially different than an application that is installed traditionally. In either case the underlying OS is to be considered the TOE platform.




Figure 1. TOE as an Application and Kernel Module Running on an Operating System




Figure 2. TOE as an Application Running in an Execution Environment Plus Native Code

## 1.4. TOE Usage

The essence of the requirements for application software TOEs is that they are well behaved and do not compromise the security of their operational environment. Additionally, these requirements ensure that evaluated applications are secure by default, store sensitive data in a secure manner and communicate with external entities using secure well-known protocols. Examples of applications are provided in the section above. This cPP forms the Base-PP and would be applicable to all applications.

## 2. CC Conformance Claims

As defined by the references [CC1], [CC2] and [CC3], this cPP:

- conforms to the requirements of Common Criteria v3.1, Revision 5,
- is Part 2 extended,
- is Part 3 conformant,
- Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS) v1.1 – augmented

- does not claim conformance to any other security functional requirement packages.

The methodology applied for the PP evaluation is defined in [CEM]. This cPP satisfies the following Assurance Families: APE\_CCL.1, APE\_ECD.1, APE\_INT.1, APE\_OBJ.1, APE\_REQ.1 and APE\_SPD.1.

This cPP also applies the CC and CEM Addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs: V0.5 dated May 2017 noting that it is labelled as “for trial use”.

In order to be conformant to this cPP, a ST shall demonstrate Exact Conformance. Exact Conformance, as a subset of Strict Conformance as defined by the CC, is defined as the ST containing all of the SFRs in [Security Functional Requirements](#) (these are the mandatory SFRs) of this cPP, and potentially SFRs from [\[Consistency Rationale\]](#) (these are selection-based SFRs) and [Selection-Based Requirements](#) (these are optional SFRs) of this cPP. While iteration is allowed, no additional requirements (from the CC parts 2 or 3, or definitions of extended components not already included in this cPP) are allowed to be included in the ST. Further, no SFRs in [Security Functional Requirements](#) of this cPP are allowed to be omitted.

The packages to which exact conformance can be claimed in conjunction with this PP are specified in the ‘Allowed Packages’ list at <https://github.com/appswcpp/cPP>. The PP-Modules that are allowed to specify this cPP as a base-PP are specified in the ‘Allowed PP-Modules list at <https://github.com/appswcpp/cPP>

## 2.1. Components allowed with this cPP in a PP-Configuration

The list of packages, PP-Modules and cPPs that may be used in conjunction with this cPP can be found at: <https://appswcpp.github.io/PP-config.html>

The packages to which exact conformance can be claimed in conjunction with this PP are specified in the Allowed Packages list.

PP-Modules that are allowed to specify this cPP as a base PP are specified in the Base PP list.

Other cPPs that are allowed to be included in a PP-Configuration along with this cPP are specified in the Other cPP list.

## 3. Security Problem Definition

### 3.1. Threats

This section identifies the threats to be addressed by software applications complying with this cPP.

#### 3.1.1. T.LOCAL\_ATTACK

An attacker as a non-administrative user of the underlying platform or application gains unauthorized access to application data or functions. For example, attackers may provide maliciously formatted input to the application in the form of files or other local communications

thus providing unauthorized access to plaintext sensitive data.

SFR Rationale:

- FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1 and FPT\_API\_EXT.2 define requirements to ensure that the application doesn't allow for exploiting memory or local storage access that may be available to a local attacker. They also ensure that the application does not subvert security mechanisms provided by the platform thereby allowing an attacker with local access to exploit the application.
- Creating custom parsers have shown to create security vulnerabilities due to the complication of dealing with various file formats. FPT\_API\_EXT.2 ensures that the application uses platform provided parsers for well-known file types in order to avoid introduction of these vulnerabilities.
- FCS\_STO\_EXT.1 defines requirements for securely storing credentials to protect against a local attacker compromising and gaining access.
- FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1 ensures that the file permissions are set such that the application and its data is protected from a local attacker.

### **3.1.2. T.UNAUTHORIZED\_ADMINISTRATOR\_ACCESS**

An attacker may attempt to gain administrator access to the application by nefarious means such as masquerading as an administrator to the application, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session. Successfully gaining administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the security of the application to gain access to data.

SFR Rationale:

- FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1 ensures that an attacker cannot gain administrator access via nefarious means.
- FCS\_STO\_EXT.1 and FCS\_CKM.1/PBKDF2 ensures that if credentials are stored, they are stored in a secure manner to prevent unauthorized access.
- FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1, FIA\_EIP\_EXT.1, FIA\_UAU.7, FIA\_UAU\_EXT.5, FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2, FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1, and FTA\_TAB.1 ensures that an appropriate mechanism is in place to ensure only an authorized user can interact with the application (if interactive).
- FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 specifies the use of secure communication channels to protect data in transit.

### **3.1.3. T.WEAK\_CRYPTOGRAPHY**

Attackers may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.

SFR Rationale:

- FCS\_CKM.1/Asymmetric and FCS\_CKM.2 defines the requirements for key generation and key distribution respectively.
- FCS\_COP.1 defines the requirements for use of cryptographic schemes.

- FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 and FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2 defines the requirements for random bit generation to support key generation and secure protocols (see SFRs resulting from T.UNTRUSTED\_COMMUNICATION\_CHANNELS).
- FMT\_SMF.1 defines the management of cryptographic functions.

### **3.1.4. T.UNTRUSTED\_COMMUNICATION\_CHANNELS**

Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed or non-secure protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the application itself. Attackers may attempt to target applications that do not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. This threat is of particular concern when an application uses protocols that have not been subject to extensive peer review.

SFR Rationale:

- FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 defines how sensitive data is to be handled and specifies the use of secure communication channels to protect sensitive data in transit.
- FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev and FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 ensure that certificates used for secure communication channels are validated properly to prevent someone gaining unauthorized access to the TOE.
- FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1, [SSH Package], [TLS Package] ensures that the secure communication protocols are used to secure the communication channels.

### **3.1.5. T.UPDATE\_COMPROMISE**

Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the application which undermines the security functionality of the application. Non-validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the updated application vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.

SFR Rationale:

- FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 ensures that a user can determine the current version of the TOE and that the updates are cryptographically secured to protect against compromising the update process.

### **3.1.6. T.PLATFORM\_UPDATE**

Updating the platform that the application operates on could break application's functionality. As such an end user might choose not to update the platform, thereby preventing the patching of known issues on the platform. An attacker could exploit such unpatched vulnerabilities in the platform to then mount an attack on the application.

SFR Rationale:

- FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1 and FPT\_API\_EXT.2 SFRs ensure that the TOE leverages the functionality provided and supported by the platform. This ensures that when the platform is updated, the supported functionality does not break and makes it easier to keep the platform updated

without having to worry about breaking the applications running on the platform.

### **3.1.7. T.DATA\_LEAKAGE**

A software application may transmit or receive data that is unauthorized for transfer. This could enable an attacker to read and/or modify the data.

SFR Rationale:

- FDP\_NET\_EXT.1 ensures that only those connections that are required for the TOE to operate are available. This helps enumerate the type of connections thereby helping security administrators identify granular filtering requirements through the network.
- FMT\_SMF.1 ensures that the data transmitted out of the TOE is limited to only that which is required for TOE execution.
- FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 ensures that if sensitive data needs to be transmitted, it is transmitted using secure protocols.

## **3.2. Assumptions**

This section describes the assumptions made in identification of the threats and security requirements for software applications.

### **3.2.1. A.PLATFORM**

The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime environment it provides to the TOE.

[OE.PLATFORM]

### **3.2.2. A.PROPER\_USER**

The user of the application is trusted to use the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.

[OE.PROPER\_USER]

### **3.2.3. A.PROPER\_ADMIN**

The administrator of the application is trusted to administer the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

[OE.PROPER\_ADMIN]

### **3.2.4. A.SECURE\_LOCATION**

For enterprise servers that run enterprise applications, it is assumed that these servers are housed in a physically secure location

[OE.SECURE\_LOCATION]

## 3.3. Organizational Security Policies

There are no OSPs for applications.

# 4. Security Objectives

## 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE

This cPP does not define any security objectives for the TOE as it is a 'low-assurance PP' as defined in [CC1, B.11].

## 4.2. Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

### 4.2.1. OE.PLATFORM

The TOE relies upon the underlying platform for its security and as a result this platform must be trustworthy. It is the organization's responsibility to ensure that the platform meets the trustworthiness requirements of the organization's security policies.

### 4.2.2. OE.PROPER\_USER

The user of the application uses the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

### 4.2.3. OE.PROPER\_ADMIN

The administrator of the application software is trusted to administer the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

# 5. Security Functional Requirements

The individual security functional requirements are specified in the sections below. SFRs in this section are mandatory SFRs that any conformant TOE must meet. Based on selections made in these SFRs it will also be necessary to include some of the selection-based SFRs in Appendix B. Additional optional SFRs may also be adopted from those listed in Appendix A.

The Evaluation Activities defined in [SD] describe actions that the evaluator will take in order to determine compliance of a particular TOE with the SFRs. The content of these Evaluation Activities will therefore provide more insight into deliverables required from TOE Developers.

## 5.1. Conventions

The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

- [*Italicized text within square brackets*] indicates an operation to be completed by the ST author.
- **Bold text** indicates additional text provided as a refinement.
- [**Bold text within square brackets**] indicates the completion of an assignment.
- [text within square brackets] indicates the completion of a selection.
- Number in parentheses after SFR name, e.g. (1) indicates the completion of an iteration.
- Extended SFRs are identified by having a label “EXT” at the end of the SFR name.

Where compliance to RFCs is referred to in SFRs, this is intended to be demonstrated by completing the corresponding evaluation activities in [SD] for the relevant SFR.

## 5.2. Cryptographic Support (FCS)

This section defines cryptographic requirements that underlie other security properties of the TOE.

### 5.2.1. Random Bit Generation Services (FCS\_RBG)

#### 5.2.1.1. FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation Services

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2.1** The application shall [*selection: use no DRBG functionality, invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality, implement DRBG functionality according to FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1*] for its cryptographic operations.

**Application Note 1:** In this requirement, cryptographic operations include all cryptographic key generation/derivation/agreement, IVs (for certain modes), as well as protocol-specific random values.

Unless *use no DRBG functionality* is selected, an Entropy Analysis Report specified in Appendix D is required.

### 5.2.2. Storage of Credentials (FCS\_STO)

#### 5.2.2.1. FCS\_STO\_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials

**FCS\_STO\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*selection: not store any credentials, invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store [assignment: list of credentials], implement functionality to securely store [assignment: list of credentials]*] according to [*selection: FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption, FCS\_CKM.1/Hash, FCS\_CKM.1/KeyedHash, FCS\_CKM.1/PBKDF2*] to non-volatile memory.

**Application Note 2:** This requirement ensures that persistent credentials (secret keys, PKI private keys, or passwords) are stored securely.

## 5.3. User Data Protection (FDP)

This section defines requirements pertaining to protection of user data.



## 5.3.1. Network communications (FDP\_NET)

### 5.3.1.1. FDP\_NET\_EXT.1 (Network Communications)

**FDP\_NET\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall restrict network communication to: [*selection: no network communication, outbound connections, in-bound connections*].

**Application Note 3:** This requirement is intended to restrict both inbound and outbound network communications to only those required. It does not apply to network communications handled by the platform that may support access to remote filesystems mounted locally by the platform.

## 5.4. Security Management (FMT)

Management functions in this section describe required capabilities to support a Security Administrator role and basic set of security management functions dealing with management of configurable aspects included in other SFRs, Default Configuration (FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1) and Specification of Management Functions (FMT\_SMF.1).

### 5.4.1. Default Configuration (FMT\_CFG)

#### 5.4.1.1. FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1 (Default Configuration)

**FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1.1** Any default credentials supported by the TSF shall be changed [*selection: during installation, before application is operational*].

**Application Note 4:** Manufacturer default credentials are credentials (e.g., passwords, keys) that are automatically (without user interaction) loaded onto the platform during application installation. Credentials generated during or after the installation using requirements laid out in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 are not by definition default credentials. An application is considered operational once initial set-up is complete or at first use.

The changing of default credentials has to be enforced by the application.

**FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1.2** The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect it and its data from unauthorized access.

**Application Note 5:** The precise expectations for file permissions vary per platform but the general intention is that a trust boundary protects the application and its data.

#### 5.4.1.2. FMT\_SMF.1 (Specification of Management Functions)

**FMT\_SMF.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- configuration for transmission of sensitive data [*selection:*
  - *no transmission of sensitive data,*
  - *enable/disable the transmission of any information describing the system's hardware, software, or configuration,*
  - *enable/disable the transmission of any PII,*

- *configuration of user authentication,*
- *enable/disable transmission of any application state (e.g. crashdump) information,*
- *enable/disable network backup functionality to [assignment: list of enterprise or commercial cloud backup systems]]*
- *[assignment: Other management functions].*

**Application Note 6:** This requirement stipulates that an application needs to provide the ability to enable/disable only those functions that it actually implements. The application is not responsible for controlling the behavior of the platform or other applications.

## 5.4.2. FMT\_SMR.2 Protected authentication feedback

**FMT\_SMR.2.1** The TSF shall maintain the roles:

- Security Administrator.

**FMT\_SMR.2.2** The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

**FMT\_SMR.2.3** The TSF shall ensure that the conditions [*selection:*

- *The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally,*
- *The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely]*

are satisfied.

## 5.5. Protection of the TSF (FPT)

This section defines requirements for the TOE to provide trusted methods for updates to the TOE firmware/software, support of platform APIs and implementation of anti-exploitation capabilities.

### 5.5.1. Anti-Exploitation Capabilities (FPT\_AEX\_EXT)

#### 5.5.1.1. FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1 (Anti-Exploitation Capabilities)

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.1** The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [*selection:*

- no exceptions,
- *assignment: list of explicit exceptions].*

**Application Note 7:** Requesting a memory mapping at an explicit address subverts address space layout randomization (ASLR).

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.2** The application shall [*selection:*

- *not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions,*
- *allocate memory regions with write and execute permissions for only [assignment: list of functions performing just-in-time compilation].*

**Application Note 8:** Requesting a memory mapping with both write and execute permissions subverts the platform protection provided by DEP. If the application performs no just-in-time compiling, then the first selection must be chosen.

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.3** The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor except for [*selection: [assignment: list of explicit exceptions], no exceptions*].

**Application Note 9:** This requirement is designed to ensure that platform security features do not need to be disabled in order for the application to run. The ability to provide exception in recognition that for certain applications disabling specific security features might be necessary (e.g. an anti-virus application disabling platform provided virus detection features).

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.4** The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.

**Application Note 10:** Executables and user-modifiable files may not share the same parent directory but may share directories above the parent.

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.5** The application shall be compiled with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.

**Application Note 11:** Any interpreted code is assumed to have met this requirement by default.

## 5.5.2. Integrity for Installation and Update (FPT\_TUD\_EXT)

### 5.5.2.1. FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 (Integrity for Installation and Update)

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*selection: provide the ability, leverage the platform*] to report the current version of the application software.

**Application Note 12:** Version is a unique identifier. For example, it could be a sequence of numbers (e.g. major.minor.build.patch) or a version identifier with an explicit list of patches.

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2** The application installation package and its updates shall be digitally signed such that the [*selection: TOE, platform*] can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.

**Application Note 13:** The specifics of the verification of installation packages and updates involves requirements on the platform (and not the application), so these are not fully specified here.

## 5.6. Trusted Channels (FTP)

This section defines requirements for a trusted communication path between the TSF and other trusted IT products

### 5.6.1. Data in Transit (FTP\_DIT\_EXT)

#### 5.6.1.1. FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 (Data In Transit)

**FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*selection:*

- *not transmit any data,*
- *encrypt all transmitted [selection: sensitive data, data] with [selection: HTTPS as as specified in FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1 in accordance with FCS\_CKM.2, TLS as specified in the [TLS Package] in accordance with FCS\_CKM.2, DTLS as specified in [TLS Package] in accordance with FCS\_CKM.2, SSH as specified in [SSH Package]] in accordance with FCS\_CKM.2,*
- *invoke platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted [selection: sensitive data, data] with [selection: HTTPS as as specified in FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1 in accordance with FCS\_CKM.2, TLS as specified in the [TLS Package] in accordance with FCS\_CKM.2, DTLS as specified in [TLS Package] in accordance with FCS\_CKM.2, SSH as specified in [SSH Package]] in accordance with FCS\_CKM.2]*

between itself and another trusted IT product.

**Application Note 14:** The selection ‘not transmit any data’ cannot be selected for TOEs being evaluated against the Server or Agent modules.

## 6. Security Assurance Requirements

The [Security Objectives](#) for the TOE were constructed to address [\[threats\]](#) identified in the [Security Problem Definition](#). The [Security Functional Requirements](#) are a formal instantiation of the [Security Objectives](#). This cPP identifies the Security Assurance Requirements to frame the extent to which the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable for the evaluation and performs independent testing.

This section lists the set of SARs from CC part 3 that are required in evaluations against this cPP. Individual Evaluation Activities to be performed are specified in [\[SD\]](#).

The general model for evaluation of TOEs against STs written to conform to this cPP is as follows:

After the ST has been approved for evaluation, the ITSEF (IT Security Evaluation Facility) will obtain the TOE, supporting environmental IT (if required), and the administrative/user guides for the TOE. The ITSEF is expected to perform actions mandated by the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for the ASE and ALC SARs. The ITSEF also performs the Evaluation Activities contained within the SD, which are intended to be an interpretation of the other CEM assurance requirements as they apply to the specific technology instantiated in the TOE. The Evaluation Activities that are captured in the SD also provide clarification as to what the developer needs to provide to demonstrate the TOE is compliant with the cPP.

*Table 2. Security Assurance Requirements*

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Security Target (ASE)	Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1)
	Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
	ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
	Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
	Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
	Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
	TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV)	Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance documents (AGD)	Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
	Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life cycle support (ALC)	Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
	TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
	Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR.3)
Tests (ATE)	Independent testing – sample (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability assessment (AVA)	Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)

## 6.1. ASE: Security Target

The ST is evaluated as per ASE activities defined in the [CEM]. In addition, there may be Evaluation Activities specified within the [SD] that call for necessary descriptions to be included in the TSS that are specific to the TOE technology type.

## 6.2. ADV: Development

The design information about the TOE is contained in the guidance documentation available to the end user as well as the TSS portion of the ST, and any additional information required by this cPP that is not to be made public (e.g., Entropy Report).

### 6.2.1. Basic Functional Specification (ADV\_FSP.1)

The functional specification describes the TOE Security Functions Interfaces (TSFIs). It is not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these interfaces. Additionally, because TOEs conforming to this cPP will necessarily have interfaces to the Operational Environment that are not directly invocable by TOE users, there is little point specifying that such interfaces be described in and of themselves since only indirect testing of such interfaces may be possible. For this cPP, the Evaluation Activities for this family focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the TSS in response to the functional requirements and the interfaces presented in the AGD documentation. No additional “functional specification” documentation is necessary to satisfy the Evaluation Activities specified in [SD].

The Evaluation Activities in [SD] are associated with the applicable SFRs; since these are directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element ADV\_FSP.1.2D is implicitly already done and no additional documentation is necessary.

## 6.3. AGD: Guidance Documentation

The guidance documents will be provided with the ST. Guidance must include a description of how the IT personnel verifies that the Operational Environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and readable by the IT personnel.

Guidance must be provided for every operational environment that the product supports as claimed in the ST. This guidance includes:

- instructions to successfully install the TSF in that environment; and
- instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of the larger operational environment; and
- instructions to provide a protected administrative capability.

Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality must also be provided; requirements on such guidance are contained in the Evaluation Activities specified in the [SD].

### 6.3.1. Operational User Guidance (AGD\_OPE.1)

The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web pages.

The developer should review the Evaluation Activities contained in the [SD] to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.

### 6.3.2. Preparative Procedures (AGD\_PRE.1)

As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the Evaluation Activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.

## 6.4. Class ALC: Life-cycle Support

At the assurance level provided for TOEs conformant to this CPP, life-cycle support is limited to end-user-visible aspects of the life-cycle, rather than an examination of the TOE vendor's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it is a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this assurance level.

### 6.4.1. Labelling of the TOE (ALC\_CMC.1)

This component is targeted at identifying the TOE such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user. A label could consist of a "soft label" (e.g., electronically presented when queried).

The evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC\_CMC.1

### **6.4.2. TOE CM Coverage (ALC\_CMS.1)**

Given the scope of the TOE and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, the evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC\_CMS.1.

### **6.4.3. Flaw remediation (ALC\_FLR.3)**

Given the scope of the TOE and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, the evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC\_FLR.3.

## **6.5. Class ATE: Tests**

Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage of design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through the ATE\_IND family, while the latter is through the AVA\_VAN family. For this cPP, testing is based on advertised functionality and interfaces with dependency on the availability of design information. One of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as specified in the following requirements.

### **6.5.1. Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE\_IND.1)**

Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the operational guidance (includes “evaluated configuration” instructions). The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in Section 5 are being met. The Evaluation Activities in the SD identify the specific testing activities necessary to verify compliance with the SFRs. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the platform/TOE combinations that are claiming conformance to this cPP.

## **6.6. Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment**

For the first generation of this cPP, the iTC is expected to survey open sources to discover what vulnerabilities have been discovered in these types of products and provide that content into the AVA\_VAN discussion. In most cases, these vulnerabilities will require sophistication beyond that of a basic attacker. This information will be used in the development of future protection profiles.

### **6.6.1. Vulnerability Survey (AVA\_VAN.1)**

[SD] provides a guide to the evaluator in performing a vulnerability analysis.

## **Appendix A: Optional Requirements**

As indicated in the introduction to this cPP, the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the TOE) are contained in the body of this cPP. Additionally, there are two other types of requirements specified in Appendices A and B.

The first type (in this Appendix) comprises requirements that can be included in the ST, but are not

mandatory for a TOE to claim conformance to this cPP. The second type (in Appendix B) comprises requirements based on selections in other SFRs from the cPP: if certain selections are made, then additional requirements in that appendix will need to be included in the body of the ST (e.g., cryptographic protocols selected in a trusted channel requirement).

If a TOE fulfils any of the optional requirements, the vendor is encouraged to add the related functionality to the ST. Therefore, in the application notes of this chapter the wording "This option should be chosen..." is repeatedly used. But it also is used to emphasize that this option should only be chosen if the TOE provides the related functionality and that it is not necessary to implement the related functionality to be compliant to the cPP. ST authors are free to choose none, some or all SFRs defined in this chapter. Just the fact that a product supports a certain functionality does not mandate to add any SFR defined in this chapter.

## A.1. Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)

This section defines optional cryptographic requirements that underlie other security properties of the TOE.

### A.1.1. Cryptographic Key Management (FCS\_CKM)

#### A.1.1.1. FCS\_CKM.1/Symmetric Cryptographic Key Generation

**FCS\_CKM.1.1/Symmetric** The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [*assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm*] using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key sizes [*selection: 128 bit, 256 bit*], that meet the following: [*assignment: list of standards*].

**Application Note 15:** Symmetric keys may be used to generate keys along the key chain.

## A.2. Class: Protection of the TSF (FPT)

This section defines requirements for the TOE while using platform provided APIs as well as transferring data between different parts of the TOE.

### A.2.1. Use of Supported Services and APIs (FPT\_API\_EXT)

#### A.2.1.1. FPT\_API\_EXT.2 (Use of Supported Services and APIs)

**FPT\_API\_EXT.2.1** The application [*selection: shall use platform-provided libraries for parsing*] [*assignment: list of formats parsed that are included in the IANA MIME media types*], does not perform parsing].

**Application Note 16:** The IANA MIME types are listed at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types> and include many image, audio, video, and content file formats. This requirement does not apply if providing parsing services is the purpose of the application.



# Appendix B: Selection-Based Requirements

As indicated in the introduction to this PP, the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the TOE or its underlying platform) are contained in the body of this PP. There are additional requirements based on selections in the body of the PP: if certain selections are made, then additional requirements below will need to be included.

## B.1. Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)

This section defines selection based cryptographic requirements that underlie other security properties of the TOE.

### B.1.1. Random Bit Generation (Extended – FCS\_RBG\_EXT)

#### B.1.1.1. FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [*selection: Hash\_DRBG (any) in accordance with FCS\_COP.1/Hash, HMAC\_DRBG (any) in accordance with FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash, CTR\_DRBG (AES) in accordance with FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption*].

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2** The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy sources that accumulates entropy from [*selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source(s), [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source(s)*] with a minimum of [*selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits*] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

**Application Note 17:** This requirement shall be included in STs in which implement DRBG functionality is chosen in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2.1.

For the first selection in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2, the ST author selects at least one of the types of noise sources. If the TOE contains multiple noise sources of the same type, the ST author fills the assignment with the appropriate number for each type of source (e.g., 2 software-based noise sources, 1 hardware-based noise source). The documentation and tests required in the Evaluation Activity for this element should be repeated to cover each source indicated in the ST.

ISO/IEC 18031:2011 contains three different methods of generating random numbers; each of these, in turn, depends on underlying cryptographic primitives (hash functions/ciphers). The ST author will select the function used and include the specific underlying cryptographic primitives used in the requirement. While any of the identified hash functions (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) are allowed for Hash\_DRBG or HMAC\_DRBG, only AES-based implementations for CTR\_DRBG are allowed.

If the key length for the AES implementation used here is different than that used to encrypt the user data, then FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption may have to be adjusted or iterated to reflect the different key length. For the selection in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2, the ST author selects the minimum number of bits of entropy that is used to seed the RBG, which must be equal or greater than the

security strength of any key generated by the TOE.

## B.1.2. Cryptographic Key Management (FCS\_CKM)

### B.1.2.1. FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services

**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*selection: generate no asymmetric cryptographic keys, invoke platform-provided functionality for asymmetric key generation, implement asymmetric key generation according to FCS\_CKM.1/Asymmetric*].

**Application Note 18:** This requirement depends upon selection in [TLS Package] and [SSH Package].

### B.1.2.2. FCS\_CKM.1/Asymmetric Cryptographic Key Generation (Refinement)

**FCS\_CKM.1.1/Asymmetric** The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [*selection:*

- *RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;*
- *ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [selection: P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4;*
- *FFC schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.1*
- *FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: “NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [selection: RFC 3526, RFC 7919]*

]

and specified cryptographic key sizes [*assignment: cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [*assignment: list of standards*].

**Application Note 19:** The ST author selects all key generation schemes used for key establishment (including generation of ephemeral keys) and device authentication. When key generation is used for key establishment, the schemes in FCS\_CKM.2.1 and selected cryptographic protocols must match the selection. When key generation is used for device authentication, other than SSH-RSA, ECDSA-SHA2-NISTP256, ECDSA-SHA2-NISTP384 and ECDSA-SHA2-NISTP521, the public key is expected to be associated with an X.509v3 certificate.

If the TOE acts as a receiver in the key establishment schemes and is not configured to support mutual authentication, the TOE does not need to implement key generation.

### B.1.2.3. FCS\_CKM.1.1/PBKDF2 Password Conditioning

**FCS\_CKM.1.1/PBKDF2** A password/passphrase shall perform [*assignment: Password-based Key Derivation Functions*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm as specified in

FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash, with [assignment: positive integer of 1,000 or more] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128, 256] that meet the following [NIST SP 800-132].

**FCS\_CKM.1.2/PBKDF2** The TSF shall generate salts using a RBG that meets FCS\_RGB\_EXT.1 and with entropy corresponding to the security strength selected for PBKDF in FCS\_CKM.1.1/PBKDF2.

**Application Note 20:** This should be included if selected in FCS\_STO\_EXT.1

Conditioning can be performed using one of the identified hash functions or the process described in NIST SP 800-132; the method used is selected by the ST Author. SP 800-132 requires the use of a pseudo-random function (PRF) consisting of HMAC with an approved hash function. The ST author selects the hash function used, also includes the appropriate requirements for HMAC and the hash function.

Appendix A of SP 800-132 recommends setting the iteration count in order to increase the computation needed to derive a key from a password and, therefore, increase the workload of performing a password recovery attack. A significantly higher value is recommended to ensure optimal security. This value is expected to increase to a minimum of 10,000 in a future iteration based on SP 800-63.

#### **B.1.2.4. FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refinement)**

**FCS\_CKM.2.1** The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [selection:

- *RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1”;*
- *Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;*
- *Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”.*

**Application Note 21:** This is a refinement of the SFR FCS\_CKM.2 to deal with key establishment rather than key distribution.

The ST author selects all key establishment schemes used for the selected cryptographic protocols.

The elliptic curves used for the key establishment scheme correlate with the curves specified in FCS\_CKM.1.1/Asymmetric. The domain parameters used for the finite field-based key establishment scheme are specified by the key generation according to FCS\_CKM.1.1/Asymmetric.

Safe-prime groups are covered in Appendix D of SP 800-56A Revision 3, “Appendix D: Approved ECC Curves and FFC Safe-prime Groups”.

### B.1.3. Cryptographic Operation (FCS\_COP)

#### B.1.3.1. FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/DataEncryption** The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [*selection: CBC, CTR, GCM*] mode and cryptographic key sizes [*selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits*] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [*selection: CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772*].

**Application Note 22:** For the first selection of FCS\_COP.1.1/DataEncryption, the ST author chooses the mode or modes in which AES operates. For the second selection, the ST author chooses the key sizes that are supported by this functionality. The modes and key sizes selected here correspond to the cipher suite selections made in the trusted channel requirements.

#### B.1.3.2. FCS\_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/SigGen** The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services [*selection: generation, verification*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*selection:*

- *RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [assignment: 2048 bits or greater],*
- *Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 256 bits or greater]*

that meet the following: [*selection:*

- *For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1\_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3,*
- *For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves” [selection: P-256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4].*

**Application Note 23:** The ST Author chooses the algorithm(s) implemented to perform digital signatures. For the algorithm(s) chosen, the ST author makes the appropriate assignments/selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm. The ST author ensures that the assignments and selections for this SFR include all the parameter values necessary for the cipher suites selected for the protocol SFRs (see Appendix B.1.4) that are included in the ST. The ST Author checks for consistency of selections with other FCS requirements, especially when supporting elliptic curves.

#### B.1.3.3. FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/Hash** The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*selection: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512*] and cryptographic key sizes [*assignment: cryptographic key sizes*] message digest sizes [*selection: 160, 256, 384, 512*] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.

**Application Note 24:** Vendors are strongly encouraged to implement updated protocols that support the SHA-2 family; until updated protocols are supported, this cPP allows support for SHA-1 implementations in compliance with SP 800-131A. In a future version of this cPP, SHA-256 will be the minimum requirement for all TOEs.

The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used for FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption and FCS\_COP.1/SigGen (for example, SHA 256 for 128-bit keys).

#### **B.1.3.4. FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)**

**FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyedHash** The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*selection: HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512*] and cryptographic key sizes [*assignment: key size (in bits) used in HMAC*] and message digest sizes [*selection: 160, 256, 384, 512*] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.

**Application Note 25:** The key size [k] in the assignment falls into a range between L1 and L2 (defined in ISO/IEC 10118 for the appropriate hash function). For example, for SHA-256, L1=512, L2=256, where  $L2 \leq k \leq L1$ .

### **B.1.4. Cryptographic Protocols (Extended – FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT)**

#### **B.1.4.1. FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT HTTPS Protocol**

HTTPS is not a required component of this cPP. If a TOE implements HTTPS, a corresponding selection in FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 should have been made that defines what the HTTPS protocol is implemented to protect.

##### **B.1.4.1.1. FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol**

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

**Application Note 26:** The ST author must provide enough detail to determine how the implementation is complying with the standard(s) identified; this can be done by additional detail in the TSS.

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS.

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.3** If a peer certificate is presented, the TSF shall [*selection: not require client authentication, not establish the connection, request authorization to establish the connection, [assignment: other action]*] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

**Application Note 27:** If HTTPS is selected FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 then validity is determined by the identifier verification, certification path, the expiration date, and the revocation status in accordance with RFC 5280. Certificate validity is tested in accordance with testing performed for FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev.

#### **B.1.4.2. TLS Protocol**

TLS is not a required component of this cPP. If a TOE implements TLS, a corresponding selection in

FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 should be made to define what the TLS protocol is implemented to protect. If the TOE implements the TLS protocol, the ST author shall include the requirements from [TLS Package]

### **B.1.4.3. SSH Protocol**

SSH is not a required component of this cPP. If a TOE implements SSH, a corresponding selection in FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 should have been made that defines what the SSH protocol is implemented to protect. If the TOE acts as both a client and server and the selections are different, the ST author should iterate using the identifiers FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1/Server and FCS\_SSH\_EXT.1/Client in the [SSH Package].

## **B.2. Class: Identification and Authentication (FIA)**

This section defines selection based Identification and Authentication requirements that underlie other security properties of the TOE.

### **B.2.1. Authentication Failure (FIA\_AFL\_EXT)**

#### **B.2.1.1. FIA\_AFL\_EXT X.509 Authentication Failure Management**

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall detect when a configurable positive integer within [*assignment: range of acceptable values for each authentication mechanism*] of unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to last successful authentication for each authentication mechanism.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.2** When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [*selection: prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a session using the locked authentication method until [assignment: action to unlock] is taken by an Administrator; prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a session using any authentication method until an Administrator-defined time period has elapsed*].

### **B.2.2. External Identity Provider (FIA\_EIP\_EXT)**

#### **B.2.2.1. FIA\_EIP\_EXT.1 External Identity Provider**

**FIA\_EIP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of using [*selection: IPsec, TLS, DTLS*] to provide a communication channel between itself and an external identity provider.

**FIA\_EIP\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall provide a [*selection: configurable, externally-managed*] mechanism to enroll with the external identity provider.

**FIA\_EIP\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall establish attribute mapping with the provider for [*assignment: list of maintained attributes*].

### **B.2.3. User Identification and Authentication (FIA\_UIA\_EXT)**

#### **B.2.3.1. FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication**

**FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the administrative user to initiate the identification and authentication process: [*selection:*

- *display the warning banner in accordance with FTA\_TAB.1;*
- *[assignment: list of services, actions performed by the TSF in response to non-TOE requests];*
- *no actions].*

**FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

## **B.2.4. Authentication Mechanism (FIA\_UAU\_EXT)**

### **B.2.4.1. FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2 Authentication Mechanism**

**FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall provide a [*selection: password-based, SSH public key-based, certificate-based, [assignment: other authentication mechanism]*] authentication mechanism to perform administrative user authentication.

### **B.2.4.2. FIA\_UAU\_EXT.5 User Authentication Mechanisms**

**FIA\_UAU\_EXT.5.1** The TSF shall [*selection: provide an authentication mechanism, integrate with an external identity provider*] to support user authentication.

**FIA\_UAU\_EXT.5.2** The TSF shall consider [*selection: password, SSH Public Key, X.509 certificate, [assignment: other authentication mechanism]*] as authentication mechanisms.

**Application Note 28:** If the TOE implements its own authentication mechanism, “provide an authentication mechanism” should be selected and the following selection-based SFRs must be included in the ST: FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1, FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2, FIA\_UAU.7, and FMT\_SMR.2.

**Application Note 29:** If the TOE connects to an external authentication service, the selection “integrate with an external identity provider” and the following selection-based SFRs must be included in the ST: FIA\_EIP\_EXT.1.

### **B.2.4.3. FIA\_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback**

**FIA\_UAU.7.1** The TSF shall provide only *obscured feedback* to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress.

**Application Note 30:** The TSF may permit user interaction to display the input data. However, this may not be the default state and must revert to an obfuscated state after user interaction.

## **B.2.5. X.509 Certificate Validation (FIA\_X509\_EXT)**

### **B.2.5.1. FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation**

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1/Rev** The application shall [*selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality*] to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a minimum path length of three certificates.

- The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
- The application shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
- ECC certificates shall conform to RFC 5480, section 2.1.1.
- The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [*selection:*
  - *the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960,*
  - *a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3,*
  - *a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5,*
  - *an OCSP TLS Status Request Extension (i.e., OCSP stapling) as specified in RFC 6066*
  - *no revocation method ]*
- The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
  - Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2/Rev** The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

**Application Note 31:** This requirement applies to certificates that are used and processed by the TSF and restricts the certificates that may be added as trusted CA certificates.

#### **B.2.5.2. FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication**

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [*selection: HTTPS, SSH, TLS, DTLS, code signing for system software updates, code signing for integrity verification, [assignment: other uses]*].

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2** When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [*selection: allow the Administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate in these cases, accept the certificate, not accept the certificate*].

**Application Note 32:** In FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1, the ST author's selection includes TLS, or HTTPS if these protocols are included in FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1.1. SSH should be included if SSH authentication methods include X.509v3. Certificates may optionally be used for trusted updates of system software



(FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2).

Often a connection must be established to check the revocation status of a certificate - either to download a CRL or to perform a lookup using OCSP. In FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2 the selection is used to describe the behavior in the event that such a connection cannot be established (for example, due to a network error). If the TOE has determined the certificate is valid according to all other rules in FIA\_X509\_EXT.1, the behavior indicated in the selection determines the validity. The TOE must not accept the certificate if it fails any of the other validation rules in FIA\_X509\_EXT.1. If the Administrator-configured option is selected by the ST Author, the ST Author also selects the corresponding function in FMT\_SMF.1. The selection should be consistent with the validation requirements in [TLS Package, FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.3].

The ST author must include FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 in all instances except when only SSH is selected within FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 and SSH authentication methods do not include X.509v3. Additionally, FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 must be included if FPT\_TUD\_EXT digital signatures make use of X.509 certificates and the TOE performs the verification.

## B.3. (FTA) TOE Access

### B.3.1. Default TOE Access Banner (FTA\_TAB)

#### B.3.1.1. FTA\_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banner

**FTA\_TAB.1.1** Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.

**Application Note 33:** This requirement should be included if the selection for a warning banner is made within FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.

# Appendix C: Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for the extended requirements that are used in the cPP, including those used in [\[Consistency Rationale\]](#) and [Selection-Based Requirements](#) .

(Note: formatting conventions for selections and assignments in this chapter are those in [\[CC2\]](#).)

## C.1. Cryptographic Support (FCS)

### C.1.1. Cryptographic Key Generation (FCS\_CKM\_EXT)

#### C.1.1.1. Family Behaviour

Defined in [\[CC2\]](#).

### C.1.1.2. Component levelling



Figure 3. Component levelling

FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1 defines whether asymmetric keys are generated and if so whether the TOE or the platform generates the asymmetric cryptographic keys.

### C.1.1.3. Management: FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a. None

### C.1.1.4. Audit: FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. No audit necessary

### C.1.1.5. FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*selection: generate no asymmetric cryptographic keys, invoke platform-provided functionality for asymmetric key generation, implement asymmetric key generation according to FCS\_CKM.1/Asymmetric*].

## C.1.2. Cryptographic Protocols (FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT)

### C.1.2.1. Family Behaviour

Components in this family define the requirements for protecting remote management sessions between the TOE and a Security Administrator. This family describes how HTTPS will be implemented. This is a new family defined for the FCS Class.

### C.1.2.2. Component levelling



Figure 4. Component levelling

FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1 HTTPS requires that HTTPS be implemented according to RFC 2818 and supports TLS.

#### **C.1.2.3. Management: FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a. There are no management activities foreseen.

#### **C.1.2.4. Audit: FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. There are no auditable events foreseen

#### **C.1.2.5. FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS.

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.3** If a peer certificate is presented, the TSF shall [*selection: not require client authentication, not establish the connection, request authorization to establish the connection, [assignment: other action]*] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

### **C.1.3. Random Bit Generation (FCS\_RBG\_EXT)**

#### **C.1.3.1. Family Behaviour**

Components in this family address the requirements for random bit/number generation. This is a new family defined for the FCS class.

#### **C.1.3.2. Component levelling**



Figure 5. Component levelling

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation requires random bit generation to be performed in accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.

**C.1.3.3. Management: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1, FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a. There are no management activities foreseen

**C.1.3.4. Audit: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1, FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. Minimal: failure of the randomization process

**C.1.3.5. FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [*selection: Hash\_DRBG (any), HMAC\_DRBG (any), CTR\_DRBG (AES)*].

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2** The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [*selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source, [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source*] with a minimum of [*selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits*] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

**C.1.3.6. FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation Services**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2.1** The application shall [*selection: use no DRBG functionality, invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality, implement DRBG functionality*] for its cryptographic operations.

## **C.1.4. Storage of Credentials (FCS\_STO\_EXT)**

### **C.1.4.1. Family Behaviour**

Components in this family address the requirements for storage of credentials such as secret keys, PKI private keys, or passwords. This is a new family defined for the FCS class.

### **C.1.4.2. Component levelling**



*Figure 6. Component levelling*

FCS\_STO\_EXT.1 identifies whether the TOE stores credentials and if so how to store them securely.

### **C.1.4.3. Management: FCS\_STO\_EXT.1**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a. There are no management activities foreseen

### **C.1.4.4. Audit: FCS\_STO\_EXT.1**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. No audit necessary

### **C.1.4.5. FCS\_STO\_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials**

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

**FCS\_STO\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*selection: not store any credentials, invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store [assignment: list of credentials], implement functionality to securely store [assignment: list of credentials]*] according to [*selection: FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption, FCS\_CKM.1/Hash, FCS\_CKM.1/KeyedHash, FCS\_CKM.1/PBKDF2*] to non-volatile memory.

## **C.2. Data Protection (FDP)**

## C.2.1. Network Communications (FDP\_NET\_EXT)

### C.2.1.1. Family Behaviour

Components in this family address restrictions to network communications. This is a new family defined for the FDP class.

### C.2.1.2. Component levelling



Figure 7. Component levelling

FDP\_NET\_EXT.1 identifies whether the TOE has outbound or inbound connections.

### C.2.1.3. Management: FDP\_NET\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a. There are no management activities foreseen

### C.2.1.4. Audit: FDP\_NET\_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. No audit necessary

### C.2.1.5. FDP\_NET\_EXT.1 Network Communications

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No other components

**FDP\_NET\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall restrict network communication to: [*selection: no network communication, outbound connections, in-bound connections*].

## C.3. Identification and Authentication (FIA)

### C.3.1. External Identity Provider (FIA\_EIP\_EXT)

#### Family Behaviour

Provides for an external identity provider for authentication to the TOE.

#### Component levelling




Figure 8. Component levelling

FIA\_EIP\_EXT.1 The remote authentication service provides administrative users a managed service to allow for access to TSF mediated actions.

**Management: FIA\_EIP\_EXT**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a. None.

**Audit: FIA\_EIP\_EXT**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. No audit necessary

**C.3.1.1. FIA\_EIP\_EXT.1 External Identity Provider**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UAU\_EXT.5.

**FIA\_EIP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of using [*selection: IPsec, TLS, DTLS*] to provide a communication channel between itself and an external identity provider.

**FIA\_EIP\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall provide a [*selection: configurable, externally-managed*] mechanism to enroll with the external identity provider.

**FIA\_EIP\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall establish attribute mapping with the provider for [*assignment: list of maintained attributes*].

**C.3.2. User Identification and Authentication (FIA\_UIA\_EXT)**

**C.3.2.1. Family Behaviour**

The TSF allows certain specified actions before the non-TOE entity goes through the identification and authentication process.

**C.3.2.2. Component levelling**




Figure 9. Component levelling

FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication requires Administrators (including remote Administrators) to be identified and authenticated by the TOE, providing assurance for that end of the communication path. It also ensures that every user is identified and authenticated before the TOE performs any mediated functions

#### C.3.2.3. Management: FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a. Ability to configure the list of TOE services available before an entity is identified and authenticated

#### C.3.2.4. Audit: FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. No audit necessary

#### C.3.2.5. FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FTA\_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners

**FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the administrative user to initiate the identification and authentication process: [*selection*:

- *display the warning banner in accordance with FTA\_TAB.1;*
- [*assignment: list of services, actions performed by the TSF in response to non-TOE requests*];
- *no actions*].

**FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

### C.3.3. User authentication (FIA\_UAU\_EXT)

#### Family Behaviour

Provides for a locally based administrative user authentication mechanism



## Component levelling




Figure 10. Component levelling

FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2 The password-based authentication mechanism provides administrative users an authentication mechanism for access to TSF mediated functionality.

FIA\_UAU\_EXT.5 The TSF provides administrative users a local or external authentication mechanism.

### **Management: FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2, FIA\_UAU\_EXT.5**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a. configuration of user authentication

### **Audit: FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2, FIA\_UAU\_EXT.5**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. No audit necessary

### **C.3.3.1. FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2 User Authentication**

#### **FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2 User Authentication**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No other components.

**FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall provide a [*selection: password-based, SSH public key-based, certificate-based, [assignment: other authentication mechanism]*] authentication mechanism to perform administrative user authentication.

### **C.3.3.2. FIA\_UAU\_EXT.5 User Authentication Mechanisms**

#### **FIA\_UAU\_EXT.5 User Authentication Mechanisms**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2 User Authentication.

**FIA\_UAU\_EXT.5.1** The TSF shall [*selection: provide an authentication mechanism, integrate with an external identity provider*] to support user authentication.

**FIA\_UAU\_EXT.5.2** The TSF shall consider [*selection: password, SSH Public Key, X.509 certificate, [assignment: other authentication mechanism]*] as authentication mechanisms.

### **C.3.4. Authentication using X.509 certificates (FIA\_X509\_EXT)**

#### **C.3.4.1. Family Behaviour**

This family defines the behaviour, management, and use of X.509 certificates for functions to be performed by the TSF. Components in this family require validation of certificates according to a specified set of rules, use of certificates for authentication for protocols and integrity verification, and the generation of certificate requests.

#### **C.3.4.2. Component levelling**



*Figure 11. Component levelling*

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1** X509 Certificate Validation, requires the TSF to check and validate certificates in accordance with the RFCs and rules specified in the component.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2** X509 Certificate Authentication, requires the TSF to use certificates to authenticate peers in protocols that support certificates, as well as for integrity verification and potentially other functions that require certificates.

#### **C.3.4.3. Management: FIA\_X509\_EXT.1, FIA\_X509\_EXT.2**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a. Remove imported X.509v3 certificates
- b. Approve import and removal of X.509v3 certificates

#### **C.3.4.4. Audit: FIA\_X509\_EXT.1, FIA\_X509\_EXT.2**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. No audit necessary

### C.3.4.5. FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 Certificate Validation

### C.3.4.6. FIA\_X509\_EXT.1X.509 Certificate Validation

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1/Rev** The application shall [*selection: invoke platform-provided functionality, implement functionality*] to validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a minimum path length of three certificates.
- The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
- The application shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
- ECC certificates shall conform to RFC 5480, section 2.1.1.
- The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [*selection:*
  - *the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960,*
  - *a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3,*
  - *a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5,*
  - *an OCSP TLS Status Request Extension (i.e., OCSP stapling) as specified in RFC 6066*
  - *no revocation method* ]
- The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
  - Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

### C.3.4.7. FIA\_X509\_EXT.2X.509 Certificate Validation

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Authentication

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [*selection: HTTPS, SSH, TLS, DTLS*], and [*selection: code signing for system software updates, code signing for integrity verification, [assignment: other uses], no additional uses*].

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2** When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [*selection: allow the Administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate in these cases, accept the certificate, not accept the certificate*].

## C.4. Security Management (FMT)

### C.4.1. Default Configuration (FMT\_CFG\_EXT)

#### C.4.1.1. Family Behaviour

Components in this family address requirements for secure default configuration. This is a new family defined for the FMT class.

#### C.4.1.2. Component levelling



Figure 12. Component levelling

FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1 identifies whether the TOE has default credentials and if so the default credentials can be changed.

#### C.4.1.3. Management: FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

##### Audit: FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1

##### *Changing of default credentials*

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. No audit necessary

#### C.4.1.4. FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1 Default Configuration

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No other components

**FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1.1** Any default credentials supported by the TSF shall be changed [*selection: during installation, before application is operational*].

**FMT\_CFG\_EXT.1.2** The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect it and its data from unauthorized access.

## C.5. Protection of the TSF (FPT)

### C.5.1. Anti-Exploitation Capabilities (FPT\_AEX\_EXT)

#### C.5.1.1. Family Behaviour

Components in this family address requirements to ensure the TOE is not susceptible to commonly used exploitation methods. Additionally, it ensures that the application doesn't circumvent security functionality provided by the platform. This is a new family defined for the FPT class.

#### C.5.1.2. Component levelling




Figure 13. Component levelling

FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1 ensures the TOE is not susceptible to commonly used exploitation methods and that it doesn't circumvent security functionality provided by the platform.

#### C.5.1.3. Management: FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FPT:

- a. There are no management activities foreseen

#### C.5.1.4. Audit: FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. No audit necessary

#### C.5.1.5. FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No other components

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.1** The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [*assignment: list of explicit exceptions*].

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.2** The application shall [*selection:*

- *not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions,*
- *allocate memory regions with write and execute permissions for only [assignment: list of functions performing just-in-time compilation].*

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.3** The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor except for [*selection: [assignment: list of explicit exceptions], no exceptions*].

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.4** The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.

**FPT\_AEX\_EXT.1.5** The application shall be compiled with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.

## **C.5.2. Use of Supported Services and APIs (FPT\_API\_EXT)**

### **C.5.2.1. Family Behaviour**

Components in this family address requirements to ensure the TOE uses platform services and APIs that are supported by the platform vendor.

### **C.5.2.2. Component levelling**



*Figure 14. Component levelling*

FPT\_API\_EXT.2 ensures the TOE is not dependent on services and APIs that are not supported by the platform vendor and would be difficult to maintain as the underlying platform is upgraded/changed.

### **C.5.2.3. Management: FPT\_API\_EXT.2**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FPT:

- a. There are no management activities foreseen

### **C.5.2.4. Audit: FPT\_API\_EXT.2**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. No audit necessary

### C.5.2.5. FPT\_API\_EXT.2 Use of Supported Services and APIs

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No other components

**FPT\_API\_EXT.2.1** The application [*selection: shall use platform-provided libraries for parsing* [*assignment: list of formats parsed that are included in the IANA MIME media types*], does not perform parsing].

## C.5.3. Integrity for Installation and Update (FPT\_TUD\_EXT)

### C.5.3.1. Family Behaviour

Components in this family address the requirements for updating the TOE software.

### C.5.3.2. Component levelling



Figure 15. Component levelling

FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 ensures that there are tools available to view the version of the TOE and update the TOE either using the TOE itself or the platform.

### C.5.3.3. Management: FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FPT:

- a. Ability to update the TOE and to verify the updates using the digital signature capability

### C.5.3.4. Audit: FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. Initiation of the update process.
- b. Any failure to verify the integrity of the update

### C.5.3.5. FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Integrity of Installation and Upgrade

#### C.5.3.5.1. FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Integrity of Installation and Upgrade

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No other components

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*selection: provide the ability, leverage the platform*] to report the current version of the application software.

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2** The application installation package and its updates shall be digitally signed such that the [*selection: TOE, platform*] can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.

## **C.5.4. Data in Transit (FTP\_DIT\_EXT)**

### **C.5.4.1. Family Behaviour**

Components in this family address requirements to ensure the TOE either doesn't transmit data or if it does transmit sensitive data such data is transmitted in a secure tunnel.

### **C.5.4.2. Component levelling**



*Figure 16. Component levelling*

FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 ensures that if the TOE transmits sensitive data it is done so inside of a secure tunnel protected by HTTPs, TLS, DTLS or SSH.

### **C.5.4.3. Management: FPT\_API\_EXT.2**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FPT:

- a. There are no management activities foreseen

### **C.5.4.4. Audit: FPT\_API\_EXT.2**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a. No audit necessary

## **C.6. Trust Path/Channel (FTP)**

### **C.6.1. FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 Data in Transit**

#### **C.6.1.1. FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 Data in Transit**

Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No other components

**FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1.1** The application shall [*selection:*

- *not transmit any data,*



- *encrypt all transmitted [selection: sensitive data, data] with [selection: HTTPS as as specified in FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1, TLS as specified in the [TLS Package], DTLS as specified in [TLS Package], SSH as specified in [SSH Package]],*
- *invoke platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted [selection: sensitive data, data] with [selection: HTTPS as as specified in FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1, TLS as specified in the [TLS Package], DTLS as specified in [TLS Package], SSH as specified in [SSH Package]]]*

between itself and another trusted IT product.

## Appendix D: Entropy Documentation and Assessment

This appendix describes the required supplementary information for each entropy source used by the TOE.

The documentation of the entropy source(s) should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the entropy source and why it can be relied upon to provide sufficient entropy. This documentation should include multiple detailed sections: design description, entropy justification, operating conditions, and health testing. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS.

### D.1. Design Description

Documentation shall include the design of each entropy source as a whole, including the interaction of all entropy source components. Any information that can be shared regarding the design should also be included for any third-party entropy sources that are included in the product.

The documentation will describe the operation of the entropy source to include how entropy is produced, and how unprocessed (raw) data can be obtained from within the entropy source for testing purposes. The documentation should walk through the entropy source design indicating where the entropy comes from, where the entropy output is passed next, any post-processing of the raw outputs (hash, XOR, etc.), if/where it is stored, and finally, how it is output from the entropy source. Any conditions placed on the process (e.g., blocking) should also be described in the entropy source design. Diagrams and examples are encouraged.

This design must also include a description of the content of the security boundary of the entropy source and a description of how the security boundary ensures that an adversary outside the boundary cannot affect the entropy rate.

If implemented, the design description shall include a description of how third-party applications can add entropy to the RBG. A description of any RBG state saving between power-off and power-on shall be included.

### D.2. Entropy Justification

There should be a technical argument for where the unpredictability in the source comes from and

why there is confidence in the entropy source delivering sufficient entropy for the uses made of the RBG output (by this particular TOE). This argument will include a description of the expected min-entropy rate (i.e. the minimum entropy (in bits) per bit or byte of source data) and explain that sufficient entropy is going into the TOE randomizer seeding process. This discussion will be part of a justification for why the entropy source can be relied upon to produce bits with entropy.

The amount of information necessary to justify the expected min-entropy rate depends on the type of entropy source included in the product.

For developer-provided entropy sources, in order to justify the min-entropy rate, it is expected that a large number of raw source bits will be collected, statistical tests will be performed, and the min-entropy rate determined from the statistical tests. While no particular statistical tests are required at this time, it is expected that some testing is necessary in order to determine the amount of min-entropy in each output.

For third-party provided entropy sources, in which the TOE vendor has limited access to the design and raw entropy data of the source, the documentation will indicate an estimate of the amount of min-entropy obtained from this third-party source. It is acceptable for the vendor to “assume” an amount of min-entropy, however, this assumption must be clearly stated in the documentation provided. In particular, the min-entropy estimate must be specified and the assumption included in the ST.

Regardless of the type of entropy source, the justification will also include how the DRBG is initialized with the entropy stated in the ST, for example by verifying that the min-entropy rate is multiplied by the amount of source data used to seed the DRBG or that the rate of entropy expected based on the amount of source data is explicitly stated and compared to the statistical rate. If the amount of source data used to seed the DRBG is not clear or the calculated rate is not explicitly related to the seed, the documentation will not be considered complete.

The entropy justification shall not include any data added from any third-party application or from any state saving between restarts.

### **D.3. Operating Conditions**

The entropy rate may be affected by conditions outside the control of the entropy source itself. For example, voltage, frequency, temperature, and elapsed time after power-on are just a few of the factors that may affect the operation of the entropy source. As such, documentation will also include the range of operating conditions under which the entropy source is expected to generate random data. Similarly, documentation shall describe the conditions under which the entropy source is no longer guaranteed to provide sufficient entropy. Methods used to detect failure or degradation of the source shall be included.

### **D.4. Health Testing**

More specifically, all entropy source health tests and their rationale will be documented. This will include a description of the health tests, the rate and conditions under which each health test is performed (e.g., at start up, continuously, or on-demand), the expected results for each health test, TOE behaviour upon entropy source failure, and rationale indicating why each test is believed to be

appropriate for detecting one or more failures in the entropy source.

# Appendix E: Application Software

## Equivalency Guidelines

The documentation of the product's encryption key management should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the product's key management and how it meets the requirements to ensure the keys are adequately protected. This documentation should include an essay and diagram(s). This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS - it can be submitted as a separate document and marked as developer proprietary.

### E.1. Introduction

The purpose of equivalence in cPP-based evaluations is to find a balance between evaluation rigor and commercial practicability—to ensure that evaluations meet customer expectations while recognizing that there is little to be gained from requiring that every variation in a product or platform be fully tested. If a product is found to be compliant with a cPP on one platform, then all equivalent products on equivalent platforms are also considered to be compliant with the cPP.

A Vendor can make a claim of equivalence if the Vendor believes that a particular instance of their Product implements cPP-specified security functionality in a way equivalent to the implementation of the same functionality on another instance of their Product on which the functionality was tested. The Product instances can differ in version number or feature level (model), or the instances may run on different platforms. Equivalency can be used to reduce the testing required across claimed evaluated configurations. It can also be used during Assurance Continuity to reduce testing needed to add more evaluated configurations to a certification.

These equivalency guidelines do not replace Assurance Continuity requirements or per scheme equivalency guidelines. Nor may equivalency be used to leverage evaluations with expired certifications.

These Equivalency Guidelines represent a shift from complete testing of all product instances to more of a risk-based approach. Rather than require that every combination of product and platform be tested, these guidelines support an approach that recognizes that products are being used in a variety of environments—and often in cloud environments over where the vendor (and sometimes the customer) have little or no control over the underlying hardware. Developers should be responsible for the security functionality of their applications on the platforms they are developed for—whether that is an operating system, a virtual machine, or a software-based execution environment such as a container. But those platforms may themselves run within other environments—virtual machines or operating systems—that completely abstract away the underlying hardware from the application. The developer should not be held accountable for security functionality that is implemented by platform layers that are abstracted away. The implication is that not all security functionality will necessarily be tested for all platform layers down to the hardware for all evaluated configurations—especially for applications developed for software-based execution environments such as containers. For these cases, the balancing of evaluation rigor and commercial practicability tips in favor of practicability.

Equivalency has two aspects:

- **Product Equivalence:** Products may be considered equivalent if there are no differences between Product Models and Product Versions with respect to cPP-specified security functionality.
- **Platform Equivalence:** Platforms may be considered equivalent if there are no significant differences in the services they provide to the Product—or in the way the platforms provide those services—with respect to cPP-specified security functionality.

The equivalency determination is made in accordance with these guidelines by the Certifier and Scheme using information provided by the Evaluator/Vendor.

## E.2. Approach to Equivalency Analysis

There are two scenarios for performing equivalency analysis. One is when a product has been certified and the vendor wants to show that a later product should be considered certified due to equivalence with the earlier product. The other is when multiple product variants are going through evaluation together and the vendor would like to reduce the amount of testing that must be done. The basic rules for determining equivalence are the same in both cases. But there is one additional consideration that applies to equivalence with previously certified products. That is, the product with which equivalence is being claimed must have a valid certification in accordance with scheme rules and the Assurance Continuity process must be followed. If a product's certification has expired, then equivalence cannot be claimed with that product.

When performing equivalency analysis, the Evaluator/Vendor should first use the factors and guidelines for Product Model equivalence to determine the set of Product Models to be evaluated. In general, Product Models that do not differ in cPP-specified security functionality are considered equivalent for purposes of evaluation against the cPP.

If multiple revision levels of Product Models are to be evaluated—or to determine whether a revision of an evaluated product needs re-evaluation—the Evaluator/Vendor and Certifier should use the factors and guidelines for Product Version equivalence to analyze whether Product Versions are equivalent.

Having determined the set of Product Models and Versions to be evaluated, the next step is to determine the set of Platforms that the Products must be tested on.

Each non-equivalent Product for which compliance is claimed must be fully tested on each non-equivalent platform for which compliance is claimed. For non-equivalent Products on equivalent platforms, only the differences that affect cPP-specified security functionality must be tested for each product.

**“Differences in PP-Specified Security Functionality” Defined** If cPP-specified security functionality is implemented by the TOE, then differences in the actual implementation between versions or product models break equivalence for that feature. Likewise, if the TOE implements the functionality in one version or model and the functionality is implemented by the platform in another version or model, then equivalence is broken. If the functionality is implemented by the platform in multiple models or versions on equivalent platforms, then the functionality is considered different if the product invokes the platform differently to perform the function.

## E.3. Specific Guidance for Determining Product Model Equivalence

Product Model equivalence attempts to determine whether different feature levels of the same product across a product line are equivalent for purposes of cPP testing. For example, if a product has a “basic” edition and an “enterprise” edition, is it necessary to test both models? Or does testing one model provide sufficient assurance that both models are compliant?

Product models are considered equivalent if there are no differences that affect PP-specified security functionality—as indicated in Table 4.

Table 3. Determining Product Model Equivalence

Factor	Same/Different	Guidance
PP-Specified Functionality	Same	If the differences between Models affect only non-cPP-specified functionality, then the Models are equivalent.
	Different	If cPP-specified security functionality is affected by the differences between Models, then the Models are not equivalent and must be tested separately. It is necessary only to test the functionality affected by the software differences. If only differences are tested, then the differences must be enumerated, and for each difference the Vendor must provide an explanation of why each difference does or does not affect cPP-specified functionality. If the Product Models are separately tested fully, then there is no need to document the differences.

## E.4. Specific Guidance for Determining Product Version Equivalence

In cases of version equivalence, differences are expressed in terms of changes implemented in revisions of an evaluated Product. In general, versions are equivalent if the changes have no effect on any security-relevant claims about the TOE or assurance evidence. Non-security-relevant changes to TOE functionality or the addition of non-security-relevant functionality does not affect equivalence.

Table 4. Factors for Determining Product Version Equivalence

Factor	Same/Different	Guidance
Product Models	Different	Versions of different Product Models are not equivalent unless the Models are equivalent as defined in previous section.

Factor	Same/Different	Guidance
PP-Specified Functionality	Same	If the differences affect only non-cPP-specified functionality, then the Versions are equivalent.
	Different	If cPP-specified security functionality is affected by the differences, then the Versions are not considered equivalent and must be tested separately. It is necessary only to test the functionality affected by the changes. If only the differences are tested, then for each difference the Vendor must provide an explanation of why the difference does or does not affect cPP-specified functionality. If the Product Versions are separately tested fully, then there is no need to document the differences.

## E.5. Specific Guidance for Determining Platform Equivalence

Platform equivalence is used to determine the platforms that equivalent versions of a Product must be tested on. Platform equivalence analysis done for one software application cannot be applied to another software application. Platform equivalence is not general—it is with respect to a particular application.

Product Equivalency analysis must already have been done and Products have been determined to be equivalent.

The platform can be hardware or virtual hardware, an operating system or similar entity, or a software execution environment such as a container. For purposes of determining equivalence for software applications, we address each type of platform separately. In general, platform equivalence is based on differences in the interfaces between the TOE and Platform that are relevant to the implementation of cPP-specified security functionality.

## E.6. Platform Equivalence—Hardware/Virtual Hardware Platforms

If an Application runs directly on hardware without an operating system—or directly on virtualized hardware without an operating system—then platform equivalence is based on processor architecture and instruction sets. In the case of virtualized hardware, it is the virtualized processor and architecture that are presented to the application that matters—not the physical hardware.

Platforms with different processor architectures and instruction sets are not equivalent. This is not likely to be an issue for equivalency analysis for applications since there is likely to be a different version of the application for different hardware environments. Equivalency analysis becomes important when comparing processors with the same architecture. Processors with the same

architecture that have instruction sets that are subsets or supersets of each other are not disqualified from being equivalent for purposes of an App evaluation. If the application takes the same code paths when executing cPP-specified security functionality on different processors of the same family, then the processors can be considered equivalent with respect to that application. For example, if an application follows one code path on platforms that support the AES-NI instruction and another on platforms that do not, then those two platforms are not equivalent with respect to that application functionality. But if the application follows the same code path whether or not the platform supports AES-NI, then the platforms are equivalent with respect to that functionality.

The platforms are equivalent with respect to the application if the platforms are equivalent with respect to all cPP-specified security functionality.

*Table 5. Factors for Determining Hardware/Virtual Hardware Platform Equivalence*

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Same/Different</b>	<b>Guidance</b>
Platform Architectures	Different	Platforms that present different processor architectures and instruction sets to the application are not equivalent.
PP-Specified Functionality	Same	For platforms with the same processor architecture, the platforms are equivalent with respect to the application if execution of all cPP-specified security functionality follows the same code path on both platforms.

## **E.7. Platform Equivalence—OS Platforms**

For traditional applications that are built for and run on operating systems, platform equivalence is determined by the interfaces between the application and the operating system that are relevant to cPP-specified security functionality. Generally, these are the processor interface, device interfaces, and OS APIs. The following factors applied in order:

*Table 6. Factors for Determining OS/VS Platform Equivalence*

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Same/Different</b>	<b>Guidance</b>
Platform Architectures	Different	Platforms that present different processor architectures and instruction sets to the application are not equivalent.
Platform Vendors	Different	Platforms from different vendors are not equivalent.
Platform Versions	Different	Platforms from the same vendor with different major version numbers are not equivalent.
Platform Interfaces	Different	Platforms from the same vendor and major version are not equivalent if there are differences in device interfaces and OS APIs that are relevant to the way the platform provides cPP-specified security functionality to the application.

Factor	Same/Different	Guidance
Platform Interfaces	Same	Platforms from the same vendor and major version are equivalent if there are no differences in device interfaces and OS APIs that are relevant to the way the platform provides cPP-specified security functionality to the application, or if the Platform does not provide such functionality to the application.

## E.8. Software-based Execution Environment Platform Equivalence

If an Application is built for and runs in a non-OS software-based execution environment, such as a Container or Java Runtime, then the below criteria must be used to determine platform equivalence. The key point is that the underlying hardware (virtual or physical) and OS is not relevant to platform equivalence. This allows applications to be tested and run on software-based execution environments on any hardware.

*Table 7. Factors for Software-based Execution Environment Platform Equivalence*

Factor	Same/Different	Guidance
Platform Type/Vendor	Different	Software-based execution environments that are substantially different or come from different vendors are not equivalent. For example, a java virtual machine is not the same as a container. A Docker container is not the same as a CoreOS container.
Platform Versions	Different	Execution environments that are otherwise equivalent are not equivalent if they have different major version numbers.
cPP-Specified Security Functionality	Same	All other things being equal, execution environments are equivalent if there is no significant difference in the interfaces through which the environments provide cPP-specified security functionality to applications.

## E.9. Level of Specificity for Tested Configurations and Claimed Equivalent Configurations

In order to make equivalency determinations, the vendor and evaluator must agree on the equivalency claims. They must then provide the scheme with sufficient information about the TOE instances and platforms that were evaluated, and the TOE instances and platforms that are claimed to be equivalent.

The ST must describe all configurations evaluated down to processor manufacturer, model number,



and microarchitecture version.

The information regarding claimed equivalent configurations depends on the platform that the application was developed for and runs on.

### E.9.1. Traditional Applications

For applications that run with an operating system as their immediate platform, the claimed configuration must describe the platform down to the specific operating system version. If the platform is a virtualization system, then the claimed configuration must describe the platform down to the specific virtualization system version. The Vendor must describe the differences in the TOE with respect to cPP-specified security functionality and how the TOE functions differently to leverage platform differences in the tested configuration versus the claimed equivalent configuration. Relevant platform differences could include instruction sets, device interfaces, and OS APIs invoked by the TOE to implement cPP-specified security

### E.9.2. Software Based Execution Environments

For applications that run in a software-based execution environment such as a Java virtual machine or a Container, then the claimed configuration must describe the platform down to the specific version of the software execution environment. The Vendor must describe the differences in the TOE with respect to cPP-specified security functionality and how the TOE functions differently to leverage platform differences in the tested configuration versus the claimed equivalent configuration.

## Appendix F: Rationales

### F.1. SFR Dependencies Analysis

The dependencies between SFRs implemented by the TOE are addressed as follows.

Table 8. SFR Dependencies Rationale for Mandatory SFRs

SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.1	None	
FCS_STO_EXT.1	None	
FDP_NET_EXT.1	None	
FMT_CFG_EXT.1	None	
FMT_SMF.1	None	
FPT_AEX_EXT.1	None	
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	None	
FTP_DIT_EXT.1	None	

Table 9. SFR Dependencies Rationale for Optional SFRs

SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FCS_CKM.1/Symmetric	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.2 is met  FCS_COP.1 is met  FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction isn't included since software applications rely on underlying platform for memory and storage management
FCS_API_EXT.2	None	

Table 10. SFR Dependencies Rationale for Selection-Based SFRs

SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.1	None	
FCS_CKM_EXT.1	None	
FCS_CKM.1/Asymmetric	[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1]  FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.2 is met  FCS_COP.1 is met  FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction isn't included since software applications rely on underlying platform for memory and storage management
FCS_CKM.2	[FDP_ITC.1, or FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1/Asymmetric ]  FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1/Asymmetric met  FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction isn't included since software applications rely on underlying platform for memory and storage management
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	[FDP_ITC.1, or FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1/Asymmetric ]	FCS_CKM.1/Asymmetric met
FCS_COP.1/SigGen		FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction isn't included since software applications rely on underlying platform for memory and storage management
FCS_COP.1/Hash		
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	FCS_CKM.4	
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	None	
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	FIA_X509_EXT.2	Met
FIA_X509_EXT.2	FIA_X509_EXT.1	Met

# Appendix G: Glossary

For the purpose of this cPP, the following terms and definitions given in *some specific references* apply. If the same terms and definitions are given in those references, terms and definitions that fit the context of this cPP take precedence.

## **Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)**

An anti-exploitation feature which loads memory mappings into unpredictable locations. ASLR makes it more difficult for an attacker to redirect control to code that they have introduced into the address space of an application process.

## **Application**

Software that runs on a platform and performs tasks on behalf of the user or owner of the platform, as well as its supporting documentation. The terms TOE and application are interchangeable in this document.

## **Component**

Component is a discreet executable. A software application can be composed of a single or multiple components.

## **Connection**

The SSH transport layer between a client and a server. Within a connection there can be multiple sessions.

## **Credential**

Data that establishes the identity of a user, e.g. a cryptographic key or password.

## **Operating System**

Software that manages hardware resources and provides services for applications.

## **Personally Identifiable Information (PII)**

Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any other personal information which is linked or linkable to an individual.

## **Platform**

The environment in which application software runs. The platform can be an operating system, an execution environment which runs atop an operating system, or some combination of these.

## **Rekey**

Where the connection renegotiates the shared secret and each session subsequently derives a new encryption key.

## Sensitive Data

Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or may be specific application data such as emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts. Sensitive data must minimally include PII, credentials, and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the application's TSS by the ST author.

## Session

A discrete stream of data within a connection.

# Appendix H: Acronyms

Table 11. Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	Application Programming Interface
ASLR	Address Space Layout Randomization
CMC	Certificate Management over CMS
CN	Common Names
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
DHE	Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
DTLS	Datagram Transport Layer Security
ECDHE	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EST	Enrollment over Secure Transport
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
HMAC	Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IANA	Internet Assigned Number Authority
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IP	Internet Protocol
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	IT Security Evaluation Facility

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
MIME	Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier
OS	Operating System
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PP	Protection Profile
RBG	Random Bit Generator
RFC	Request for Comment
RNG	Random Number Generator
SAN	Subject Alternative Name
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
S/MIME	Secure/Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions
SP	Special Publication
SSH	Secure Shell
TLS	Transport Layer Security
XOR	Exclusive Or